

EDITED BY LARS JENSEN,
JULIA SUÁREZ-KRABBE,
CHRISTIAN GROES
AND ZORAN LEE PECIC



POSTCOLONIAL EUROPE

COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS
AFTER THE EMPIRES

Postcolonial Europe

Postcolonial Europe

Comparative Reflections after the Empires

Edited by Lars Jensen, Julia Suárez-Krabbe,
Christian Groes and Zoran Lee Pecic

ROWMAN &
LITTLEFIELD

INTERNATIONAL

London • New York

Published by Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd
Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26–34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB
www.rowmaninternational.com

Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd. is an affiliate of Rowman & Littlefield
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, USA
With additional offices in Boulder, New York, Toronto (Canada), and Plymouth (UK)
www.rowman.com

Selection and editorial matter © 2018 Lars Jensen, Julia Suárez-Krabbe, Christian Groes
and Zoran Lee Pecic

Copyright in individual chapters is held by the respective chapter authors.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any
electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems,
without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote
passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: HB 978-1-7866-0304-3
PB 978-1-7866-0305-0

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Is Available

ISBN 978-1-78660-304-3 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-78660-306-7 (electronic)

™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Introduction	1
<i>Lars Jensen, Julia Suárez-Krabbe, Christian Groes and Zoran Lee Pecic</i>	
1 Uneven Whiteness: Images of Blackness and Whiteness in Contemporary (Postcolonial) Italy (2010–2012)	15
<i>Gaia Giuliani</i>	
2 Challenging the Domestic Colonial Archive: Notes on the Racialization of the Italian Mezzogiorno	29
<i>Carmine Conelli</i>	
3 <i>El Moro</i> – Discovering the Hidden Coloniality of the Contemporary Spanish/Catalan Society and Its Colonial Subjects	43
<i>Martin Lundsteen</i>	
4 The Coloniality of Power and the Disempowerment of the Roma	61
<i>Sabrina Marks and Miye Nadya Tom</i>	
5 Claiming Greyness: Dutch Coloniality against Polarization	75
<i>Patricia Schor and Egbert Alejandro Martina</i>	
6 How to Draw a Haunted Nation: Colonial Ghosts and Spectres in Conceição Lima's Poems	91
<i>Inês Nascimento Rodrigues</i>	
7 Who Speaks the Postcolonial Community? Reflections on Language, Community and Imperial Nostalgia within the European Continent	103
<i>Elena Brugioni</i>	

8	‘Translation as a Place of Loss’: A Study of the Translations of Fanon’s <i>Peau noire, masques blancs</i> (1952) and Their Role in Anglophone Postcolonial Studies <i>Sarah Scales</i>	115
9	Between Imperial Anxieties and Postcolonial Discourses <i>Alice Brown</i>	129
10	Possible Greenland – Impossible Denmark? <i>Rigsfællesskabet</i> and the Postcolony <i>Lars Jensen</i>	147
11	From Mobutu to Molenbeek: Belgium and Postcolonialism <i>Sarah Arens</i>	163
12	Comparative Posts Going Political – the Postcolonial Backlash in Poland <i>Dorota Kołodziejczyk</i>	177
13	Between East and West: Queerness in Zhang Yuan’s <i>East Palace, West Palace</i> <i>Zoran Lee Pecic</i>	193
	Postcolonial Europe: Afterword <i>Gurminder K. Bhambra</i>	215
	References	221
	Index	249
	About the Authors	259

Introduction

Lars Jensen, Julia Suárez-Krabbe,
Christian Groes and Zoran Lee Pecic

Postcolonial Europe is at once a nebulous label fraught with contradictions and an exciting, rapidly growing research field spawning articles and books – even research centres – across Europe and beyond. Postcolonial Europe in its narrower definition refers more specifically to a number of European nations, among them Portugal, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, as *also* imperial states whose structures rest on the exploitation of colonial territories in the non-European world (for post-colonial approaches referring to this cluster of nations, see Almeida 2004; Peralta 2011; Perraudin and Zimmerer 2010; Schilling 2014; Majumdar 2007; Forsdick and Murphy 2003; Lombardi-Diop and Romeo 2012; Giuliani and Lombardi-Diop 2013; Castryck 2010; Boehmer and de Mul 2012b; Wekker 2016; Jimenez 2017). Yet postcolonial Europe in this historical framing can also be expanded to refer to European countries on the periphery of this exploitative relationship, which nonetheless benefitted from it – Scotland as part of Britain and Norway as part of the dual kingdom of Denmark-Norway. Indeed even countries that either had no colonies or limited overseas possessions for a shorter period of time benefitted from the power position Europe held for centuries where enormous profits were siphoned off from the colonial world and injected into Europe.¹

Research on postcolonial Europe has also concerned itself with the issue of the legacy of European domination, both in the former colonies and in the ‘ex-metropolitan’ culture.² It traces contemporary forms of racism back to the colonial roots and demonstrates the inadequacy of addressing racism as a recalcitrant ‘stain’ on the national imaginary. Racism is actively reproduced, reformulated and taking on new forms to continue operating as a platform from which it can be directed against its targets, including racialized minorities produced as ‘resistant’ to integration. The dynamics of racism fly in the

face of an inflated cosmopolitan idea of living in a globalizing world working progressively to hem in ‘surviving’ pockets of racism. The inherent progressive reading that is the premise of this conceptualization invites the question as to how to read the manifestation of political figures and actors such as Trump, Farrage, Le Pen, Støjberg, Wilders, Lega Nord and Pegida: are they really only to be understood as particularly recalcitrant pockets of resistance or as the dying gasps of an increasingly redundant white order? More disturbingly, their rise invites the question as to what is so inherently progressive about our own contemporary times.

Research on postcolonial Europe also confronts European scholars’ own status as possibly complicit witnesses to the incredibly perilous journeys by already-threatened people across the Mediterranean or through the Turkish route – even as we perhaps participate in protest demonstrations, and teach and write about the historical ties between past and present. This research field also displays the need to revisit the inadequacy of our responses to rapidly evolving draconian laws aimed at people fleeing war zones and futureless life situations. Just as we need to confront the orchestrated campaigns that seek to protect constructed ‘heirloom’ of the nation’s sacred narratives of innocence – from Zwarte Piet in the Netherlands, over racist images and narratives in Tintin and Pippi Longstocking, to racist nursery rhymes of the ‘Ten Little Niggers’ variety. These are not only part of a national narrative; through their accumulation, they become a pan-European narrative of innocent selfhood at the expense of the racialized other which is simultaneously historical and contemporary. Fanon’s opening phrase to ‘The Fact of Blackness’ in *Black Skins, White Masks* ‘Look, a Negro!’ is not an outdated critique of the ‘ugly’ European of 1952. It is a phrase that continues to be used; the N-word continues to be defended on grounds of its now ‘merely descriptive’ usage stripped from its colonial ‘tainted’ legacy even when it becomes a reflection of not only its continuity but also its resurgence. We need to remind ourselves that draconian laws targeting racialized others have already been put in place *before* the populist right have taken over the reins of government in the vast majority of European countries, albeit with notable exceptions such as Poland and Hungary. Hence, one of the paradoxes of the current political European landscape is the eagerness with which old political establishment parties embrace anti-refugee and anti-migration legislation with reference to the threat of a populist right that in government will undermine the ‘humanity’ of the established political order.

This volume on postcolonial Europe explores how the postcolonial predicament, or coloniality of power (Quijano 2000), manifests itself in various national, regional or transnational contexts. These contexts invite the reflection and analysis of a series of themes central to current global configurations of power. The themes include, first, different European nations’ imperial

exceptionalism that is the representation of their own colonial and imperial endeavour as exceptionally benevolent as a strategy of denial and simultaneous legitimization of continued racial exclusion at the national and international level. Second, several contributions in the volume engage with how this exceptionalism is linked to the idea of postcolonial inclusion, for example, through mediatized and artistic images of colonialism and postcolonial migration. Third, the volume also engages questions pertaining to how colonial power relations have shaped the very ways in which we think the global and the local, not least in relation to development and international relations. Finally, by engaging the South as an epistemic and geopolitical site of knowledge production, the volume also brings forth alternative and thought-provoking perspectives on coloniality and the postcolonial, which are commonly marginalized in studies concerning Europe itself. As such, the volume is more concerned with legacy and resurrection than with challenging national (and European) historiography, though certainly efforts to ‘provincialise Europe’ need to be attended to and kept in mind while reading some of the contributions (Chakrabarty 2007 [2000]). We are also more interested in establishing ways of reading postcolonial Europe comparatively than we are with establishing postcolonial Europe as an accumulation of cases. How this works in practice is part of what we will establish later in the Introduction. Here we want to turn our attention to how we may begin to read postcolonial Europe continentally, given our concerns with the colonial as legacy. To focus overtly on the contemporary as a way of mapping out postcolonial Europe through a number of engagements with themes that are located within the nation but with clear repercussions for wider European concerns provides both challenges and opportunities. Opportunities include a wider, even if clearly not a pan-European, scope that undermines the nation narration characteristically premised on postcolonial exceptionalism. Instead, it invites reflection on how, in spite of clearly very different historical experiences, narratives of self- and otherhood in Europe share so many characteristics (see Bhambra 2009; Poddar, Patke and Jensen 2008; Suárez-Krabbe 2014).

Challenges, on the other hand, lie less in the importance of establishing the national ‘traits’ in nation narration and more in identifying the parameters of the rapidly shifting terrain that postcolonial Europe also is. We began to plan this volume in 2013, when Europe was in the depth of a financial crisis that threatened to tear apart the European Union from the inside and from the outside. The repercussions of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 had not been settled by the massive bailout of speculative capitalism at the expense of the taxpayer and the impoverished. Instead it produced a Europe-in-crisis narrative that continues to hold sway. Yet the crisis was radically reformulated as the war in Syria and other destabilizations across the Middle East, and in North, East, West and Central Africa, produced an exodus of people

seeking safety and a future outside their countries ravaged by conflict caused by domestic tensions, outside interference, climate change and destructive neoliberal reforms accompanied by entrenched corruption. Today, in early 2017, as the economic fallout from the Global Financial Crisis continues, it has already been historicized in mainstream European discourse in favour of the new crisis: European ‘integration’ threatened by the porousness of its external and internal borders and an acute lack of leadership and solidarity across the nation-states that make up the European Union (EU). Stefan Jonsson and Julia Willén directly link the two crises – austerity undermining the welfare society and overt racism – based on the perceived threat of migrants and refugees to European selfhood. They observe that

austerity turns economic concerns into moral and cultural ones . . . remodels historical consciousness and conceptions of Europe’s colonial past; how it changes the relationships between classes, ethnic minorities, majorities and migrants; and how all this affects the very definition and self-image of contemporary *European Societies*. (Jonsson and Willén 2017: 1)

They emphasize the crisis is not merely an exercise in slowing an inevitably progressive narrative of the inclusive nation that is the customary defence of the clawing back of monolithic nationhood with reference to a multicultural society unfolding too rapidly for the ‘locals’ to keep pace with it. Instead they see it as a dramatic shift in conceptualizations of the current nation-state away from an earlier contested acceptance of the reality of the future multicultural reality of European societies:

Multiculturalism, postcolonial memories and minority discourses are being marginalised, and this at the very moment when it was reasonable to expect that they would be confirmed and inscribed as central concerns in any overview of European history and European society. (Jonsson and Willén 2017: 4)

INTERDISCIPLINARY RESPONSES TO POSTCOLONIAL EUROPE

Postcolonial Europe: Comparative Reflections after the Empires grew out of an interdisciplinary conference. Featuring scholars from a range of academic disciplines, the conference worked as an invitation to rethink European colonialism in light of the vanishing historical horizon of the European empires and the rise of new forms of power formations. But it was also a call to look beyond disciplinary approaches, predominantly in history and literature studies, and to accept the legacy of colonial history and the production and reproduction of racialized framings require a far broader approach to capture

such racialized imaginings in their many different forms of representation. The present volume is a manifestation of this important work of questioning and challenging existing disciplinary approaches, as well as establishing a grounded interdisciplinary approach. There of course exist interdisciplinary fields of inquiry preoccupied with European colonialism and its legacy. Postcolonial studies, decolonial studies, whiteness studies, gender studies and critical race studies have emerged as parallel fields broadly concerned with the deconstruction of naturalized discourses that have and continue to place Europe 'always on top' (Said 2003). Each field has sought to develop its own epistemology and its own methodology. While some influential scholars are central reference points across several fields, a great deal of scepticism about the other fields has also informed the attitudes of many scholars. Rather than assuming disciplinary rivalry to be the only explanation for this unease, we accept that there are often solid reasons for these reservations.

Within the spectrum of postcolonial and decolonial feminism, discussions have evolved around critiques of gender formations founded in Western epistemologies or inherited capitalist-racist-patriarchal structures of domination (Mohanty 2003; Lugones 2003; Oyěwùmí 2010). Critical race studies and whiteness studies have examined the influence of imperialism and colonialism on national identities in the European Nordic countries showing how contemporary discourses are shaped by tropes, practices and ideologies of colonialism (Loftsdóttir and Jensen 2012). Our volume has a pan-European focus that allows for a broader perspective on the place of postcolonial Europe in a globalized world. In the past decade or so a range of scholars have rethought the place of postcolonial Europe vis-à-vis former colonies through decolonial studies that have often been based on a conceptualization of or rewriting of epistemologies from the South (Mbembe 2001; Mignolo 2011a; Spivak 1999; Suárez-Krabbe 2016). The purpose of such studies has been to think from and with previously silenced margins, invisible 'others' and depreciated 'indigenous' knowledges and to denaturalize, deconstruct or dismantle European hegemonies, as well as 'provincializing' a Europe that can no longer be seen as the sole site of knowledge production or as having the monopoly of world views and critical thinking (see also Chakrabarty 2007 [2000]). Additionally, recent studies on migration from the Global South towards Europe have attempted to address the urgency of understanding such movements from a non-European point of view, privileging voices, journeys, dreams and experiences of migrants from parts of Africa, for example, instead of foregrounding nationalist interests in 'integration', social cohesion or border control, which more often presents themselves as brutal emblems of Fortress Europe (Cole and Groes 2016; Piot 2010). Although diverse, these fields have developed with an acute sense of importance of their rootedness, that is the specific historical, geopolitical, gendered, racialized and cultural

contexts from which they emerged. They all seek to bring their 'localised practices and knowledge' to a broader level in order to destabilize a distinct and pervasive normativity that has patrolled ways of addressing local and global relationships, historically as well as currently.

This book demonstrates through its diverse approaches to European colonialism and its legacy that postcolonial and decolonial studies as well as studies on whiteness, gender and race share a great deal in their desire to rethink the highly contested space of European colonialism and its legacy. Furthermore, the chapters in this volume show that the preferred approach of 'nation studies' is unable to capture the overlap between the different colonial and postcolonial experiences and legacies across Europe, as well as the idea of Europe as something which the postcolonial society beyond Europe has to struggle with. Starting with this awareness and drawing upon various methodologies and areas of study – literature, poetry, cinema, translation, historiography, sociology, anthropology, political economy – as well as vernacular postcolonial histories – Lusophone, Francophone, Scandinavian, Anglophone, German, Italoophone and Hispanic – the chapters in this volume look within and outside Europe as a contested space also defined by colonial underpinnings. The book cannot lay claim to covering all of Europe. It is, however, wide enough to open the space for dialogue concerning colonialism and its legacies. The focus on those parts of Europe that had an overseas empire enables the narration of a contemporary experience created by a, at a general level, shared history without losing sight of the need to flesh out the particularities of the various nation-defined imperial and colonial experiences.

The book engages with Europe in several ways: as a geographical space, as a geopolitical power and as a privileged epistemic site that historically has occluded others and continues to marginalize them. Indeed, even as the power base of European nations has clearly diminished and continues to shrink within the current neoliberal order of unrestrained capitalism, Europe not only represents an imperial legacy but also continues to be a commanding powerhouse with several economic epicentres such as London, Frankfurt (Berlin) and Paris. One question this raises is how geopolitically and epistemologically Europe is transformed within the current global order. In other words, how does coloniality and European self-perception established through its worldwide dominance continue to influence the ways in which Europe conceptualizes its position in the world? And how has coloniality shaped geopolitical differences inside the European geographical space, pitting (an affluent, because 'industrious') white Protestant northern Europe, against a (backward, because 'lazy') Catholic southern Europe, historically but also during the still unfolding financial crisis, not least in the derogatory labelling of 'them' as the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain)? How has

this derogatory financial discourse been transformed by the current focus on the migrants and refugees which nonetheless once again questions the real right to belong for countries unable to ‘defend’ their borders or ‘process’ the refugees and migrants, while northern and central Europe happily sit on the fence safeguarded by the buffer zone of the European South? And how does this connect to the problems faced by Roma populations inside Europe?

The task of engaging with Europe in these different dimensions is something which seldom takes place at a pan-European level, apart from through the bureaucratic instrumentality of the EU. At a national level, however, the idea of Europe works as a legitimizing discourse that projects itself out into the world as something to which nations beyond Europe can only aspire (e.g. as the cradle and incarnation of Enlightenment, human rights and democracy) but to which secular/Christian whites are seen to have special, sometimes privileged access. Yet where does this leave the non-Europeans, non-whites, Muslims (in and outside of Europe) and the ‘liminal’ Europeans, such as Roma populations, eastern and southern Europeans constructed as peripheral or even dubious Europeans seen from Europe’s current power centres?

A shared concern reflected in the contributions of this book is how colonialism continues to inform global relations. Even if the preferred terminology has changed from the historic dualism of the imperial centre/colonial periphery to more complex vocabularies of globalization, which is predominantly seen now in terms of the Global North and Global South (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Connell 2007; Bello 2013; Suárez-Krabbe 2016). Interestingly, the latter (as the most recent adaptation for speaking about globality) entails looking beyond North and South as geopolitical entities without ignoring the continuity of geopolitical power relations that have traditionally divided the world into North and South. Part of the Global North *is* in the south (e.g. Australia), while part of the Global South is located in the extreme north (Greenland). This banal geopolitical observation remains trivial only as long as we fail to take into consideration how routinely Australia’s position as part of the north (or equally paradoxically, the West) is referred to without questioning how this is to be understood. And this represents only the first step in addressing the underpinning logic of the tropes of Global North and South. There are plenty of examples of southern presence *within* the North (asylum seekers and Roma people in Europe) and of northern presence in the South (affluent ex-patriots and local elites. The top-ten list of the world’s most expensive cities for expats to live in includes N’Djamena, Kinshasa and Luanda (Karuri 2016).

Spanning academic disciplines as well as geographies, *Postcolonial Europe* represents a renewed approach to contemporary global problems pertaining to colonality of power. The methodology of this book can be described as a conscious and necessary displacement of well-established

paradigms. The process entailed in such a methodology consists of leaving aside the traditional Eurocentric categories of analysis and thinking and shifting the geography of reason in order to engage in other, previously excluded, perspectives concerning Europe and its relation to the world at large. The volume addresses specific historic and cultural relations between former metropolises and colonies. It analyses continuities and discontinuities from colonial times to the contemporary postcolonial world, also outside the conventional colony/empire axis. China, for instance, once semi-colonized and forced to give concessions to foreign powers, now finds itself at the better end of the contemporary financial downturn. Its colonial history, which positioned China as ‘lagging’ behind the West, can still be found not only in contemporary Chinese writing but also in its cinematic representations of non-normative desire, which is ‘caught’ between the ‘modern’ West and the ‘traditional’ East. Investigating these colonial remnants requires not only keeping a constant and vigilant eye on the processes of continued legacies of colonialism; if we are to unpack these developments we must be willing to traverse geographies as well as disciplinary boundaries.

INTERNAL COLONIALISM

The chapters in this volume engage in different ways with the entangled critical issues raised earlier. They also, however, deal with different academic disciplines and their own specific situatedness. Gaia Giuliani’s chapter, ‘Uneven Whiteness: Images of Blackness and Whiteness in Contemporary (Postcolonial) Italy (2010–2012)’, examines some recent examples of how sexuality and colour are inscribed into the public discourse in Italy. She sees this as evidence of a colonial archive that is continuously re-evoked in a contemporary Italy haunted by the arrival of postcolonial ‘others’. Giuliani’s chapter in this way addresses the volume’s overt concern with linking colonialism to forms of postcolonial re-enactments of colonialist practices. Her chapter also draws attention to how the historical phases, various European countries have gone through, continue to reproduce colonial forms of representations in the colonies and in the metropolitan centre. Here, the particularity of the Italian Fascist experience is an interesting example because it is one of the few places in Europe (along with Spain and Portugal) where Fascism defined the national culture for a considerable length of time. Yet rather than merely single out the uniqueness of the Italian Fascist experience, and its re-emergence as neo-Fascism in contemporary Italy, Giuliani’s chapter also through its focus on racialization demonstrates the shared anti-migration platform across Europe, between countries continuously struggling with the legacy of Fascism and ‘purely’ democratic countries and within the same

nation across time between a historical Fascist Italy and a contemporary democratic Italy.

Carmine Conelli's 'Challenging the Domestic Colonial Archive: Notes on the Racialization of the Italian Mezzogiorno' and Martin Lundsteen's '*El Moro* – Discovering the Hidden Coloniality of the Contemporary Spanish/Catalan Society and Its Colonial Subjects' chapters both provide important insights into what we might call 'domestic' racialization processes – the former in Italy, the latter in Catalonia, Spain. At the same time, and largely due to the historical differences between Italy and Spain, these two chapters are different in many ways. Conelli's chapter analyses the ways in which the southern Italians were part and parcel – through negation – of the elitist project of constructing the Italian national state. Lundsteen's contribution shows how the anti-Semitic practices (directed against Jews as well as Muslims) which emerged in the reconquest of Al-Andalus were also integral to the construction of Spanish and Catalan ideas of belonging. Both chapters point to the pervasiveness of the coloniality of power and delve into depth with how the global colonial projects are localized, and translated, in Spain and in Italy. The pervasiveness of these racist discourses today – in Italy in relation to its southern populations, in Catalonia in relation to the 'Moors' – is also an important reference point when seeking to understand to what extent southern European countries have become the ethnicized other of northern Europe (Grosfoguel 2004). Significantly, the racist grammar by which they are categorized as PIGS is employed domestically in relation to their own 'southern' other: the Mezzogiorno and the Muslim.

Sabrina Marks and Miye Nadya Tom deliver in their chapter, 'The Coloniality of Power and the Disempowerment of the Roma', a decolonial analysis of the intersections between anti-Roma legislation in Europe and North America. In doing so, they challenge the idea of Europe and modern narratives of homogeneity that continue to exclude Roma peoples. For instance, they show how the fall of Communism in central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s only intensified the processes of segregation, discrimination and social exclusion of Roma people. Simultaneously, the immigration of Roma people to Canada, whose laws regarding refugees and asylum seekers were historically liberal, was nearly halted as a consequence of Canada's changing political relationship with the 'reformed' European nations. Marks's and Tom's chapter illustrates the continuous efforts in the construction of the idea of Europe as homogenous that relies on the image of the 'Gypsy' as a nomad, a non-settler and ultimately a non-European.

In 'Claiming Greyness: Dutch Coloniality against Polarization', Patricia Schor and Egbert Alejandro Martina take a close look at Dare to Be Grey, an anti-polarization campaign organized by students at the Utrecht University in the Netherlands. By challenging the notion that anti-polarization

initiatives – themselves responses to prevailing Islamophobia and racism – which emphasize positivity, stability and togetherness, are inherently noble and virtuous, the authors argue that these social appeals normalize and in fact reinforce the discourse of whiteness and anti-blackness. By discouraging dissidence and the challenging of hegemonic whiteness and racism, these campaigns put forward the notion of ‘greyness’ – a happy medium between black and white – that serves as a peaceful racial conciliation, in effect disavowing political dissent through social coercion.

DECOLONIZING THE IMPERIAL CENTRE

Inês Nascimento Rodrigues’s chapter, ‘How to Draw a Haunted Nation: Colonial Ghosts and Spectres in Conceição Lima’s Poems’, addresses Europe as a privileged epistemic site and a place of different voices. The chapter investigates how Lima’s poetry – considering the violence of colonialism which is also a form of epistemological erasure of the colonial subjects – may be used to begin to recover the buried voices of the colonial subjects. By using the figure of the spectre, she shows how this recovery poses a challenge to the dominant national narratives both in the former (now postcolonial) colony as well as in the (then colonial) metropolitan centre. By resuscitating the figure of the contract worker, Lima contests the posited exceptionalism and benevolence of Portuguese colonial rule while staking a claim in the discourses surrounding the national homogeneity of São Tomé and Príncipe.

If Lima’s poetry questions the Santomean national and cultural identity, Elena Brugioni’s chapter, ‘Who Speaks the Postcolonial Community? Reflections on Language, Community and Imperial Nostalgia within the European Continent’, takes the postcolonial Lusophone-/Portuguese-speaking Africa *back* to its former imperial centre. She addresses how the various postcolonial experiences, typically formulated in terms of former metropolitan cultures – labelled as – ‘phones’ – continue in significant ways to privilege a hierarchical archive of cultural products in terms of their distance from a metropolitan centre. Instead of contending for the elimination of the term and the notion of the Lusophone, she argues for the need of a ‘decolonization’ of the sense of community and shared cultural identity in the former colonies. Much like Rodrigues’s chapter, Brugioni’s contribution argues for the use of language to promote the differences, the hybridities, indeed the polyphonies of the postcolonial Lusophone world – rather than constructed shared ‘essences’.

Sarah Scales’s chapter, ‘“Translation as a Place of Loss”: A Study of the Translations of Fanon’s *Peau noire, masques blancs* (1952) and Their Role in Anglophone Postcolonial Studies’, deals with another cultural-linguistic domain of the postcolonial polyphony. Scales, like Brugioni, emphasizes the

centrality of language to power relations, raising important questions regarding received ways of reading important decolonial/postcolonial thinkers. This is significant for the inevitable translation of the Lusophone world into an Anglophone-based mode of critique, which draws upon a history primarily of Anglophone experience relating to the history of the British Empire and Anglophone coloniality. Pursuing an argument echoing Said's discussion of 'traveling theory', Scales interrogates the relationship between power relations that exist also in reading practices overtly concerned with destabilizing prevailing forms of hierarchies. Her chapter asks provocative questions concerning the relationship between English as the *lingua franca* of postcolonial studies and how the translation of texts from other languages reinforces a unifying way of reading across the linguistically, historically and culturally vastly different postcolonial experience in all its European formations. This grants Scales's chapter a central place in relation to the volume's concerns with providing more representative ways of discussing the postcolonial and the various European empires and their legacies.

COLONIAL PASTS, POSTCOLONIAL CRISES

In 'Between Imperial Anxieties and Postcolonial Discourses', Alice Brown investigates the close relationship between European countries' national imaginaries as being constituted upon the negation of the other, who is produced as absent, idle and insignificant. Brown's chapter focuses on France and its colonial relationship with Africa, especially the Sahel region. Examining the French intervention in Mali and the hostage crisis in Algeria, the chapter proposes that colonial structures and practices continue to exist and that they are to a large extent mediated through hegemonic media discourse. In a sense, then, the construction of the French national identity is, like the Italian and Catalanian, intrinsically racist and colonial. Additionally, the colonial structures and practices are not limited to the European territories. Through her analysis concerning the Sahel region, Brown also shows the persistence of what Latin American scholars have called 'internal colonialism': the adoption of colonial positions and practices by selected elites in the formerly colonized territories, who continue thinking and acting in accordance with coloniality.

Brown's chapter, furthermore, opens the volume up to investigations which have been traditionally the terrain of political science and international relations studies. Brown's chapter joins Lars Jensen's 'Possible Greenland – Impossible Denmark? *Rigsfællesskabet* and the Postcolony' in its emphasis on the ways the current postcolonial condition of former colonies continues in important ways to be shaped by a global order that, on the one hand, dates back to colonialism itself, while, on the other hand, it manifests the constantly

redefined order that seeks to reshape itself in response to emerging postcolonial crises. More specifically, in relation to the Sahel and Greenland, we could argue that these are issues relating to securitization, both understood in a concrete way in terms of the history of postcolonial intervention in the Sahel region and in the wider sense of securing resources from ever more remote corners of the world. ‘Possible Greenland’ is a reading of Greenland emerging into the space which has been labelled ‘the scramble for the Arctic’, with a direct reference to the divisions of Africa into European-controlled territories, which not only saw the continent once more subjected to exploitation but also simultaneously laid the foundation for future crises – such as the current crisis in the Sahel.

Emphasizing the municipality of Molenbeek in Belgium, a place that has received considerable media attention due to its being home to the perpetrators who committed the recent violent attacks and bombings in Belgium, Sarah Arens’s chapter argues that the ethnic tensions in Molenbeek are closely connected to Belgian colonial project in sub-Saharan Africa. Arens notes that Molenbeek serves as a space and a place that intersects several transnational trajectories and diasporic routes. Focusing on Adil El Arbi’s and Bilall Falah’s 2015 film *Black* and Patrick François’s 2011 novel *La dernière larme du lac Kivu* (*The Last Tear of the Kivu Lake*), Arens argues that both the film and the novel intersect the local and the postcolonial by connecting narratives set in Molenbeek, Matonge and Waterloo to Belgium’s colonial project in sub-Saharan Africa. The young, black, male mobility challenges the political and cultural landscape that highlights reintroduction of physical borders as a response to transnationalism and global migration.

Dorota Kołodziejczyk’s contribution, ‘Comparative Posts Going Political – the Postcolonial Backlash in Poland’, addresses yet another facet of coloniality as it plays out in Poland. Initially, she traces the evolution of a region-based eastern and central European postcolonial discourse with a convoluted relationship to the Communist era, thus pointing to the heterogeneous field of postcolonial Europe. From there the chapter moves on to trace the roots and development of the ‘postcolonial backlash’ in the populist right-wing politics which adopts and reconfigures postcolonial terms like ‘decolonization’, ‘self-colonization’, the ‘subaltern’ and the ‘hegemon’ to defend policies and values closely connected to whiteness. These ‘ethical highjacks’ indeed serve the case of defending the purity of the nation, treating historical fact – including historically constituted power relations – as either inexistent or malleable at will, and framing their discourse and historical outlook from a methodological nationalism that is, at the same time, complicit with the capitalist logic of ownership.

The volume’s final chapter, Zoran Lee Pecic’s ‘Between East and West: Queerness in Zhang Yuan’s *East Palace, West Palace*’, emphasizes

postcolonialism as more than a way of reworking individual relations between the metropolitan centre and the colonial periphery. China was never formally colonized but was placed under consistent pressures through the perpetual threat of Western colonialist intervention. This produced a Chinese nationalism premised on the notion of its post-imperial, anti-colonial beginning but – similar to the ways colonial self-perceptions were adopted and contested in the colonial peripheries – China has historically as well as in recent history struggled with how to adapt its infatuations with Western modernity as an influential strand in twentieth-century Chinese thought. Pecic's chapter locates queerness as represented as a way of positioning China in a contested space in relation to the question of an emergent post-socialist nationalism and a process of situating China in a tenuous relationship with a Western-defined modernity. As such his chapter works as an important reminder of the dangers involved in overemphasizing the uniqueness of the postcolonial European experience and raises important questions concerning the definition of modernity and its geographical locus.

Thus, this volume also points beyond a mere focus on postcolonial Europe and its historical and contemporary repercussions. It also inspires the effort to decolonize the theoretical hegemony of European as well as Western thought and allows for a rewriting of epistemologies from other hemispheres, inside and outside of the site of control and coloniality of once colonial powers.

NOTES

1. There is in eastern Europe a different way of conceptualizing postcolonial Europe as more specifically related to the post-1989 aftermath of the Soviet Union and the process of dealing with the fallout from the communist era (for the debate on this, see Buchowski 2006; Cavanagh 2004; Fiut 2014; Imre 2005; Kołodziejczyk 2014; Owczarzak 2009; Thompson 2000 – and Kołodziejczyk in this volume).

2. Two recent examples is Joana Gorjão Henriques's book, *Racismo em Portugal* (2016), where she investigates the relationship between contemporary forms of racism in the former Portuguese African colonies and Gloria Wekker's book, *White Innocence*, that traces the persistence and even resurrection of the colonial archive in the Netherlands, where an entrenched 'white' Dutch racism coexists and is bolstered by a perceived innocence discourse rendering Dutch nationalism 'incapable' of racism.

Chapter 1

Uneven Whiteness: Images of Blackness and Whiteness in Contemporary (Postcolonial) Italy (2010–2012)

Gaia Giuliani

In 2009, the former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi stated that Italy is ‘multiracial, but not multicultural’. Focusing on a series of recent events and figures, the main aim of this chapter is to reveal the role that colour assignment plays within public discourse, re-creating racial stereotypes and white, heteronormative privilege in ‘multiracial’ Italy. These events and figures, in my opinion, point to a number of revealing signs pertaining to the European postcolonial framework in which Italy can be significantly included and understood. In particular, it takes into account the hetero-referential construction of Otherness and Whiteness that Italy shares with many European and largely Western national contexts. With hetero-referential construction of a racialized Other I mean – following French sociologist Colette Guillaumin’s theorization of hetero- and self-referential matrices of racism (1972) and US sociologist Ruth Frankenberg’s idea of unmarked whiteness (2001) – the process of racial construction that marks that which is not white, silently and invisibly builds hegemonic whiteness thereby naturalizing it. The events of 2010, I discuss here, unveil a significant set of similarities between Italy and a wider postcolonial European context in the ways they construct their Others. In the first instance, a ‘hyper-signification’ of black male bodies, which in my chapter is thematized by two cases: migrant workers employed in fields in southern Italy and the offences directed at the famous soccer player, Mario Balotelli. In the second instance, the vested orientalization and sexualization of the internal (the Southerner) and non-European brown Mediterranean women, in line with the European colonial tradition – as in the case of Berlusconi’s go-go girls. Finally, the typical association of brown heterosexual men with public danger and sexual assaults, especially after 9/11, which is exemplified here by the repeated targeting of brown men in the police investigations around the kidnapping of Yara Gambirasio.

While Italy's racializing dynamics is better understood within the European shared colonial and postcolonial hegemonic culture, as I will argue, the racialized and racializing constructions of Self and Other in Italy are specifically related to the symbolic construction of both its cultural and historical past. Constructions of the Self and its Others in Italy derive from an idea of national, cultural, historical and biological heritage that manufactures *italianità* (Italianness) as both white and Mediterranean, as essentially heterosexual, and virile. This self-representation, as I have argued elsewhere, is the result of a slow process of discursive construction that finds its own fundamentals in the Fascist idea of *uomo nuovo* (new man). According to this idea, Italians are animated by two complementary and apparently opposite/polar features inherited by the Romans' fine and military/governing arts, Renaissance's arts and sciences, Catholic moral and patriarchal social rules: passion and rationality. The peninsula's passion derives from Italy's geographical position: belonging to the Mediterranean basin, Italians participate in its 'blackness'. This 'vice' becomes a virtue insofar as it is mastered by rationality. In my view, the long-lasting Fascist narrative of the *uomo nuovo* makes Italians neither completely white nor completely black. Their racial liminality positions them in a very complicated space, in which they cannot neatly distinguish themselves from 'African backwardness and blackness'. This self-representation grounds the many shifts of Italy's internal colour lines that sometimes include, and sometimes exclude, those subjects traditionally positioned at the 'racial margins' of Italianness – like southerners. Berlusconi's 'multiracial but not multicultural' recalls, as he has made clear on a number of occasions, the Fascist idea elaborated by the endocrinologist Nicola Pende (1933), in line with the anthropologist Giuseppe Sergi, that Italians are the 'result of fruitful interbreeding' that occurred at the time of the Roman Empire and which is framed within the same (Roman that is supposedly white, Western and at once Mediterranean) culture. At the same time, Berlusconi's 'multiracial but not multicultural' refers to 'multicultural Italy' as an impossible outcome: many racial backgrounds can be merged with Italian stamina, but Italian culture needs to be crystallized in an ahistorical figure that includes whiteness and Mediterraneanness. In contrast to the 'surgical' idea of the nation in Nazi Germany, the idea of nation Italians have inherited from Fascism is, in my opinion, built on 'racial anthropophagy'. According to a 'surgical idea of a nation', as the Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito highlights (2004), Nazism conceived Germany as a body from which corrupted cells and organs needed to be extirpated. In the case of Fascist Italy 'anthropophagism', domestic differences are swallowed and digested. I borrow the image of anthropophagism from decolonial studies in Latin America and Indigenous studies in the Pacific and Australia, where it refers to the 'cannibalistic approach', respectively, of Spanish and British settler colonialisms

(see, for instance, Banivanua-Mar 2007, for the case of the Pacific and Jáuregui 2008, for Latin America). I use it here as a formula that stands for a ‘digesting’ model of racialized citizenship that transforms phenotypic differences into nutrients for the Italian body politic that assimilates them, neutralizing both their differential cultural purport and political subjectivities. According to the anthropophagic model of the Italian nation, a number of subjects can be ‘assimilated’ insofar as they are considered ‘absorbable’. Hence, their race is not pure, but a particular Italian ideal-typical phenotype that needs to be unconditionally preserved. Here, hetero-referential racism merges with self-referential racism where, as I have argued elsewhere, a precise and assertive cultural and racialized idea of Italianness is forged: whiteness is no longer hidden nor silenced nor constructed ‘by contrast’ through its others. It is instead reappraised as Mediterranean, Roman, (heterosexual) and virile.

While it may still be termed postcolonial, the methodology deployed here, in line with my broader research, can be described as *epistemological uprooting*: in ‘analyzing continuities and discontinuities from colonial times to the contemporary postcolonial world, also outside the conventional colony/empire axis’, my chapter’s methodology consists of making the concealed visible, against the historically rooted idea (appropriated by mass as well as institutional culture since the approval of the Italian Republican Constitution in 1948) that Italians have no race and no racial memories as both racializing and racialized subjects. In fact, as noted by a number of scholars (see in particular Njegosh in Njegosh and Scacchi 2012), one of the popularized excuses brought against accusations of racism by Italian hegemonic and mainstream culture’s agencies (TV, political elites, culture makers) is grounded in the idea that a people who have experienced racism cannot be racist. As many colonial and postcolonial examples sadly testify (most remarkably Rwanda, Israel, post-apartheid South Africa), the in-between position – between racialized and racializing – does not preserve any hegemonic culture and its public institutions from forging, reproducing and enacting racism. In particular, by using critical race and whiteness approaches, jointly with gender and sexuality theories, and postcolonial, decolonial and cultural studies, my chapter investigates constructions of whiteness in contemporary Italy. The texts explored are mostly visual for their power to influence and mould common sense and popular conceptions of racial, gendered and sexual normativity.

In January 2010, the start of the political season was marked by a riot in Rosarno, Calabria, initiated by a group of migrant seasonal agricultural workers (mostly men from sub-Saharan Africa) in response to inhumane working conditions, and the shooting of two of the group by a local. The same year, a new scandal regarding Berlusconi’s sexual habits broke out. This time, it involved Karima el Mahroug, an underage Moroccan girl more commonly known by her nickname ‘Ruby’. In August 2010, Mario Barwuah Balotelli,

a famous Italian soccer player of Ghanaian origins, started playing for the Italian national soccer team. Finally, in November, a young Lombardian girl, Yara Gambirasio, disappeared, possibly kidnapped. Police investigations focused first on a young Moroccan construction worker, then on a number of other 'brown' men as probable culprits.

My investigation is situated in the wake of a recent discussion between a number of Italian and foreign intellectuals coming from a variety of disciplines related to Cultural Studies, regarding the intersectional models of masculinity and femininity, and the cultural and/or racial constructions that populate and structure Italian popular and critical culture. This work is also informed by the examinations of the forms of heterosexual (and homosexual) male and female desire, as well as the interracial fantasies that dominate the collective imagination of Italian men and women (see Barbara De Vivo's and Dufour's 2012, and Colpani 2015). This chapter builds on and extends the analysis I conducted in the volume *Bianco e nero. Storia dell'identità razziale degli italiani* (*Black and White. History of the Racial Identity of Italians*), co-written with Cristina Lombardi-Diop (2013): its aim is to contribute to an interpretative framework that grasps the symbolic matter of which contemporary racial repertoires are made, unravelling the highly complicated intertwining of processes, loci, dynamics and texts of the daily naturalization of cultural, social, gender, race and religious difference in Italy. This interpretative framework will contribute to unpacking the various and multi-layered constructions of particular subjects as 'exploitable', 'subjugable' or 'disposable',¹ and which are part of the discourse legitimizing their actual exclusion, differential inclusion, exploitation and elimination (symbolic or physical) of the racialized Other at the level of society and institutions, both national and European. My chapter, in other words, participates in the larger multidisciplinary- and transdisciplinary and national/international discussion of the relationship between the mechanisms producing racist and sexist stereotypes and 'white heteropatriarchal hegemony' in Italy, and the Italian and European cultural backgrounds that are behind regulations regarding immigration, border control,² division of labour on a national,³ European Union and international levels.⁴

In the media coverage of the Rosarno events following the sub-Saharan African migrant workers' revolt, migrants are described as beastly and lacking decorum and self-control, and their protests were described as the assaults of cavemen. The *La Stampa* article of 8 January 2010, expresses the efforts to reappropriate 'Italians'' wounded pride, ready to defend whiteness, property, women, children and territory from the barbarian invaders who have been 'tolerated for too long':

An Italian city burns, Calabrians shoot at the immigrants injuring some, the foreigners destroy the town, attacking cars with women and children in them,

injuring Italians. And when dark sets in the looting continues, destruction, burning of cars, gutted fixtures, with nine Italians and six foreigners wounded, the people who are terrified and running away spur the officers against the foreigners, 'Shoot them!', women in tears, 'we've never seen anything like this even if here we see immigrant protests often'. (A.N. 2010a, author's translation)

In a video on the broadcasting website *Rainews24*, an implicit reference to the 'sexual' threat that the migrants represent for 'our women' (Antefatto 2010) appears when a Rosarnian facing the news cameras singles out the nudity of the black labourers as they showered out of sight behind piled up tyres as the (unbearable) event that provoked the shooting of the two migrants with an air rifle. The same woman refers to the immigrants as eventual kidnappers: 'Because a mother can't even go to the grocery store that she gets home having left her kid there and doesn't know if she'll find him. . . . We will not give in to this violence' (Antefatto 2010).⁵ The violence which she refers to is evidently both physical and symbolic and revolves around the barbarity injected by the black body of the migrant into the white body of the Rosarnian society.

The statement of the then Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni (Lega Nord [the Northern League]), ties together these fragments constructing the Rosarnians as Italians in danger ('in all these years illegal immigration has been tolerated without anyone doing anything effective which, on the one hand, has fuelled crime and on the other, has created extremely horrible conditions like the situation in Rosarno', author's translation), ending by expressing his solidarity with the Rosarnian citizens.⁶ Two days later (10 January),⁷ he restated the distinction between exasperated Italian citizens and the *'ndrangheta* (the Calabrian traditional organized crime), which he would further mention in his speech before the Senate (12 January 2010).⁸ The reference to 'fellow citizens in need of defence' in a situation in which tolerance had been too high (and exceeded the codes that define the racial balance of the Calabrian countryside) is confirmed by a group of Rosarnians, who, meeting with Minister Maroni and the local officials, request that they 'finally rid Rosarno of all immigrants' (*Vi racconto la rivolta degli immigrati a Rosarno* 2010, author's translation).

The image of a horde of black barbarians, violent, out of control, 'drunk'⁹ always on the edge of violating the 'codes of civil society' (the same paradoxical and racist codes that force them to sleep in sheet-metal huts and large cement tubes), is contrasted with, and constructed against, the image of the Calabrian-as-Italian-in-danger, the honest southern Italian whom Maroni's words bleach and raise to the status of a 'fellow citizen'. Against Maroni's very ideological background, which considers the South of Italy as 'different (that is inferior) socially, culturally, politically', and which is in line with a North versus South conception of the nation that has been articulated and

publicly stated by intellectuals, scientists and politicians since the unification (1861). The idea of southerners being ‘culturally’ – and ‘biologically’ – inferior and belonging to Hamitic and Semitic kinships was advocated by important scientists, most notably, the internationally known criminal anthropologist Cesare Lombroso and his follower, anthropologist Alfredo Niceforo, author of *L'Italia barbara contemporanea* (1898). This discourse was popularized through a number of cultural initiatives and social policies by the state and its elites throughout the Liberal Age (1861–1922) and Fascism (1922–1945) and strongly institutionalized in the first decades of the Republic. While it constitutes the xenophobic background of Lega Nord’s federalist ideological fundaments since its early foundation (1983), it is largely shared especially in northern Italy’s popular culture. But in the Rosarno events, the narrative of ‘inferior’ (corrupted, unreliable, lazy, backward) southerners is no longer serviceable: both Minister Maroni’s role as a representative of the state’s regulating power over highly conflicting situations involving Italian citizens and the institutional discourse legitimizing the repression of the migrants’ revolt in Rosarno as an act protecting Italian citizens need Calabrians and southerners to become (at least temporarily) white.

In the Rosarno episode, where the colour line is written on documented and undocumented migrant bodies, Calabrians are thus fully included within the Italian imagined community. Yet in the media coverage of the disappearance and murder of the young Yara Gambirasio in Lombardy, Calabrians are returned to a racialized criminal status. Following Cesare Lombroso’s positivist frenologist theory, Calabrians are depicted as possible suspects (by their nature) in the disappearance of this teenager in the province of Lombardy, after first one and then another Moroccan, and then a Romanian were identified and dismissed as possible culprits. Here, where the colour line is inscribed on the body of a white northern Italian teenager, the Calabrian is returned to blackness.

The contrast with Ruby’s case is quite evident for a number of reasons, which should be analysed through an intersectional perspective that takes into consideration the following factors: the class dynamics, as well as the social and cultural capital, that characterizes Ruby’s biography in contrast with the condition of ‘Rosarnian migrants’; gender that plays a fundamental role in positioning the two figures differently in the Italian imagination; the numbers that is to say her individual story and presence versus the multitude of black fruit-pickers in ‘besieged’ Rosarno; the places where the two events take place – the rich North of the Berlusconi empire versus the deepest South of Calabria; the people involved – the richest, most powerful, ‘bright white’ men of the political and financial establishments versus the state-abandoned, brown southerner, mafia-sustained citrus fruit growers and their families; the heterosexual-centric redefinition of non-white bodies and finally the very

different stereotypes of the ‘black African’ versus the (not-so-different or almost-like-us) ‘Arab woman’.

As the Italian literary scholar Riccardo Bonavita (2010) and historian Barbara Spadaro (2013) remind us, the body of the Arab woman once belonged relationally to the space of proximity. Although the Arab woman was obviously rendered inferior and loaded with bestial symbology and stereotypes, we can find this ‘like-us’ image in Fascist era colonial novels as well as memoirs and photographs of the period. This proximity is erased with the establishment of the colonial laws in matters of interracial relations in 1936–1937, and successively with the 1938 *Manifesto degli scienziati razzisti* (Manifesto of racist scientists) and the 1939 racial laws. With what I have defined elsewhere as the ‘self-referential (and then Aryanist) turn’ of Fascist raciology (see Giuliani 2013b), the traditional tolerance towards interracial sexual relationships in the colonies was permitted, while equality between male colonizers and their colonized concubines was never accepted. The gender and racial superiority of the (white) Italian man over brown women’s bodies and colonized cultures were always behind the Italian ‘missione civilizzatrice’ but never openly stated until the mid-1930s and the declaration of the Fascist empire in 1936.

Associations of the white virginal young woman’s body to, on the one hand, the Arab man’s body and, on the other, to the black male body are located within entirely different semantics.¹⁰ In the first case, the relationship is marked, especially since the Libyan war (1911–1912), by the idea of the unmasterable Arab warrior, and later by the presence of ‘bad and miserable muslim men’ who, since the late 1980s, have migrated in high numbers mostly from the Maghreb (see Dal Lago 1997), and finally by the post-9/11 idea of Islamic masculinity-as-dangerous. In the second case, the image of a degraded and brutal black masculinity constructed during colonial time resounds in the Rosarnian comments. Very much the result of the theorization of Italianness by criminal anthropologists, phrenologists, endocrinologists, psychiatrists, archaeologists and linguists (1850s to 1945), the Italian shared idea of the black horde finds its roots in scientists like Cesare Lombroso, Corrado Gini and Salvatore Ottolenghi. Maintained by Fascist descriptions of black barbarians (especially when revolting against the Italian colonial power), this image has been strongly mediated since World War II by American popular culture and its stereotypes, arriving in Italy as movies and TV series, sport and TV shows (see Gilroy 1993; Njegosh and Scacchi 2012; Giuliani 2013c). As W. E. B. Du Bois (1903) first, and then Frantz Fanon (1952) have argued, and scholarly research within black and then Critical whiteness studies have later expanded for a number of colonial, postcolonial and settler colonial contexts, the hyper-signification of black bodies has often worked to produce the clear coding of an indubitably

racial homogeneity of the dominant collective subject. This occurs too in the case of Rosarno: thanks to black immigrants, Calabrians are included to the ideal-typical whiteness to which the ruling elite or the richest northerners belong.

In the case of Yara Gambirasio, the image of the black rapist is extended to the mass of 'brown' men. Yara is described as a 'sweet girl', model daughter from a good northern Italian family. She is always shown with braces, in sweatpants, as a virginal body taken from the pages of a Santa Maria Goretti holy novel,¹¹ unaware of the horrible destiny that awaited her. Wanting revenge for this lost innocence, some community members put up signs asking for 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth', from the beginning of the police investigation, in front of Yara's family house.¹² In this second case, the reference to a tribal practice, roughly associated with Arab cultures, indicates the guilty party as not white, or not white enough (in relation to colour, but also social and economic factors). Their diversity marks them as 'potential public enemies', in the position to violate a twelve-year-old girl, and with her, the peace and social order of this small Lombardian town.¹³ The local priest, who was close to the family, appealed for calm and respect, instead of hasty judgements and terrible vengeance (A.N. 2010c). Despite the priest's pleas, part of the community violently reconfirmed its self-representation as white and superior through the condemnation of the 'violence of the less-white'. In an article in the *Corriere della Sera*, 16 March 2011, Yara's is briefly compared to Ruby's figure and story, but then the connection is immediately rejected by the same journalist, finding it impossible that a young Italian girl might resemble Ruby, 'a girl interested in unexpected encounters, [a life] made of dangerous liaisons with strangers'. 'Is it impossible to imagine', continues the journalist, 'in fact quite the opposite happened? Yara Gambirasio ran away from a Romanian and a Moroccan, as described by a witness' (A.N. 2011).

In contrast to Yara Gambirasio, in the case of Karima El Mahroug (Ruby), the image of the prime minister's male virility (and that of those Italians whose manhood rests on this type of definition) is increased through the scandal of their relationship, which appears to contain a subtly familiar, almost naïve colonial touch. As a benefactor who took care of the girl's problems (A.N. 2010b), Berlusconi is sarcastically connoted as the 'good Samaritan', implying that the 'paternal' benefactor can also be openly attracted to his or her protected, exchanges his favours with his or her sexual services. 'Papi' (daddy) Berlusconi establishes thus an unequal relationship (father-daughter) that, besides any emotional context, is placed in an evident relationship of (sex-money) power. Besides, he called himself 'sultan', thus recalling hegemonic constructions of masculinity and tickling the Italian male imaginary of a lost virility, overwhelming male sexuality, women's objectivation

and possession and unbounded masculinity within a strict, heteronormative semantics, which is sometimes seen as perfectly represented by 'the old colonial Orient'. Berlusconi's status as self-proclaimed 'sultan', while it orientalizes him, also distinguishes him from brown Arabs and black Africans because he is white, 'tannable' and therefore 'always whiteable'. He is depicted as virile and forever young, the icon of Mediterranean male beauty so well described by advertisements like those of Dolce & Gabbana and Giorgio Armani¹⁴ produced in 2013 or movies like *Under the Tuscan Sun* (2003) where the Italian man, the super-white US female beauty (Diane Lane) falls in love with, is featured as a virile, brown-complexioned, well-built, sexy and passionate man (Raul Bova). He is fascinating and seduces all (white) women but at the same time he is engaged with a stereotypically Italian (small, brown, objectified, highly sexualized, southern), Kharima-like brown beauty. The newspapers did not waste many words on the fact that Karima El Mahroug is not white, but this aspect instead tickled the imagination of Italian talk shows and nightclubs, contributing to the questionable attention paid to the exuberant and 'tanned' body of the barely-of-age girl. One could reasonably link this case to the common expression during Italian colonialism that described Africa as a 'virgin land ready to be penetrated' (see Sabelli 2010: 106). However, in order to better understand the contemporary use of that image in the specific case of the prime minister, it might be more effective to look at contemporary cinema, in particular the images of Caligula in Tinto Brass's famous film (*Caligula* 1979) depicting the emperor (Malcolm MacDowell) as a Roman (kitch) version of a 'sultan', always surrounded by naked beauties swimming in warm water pools, dancing for his pleasure or participating in Bacchic feasts and orgies.¹⁵ One must underline, however, that the girls of the contemporary Caligula-Berlusconi are not helpless, devoid of subjectivity and dependent on the emperor. Instead they reclaim their space and agency within a very particular system of gendered, racialized and sexualized postcolonial power relations. 'Kharima and the others' use their 'residual' power as best they can, framed and mediated by the same codes provided by the Caligulian television imagery. Yet in the public arena, major cultural agencies (news, TV entertainment shows, political talk shows) obstinately depict them simply as immoral 'coloured burglars', participating in the construction of that degraded image of Italian masculinity provided by Berlusconi's colonial and 'multiracial burlesque'.¹⁶ This burlesque, as the prime minister stated for the whole of Italy, is 'multiracial but not multicultural', a phrase that consolidates the concept of 'different-is-beautiful' only in function of the 'manly and Italian' desire of 'young, beautiful, and tanned' female bodies (see Giuliani 2013c). Multiracialism is good, only if it is framed within a single cultural system – white male desire-centred, labour and sexually exploitative, consumerist, patriarchal and heterosexist.

Because she is a woman, raised in Italy, less black than Balotelli, and young and beautiful, Karima El Mahroug is afforded greater agency with which to negotiate her space and future possibilities. Ruby, in fact, participates in the production of her own image and life. This space is defined by the 'availability' and objectification of the female body by various 'Caligulas', as in the case of the 'morette coloniali' – literally colonial dark-skinned females, an objectifying and inferiorizing expression coined during Italian colonialism in Africa (1882–1961). This space separates and distinguishes her from both Roman-descending and respect-deserving Mediterranean 'mothers of the nation' – wives and maternal nurturers, respectable ladies – and young and innocent 'daughters of the nation' like Yara.

The level of agency that Ruby can exert in this space depends on the position she takes in relation to power. Ruby's body is a 'porno-trope', to use Sonia Sabelli's reading (2010) of Anne McClintock's (1995) work. As in colonial times, like the 'morette coloniali', she lets herself be photographed (see Bini 2003: 16–17) and included in the erotic universe of the white man, obtaining her own form of (economic, social, sexual) emancipation from local gender and class rules. The 'Rubies' are therefore not just victims or simple reproducers of their own exploitation, material and symbolic silence or visual and material subordination.¹⁷ They are, instead, contradictory figures, such as those described by Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003). In the act of trying to profit as much as they can from a situation, they reveal their resilience/opportunism. By displaying themselves as fierce defenders of their role as emperor's vestals, they also reveal the desirability and popularity of this type of 'success', within the limited resources provided to women in contemporary Italy. As happens for the black body of Rosarnian fruit-pickers working for Calabrian citizens, Berlusconi's go-go girls provide the locus on which to reinstate Italian women's identity in terms of colour, class, morality, sexuality, gender roles and place in Italian society. In contrast to the go-go girls, Italian women construct themselves and are constructed as white and Mediterranean, that is as embodying non-exceeding, controllable and thus acceptable, matrimonially and patriarchally framed passion and sensuality. In that sense, Rubies are thus the 'epidermalized' brown non-European Others, following Frantz Fanon, through which, by opposition, Italian women can be 'de-epidermalized', whitened, Europeanized and made superior. Included within the space where Italians are gendered, racialized and sexualized, Rubies construct and reinforce the normative whiteness of Italian women and men.

The Rosarno migrants play a very similar role, but from a different position. They are black and they are men. But most importantly, they are illegal migrants. Their absolute Otherness – read within a patriarchal system of representation that includes brown girls as sexualized objects and excludes

black men as monstrous competitors with white virility – makes their relational contribution to the construction of Italian racial identity a very particular one. Their physical and symbolic presence expands Italian whiteness to include its internal and more acceptable Other (the southerner). Embodying the border that identifies absolute Otherness and distinguishes it from acceptable proximity, they materialize the limits of Italian ‘anthropophagic racial citizenship’.

Balotelli, in a much more problematic manner, is ‘one of us’. He is what Nirmal Puwar defines as ‘space invader’ (2004). He is the piece of Otherness that the white body has already swallowed but cannot digest and so wants to expulse: the unabsorbable that is already in. Balotelli is male and his masculinity, within the semantic field of the stadium, intolerably threatens the idea that white viewers have of themselves and of their imagined community.¹⁸ He is not a beautiful young Moroccan woman ‘complicit’ in building Italians’ orientalized male heterosexual sexual desire for objectified not-so-different brown girls.¹⁹ Balotelli’s blackness is in Italy determined by the representational history of inferiority derived not only from the colonial period (see Marchetti 2011) but also from American pop culture (see Njegosh and Scacchi 2012).

Balotelli’s Italian pride, his typical Italian first name, his singing of the national anthem and speaking with a strong vernacular accent, blurs distinctions and recalls the artificial nature of Italian white masculinity. The ambivalence surrounding Balotelli explains events such as the banner hung by Juventus fans during a Tim Trophy match in Turin in 2008 bearing the inscription, ‘There ain’t black Italians’ (D’Ottavio 2010: 170–76). This coexists with racist cartoons in the *Gazzetta dello Sport*,²⁰ bananas thrown²¹ at the football player and the Hulk-Orangutan pose taken by Balotelli at the 2012 World Cup match between Italy and Germany in response to the countless offences suffered on and off the field. Even if Balotelli is described as a ‘champion of Italianness’ in international and national sports newspapers, he is not. On his body the ‘anthropophagic model’ finds its limit: it cannot be assimilated. Its blackness does not function as a mirror, as in the case of Rosarnian fieldworkers. It disrupts white Italians’ identity as white and Mediterranean and fractures an image of it as naturalized, self-reflexive and self-evident.²²

CONCLUSION

The Italian man has ‘dark (tanned) skin’, is ‘passionate and sensual’ and ‘white and Mediterranean’. This is the classical perception depicted in the iconic advertising campaigns of Dolce & Gabbana and Giorgio Armani – always

virile, ‘turned on and eager’ as embodied by former Premier Berlusconi’s public and private performances. Yet he is never a black. It is precisely against blackness, in the hostile embrace of Balotelli’s fans, football spectators and television audiences that this idea of Italian masculinity and race is structured and strengthened. Blackness is not the only construction of racialized Otherness on which Italians’ racialized identity is projected. As many scholars have argued, Asian ‘yellowness’ and ‘brownness’ is also called upon in the ‘construction by contrast’ of Italian whiteness and Mediterraneanness. But blackness has always been something to be confronted with, since Lombroso’s statement that half Italians were Hamitic. When blackness is projected on the Other, all internal racial differences collapses, and the hetero-referential identity of Italians as white is precisely constructed as inclusive and even. It may also include Moroccan (beautiful) girls and Hamitic/Semitic southerners within what I have called an ‘anthropophagic model of racialized citizenship’ (see also Giuliani 2015). Besides blackness, North-African, Arab and Asian brown masculinities also cannot be easily swallowed, digested and assimilated. Their bodies are to be rejected at the frontiers or investigated as suspected culprits of horrible murders. When blackness comes to be too close and familiar as in the case of Balotelli, or even pretends to be representative of Italians’ identity at home and abroad (like in the case of many young Italians of non-Italian background reclaiming citizenship),²³ Italianness as whiteness and Mediterraneanness reveals itself to be another manufactured identity, whose internal homogeneity is nothing but the result of a (not always successful) digesting process. In the picture of Italy as ‘multiracial but not multicultural’, that internal blackness represents the ultimate limit of the anthropophagic model of racialized inclusion, the extreme border that contains and identifies a national identity which is the result of the converging of hetero-referential and self-referential racializations. The first operates by contrast, through and against the Rosarnians and Yara’s kidnappers and murderers; the second is attached to that idea of well-balanced passion and rationality – which includes also the South – physical majesty, arts and science (so perfectly captured by the classic Discus Thrower statue adopted and recast by Fascist iconography) that is supposed to connect Italians to both ancient Roman history of grandeur and northern Europeans’ whiteness and rationality.

NOTES

1. I am referring to the categories developed by Chandra T. Mohanty (2003) and Talal Asad (2007). Regarding the need to investigate stereotypes in order to prevent ongoing racial discrimination in Italy, see Oliveri (2008: 74) and Margiotta (2007: 132–42).

2. As demonstrated by their synthesis in the ‘security package’ (2008). See Margiotta (2012).

3. See Grappi and Sacchetto (2013).

4. Regarding this issue see the work of Sandro Mezzadra, Federica Sossi and her research team, and Enrica Rigo. For an important piece on the relevance of the security systems adopted in border control operations after 11 September, see Pugliese (2010). For a discussion of the effects of the crisis in terms of the constriction of European and Italian citizenship, we refer you to the conference ‘Implications of the Eurozone Crisis for Perceptions, Politics and Policies of Migration’ held in Malmö (Sweden) at the end of November 2012 whose proceedings will soon be available.

5. Published by *antefatto.it*.

6. Statements from 8 January 2010.

7. www.ilsole24ore.com/art/SoleOnLine4/Italia/2010/01/rosarno-maroni-immigrati-esplorazione.shtml.

8. See this page on the Ministry of the Interior’s website: http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/interview/interventi/2100_500_ministro/0984_2010_01_12_informativa_senato_Rosarno.html.

9. As stated by the commentators Xavier Jacobelli e Filippo Cutrupi (*Vi racconto la rivolta degli immigrati a Rosarno* 2010).

10. However, it is important to remember that the small number of white women in the Horn of Africa in combination with the small number of black men in the home country did not stimulate fears regarding contact between black men and white women with the same virulence that is found in other colonial contexts (i.e. France) and racial segregation (i.e. United States).

11. http://www.adnkronos.com/IGN/News/Cronaca/Caso-Yara-parroco-Brembate-e-come-Santa-Maria-Goretti_311759698327.html; http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/italia/2011/03/14/AOBAGiE-yara_silenzio_corinno.shtml

12. http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2010/12/06/news/razzismo_brembate-9870349.

13. Yara’s is not an isolated case: there was an attempted rape and murder of a white Italian woman, Giovanna Reggiani, in Rome by a Romanian national in October 2007, that resulted in the reinforcement of the same ‘defence of our women’ rhetoric that we found in Rosario, including the explosion of populist and racist violence against the Roma community and a crackdown on Roma camps and immigrants by the provincial magistrate, mayor and police of the capital. This event, in public opinion, represented an important moment in the redefinition of ‘citizenship’, ‘manhood’ and ‘Italian-ness’ in terms of space and bodies. See Ribeiro Corossacz (2013), Bonfiglioli (2010) and, especially, Rivera (2009). Rivera specifies the naturalizing significance in the omission of the ‘whiteness’ of an Italian perpetrator/victim and the implicit blackness of the foreigner, non-citizen and not-white-person in both the position of guilt or victim of a crime such as, for example, rape in Italian public media and political debate.

14. For an example of this, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGWKP8DjHaQ.

15. The Morandini cinema dictionary defines it in this manner: ‘The frantic life, the cruel actions, incest with his sister Drusilla, the follies and the violent death of Gaius Caesar Augustus Germanicus otherwise known as Caligula (12–41 AD),

from Suetonius' perspective, the most vicious and least reliable historian of Greek-Roman times, and that of American Gore Vidal: a child that find the world in his hands, that doesn't know what to do with it and unleashes his destructive instincts on it. . . . [In the] '84 [edition] while purged of its most raw images, a festival of fantapornosodomasolatin kitsch remains, where the fantasy-story combines with porn and violent cinema' (Morandini, Morandini and Morandini 2005: 680–81, author's translation).

16. Silvio Berlusconi himself called the risqué parties and orgies he organized at his home, at Arcore, and at Villa Certosa, burlesque. The image of 'burlesque' is, in fact, perfectly fitting: a striptease in front of the traditional male gaze in a bedroom show. Nowadays, burlesque belongs to an erotic subculture that once again situates the male at the centre of the heterosexual erotic scene. Filtered from the Folies Bergères tradition, burlesque considers the presence of 'colored' bodies positively, as an added value to the variety of 'characters' to be impersonated on the stage. On the image spread by Berlusconi television starting in the 1980s and its proximity to that of burlesque, see Giomi (2012: 3–28). For the expression 'zoo delle differenze' (zoo of differences), see Gribaldo and Zapperi (2012: 42–45).

17. I contest here what is affirmed by critics such as Lorella Zanardo, but also Lorenzo Bernini and Olivia Guaraldo who both victimize women 'enslaved' by images and TV industry and demonize the Italian media's power of representing objectified and 'un-authentic' womanhood. For a critique of the opposition between the media (stereotypes, excess) and reality (the 'proper' woman, white, heterosexual, middle class, simple, complete and domesticated) in these analyses, see Gribaldo and Zapperi (2012: 26–30).

18. It is to this imagined community that Dell'Agnese and Ruspini are also referring when they analyse Italian masculinity. See Dell'Agnese and Ruspini (2007: XVII–XXIII).

19. This follows the same idea that important anthropologist Giuseppe Sergi first and then endocrinologist and racist Nicola Pende – both claiming the idea of Italian race as a set of kinships from the best stocks of the Mediterranean – tried to instil in Italian culture during the era of 'the colonies' and that the Italian citizenship granted to the Libyans confirmed (see Giuliani 2013b).

20. For a critical and transnational reading of these cartoons, see <http://blog.futbologia.org/2012/06/balotelli-lebron-e-gli-stereotipi-razzisti-della-gazzetta/>.

21. www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/multimedia/sport/2012/06/14/APNueyiC-banane_contro_balotelli.shtml.

22. As Angela D'Ottavio notes, the study of sports fan dynamics is essential because football is a 'total social fact', a phenomenon that produces and transforms social tensions and 'on which large material, emotional and symbolic investments are made' (2010: 175).

23. Italian laws concerning citizenship are based on Roman *jus sanguinis* that does not allow people born in Italy to be Italian citizens at birth. A so-called second generation movement (i.e. a social movement composed of young women and men who were born in Italy by non-Italian parents) is campaigning to change the legislation to one based on *jus soli* (according to which citizenship is territorial and assigned at birth).

Chapter 2

Challenging the Domestic Colonial Archive: Notes on the Racialization of the Italian Mezzogiorno

Carmine Conelli

During the economic crisis in the Eurozone, the neoliberal discourse that informs European Union politics has ascribed responsibility for the recession to the so-called PIGS¹ nations. As viewed through this prism, the crisis has been exploited by financial institutions and European politicians to further broaden the chasm between northern Europe, whose politics of austerity guarantees production efficiency and economic development, and the PIGS, characterized by common ‘bad habits’ such as corruption, clientelism, mal-administration, laziness and wasteful spending. These are the first causes of the exorbitant public debt and low production rates that, according to the neoliberal elites, spurred the crisis, threatening the Euro’s stability and financial investments. In actuality, the crisis mainly afflicted and continues to afflict the PIGS countries, as they are obliged to obey Frankfurt’s diktats and, consequently, to dismantle their welfare state systems. This has allowed experts to theorize about a ‘two-speed Europe’, consisting of a vanguard North and a South that falls behind. The logic that informs this discourse can be argued as colonial and civilizing, as the PIGS are blamed for their cultural characteristics in order to be reformed and market-oriented. Furthermore, the nuances of this colonial framing can be also ascertained in the pejorative character of the term PIGS: the inhabitants of these countries have been dehumanized, reduced to the imagery of beasts (Van Vossolle 2016). As Roberto Dainotto has pointed out, Europe has marginalized the continent’s own southern region, portraying countries such as Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain as irrational, corrupt and clan-based in comparison to the rational, civic-minded nations of northern Europe: ‘A modern European identity, in other words, begins when the non-Europe is internalized – when the South, indeed, becomes the sufficient and indispensable internal other: Europe, but also the negative part of it’ (2007: 4).

The Italian scenario constitutes a particular framework in which the blame for the economic slowdown is shifted to its southern regions. ‘The South must change its mentality’, said former Prime minister Mario Monti, accusing the ‘Mezzogiorno’ of being responsible for unsuccessful compliance with neoliberal European standards. ‘I am content to lose the primary elections if the South does not understand that it needs to change its mentality’, twitted Matteo Renzi (prime minister 2014–2016) after his defeat in the 2012 race for the centre-left primary elections. What these statements confirm is that during the crisis, a wide range of stereotypes and prejudices have reactivated the concept of a lazy and idle southern Italy, represented homogeneously and through a non-historical narration (Curcio 2014). This vision shares all the *clichés* rooted in the long-standing ‘southern question’, in which the South has been presented as a separate entity from the rest of the peninsula. Officially born in the decades following Italian unification as the effort of the *meridionalisti*² to draw the attention of the Italian public to the catastrophic social conditions of the South, the southern question has continued to draw attention to the persistent economic and social divide between the developed North and the backward South. Compared to the industrious North, the Mezzogiorno is constantly accused of being the ‘ball and chain’ of the North, slowing down the economic growth of the Italian state; indeed it has always been represented as plagued by the mafia, corruption and clientelism. Consequently, the Mezzogiorno has been considered a region of deprivation and desolation, situated in what Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) has called the ‘waiting room of history’, since it has never arrived at the destination of the economic and welfare standards of northern Italy.

THE SOUTHERN QUESTION: A (POST)COLONIAL ISSUE

The rise of the Lega Nord party on the Italian political scene at the end of the 1980s was based on anti-southern rhetoric. This political shift brought a group of scholars to call into question the Manichean vision of an Italy divided between North and South, and the representation of the South as a backward unified bloc (Moe 2002). Intellectuals from different disciplines associated with the journal *Meridiana* have sought in their own words to ‘deconstruct, deideologize and critique cultural representations and stereotypes inspired by misleading and abstract uniformities’.³ At the same time, scholars in the Anglophone Italian studies departments have borrowed a new idiom from Edward Said’s *Orientalism* to decode the role played by stereotypes and representations in shaping the inferior image of the Mezzogiorno during the Italian nation-building process (Schneider 1998; Dickie 1999; Moe 2002). These efforts are directed at exploring the question of Italian national

identity with different eyes, underlining how a modern Italian identity has grown while negating the southerner's role in creating the Italian social fabric. However, they fail in fully grasping the domestic *colonial fracture* that marks the Italian unification process.

My aim in this chapter is to respond to Pasquale Verdicchio's invitation to study southern Italy by adopting postcolonial theories and through this to contribute to the epistemological uprooting of the southern question. This entails considering the history of the Mezzogiorno as one of colonization, 'where colonialism was the unspoken agenda when Italy was "united" by Piedmontese forces in the 1860s' (Verdicchio 1997: 191). This also means bringing to the fore Antonio Gramsci's anti-colonialist thoughts in his *Quaderni del carcere* (1975: 2021, 2022 and 2038), analysing the southern question.⁴ Moreover, interpreting southern Italy's history from a postcolonial viewpoint would fulfil the first step of that discursive strategy which Miguel Mellino has called *de-provincializing Italy* (2012b). What Mellino suggests in his essay is exploring the 'historical interpenetration between the global spreading of modern colonial and imperial capitalism . . . and local Italian economic and cultural history' (2012b: 85). More precisely, what Quijano (2000) has productively labelled the 'coloniality of power' pervaded the annexation of the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by the newborn Italian state and can be understood as a localized translation of the global colonial project. Inside the Italian borders, it reflects a racist discourse directly drawn from the colonial global archive, which results in the colonization and racialization of southerners. In Mellino's words, 'race, racism and racialization have fractured the Italian national space ever since the birth of the nation' (2012b: 87). In the wake of this divide, the Mezzogiorno and the southern people, considered biologically inferior, came to embody the lesser desirable features of the Italian nation, thus allowing the northern bourgeoisie to increasingly assert their disassociation from the backward South, in order for the North to align itself with a northern European-defined modernity.

REPRESENTING THE SOUTH

In his *Quaderni del carcere*, Antonio Gramsci provided an incisive analytical category for interpreting class composition during the formation of the Italian-imagined community (Anderson 1991 [1983]). What happened was described by the Sardinian Marxist as a passive revolution (1975: 2010–14), as the leaders of the Risorgimento, lacking the conditions for complete hegemony over the new nation, enrolled the established dominant classes⁵ in their claims to power, rather than promoting social change. This also crucially ignored the popular demands for agrarian reform. As the Gramscian analysis

suggests, the construction of the Italian national state has overall been an elite achievement. The Risorgimento could thus be easily depicted as the story of a small elite leading the masses from foreign subjugation to freedom. Consequently, traditional Italian historiography has omitted the masses from the national epic, and in this way reproduced a linear and progressive vision of Italian history. The historicist discourse of Italian historiography, imbued by a constant appeal to the inevitability of the triumph of the ideals of Western liberalism, has widely celebrated the progress, whose manifestation was Cavour's Piedmont, at the expense of the backward Bourbon South.

My aim here is to expose this linear and homogeneous narrative, thus unveiling the manner through which the southerners were not only excluded by the national discourse but also negated in its reproduction. Edward Said in *Orientalism* illustrated the dominance of the Western world over the East through its dissemination of a colonialist agenda bearing a broad range of characterizations aimed at the denigration of the East. In a very similar way, as argued by Nelson Moe, in his *The View from Vesuvius*, 'a modern vision of the Italian South or the Mezzogiorno, took form in the middle decades of the nineteenth century under the combined pressures of Western Eurocentrism, nationalism and bourgeoisification' (2002: 1). At the end of eighteenth century, in the mind of many Europeans, southern Italy was already a *paradise inhabited by devils* (Croce 2006), a definition that exalted the contrasting images of the beautiful nature, climate and fertility of the South, on the one hand, and the terrible vices of the people who lived there in penury, on the other. Compared to the 'real' European world, the South was at the time considered backward and uncivilized, natural and picaresque, a 'liminal zone between European civilization and the world beyond' (Moe 2002: 54). As Michele Nani has shown, southern alterity was not imposed through a linear process, but *travelled* through the interaction of several subjects in a continuous circulation of stereotypes: 'European travelers acquired their information and prejudices from southern intellectuals conscious of their backwardness; travel diaries circulated all over Europe and fascinated new visitors, while provoking critics of the elites of the peninsula' (Nani 2006: 108).⁶

Nevertheless, Marta Petrusiewicz (1998) has argued how the South emerges as a category, a construction and an invention by tracing the birth of the southern question back to 1848, when liberal exiles settled in England and Piedmont after the uprisings against the Bourbon monarchy. These nationalist patriots used a consistent 'Orientalistic' cultural archive of representations and prejudices about the South to support their demands for the unification of Italy. The exiles developed an anti-southern stance articulated on two fronts. The first aimed at delegitimizing the Bourbon government system,⁷ while the latter was directed at the core of the Southern subalterns' ancestral traditions, considered too backward to aid unification and progress. The nationalist

historicist discourse contrasted the Enlightenment virtues of rationalism, democracy and citizenship with the irrational superstitions of the Neapolitan *lazzaroni*. Francesco Trinchera, one of the nationalist patriots, described the Neapolitan people in a pamphlet using dismissive language:

It does not take much intelligence or insight to understand that a people that is profoundly degraded and filled with misconceptions and gross prejudices, that believes in the evil-eye, in spiritual possession, magic and magicians, witches and witchcraft, dreams, the liquefaction of San Gennaro's blood . . . cannot think seriously about freedom, cannot understand it, want it, die for it. (Quoted in Moe 2002: 93)

In summary, southerners had to be saved from their wilderness and from the inefficiency of their government by the Piedmontese civilization. When the Italian army defeated the Bourbon resistance, a season of violence in the South ensued. The conquest of the Mezzogiorno⁸ in the 1860s can be defined as a case of domestic colonization and as an epistemic and material laboratory of colonial violence foreshadowing the Italian colonial venture in Africa. It is the crucial moment when the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies became southern Italy and its inhabitants were depicted through representations drawn from the global colonial archive that justified the act of colonial aggression that unified Italy. Analysing the correspondence between Prime Minister Cavour and his lieutenants, Moe has shown what could be called the domestic colonial register of these letters.⁹ The identification of southern Italy as Africa and as non-European is self-evident in the words written to Cavour by Luigi Carlo Farini, the chief administrator of the South in the first months of Piedmontese control there: 'But my friend, what lands are these, Molise and the South! What barbarism! This is not Italy! This is Africa: compared to these peasants the Bedouins are the pinnacle of civilization. And what misdeeds!' (Quoted in Moe 2002: 165). As we will see, these words will constitute the epistemic background of the southern racialization in the years after unification.

RACIALIZING THE SOUTH

The celebrated handshake between Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel II in Teano definitively signified the death of illusions for the thousands of peasants who had believed in Garibaldi's promises of agrarian reform and social change, smoothing the way to the military advance of the *Spedizione dei Mille* (The Expedition of the Thousand) in the South. The longed-for national revolution became instead the sheer territorial expansion of Cavour's Piedmont to the disadvantage of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In the meanwhile,

most of the peasants who earlier supported Garibaldi's action took up arms and rebelled against the Piedmontese invasion.

Dismissively characterized as *brigands* and considered a public order problem by the Italian parliament,¹⁰ the peasants have been historically depicted as ferocious criminals who threatened the safety of the southern bourgeoisie in the aftermath of unification.¹¹ In actuality, the world that the southern peasants experienced during the Italian military occupation could be described in the terms of Fanon's famous enunciation, as a *compartmentalized world* (2004: 3). On one side, there was the Italian state, its army, its public administration and judiciary bureaucracy. On the other side, there were the peasants, who were resisting an actual invasion. They were two unfathomable worlds, in which the only easily distinguishable trait was violence. The proclamation of the *état de siège* in 1862 and the *Legge Pica* legislation in 1863 further alienated the southerners. The legislation authorized the army to put to death every person suspected of being a bandit leading to the death of thousands. This scenario of violence also involved the crystallization of the inferior humanity of the southerners in the Italian national imaginary. Journalists and northern soldiers coming back from the southern countryside blatantly spoke of the Italian army mission as a struggle between civilization and barbarism, consolidating the sensation that in the South non-civilized and animalized masses lived foreign to the unification process (Dickie 1999: 120; Petraccone 2005: 10).

In the midst of the dreadful repression of brigandage, medical officers and anthropologists who were accompanying the troops studied the anatomy of the rebel peasants in order to legitimize a scientific theory of southern backwardness along racial lines. The peasants' revolt was criminalized by anthropological generalizations that theorized a biological difference between Italians. The southerners became a *cursed race* (Teti 2011), inferior for biological reasons: this evidence justified the need for their civilization, colonization and racialization. Cesare Lombroso, well known as the father of Italian criminal anthropology, typified the southerners as atavistic, by deducing their moral peculiarities and their inclination to commit crimes from their physical characteristics. Brigandage, in his opinion, was the effect of the arrested development of a collective moral sense, whose consequence was a permanent state of barbarity for the peasantry. He developed his theory after having examined the skull of the seventy-year-old Calabrian Giuseppe Vilella, put to death because he was suspected of being an outlaw. His 'median occipital cavity', according to Lombroso, was certainly a 'physical, anthropological and morphological case of a man's reversion to primitiveness' (quoted in Villa 1985: 148). As Mary Gibson (1998) has noticed, Lombroso's theory was not original in the late nineteenth century, when European nations involved in the 'scramble for Africa' justified their colonial ventures by

degrading the black, brown and yellow populations. At the end of the century another criminologist, the Sicilian Alfredo Niceforo, postulated the existence of two distinct races that inhabited the 'two Italies': Aryans in the North and the centre and Mediterraneans in the South and on the islands. Because of their discipline and educability, the Aryans of the North deserved a form of government based on liberty, while the Mediterraneans of the South 'need energetic and at times dictatorial action . . . to tear them away from the shadows' of traditionalism (quoted in Gibson 1998: 108).

As with Lombroso, in Niceforo's opinion race shaped social behaviour: the North enjoyed a better social organization, while the South was afflicted by its inhabitants' strong individualism, insubordination and indiscipline. Broadly speaking, criminal anthropological observations crystallized some of the most pervasive contemporary stereotypes and prejudices in the Italian social fabric. The notion of lawless, lazy and filthy populations from the southern regions persists in the minds of many contemporary Italians. Furthermore, less than twenty years after the colonial invasion of the South, the racialization of the southerners in unified Italy was being conducted in concert with the first endeavours at creating a colonial empire overseas. The government led by Crispi, as Gramsci suggested in his *Quaderni* (1975: 2018–19), avoided the equal redistribution of land in Italy by offering the 'mirage' of Eritrean lands to the southern Italian peasants. Verdicchio perceptively asks if the proximity between the campaign against the Sicilian Fasci and the military preparations for the invasion of Eritrea demonstrates 'an imperialist program of Piedmontese origins that worked its way down the peninsula before setting sail for the African continent' (quoted in Wong 2006: 80). After all, the interest that Leopoldo Franchetti, *meridionalista* and pupil of Pasquale Villari, placed in the agrarian colonization of Eritrea for solving the problem of southern rural overpopulation (1951) exposes the intrinsic link existing between these two colonial issues.

During the colonial venture in Africa, similar to the previous objectification of southerners already analysed here, Italian civilization was viscerally repulsed by African barbarism. The depiction of the natives was built upon the same prejudices suffered by southerners: it stressed their violence and cruelty, disparaged their ignorance and superstitions while bemoaning their laziness and filth. As Nani (2006) has suggested, the notion of African barbarism helped to externally project incivility and exoticism, allowing Italy to downplay domestic alterity, exorcise the Southern Question and move closer to the hub of the great European powers. This viewpoint underwent a change under Fascism. As Gaia Giuliani (2013a) has argued in comparing the racializing strategies in the two periods, while in liberal Italy the *colour line* divided the urbanized petty bourgeoisie from rural populations and those who were colonized, the Fascist regime devised an oppositional strategy of

white versus black, in which blackness was banished to the colonies, outside the borders of the Italian nation. This allowed Fascism to whiten its domestic dark man and to include him in the category of the ‘imperial Italian man’ who had to conquer Ethiopia. Thus, at least symbolically, Mussolini declared the Southern Question closed.

THE BACKWARD SOUTH AT THE SERVICE OF ITALIAN DEVELOPMENT

After the end of World War II, the inhabitants of the South were relegated to the margins of the national narrative as they ‘found themselves obliged after the war to celebrate and mythologize an event – the resistance – in which they had not been able to participate’ (Gribaudi 1996: 75). The occupation carried out by the allied forces in the South, while in the North a part of the population was fighting against Germany, resulted in the exclusion of the South from one of the founding myths of the Italian Republic, *the resistance*.

Forlorn and backward with respect to the rest of the nation, as vividly depicted by Carlo Levi in his *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (1982), the South sparked the renewed interest of social scientists in its situation. Thus, researchers initiated anthropological field inquiries in order to understand the causes of the uneven development in Italy. The most famous study was conducted by political scientist, Edward Banfield, and published in his volume *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1958). He analysed social and economic life in the Lucanian village of Chiaromonte. Banfield coined the term *amoral familism* to designate a form of immoral behaviour that the villagers exhibited, pursuing only the good of their own family. As Gribaudi has noted, in Banfield’s definition ‘amoral familism was stripped of its descriptive and scientific content, and it became used to mean simply the tendency of southerners to favor the family group; as such it was identified as one of the major causes of clientelism or patronage’ (1996: 83). This described, in a very historicist and simplistic way, the lack of civil consciousness in southern populations. Nevertheless, the South did not only experience the passive resistance due to resignation as demonstrated by the peasants of Gagliano in Levi’s *Christ Stopped at Eboli*. When the peasants, who fought during World War II, came back to their lands, a massive explosion of social conflict in the southern rural areas ensued. Peasants demonstrated against the persistence of Latifundium and demanded the equal redistribution of land. As a result, agrarian reform was enacted in 1950 to prevent peasant uprisings (Bevilacqua 1993: 97). In the same year, the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*, a complex set of institutions created with the aim of promoting development in the Mezzogiorno, was established. Underlying these decisions was a revitalized

historicist outlook: a dedicated set of institutions were to take charge of ensuring the development of the whole Mezzogiorno, as it was considered incapable of autonomous development. Moreover, the fundamental aim of this project was to ensure the necessary facilities to kick-start the economies of the South and create the conditions for the future politics of industrialization, as predicted by the modernization theories of the time.

According to Luciano Ferrari Bravo and Alessandro Serafini (2007), agrarian reform and the *Cassa* were part of the same project, and it involved giving the backward South the task of realizing the Italian economic miracle. The *Cassa*, in their opinion, efficiently organized the migration of southern peasants to the industrialized triangle of Genoa-Milan-Turin in northern Italy. Through the institution of the *Cassa*, according to these authors, a process was initiated through which the southern economy and society shifted 'from a relationship of separation to one of integration with respect to the overall national economy' (Bravo and Serafini 2007: 25). In other words, the concept of southern backwardness paved the way for Italian development, through the contribution of internal migration by providing the necessary labour force to achieve the Italian economic miracle.

The massive emigration of southern peasants towards northern industrial cities involved at least 2 million people who left their homes in order to take up poorly paid jobs on the assembly lines of northern factories. Enrica Capussotti (2010) has examined the representation of southern migration as reflected in the public debate in Turin's newspapers. What her inquiry shows is that the southerners were hierarchically distinguished from the native locals, experiencing many of the prejudices and stereotypes that Italians now reserve for the new waves of international migrants. Their life in the *industrial triangle* was dominated by racialization: the traditional racist discourse against southerners became embodied in a system of discrimination encompassing the fields of labour, social life and personal relations. This situation is depicted in a scene in Luchino Visconti's film, *Rocco and His Brothers* (1960), in which the Parondi family are designated as 'those from Africa' by their new neighbours. Furthermore, the persistence of the Fascist law against urbanization,¹² which was only abolished in 1960, contributed to the paradoxical transformation of southern migrants into *clandestini* in their own country (Capussotti 2010). The perpetuation of this law did not stop internal mobility but constituted a genuine vehicle for blackmail, as the southerners were often employed in illegal labour. This racialization process was also evident in the field of housing. In Turin, southern migrants were often faced with signs declaring 'we do not rent to southerners' (Fofi 1976), and in Milan, as the famous inquiry by Franco Alasia and Danilo Montaldi (2010) has shown, southerners were very often ghettoized in makeshift urban settlements along the margins of the residential areas, nicknamed 'Koreas'.

Nevertheless, life in northern cities drastically changed southerners' lifestyles and their conditions. Southern migrants developed a class consciousness and became the uncontested spearheads of worker turmoil in the 1960s. They applied postcolonial pressures on the northern cities in a similar way to the forces exerted after World War II by the migrations from former colonies to the old European metropolises (see Mellino 2012a). Through their participation in the uprisings, the workers were finally able to overcome the territorial segregation they were exposed to as a consequence of their migration.

CHALLENGING THE DOMESTIC COLONIAL ARCHIVE

The current discourse directed against southern people *interpellates* the broad range of common stereotypes involving people and places that have influenced the historical racist discourse about the Mezzogiorno. Its inhabitants are depicted as 'terrone', Africans, choleras, filthy ones,¹³ dirties, lazybones, plagues, parasites and swindlers. This racism informs both the institutional and popular domain, even though anti-southern racism appears to exist primarily on a *latent* level today, rather than a manifest one (Curcio and Mellino 2010), as more recent waves of international migration have provided other objects of marginalization and racialization. Nevertheless, public opinion prefers to relate the North-South conflict in terms of *campanilismo* (Capussotti 2010), a useful category to transform the racial constitution of the prejudices against southern people into an innocuous representation of common sense. This can be described as the traditional foreclosure¹⁴ of anti-southern racism from Italian public debate, which in my view is intricately entwined with the erasure from the collective Italian memory of the colonial treatment historically reserved for southerners.

Moreover, as the racialized framing of southerners historically works as a device for essentializing southern culture and identity, it denies any possibility to change their existing state due to their *cursed* nature. Thus, we ought to rethink the way that the social sciences have interpreted southern history and society. Franco Cassano (2012) in his *Southern Thought* has put forward the notion that the South must reappropriate its ancient dignity as a subject of thought, in order to arrest the long-term trend of interpretation by outsiders. I am not entirely convinced by his identitarian perspective. What I would like to suggest instead, following Iain Chambers incisive insight, is that a reappropriation involves more than

to simply overturn prevalent views and a Northern framing of the South (of Europe, of the world); it is, rather to follow signs, suggestions, sounds, smells, and silences that propose a complex, open-ended narration of historical time and

its cultural composition. It is where deceptively marginal details – drawn from a dish, a mosaic, a voice – give rise to an unsuspected cartography. (Chambers 2008: 131)

CONCLUSION

Southern Italians' challenge today consists of escaping the inherent 'Northernness' of Eurocentric and historicist social science, criticized at a global level by Connell (2007). Southern Italians also need to contest 'northern' claims for universality that have been formative for the exclusion of southern local histories from the Italian national narrative. A recent example of the persistence of northern myths about Italy's south is the long-term waste crisis (1994 – present) in Naples. When the local population protested against the establishment of landfills and incinerators, they were accused of being spurred by the Camorra, of being unconcerned with the public good or of being guilty of the Not in My Back Yard syndrome, since they simply thwarted the public interest. Some scholars have exposed this false accusation of particularism and excessive individualism by demonstrating how the resisting populations, on the contrary, demanded the same treatment for all the affected communities, as the demonstration slogan 'stop landfills: not here, nor anywhere else' proclaimed (Petrillo 2009; Orizzonti Meridiani 2014). A productive new approach to challenge this racist framing of southern people would be to examine the insubordinations of southern subalterns through the perspective provided by the Indian Subaltern Studies collective. Inspired by Gramsci's views of culture, hegemony and political consciousness which the Sardinian thinker developed through his analysis of the southern subalterns, Guha (1983) has proposed an innovative theory to reveal the political nature of Indian peasants' rebellions, differently read by the colonialist and nationalist Indian historiography as pre-political and spontaneous movements. Moving from Guha's identification of a subaltern autonomous domain of politics, distinct from that of the elites, we can understand the demonstrations of the southern *political society* (Chatterjee 2004) as a weapon in their struggle against their condition of subalternity, and therefore not as rejection of progress and modernity. In contrast to Gramsci's theory, what does not figure in Subaltern Studies' writings is the historicist faith in progress that still informed Gramsci's conception of the subalterns. Even though the Italian Marxist presented the peasants as a cultural and political living force, in his opinion they were 'subjected to the activity of ruling groups' (1975: 2283), as they subscribed to their hegemonic values. Reading the life and the politics of the subordinate groups of the Mezzogiorno from the Subaltern Studies perspective can therefore help us to write *histories from below*, where southern subalterns are the conscious

subject-agents in the making of their own history. At last, through this useful *toolbox*, Antonio Gramsci can finally return home after a journey through India, allowing us to propose an original southern Italian theory.¹⁵

NOTES

1. The acronym for Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. Depending on the case, the acronym has been changed to PIIGS, so as to include Ireland.

2. The beginning of the ‘Meridionalismo’ school is classically traced back to the publication of *The Southern Letters* (1875) by Pasquale Villari, a positivist and conservative scholar concerned with the spreading of criminality in the southern regions. His ideas have been discussed by John Dickie (1999), Nelson Moe (2002) and Aliza Wong (2006).

3. <http://www.rivistameridiana.it/who-we-are.html>.

4. As Baidik Bhattacharya and Neelam Srivastava (2012) have recently pointed out, notwithstanding Gramsci’s relevance for his ideas of subalternity, cultural hegemony and political consciousness, postcolonial studies have, curiously, rarely dealt with Gramsci’s anti-colonial and anti-imperialist thought. In particular his engagement with the colonial issue in relation to Gandhian India, the Italian Southern Question and Italian imperialism and its civilizing mission has been neglected.

5. This paradoxical situation is captured by Tancredi’s famous sentence in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s novel, *The Leopard*: ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change’ (1982: 40).

6. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

7. The letters written by the conservative politician Lord William Gladstone to his party leader Lord Aberdeen during his visit in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had great resonance throughout Europe as he reported a sentence heard in Naples about the Bourbon regime as ‘the negation of God erected into a system of government’ (Gladstone 1851: 9). Importantly, the Italian edition was edited by the patriot Giuseppe Massari.

8. Nicola Zitara (2011), who has interpreted the Southern Question through a Marxist gaze, has been the only intellectual engaged in reporting the unknown history of the Italian colonial sack in the Mezzogiorno.

9. The South is ‘so far from the ideas of progress and civilization’ – wrote the nationalist patriot Massari – that it requires ‘a massive invasion of Piedmontese morality’ (quoted in Moe 2002: 166).

10. The representative Massari, during a parliamentary question about the condition of the southern regions soon after unification, stated that, ‘Brigands are a matter for the police, not for politicians’ (*Il Parlamento dell’unità d’Italia* 1961: 259).

11. The post-unification brigandage was not taken into serious account by historians until the 1960s, when Franco Molfese (1964) and Aldo De Jaco (1969) wrote their respective oeuvres. The lateness of these studies surely reflects the reluctance of scholars to engage with such problematic matters.

12. Enacted in 1939, this law essentially denied official change of residence from the countryside to the cities.

13. The Italian word for ‘filthy people’ is *sudici*, a pun on the term ‘Sud’, which means ‘South’, and thus dirty southerners.

14. As Mellino, drawing from Spivak, explains, ‘Foreclosure does not mean repression, as it is a self-defensive mechanism which, by expelling the signifier upon which it acts from the chain of signifiers (from culture, the symbolic, etc.), rejects the inscription itself’ (2012a: 89).

15. I have developed the steps of this *travel* in the essay *Back to the South: Revisiting Gramsci’s Southern Question in the Light of Subaltern Studies* (2018).

Chapter 3

***El Moro* – Discovering the Hidden Coloniality of the Contemporary Spanish/Catalan Society and Its Colonial Subjects**

Martin Lundsteen

From September 2011 to August 2013, I undertook my fieldwork in Salt, a small town of 30,000 inhabitants in Girona, the northern region of Catalonia. A significant number of African immigrants live in this location. Of these, the majority are Moroccan, who are often stereotyped as *moros*. Comprehending the social category *moro* is fundamental to understanding Spanish identity as an imagined national community, since *moro* functions as its foundational antithesis. The hegemonic idea of Spain (and Spanishness) is built on the historic negation of Muslim and Jewish identity, a construction also adopted by the dominant perception of Catalan national identity (Prado 2008). Indeed, both Spanish and Catalan ideas of selfhood have been in continuous transformation broadly as a result of changing political-economic and geopolitical circumstances. More specifically selfhood has been linked to Spanish and Catalan involvement in colonialism in Africa and America. Yet, in spite of identitarian transformations, the recent constructions of *el moro* resemble earlier ones, and it is precisely the interplay of these forms and their historical foundations that inform this chapter. It examines the social relations entrenched in the social imagery of *el moro*, as well as its intrinsic relation to changing socioeconomic contexts.¹

It is crucial to understand the social effects of *el moro* and the concept's relation to racist structures in contemporary Spanish society. In the chapter, I relate examples from my fieldwork in Salt and explain how the concept of *el moro* prevails, detailing how recently it has developed in relation to the socioeconomic context as yet another level of stratification among the working-class population of Spain, where it is used to privilege older citizens over more recent arrivals. In this regard it is important to analyse the political-economic structuring involved. Such analysis is generally avoided in recent

reductive ‘culturalist’ readings that perceive and produce culture as the main cause, for instance, of social conflict.

THE HISTORICAL (TRANS)FORMATION OF *EL MORO*

In the wake of recent changes in the migration patterns to and within Spain, contemporary studies have focused on the specific characteristics and the history of the imagery of *el moro* in relation to colonialism and other socioeconomic factors.² As a consequence of the foundation of *Al-Andalus* (Muslim Spain 790–1492) new, multiple and diverse relations developed between the different peoples of the Iberian Peninsula, often across social boundaries. These relations were frequently perceived as following religious ascriptions. Yet this was not always the case. Although a proportion of the population insisted on (and *persist* in) segmenting society according to religion, the boundaries were not strictly policed and increasingly became (and remain) blurred. Many of the ‘original’ Iberians converted to Islam (as well as from Islam and Judaism to Christianity). Among the different groupings a much-celebrated *convivencia* seems to have thrived, and, despite being romanticized, a certain right to difference and equality seems to have existed (Martin-Márquez 2008; Stallaert 1998). In fact, today *convivencia* has become a key concept in Spain regarding social relations and migration. The concept was initially employed by the medieval philologist, Ramón Menéndez Pidal (1869–1968), to describe the competition and coexistence of various phonetic forms of early Romance languages in the Iberian Peninsula – although its use can be dated back to the seventeenth century (Szpiech 2013). It was later developed by one of his disciples, Américo Castro, to describe the ideally peaceful interaction and cohabitation of medieval Jews, Muslims and Christians in the prime of *Al-Andalus* (Erickson 2011). The concept has since become the subject of critique, but the debate has mainly focused on the veracity of peacefulness and the actual interrelatedness of the social interrelations back then (Akasoy 2010; Glick and Pi-Sunyer 1992; Soifer 2009). Currently, however, the notion implies an initial difference in culture, habits, language, religion and so on, and it also seems to imply a mutual acceptance among the different corresponding communities. It is often used to refer to a situation that goes beyond mere ‘coexistence’, characterized by peace, mutual tolerance and the apparent lack of conflict.

Although during *Al-Andalus* social groups had largely followed religious lines, under the new Christian social order – which was gaining ground on the Iberian Peninsula – a stricter division between the groups was instigated. This was promoted by the Christian rulers and has been named *casticismo* (a social system roughly translated as caste purity) and developed in relation

to, for instance, disallowing interfaith marriages (Stallaert 1996). The division marked a hierarchization of the society into religious castes, which led to an increasing focus on lineage. Following this, a system of *pureza de sangre*³ (literally, blood purity) was established that aimed at avoiding contact and social mixing between the various religious-social groupings.

From the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, the sociopolitical reality of the Iberian Peninsula was characterized by violent confrontation during the various periods of Christian and Muslim rule (in the independent Muslim-ruled principalities of the *taifas* and the Islamic government of the *califas*) – a situation that cannot be reduced to conceptualizing it in simplistic oppositional terms. The societies were heterogeneous and while interests were often in conflict, this was not always the case. People living under various reigns were not consistently clearly divided, and certainly not along racial lines. Nonetheless, a more homogeneous and divisive picture of society would progressively be founded and promoted, positioning the Iberian Christian peoples against the Muslims and Jews who were depicted as alien to Christian society and foreign to the Iberian Peninsula. In the historical writings, Muslims and Jews were denominated by religion rather than by place of domicile for example, as Grenadines, Andalusians or by whichever *taifa* or *califa* they were subjects of. In relation to questions of identity, emphasis was placed on religion as the sign of difference.

Initially, tolerance towards the minority groups, their customs and religions, appeared to have been the norm. Yet little by little, especially during the fifteenth century, this tolerance faded (Stallaert 1996). The political project of *la Reconquista*⁴ gained more power and the social divisions between the Iberian peoples were severely policed by the Church and the Christian monarchy and consequently deepened. From the fifteenth century a fragmentary and conflictual vision became hegemonic and was progressively institutionalized through the works of bishops and priests (Perceval 2012), which led to pogroms against the ‘domestic’ Jews (*sefardíes*) and ‘domestic’ Muslims (*mudejares*). After these organized massacres, conversion to Christianity gathered momentum and, with it, the category ‘new Christians’ (*cristianos nuevos*) was established. There were specific sub-descriptors for the converted Jews, *marranos*, and the converted Muslims, *moriscos* (also *moros*), while the nomenclature ‘old Christians’ (*cristianos viejos*) preserved their privileged position.

The creation of intermediary and marginal categories was promoted by the unification of Queen Isabella I’s Castile and King Ferdinand II’s Aragon and advanced through their imperial religious-political project with the Catholic Church, the latter via the ‘Spanish Inquisition’. Initially the Inquisition was tasked with ensuring that the principle of *limpieza de sangre* (literally, blood cleansing) among Christians was upheld. This aimed at preventing

intermingling and checking the sincerity of faith of Muslim and Jewish converts to Christianity. Cultural questions preoccupied the Inquisition, whose anxieties were directed by the perception that the ‘new’ Christians remained in essence culturally Jewish or Muslim (Stallaert 1996: 31) and so threatened the integrity of the ‘old’ Christian culture and caste. Policies aimed at cultural assimilation were enacted, underlining the already-existing societal and spatial segregation of non-Christians founded on anti-Semitic discourses on which modern versions of anti-Semitism are also based,⁵ that is, defining anti-Semitism as both anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish – as Islamophobia and Judeophobia. These processes of marginalization would reach a crucial point with the 1492 expulsion of the Spanish Jews (*sefardies*), and later the deportation of Muslims (*mudejars*), following the conquest of Granada. The latter an event Grosfoguel has described as a genocide and the first known epistemicide as non-Christian knowledge, including manuscripts, was eradicated (Grosfoguel 2013). Consequently, contrary to the 1491 agreement made by Ferdinand and Isabella with the Nazari Caliph, Boabdil, conversions were forced upon the surviving Muslim subjects, the *mudejars*, who would be known from then on as *moriscos*.

The Church proscribed the idea of a unique Castilian Christian identity arising from a Visigoth heritage. The idea initially became hegemonic as the overarching character encompassing all other (minority) identities in a false agglomeration, but it would later conquer and colonize, as well as assimilate and incorporate, other identities such as the Catalan, Basque and Navarre. A proposition later adopted by the dictator Francisco Franco and an idea which retains currency among the conservative and nationalist political parties of contemporary Spanish society.⁶ Behind the ideological project of fabricating antecedents for the Castilian Christian identity lies a political and economic centralism which worked against any kind of heterodoxy and rebellion, and through it the *moriscos* were progressively perceived as internal enemies, a threat to the Catholic Crown, and a non-integrable Other positioned outside this unifying identity. This process of discrimination ended with the deportation of the *moriscos* (1609–1614) – although, as Piqueras (2012) points out, with the notable exception of *morisco* slaves in the Valencian Reign. Later, as a by-product of the deportation, the fear of the possible return of the *moriscos* to reclaim their land would haunt certain parts of Spanish society (and in some ways continues to do so), a depiction and imagery which reinforces the distinction between the people living in the Iberian Peninsula and its deported subjects.

It is noteworthy that the *sefardies* have become a celebrated part of the Spanish history, possibly because their descendants still speak Castilian. Hence, if a potential immigrant can prove Sephardic ancestry, he or she can obtain citizenship more quickly than other displaced peoples. In recent time a

new law project has been proposed by the People's Party government aimed at granting Spanish nationality immediately to *sefardíes*. *Mudejar/morisco* ancestry, by contrast, is not celebrated nor is it awarded any special 'returnee' status.

THE REDISCOVERY OF *EL MORO* IN NORTH AFRICA – COLONIALISM AND EVOLUTIONISM

The internal political-cultural project – *la Reconquista* – was closely connected to the external expansive colonization project of the Americas, which provided the foundation of the modern/capitalist world system (Grosfoguel 2003). From the sixteenth century, a shift in perception arose in close connection to the imperial character of the Spanish Empire. The deportation of the *moriscos* had spawned the notion of their return and/or vengeance, but the imperial project was also associated with the desire to revert the Ottoman naval incursions on the Spanish coast and its dominance in the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, projects of establishing borders *in* Africa were enforced with the colonization of several important locations in the north of Africa, such as Melilla (1497), Cazaza (1505), Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera (1508), Oran (1509) and Ceuta (1580). Thus, the initial interests in this North-Oriental part of Morocco, the 'Berbería' (which covered the Berber part of the northern coasts of Africa including parts of Algeria, Tunis and Libya), were martial and strategic and, significantly, this was where the deported *moriscos* had settled. More importantly the political legitimization of these North African incursions spawned local/regional conflicts, for example, the one between the Sultanate and the (Moroccan mountain) Rif people in 1799, in which the Sultanate and the Spanish monarchy reached an understanding about the Spanish repression of a Rif uprising.

Conflicts involving the Spanish in northern Africa were mainly based on a geographical determinism and a social classification of the residing populations. The geographical determinism was based on the notion that the northern part of Morocco was an extension of the Iberian Peninsula (the geography was considered similar) and was justified academically by an extensive historiographical revision of this part of Africa which highlighted the pre-Islamic ancient Roman period. Regarding the classification, until then both Jewish and Muslim identities were constructed as the negation of a Christian identity. Jews and Muslims either had the wrong religion (they could assimilate through conversion to Christianity) or they were the wrong peoples (they could not assimilate, and so had to be deported or annihilated). However, with the 'discovery' of the Indigenous peoples of the Americas, the options were not about assimilation, deportation or massacre but whether or not these

Indigenous peoples possessed a soul. This question became a centrepiece of the famous debate between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (Pagden 1982; Todorov 2010). In its wake, the populations of *Berberia* were re-discovered following a civilization criterion, through a logical extension of the newly produced coloniality of power (Quijano 2000). Hence, they were classified through a categorization based on the new ideas of race and the old concepts of religion (which were closely connected to cultural ideas). Following the genealogy that Mateo Dieste outlines in his work, *El 'moro' entre los primitivos. El caso del Protectorado Español en Marruecos* (1997: 52–3), a difference would be constructed between, *Arabs* (nomadic shepherds of the desert), *el moro* (urban Arabs), *Berber* (spiritually Indigenous Christian mountain people of North Africa who had fled to the high country when the Muslims came) and *el morisco* (old Andalusian Muslims who had been influenced through the cultivation received on Iberian soil). Thus, with the colonial enterprise in North Africa, a differentiation was established between *moro* and *morisco*, a difference which had not existed until then.

From the mid-eighteenth century, the Spanish Crown had developed an important textile production within the colonial empire, particularly in the Catalan region, resulting in a significant Barcelonan bourgeoisie. It is notable that the Catalan industrialization (markedly early in comparison to other southern European nations) was financed by the surplus value extracted from these colonial enterprises and, consequently, through slave labour (Piqueras 2012). With the defeat in the Spanish-American war and the subsequent loss of the last colonies in the Caribbean in the late nineteenth century (1898), hopes were placed in North Africa for political, economic and, crucially, psychological investment. The Spanish loss of the American colonies meant Spain required new markets. Morocco was seen as a possible arena for mining and for new markets for goods, and subsequently the colonization of the North African territory by means of a protectorate was established. The Spanish protectorate in Morocco lasted for more than forty years (1912/1913–1956) and was founded in the same period as the colony, Spanish Sahara, where Western Sahara now lies. (The *saharawi* people, in contemporary Catalonia, are also regarded as an oppressed minority (Bargados 2000).)

The justification for the colonial enterprise of the Protectorate was built around the idea of the inferior neighbour/brother in need of help, a rationale which functioned alongside scientific rationalizations premised on liberal economic ideas and in opposition to the military crusade of the previous religious missions. Colonialism and evolutionism foregrounded the idea of a common racial community. As Andrée Bachoud remarks:

The notion of 'blood' which at the end of the fifteenth century causes the exclusion of the impure groups and contributes to the power of the castes, inverts

within an intellectually liberal current, by the end of nineteenth century; with the assertion of its special blending, Spain pretends to find the specific nature which guarantees a kind of natural leadership over the two coveted continents [Africa and Europe]. In the same way it has pretended to make up a singular 'race' with the Latin American, 'the geographic and ethnic affinities' are asserted with Morocco.⁷ (Bachoud 1988, cited in Dieste 1997: 113)

This led to a kind of cultural relativism paired with evolutionism, based primarily on liberal economic thought. The overt aim of this new colonial mission was labelled 'pacific penetration' by the Spanish colonial enterprise. Dieste elaborates on this Spanish variation on the civilizing mission:

The idea of the Protectorate clearly illustrates this contradiction [regarding the Republican rights – inside and outside Spain]: impose the civilization; conserve the useful tradition of the inferior being, constructing the inequality based on the difference and using the universalist discourse in order to justify this ethnocentric reasoning.⁸ (Dieste 1997: 74)

Most of the Spanish colonial enterprise in Morocco was led by Catalan and Basque companies. For instance, the *Lliga Regionalista* (literally meaning, Regionalist League), a conservative Catalanist nationalist party was in favour of colonization, because the Catalan bourgeoisie – whose interests they represented – desperately required new markets for goods, and had come to accept the concept of a strong centralized state that could control both the colonial enterprise in the Protectorate as well as the internal class struggle emerging in Catalonia.⁹ This reasoning made them support the patriotic reasons for colonizing North Morocco. The period was marked by wars such as the Battle of Annual (where the Spanish military were defeated and Abdelkrim appeared as an iconic anti-colonial rebel), military repression of anti-colonial protests and the Spanish Civil War, which reproduced and transformed the imagery of *el moro*, as Martín Corrales (2002) and Sarrionandia (2012) show. In relation to issues of commemoration and memorial, there has been no official recognition (or pardon) regarding the atrocities committed during the civil war. These acts include the first air raid deploying mustard gas on a civilian population, evidenced partly through witness testimony in the documentary *Arrhash (Poison)*. The Instituto Tecnológico Marañosa, where the gas was fabricated, still experiments with similar weapons.

Generally, the imagery of *el moro* was negative but building on the Orientalist tradition (Said 1978) romantic depictions were evoked as well. However, even the romantic imagery represented *el moro* as a savage, ferocious and uncivilized Other (Dieste 1997: 57), in this way fundamentally aligning the age-old imagery with the new colonial (political-economic) reality. Furthermore, during the Spanish Civil War the Fascist rebels had an army drawn from the Indigenous population of the Protectorate known as the *Regulares*,

who on occasion impulsively committed atrocities against the opposing civilian populations of Spain. This might explain to a certain degree why a negative image of *el moro* prevails among the left-wing parties in Spain.

As I have argued until this point, historically the relationship between ‘the Spanish’ and the ‘moro’ have been mutually constitutive, one might even say clearly mixed, and continuous, although in changing roles depending on the changing socioeconomic conjunctions and relations of power. I will now address how this representational history imposes itself on contemporary Spanish migration issues.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOCULTURAL STRATIFICATION IN CATALONIA: THE CASE OF THE MOROCCAN MIGRANTS IN SALT, CATALONIA

During the first half of the year I undertook my fieldwork I shared a house with a Moroccan man, Mostafa. I had migrated to Spain from Denmark in 2005 and would describe myself as a migrant. Yet other people would classify me as an *estranger* (foreigner) or *guiri* (a term usually employed to describe tourists), so initially there would be a distinction inferred by others between my status and Mostafa’s status. Furthermore, probably because of my white skin, I was often mistakenly taken for a Catalan among the other migrants.

Mostafa and I discussed being Muslim and Moroccan in Salt, and how it was to live and work as a migrant in Salt and Catalonia. Often when we went out for coffee, just the two of us or with Mostafa’s friends, I would notice the usage of the term, *moro*, which locals ascribed to migrants from Morocco. I would also note Mostafa’s reaction to it, detailing it in a fieldwork journal. This is a typical encounter from the journal:

In Mari Carmen’s bar there was an elder woman of around 89 years old, who is called Josefa and is Mari Carmen’s mother-in-law. Both of them are from Andalusia. In the same moment we entered they were talking while a Moroccan guy was reading the newspaper at another table. Mostafa knows them and greeted them, as well as he greeted the Moroccan guy, doing the typical Muslim greeting in Salt, where you first shake hands and then afterwards you put your hand to your heart. We sat down with the Moroccan guy and had a coffee listening to the old woman talk. She said that today she didn’t feel well and that she had a hard time moving around and therefore hadn’t been able to go dance today, she says that she is getting old, and Mostafa replies that in his mind she is not old at all, that people who are really old stay in bed, and she says that she doesn’t want to be like that. Then she says that her neighbors really take care of her, she says, ‘They are *moros* but really good people’, and then Mostafa replies laughing, ‘Ah, although they are *moros*, eh . . . haha’. (Extract from my first field diary, 24 September 2011)

This use of *moro* as a label is often employed by working-class people who have originally migrated to Catalonia from other parts of Spain. The internal migration draws a line between the new and old migrants both of which are usually working class, and often live in the same neighbourhood, with *moro* often being used pejoratively.

CATALONIA: A LAND BUILT ON MIGRATION

While the first migrations to Catalonia took place at the beginning of the twentieth century (often from neighbouring regions and France), in this chapter I focus on more recent ones. During the 1960s and 1970s, the last decades of Franco's dictatorship, Catalonia experienced an important influx of internal migration. This migration led to a crucial social transformation in the Catalan geography, where these inhabitants generally moved into new shoddily built neighbourhoods (such as those in the industrial belt of Barcelona). Social transformation was paired with a perception of a sociocultural change as well by the 'original' inhabitants. The newly arrived migrants were generally poor, often came from agricultural villages (the majority from southern and north-western Spain) and ended up working in the industrial sector. They were working class, and although some of the 'original' Catalans were also labourers, the newly arrived were situated in a culturally inferior position. (Ironically, some Catalans perceived these migrants as the vanguard of a Castilian colonial project). A distinction between the 'original' Catalans (*de pura cepa*) and Spanish migrants arose, based on ethnic, cultural and class factors, often symbolized in the use, or non-use, of the Catalan language (Candel 2008). This difference heralded a social category, *el xarnego*, primarily a derogatory category meant to designate the descendants of mixed marriages between Catalans and Spaniards. Nonetheless, it was progressively employed to describe all of the non-Catalan-speaking migrants of Spanish origin, who were perceived as not integrating in sociocultural terms (Clua i Fainé 2011). In contemporary Catalonia, *xarnego* is only used to describe people who speak Castilian and are working class. From this perspective there are some similarities to the *castecismo* introduced during the medieval period, only this time the identities were primarily constructed upon cultural traits, and against notions of Spanishness which were promoted through the Franco dictatorship's brutal centralism.

In addition to the previously mentioned historic power relations, recent socioeconomic changes in the Spanish state during the 1990s led to an important influx of migrant population from the old colonies in South America and Africa. A significant part of these were people from the northern part of Morocco, Rif – coinciding in this way largely with the former territory of the Protectorate. Most of these Moroccan migrants settled in Catalonia

(Berriane 2004; Moreras 2004). In this region, a history of deprivation, chiefly because of the vacuum left behind by the colonial and later neo-colonial enterprises, had created a mobile population who would first migrate internally in Morocco during the late 1960s, and later in the 1970s to Spain (Dieste 1997). The influx rate of these populations, who had often been living right next to Spanish territory (Melilla and Ceuta), would peak in the late 1990s (García 2004). They constituted a cheap and flexible labour force (Veiga 2001) feeding the economic boom in the real estate sector and the expansion of the agricultural sector, making the economic integration of Spain into the European Union (EU) and the world economy possible and simultaneously taking advantage of such integration.

Apparently, in the beginning of the Moroccan immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, the attitude towards these populations was less hostile.¹⁰ Nonetheless, from the mid-1990s into the early 2000s, when the Spanish economy was booming, the influx of migrants, especially from Morocco, was beginning to peak and was met with an increased and often negative attention. Catalonia is the region of Spain that has received most of the Moroccan migration, starting with 18,619 persons in 1992 and reaching a total of 190,963 persons in 2007.¹¹ These migrants enabled the economic boom with their labour. Still, alongside this new influx of migrants from Africa, a new hierarchy emerged and the *xarnego* would now occupy a more privileged position. However, in the eyes of the Catalan bourgeoisie (Dieste 1997: 106), the Moroccan migrants were not always physically distinguishable from the *xarnego* (all of them were less white than the *Catalans* in terms of social positioning within a racially structured society and working class). Yet the underlying and justifying logic of this new stratification would rest on a reinvention of the coloniality of power where *culture*, and of course the imagery of *el moro*, would play a significant role. Thus while a racist discourse founded upon phenotypical difference was highly unstable, in the case of the Moroccans, the imagery of *el moro* seemed to have revived most probably due to its long history and because it was an operative way of differentiating and designating the Moroccan populations as inferior. Josep, an Old District resident and sixty-two years old, voices a representative perspective that follows the trajectory outlined earlier:

El moro here gets bad press, so to speak, and I believe that it is well earned, why? Because it is an unassimilable culture . . . these people will be a problem in the future. But I say, what I can think of, people what they have is an historical atavism . . . these people are different, they are rare . . . these people . . . and of course, they reject it . . . because for instance, the way they handle women is repugnant, and they do not want them . . . so the opposition to the mosque, is due to the implications, a certain way of . . . there they will gather . . . and then of course they will degrade the neighborhood, because they have a way of

living, a way of being, a . . . which is totally different from ours . . . thus . . . well, you know what I mean . . . this is the rejection that there is . . . but it is not a racial rejection . . . because look at me, I have Arab features, I don't care at all, it is completely irrelevant to me, I have no complex . . . but mentally, culturally . . . I'm at the opposite pole of those people . . . in Europe it's another matter. (Lundsteen 2015a, interview)

According to this viewpoint a shared identification as working class is cancelled, and instead a racialized distinction following cultural and religious lines confers privilege on the former *xarnego* as opposed to colonial subjects as a whole, who are often deprived of nationality or in danger of having their residence permits confiscated – one example of actual discrimination predicated upon class and race. The former *xarnegos* nonetheless establish privilege on the basis of being a part of the (centralist) imagined cultural community of the 'Spanish peoples'.

SOCIOECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN SALT

At the turn of the twenty-first century, defining moments occurred which would reinforce these unequal power relations between Spaniards and *los moros*. Key instances include the racist attacks in Ca n'Anglada (Terrassa 1999) and El Ejido (Almería 2000),¹² and the continuous opposition to mosque construction, and to Muslim symbols, such as in the case of Premià de Mar (Lundsteen 2015b). The official position in these cases rested on the assumption that *el moro* was problematic, a reading championed by right-wing parties in political power, such as Partido Popular and Convergència i Unió. Both these parties proposed that the victims of these racist attacks were themselves to blame, they were represented as negative elements disturbing the common 'social order'. The political parties' rhetoric followed the old schema of blaming the segregationist and non-integrable *moro*. The migrants were furthermore viewed as competing with longer time residents for housing and work. Hence 'new' cultural expressions in the public sphere – the presence of Islamic butchers, mosques, chadors, headscarves, among other signs – were used as emblems to direct attacks against. These attacks would make explicit, and at the same time reproduce, the unequal power relations in Catalan society, reinvigorating old anti-moro (as well as anti-Semitic) stereotypes and linking them to general discourse of Islamophobia (López 2011; Grosfoguel 2006; Esposito and Kalin 2009). In Spain it has been sustained and revived mainly by the Spanish and Catalan far right (although such depictions are not limited to this political spectrum) and disseminated through

mass media treatment of ‘terrorist plots’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, founded upon a revival of the age-old imagery of the fear of the return and invasion of *los moros*. Different right-wing think tanks and newspapers (such as *La Razón*, *ABC* and *El Mundo*) have been preoccupied with ‘showing’ the imminent threat that different ‘salafist’ (a literalist and conservative reading of Islam) groupings were posing, accusations often very loosely grounded. The consequence is that the Muslims at large are being criminalized and in this way the media intensifies fear and hostility towards Muslims. Salt is just one recent example in this history of vilification built upon moral panic discourse (Cohen 1972).

Recent social conflicts in Salt have largely been depicted as conflicts between *los moros* and the *autochthonous*, based on underlying problems such as urban segregation, cultural invasion and crime, all understood as products of cultural determinants. Nonetheless, a closer reading of the conflicts in Salt (Lundsteen 2015a), of which the recurrent and predictable antagonisms are construed as symptoms, reveals a more complex reality. For instance, if we examine the question of residential segregation in the town centre, which according to the hegemonic discourse is a result of implicit cultural favouritism and as such demonstrates the impossibility of *los moros*’ integration into the Catalan/Spanish society. The operation of the real estate market on a regional scale has ensured that no migrant is able to dwell in the centre of Girona (a metropolis near Salt) or in other less stigmatized areas, leaving new migrants to reside in the small towns around the region, in the working-class suburbs of Girona or in Salt. Real estate agencies that specialized in selling low-value properties at markedly inflated prices arose in the early 2000s – as a consequence of a boom which allowed extra tax-free bonuses for property purchases. Some agencies even exploited potential customers’ ignorance and disseminated misinformation, often hiring migrants to propagate this misinformation among their communities. In this way the ‘mass-migration’ to the town centre of Salt was promoted by real estate agencies; although obviously it was also an attractive place, with relatively low rents and in some regards a better location than other working-class neighbourhoods in Girona in terms of proximity to stores and public spaces. More significantly the influx of willing buyers, supported and financed by frenzy-lending banks, made the emigration of ‘the Spaniards’ – former internal migrants – possible. This way they were able to sell their old homes and move into new ones in neighbourhoods of higher standards.

This development occurred alongside an increasing focus among autochthonous and working-class sectors of local civil society on the perceived problem of rising crime. In fact, the type of crime had changed rather than the frequency of crime going up. Following local informants immersed in this sector, organized crime, including fraud and drug dealing, seemed to

have peaked around 2004–2007, and, a small proportion of local bars in the town centre owed their existence to shady businesses. This criminal-specific ecology was in part an outcome of the local-regional geography: proximity to the French border, to Girona and central location to the region. In addition, Salt's location was marginal in terms of police vigilance and due to its status as a local community of loosely structured social relations. Furthermore, Salt is a station for northbound and southbound traffic and was a locale where precarious lives (and livelihoods) without stable working conditions accumulated. The workers had no social security and if employed were often lowly paid. All these factors contributed to an informal economy and an interest in and need for easy money. However, with the economic crisis, accompanied by increased police attention, this type of crime lessened, and instead, petty crime increased. The main contrast between these two types of crime is that the latter type tends to affect residents more directly and is more visible, whereas the former type is less visible and with consequences that come from an abstract other. But above all, and maybe the most important factor is that in Salt petty crime victims were and are primarily working class and elderly.

In this sense, Salt is a model example of the social impacts of economic crisis: people are evicted daily, there are increasing redundancies and a worsening of the conditions of the employment contracts is a norm. How these problems are managed and articulated politically is consequently a political battleground. The way the social conflicts were treated, by the local and regional administrations and by the police, ended up confirming the underlying racist hypotheses. In cultural and ideological terms, the majority of the measures were directed against Moroccans, who were seen as the upholders of Islam ('being Muslim' is often equated with Arabness, this way excluding all other kinds of Muslim identities, such as sub-Saharan or Asians), their 'radical' alterity posed as the opposite of Spanish society and identity, thus again their representation reverts to the old imagery of *el moro* and Islamophobia. *El moro* is often immediately accused when a crime is committed, for example, in the case of a rape or homicide. And different right-wing media were and are quick to capitalize on this assumption,¹³ as illustrated by the case of the death of Oscar Cruz in Salt (Lundsteen 2015a), and the former mayor Iolanda Pineda's comments on this case:

Then there was the death of Oscar Cruz, who was found with an injury in his head in the 'Plaça dels colors' . . . and was led to the hospital after having an initial inspection he was told to wait but he did not want to wait . . . when he came home he told that 'a *moro* had beaten him' and then went to sleep and unfortunately he died . . . well you can imagine, a local-born kid and the social services . . . then from there on we started the investigations, and eventually

discovered that it was not a Moroccan who had beaten him up . . . but *thanks* to a Moroccan we discovered that who had killed Oscar Cruz was a Colombian. (Lundsteen 2015a, interview)

Nonetheless, although these direct attacks were largely carried out by the former internal migrants, the silence and indirect justification by the ‘Catalans’ were equally important as exemplified by Joan a forty-five-year middle-class ‘Catalan’s’ statement:

You have these ticks of . . . racism, it’s not racism, it is an irritation towards the newcomer who does what the hell he wants and who doesn’t care to integrate at all. . . . I don’t consider my family to be either very clever or very dumb, but the racist connotations that they are acquiring . . . all the people of my local environment here, are acquiring racist connotations. . . . I still don’t believe it because there are people who were totally the opposite, when you were 23–24–25 years old, and you ask yourself to what can this be attributed, the difference in age? No man come on, something must be happening here that can explain why the way of speech and way of thinking of these people have changed so drastically over a period of ten years. . . . I told you that . . . it’s not a racist position but a position that you are tired of shit. (Lundsteen 2015a, interview)

This way *los moros* are presented not as victims of racism but the somehow (in)directly responsible, given that they attract the problems due to their behaviour. This perverse justification, often politically correct in appearance, would basically support the racist attacks inflicted upon the Moroccan migrants in a contemporary crusade against what is perceived and represented as the return or the threat of *los moros*.

Conversely, the articulation around Islam as a ‘cohesive identifier’ might also be seen as a counter-strategy in a hostile society that renders certain minority subjects as threats, enemies and foreigners. It helps create a shared identity among a large majority of the different subjugated migrated/foreign peoples, which falls short though because it principally focuses on questions of identity on the basis of a religious ascription (thus ignoring the fact that other equally subjugated groups of non-religious factions exist and suffer discrimination as well). This kind of critique becomes more relevant when considering the internal dynamics, such as the Moroccan government funding different programmes which would link ‘the subjects of the Moroccan Crown’ with ‘their homeland’. My point is that these kinds of readings themselves are, albeit different, nonetheless equally culturalist apprehensions of a reality which on their own constitute reductionist views of the social problems of minority populations in Spain.

CONCLUSION

During my fieldwork in Salt, I was in contact with North African migrants, residents in town and within the local community. As I was initially struck by the persistence of the racial and ethnic classification in the use of the imagery of *el moro*, I wanted to understand how the persistence of the classification had developed historically, how the Moroccan populations integrate into the Spanish/Catalan society and how we can understand this as part of the socioeconomic transformations as a whole. Therefore, in this chapter I have aimed at focusing my analysis on images and representations as part of political processes connected to social groups and their ‘interests’ while helping to constitute, reinforce and/or reproduce them and/or their borders. The chapter began with a discussion of how *la Reconquista* was a political-cultural project, constructed on internal processes of marginalization aimed at covering up the intertwined relations and blurred boundaries between the different social groups. A marginalization which erased the ethnic and socio-historical similarities, given most of the people represented by this discussion had and have been neighbours for centuries. In sum, *la Reconquista* was built around a unifying-by-assimilation ‘Catholic Spanish’ identity in opposition to the ‘Muslim’ and *morisco/mudejar* (as well as Jewish) identities – a project which later developed with the colonization of the Americas and finally became a complex social hierarchy of intermingled coloniality of power. Furthermore, on the basis of this initial experience and the Crusades, it also helped found an idea of a Christian Europe, which would later on develop its own internal hierarchy that is now epitomized along several evolutionary splits, where the southern European countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal are relegated to an ‘inferior’ position in relation to a ‘superior’ North. This was clearly shown in the way the financial sector and media, especially by *The Financial Times* and Barclays Capital, employed the acronym PIGS during the debt crisis. In a marked contrast to the hegemonic ideas reigning in northern Europe, Spain had a very low public debt at the beginning of the crisis in comparison with other countries. Even within Spain there is a similar separation between the southern Catalan and the northern Basque Country populations.¹⁴

It is important to distinguish between the different levels in which the discourses operate. Hence, we see an Islamophobic discourse operating at a more abstract level undoubtedly related to issues of a more geopolitical and economic nature, with a trajectory that we can trace back to the fifteenth century and beyond. Back then it served as a way to justify military intervention in foreign countries and territories with the purpose of exploitation. Likewise, today the vast majority of the countries of the Global North are

immersed in several wars in 'Muslim territories' in North Africa and the Middle East which, due to their questionable purposes, require an extra-economic justification. At the same time Europe is faced with the dilemma created by this same situation, because the continuous wars and looting of the populations force them to flee from the miserable conditions they are trapped in. Faced with this scenario of forced migrations and class war, Islamophobia serves well as an ideology. The generalized diffusion of an authentic 'moral panic' (Cohen 1972) when it comes to Islam and the Muslims serves the interests of the big capital and, at the same time, the 'white' working classes, while it promotes a social differentiation in which the 'new neighbors' are subjected to an inferior position with respect to the old and 'original' populations. A social differentiation which connects well with some filo-Fascist currents that have travelled a long distance among the working classes (exemplified in some currents of anarcho-syndicalism as the one proposed by Georges Sorel), as Holmes (2000) argues. But more importantly, it heralds a privilege in an uncertain time of crisis of Europe and the welfare state, in which these populations see how the social benefits and stability obtained in the post-war era, and thus the future of their children, are endangered.

Furthermore, in the everyday interaction, the more abstract Islamophobic discourses are mixed with another kind of anti-modern, anti-globalist and hence local discourse. At this scale, the arguments and discourses that seem to work the most are of the racist type, as for example with some nationalities in particular, and in the case of Salt especially the Moroccans. Although, this undoubtedly taps into a recurring anxiety about an invasion and/or cultural imposition, the most recurrent worries are citizen insecurity and positive discrimination (unequal access to social resources). Thus, at the local level of Salt, highly Islamophobic discourses (portrayed as an identity struggle) are intermingled with issues of social justice, and limiting the access of the ethno-culturally 'undeserving'.

Finally, this continuing marginalization and discrimination of Spain's migrant population occurs during a period of neoliberal restructuring of the world economy and is justified in the media and by the regional and broader administration as part of a larger global coloniality of power. One of the main objectives seems to be the desire to maintain the privilege of 'the whites' – that is 'the nationals' of EU, and thus Spain at large, by trying to assert its 'Europeanness' as opposed to its 'Africanness'. In this liminal space we find the colonial subjects of EU, populations who both function as docile workers and surplus population and who become, when necessary, scapegoats to maintain a minimum of social welfare standards for the 'nationals'.

NOTES

1. Regarding the distinction between the terms Moor and *moro*: although both Moor and *moro* comes from the Latin word for the inhabitant of the Roman Africa, *maurus*, *moro*, has a more complex meaning that does not easily translate into English.

2. See Alcantud (2002); Dieste (1997); Corrales (2002); Martín-Márquez (2008); Navarro (2008); Sarrionandia (2012) and Stallaert (1996).

3. As Stallaert (1996) argues, ‘En su sentido etimológico, “casta” es sinónimo de “nación” y “raza” . . . y de ahí de “etnia” o grupo étnico. . . . “Castizo” se dice del linaje étnicamente limpio . . . “no contaminado de sangre mora o judía”’. (22).

4. ‘The reconquest’ is a myth deeply entangled with the history of the idea of Christian Europe. It remains predominant and is clearly at the root of current Islamophobia (Grosfoguel 2006).

5. I understand anti-Semitism as Islamophobic and Judeophobic.

6. See, for example, the speeches and writings of the ex-prime minister and *Partido Popular* member, José María Aznar. Strands of the Catalan and Basque nationalist parties would also adopt the concept of Christian versus Muslim identity.

7. ‘La noción de “sangre”, que a finales del siglo XV origina la exclusión de los grupos “impuros” y contribuye al poder de las castas, se invierte dentro de una corriente liberal intelectual, a finales del siglo XIX; con la afirmación de su mestizaje especial, España pretende encontrar la especificidad que le asegure una especie de liderazgo natural sobre los dos continentes codiciados [África y Europa]. . . . De la misma manera que se pretende formar una sola “raza” con los latinoamericanos, se afirman ‘las afinidades geográficas y étnicas’ con Marruecos’. (The translations are mine.)

8. ‘La idea de protectorado ilustra claramente esta contradicción: imponer la civilización; conservar la tradición útil del ser inferior, construyendo la desigualdad sobre la diferencia y usando el discurso universalista para legitimar esta razón etnocéntrica’.

9. The ‘Setmana Tràgica’ is an excellent example of the entanglement of these issues (Ullman 1968; Ealham 2005).

10. See, for example, Najat El-Hachmi (2004).

11. Following the ‘Observatorio de la inmigración marroquí en España’, <http://www.uam.es/otroscentros/TEIM/Observainmigra/Espana/Regulares/regularesevolucion.html>.

12. See Veiga (2001), for an interesting analysis of the political-economic factors behind the latter events.

13. ‘El joven fallecido en Salt fue asesinado por un moro, al que reprochó que llamara ‘hijos de puta’ y ‘cabrones’ a los españoles’, *Alerta Digital* 18 March 2011; ‘La alcaldesa de Salt pide justicia para el joven fallecido tras una agresión’, *ABC* 22 March 2011.

14. See <http://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/public-debt-percent-gdp>.

Chapter 4

The Coloniality of Power and the Disempowerment of the Roma

Sabrina Marks and Miye Nadya Tom

This chapter examines past and present situations of Roma populations in Europe through a postcolonial lens. In so doing, the aim of this chapter is to not only decentralize postcolonial discussions from Europe but also challenge the idea of Europe by disrupting modern narratives of homogeneity that continue to exclude Roma peoples. Despite centuries of state-sanctioned efforts to eradicate their differences, the Roma have been able to maintain their unique identity. We use the concept of coloniality to illustrate how the technologies of domination and eradication of the ‘Other’ that developed through colonialism have also framed the situation of the Roma throughout the globe. We focus on Western and central-eastern Europe (CEE) and, later, North America.

APPROACHING ROMA MIGRATION FROM A POSTCOLONIAL LENS

From ‘discovery’ to forced migration across bodies of water and landmasses to the search for economic prosperity in other lands, human movement has fashioned the modern Western world. As a result of these movements, non-Western peoples were displaced from territories that came under the colonial occupation of European empires. From the onset of early modernity, however, various religious and ethnic minority groups within Europe were also subjected to similar histories of genocide, exclusion, expulsion and/or forced assimilation that occurred within Europe. Among these groups have been the Roma. More commonly known as Gypsies, the Roma are the oldest and largest ethnic minority group dispersed throughout Europe (Garcés et al.

2015). Despite their status as one of the most marginalized and socially disadvantaged peoples throughout the Western world (ibid.), the struggles that the Roma have endured during this time span have often been overlooked – within and beyond the European geographical space.

In this chapter, rather than focusing on specific laws, we provide a broad historical overview of how the colonality of power (Quijano 2008) – a globalized system of oppression developed through colonial relations that racially ranked peoples and places – has shaped the situation of Roma communities in Europe and North America. In particular, we examine the grip of this oppressive system within Western and CEE, two regions with large Roma populations living within their borders and long histories of enforcing state-sanctioned efforts to limit the rights of those populations. We then set our sights westward to broadly examine restrictions enacted in North America to deter Roma migration across the Atlantic, which increased after the mid-nineteenth century and then, again, during the late twentieth century. Our choice to also focus on North America allows us to further extend postcolonial discourses by turning attention to the often-overlooked situation of the American Roma. By drawing these connections, we not only seek to acknowledge the global reaches of this diverse ethnic community, but we also seek to challenge the idea of Europe and modern narratives of homogeneity that continue to exclude Roma peoples.

The history of the Roma in Europe and throughout the world – like human history – is also one of movement. Comparative linguistic studies of the Roma language with Sanskrit and Hindi yield strong evidence that the Roma began to migrate from their ancestral land in northern India to Europe around the tenth century (Fraser 1995; Hancock 1987, 2010a, 2010b; Herakova 2009; Liegeois 1986; Oprea 2007). Although the timing of their exodus is solid among scholars, some academics disagree regarding the reason for the ethnic group's departure (Fraser 1995; Liegeois 1986).¹

During the beginning of their migration and dispersion, members of Roma communities were able to remember their Indian roots but as centuries passed, they forgot their background, thus leaving it up to Western scholars to trace their origins and construct their ethnic identity (Hancock 2010b). This has led to many misconceptions, such as the misnomer *Gypsy* by which the Roma are most commonly known due to the mistaken idea that they came from Egypt based on their dark complexions and features (Bardi 2006; Fraser 1995; Hancock 2010b).² The emergence of the Roma in the West has excited the imaginations of writers, historians and journalists, thus, influencing their representation as the exotic or criminalized 'Other'.

By the seventeenth century, Roma could be found dispersed throughout all parts of Europe (Fraser 1995; Hancock 1987, 2010b). Their history is

one of great resilience. Despite centuries of state-sanctioned efforts that sought to eradicate their differences, the Roma have been able to maintain their unique identity. Currently, the Roma are one of the most marginalized and socially disadvantaged populations throughout Europe (Gabel 2009; Imre 2006; Jones 1998). To this day, dehumanizing stereotypes remain prevalent in paradigms of inclusion and citizenship that have historically shaped Roma policies (Araújo 2016; Bancroft 2001; Kenney 2009) – and, as we explore, those which have sought to control their movements. The following section examines past and present situations of Roma populations in Europe through a postcolonial lens. More specifically, it uses the concept of coloniality to illustrate how the technologies of domination and eradication of the ‘Other’ have framed the social standing of the Roma in Europe that would eventually spread to North America. Finally, we conclude this chapter by redressing the idea of Europe to explore what postcolonial debates can learn from Roma experiences, which are too often omitted from these debates altogether.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: COLONIALITY AND THE IDEA OF EUROPE

If one puts faith in ‘official’ accounts of ‘world history’, it could easily be surmised that colonialism was but a historical moment when imperial European countries politically and culturally imposed themselves upon the peoples within the territories they occupied. Exploitative colonial-capitalist relations helped proliferate the modern world system – within which all societies or nation-states are enmeshed (Wallerstein 1974). As the birthplace of the modern, Chakrabarty (2007) surmises that Europe is ‘an imaginary’ enmeshed in all political and institutional facets of modernity that were exported globally during – and after – colonialism.

In the aftermath of the colonial era, postcolonial debates offer various conceptual tools and strategies for deconstructing the West as a totality, challenging us to critically engage with questions regarding to what extent the world and our societies have been shaped by the colonial era, including the conceptual tools we use to interpret it. In this respect, the ‘coloniality of knowledge and power’ is inherent to the modern world system (Quijano 2008). Coloniality is iterated in the institutional functions of the modern nation-state and that which constitutes hegemonic Western knowledge. Eurocentrism is fundamental and foundational to this knowledge production. As Quijano elaborates: ‘All of the histories, resources, and cultural products ended up in one global cultural order revolving around European

or Western hegemony. Europe's hegemony over the new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony' (2008: 189).

Despite its globalized nature, coloniality has manifested differently; therefore, to gain a better understanding of coloniality as a global system of oppression we must also address its manifestation in different historical and regional contexts. Like other regions, race and racism in Europe play a crucial role in the configuration of coloniality (Suárez-Krabbe 2014). The Roma's assignment as an inferior race has traversed history, revealing a record of unfavourable representations. Their nomadism inspired the natural scientist, Charles Darwin, to mark the Roma as inferior to sedentary peoples (Fraser 1995; Grellman 1787; Hancock 1997, 2010b, 2011; Mayall 1988). Additionally, the racialization of criminality has left the ethnic group marked as inferior and immoral as the genetic criminality of Roma became a recurring theme. Based on Darwin's research, for instance, Cesare Lombroso, an Italian scholar, published his influential work in 1876, which claimed the ethnic minority had a genetic propensity for criminality and was essentially a race of criminals.³ Subsequent works intensified Lombroso's sentiments, calling for the euthanasia of Roma to relieve civilized society and the Roma themselves of their disdained inherent condition (see Fraser 1995; Hancock 2010b, 2011).

Additionally, it is significant to note that our text is written from the North American context and that it is also collaboration between a Roma-American researcher and a Native American researcher. Due to these factors, our analysis of Europe is one of outsiders looking in on origins of violent repression: through coloniality. At the onset of early modernity, the bloody conquest of the Americas paralleled violent efforts undertaken in the name of national unification in Spain (Garcés et al. 2015). More specifically, various religious and ethnic minority groups within Europe – including the Roma – were subjected to similar histories of genocide, expulsion and/or forced assimilation that occurred within colonized territories outside Europe. Should we focus on the colonial question from the Americas, one link can be observed in the first anti-Roma laws in Spain that came to fruition in 1499 – only seven years after the 'discovery' of the Americas (Perez 2009). In Spain (as well as in Portugal), anti-Roma laws would include forced sedentariness and/or the prohibition of the use of their language, traditional clothing and trades. In the Portuguese context, the Roma faced expulsions to Spain, Brazil or Portugal's colonies in Africa (Bastos 2007). Indigenous peoples in and of distant continents – as well as within Europe should we also consider the Sami of Nordic regions – were not the sole victims of colonialism. Through such historical processes, the Roma have been relegated to unbelonging in

countries throughout Europe. The colonial logic also endures in mainstream postcolonial discussions, which rarely acknowledge Roma socio-historical experiences. If the idea of Europe and the takes that it tells of itself were created through what Chakrabarty (2007 [2000]) calls ‘asymmetrical ignorances’, these asymmetrical ignorances also persist through the failure of many postcolonial scholars to include Roma histories.

The period of Enlightenment played an integral role in the racialized view of non-Western peoples within imperial colonies. True to the legacy of colonialism, the racialized rankings placed Western peoples in the superior position relegating non-Westerners to the inferior orders – including the Roma. These legacies, alongside the emergence of the modern nation-state and narratives of homogeneity that frame citizenship and belonging have, throughout history, worked to marginalize and disenfranchise Roma populations (Marsh 2007). Their assignment as an inferior race has traversed history, revealing a record of unfavourable representations – ascribed a less-than-human status, Roma have been equated to vermin, parasites, refuse, carrion eaters and cannibals by scholars, scientists, political figures and other colonial agents.

While each European country may have its own unique historical trajectory, overarching colonial logics have been adapted differently (Suárez-Krabbe 2014: 158). To illustrate these differences, we focus broadly on countries in CEE, where a large majority of Europe’s Roma population lives (Bancroft 2001; Fraser 1995; Gabel 2009; Imre 2006; Liegeois 1986). Countries in this region came under different political regimes that vastly impacted Roma policy – of which we focus on Authoritarian (interwar and World War II periods), state socialist and, finally, Democratic (post-socialist starting in 1989) (Bárány 2002). As these CEE countries came to be subjected to the power and hegemony of Western Europe and North America, both historical persecution and impacts of the global economy led many Roma to seek asylum in the United Kingdom and in Canada.

SLAVERY AND PERSECUTION IN CEE

Despite bringing valuable trades and skills with them, CEE did not welcome the Roma (Fraser 1995; Hancock 1987). The Roma encountered a particularly bitter reception in the Balkans, where they were enslaved for five centuries beginning in the fourteenth century within Wallachia and Moldavia, now Romania (Hancock 1987). Their enslavement was meant to reduce labour shortages within the region brought on by persistent war efforts (Fraser 1995; Hancock 1987). Following their emancipation in 1856, generations of Roma who endured slavery headed westward following in the footsteps of their

ancestors. Similar to previous historical eras, this wave of Roma migrants were not welcomed, which can be observed in the rise of anti-Roma legislation in many western European regions (McGarry 2012). Consequences included fines, forced registration, deportation, imprisonment and execution (Bardi 2006). The severity of anti-gypsy sentiments and the resulting punitive legislation increased, eventually culminating in the near annihilation of the ethnic group by the Nazi regime (Fraser 1995; Hancock 2004). Although Nazi policies targeted both the Jews and Roma for extermination, Roma were the only group tagged as a racial threat. Deemed to have a genetic propensity towards criminality, the Nazis viewed the Roma as a threat to the German gene pool if procreation between groups were permitted (Hancock 2004, 2010b). Consequently, approximately 80 per cent of the Roma population within Nazi-occupied countries was murdered at the hands of the Third Reich (Hancock 2002).

COMMUNIST ERA: FORCED SETTLEMENT AND WORK-FORCE INTEGRATION

Although nomadism has been a historical reality from many Roma groups, the majority now live settled existences, an existence predominantly forced upon them via legal actions exerted by Communist regimes during the twentieth century. The Czech Communist regime enacted policies and laws designed to forcibly end the nomadic ways of the Roma such as the Act on the Permanent Settlement of Nomadic People, passed in the mid-twentieth century. Reminiscent of previous centuries, the forced settlement of the Roma was inspired by a gap in the low-skilled labour force in the aftermath of forced expulsions and mass exterminations during the Holocaust. Under the aforementioned policy, the means by which the Roma had maintained their economic independence and nomadism, horses, wagons and so forth, were seized and destroyed, thus, making their participation in the low-wage labour force a coerced concession (Bancroft 2001). The state took responsibility to care for or ‘modernize’ groups that, ‘as a result of “capitalist exploitation” in the past, were found to live in “social and cultural backwardness”’ (Csepeli and Simon 2004: 130). While policy under socialism was in some ways similar to those that came before it (e.g. eradicating difference by way of forced assimilation), it was also markedly different because socialist policy resulted in decreased social and economic exclusion, as well as increased education levels (according to the values of dominant society). In regions where Roma were enslaved, however, these policies echoed previous eras when the Roma were forced to remedy labour shortages.

ROMA EXCLUSION FOLLOWING THE FALL OF COMMUNISM

Ironically for the Roma, the end of Communism in CEE countries brought with it increased discrimination and persecution at all levels (Gabel 2009; Imre 2006; Jones 1998; Lee 2000). The Roma were employed for decades under the socialist labour system – albeit in low-wage, unskilled jobs. Yet the dissolution of the socialist labour system left the ethnic group ill-equipped to compete in a skilled and technologically advanced market economy (Bancroft 2001). As such, these political changes resulted in Roma's virtual exclusion from the job market due to unbridled anti-Roma sentiments that were merely hidden by the communist structure (Bancroft 2001; Lee 2000). These enduring anti-Roma sentiments were fuelled by increased nationalistic pride in the new democratic countries. Hence, the political efforts that forcibly integrated the Roma into the communist state afforded them no form of capital to be considered citizens of Europe when the socialist system dissolved.

Exclusionary actions in CEE countries were not limited to the labour market as ghettoization was a common affliction for the ethnic group in many municipalities within the Czech Republic. Ghettos served to exclude the Roma in two ways: (1) exclusion from their human rights, denying regular garbage disposal, water and electricity services and (2) exclusion from non-Roma with several councils voting to build walls around Roma housing projects (Bancroft 2001).

The post-Communist era also gave rise to anti-Roma violence fostered by new-found nationalistic pride coupled with the long-lasting perception of Roma as the 'Other'. Extremist groups with connections within both private and public sectors launched hate speech campaigns and demonstrations against the Roma (Council of Europe [COE] 2012; European Roma Rights Centre [ERRC] 2011). The rhetoric and public displays reiterated ethnic stereotypes including the inherent criminality and laziness of the Roma, touting the threat that members of the ethnic group pose to hardworking CEE citizens. Moreover, much of the rhetoric called for the mass deportations, arrests and murders of Roma in these areas (COE 2012). Anti-Roma sentiments failed to cease as hate speech and violent acts against the Roma, including physical assaults, shootings, vandalism and fire bombings resulted in property damage, permanent injuries and deaths (COE 2012; ERRC 2011).

Aligning with the notion of physical separation and Roma foreignness, CEE media and legislators launched campaigns to promote the departure of the Roma from the region. One such tactic involved the airing of two documentaries that showed Roma living free from ethnic persecution and enjoying economic gain after seeking asylum in Britain and Canada (Bancroft 2001; Kenney 2009). Subsequently, many municipal councils within the Czech

Republic incentivized Roma to seek asylum in Britain or Canada by supplying one-way tickets to one of the countries (Bancroft 2001).

THE EFFECTS OF THE GLOBAL REFUGEE DILEMMA ON ROMA

Even though, the refugee dilemma only emerged as a global quandary within the past few decades, the Roma asylum-seeking situation is reminiscent of past patterns of state efforts to restrict the movements of this ethnic group. Since the fall of Communism, reasons for mass migrations have proven to be diverse and complicated, blurring the lines between refugees and economic immigrants (Virág and Vidra 2013; Zimmermann 2011). Refugees can be uprooted and forced to run from realized or potential harm derived from war, civil unrest and human rights violations (Loescher 1993). Accordingly, the refugee label has transformed over the past few decades to include those looking to escape complex forms of persecution, discrimination and social inequalities (Zetter 2007). Despite this transformation, several countries including democratic nations have failed to embrace this modern definition of refugees. Congruently, immigration policies have become more about projecting the ideal image of a country – showing that it has complete control of its borders so that it can allow worthy immigrants in and keep those it deems inadequate out (Rajaram 2013; Zetter 2007).

Furthermore, refugee determination procedures serve to create the definitions of those who are worthy and unworthy of receiving asylum (Richmond 2001; Zimmermann 2011). As a result, modern refugee and asylum policies serve as the mechanism for inclusion and exclusion (Rajaram 2013; Zetter 2007; Zimmermann 2011). Determination procedures and policies serve to define which refugee claims are valid and which are ‘bogus’ as the legitimacy debate stems from the notion that false claimants – or those deemed false by the governing powers – are merely trying to make financial gains at the expense of the receiving country. Therefore, these policies are instituted to address ‘the perceived “abuse” or misuse of the asylum system by the wrong categories of migrants’ (Zimmermann 2011: 337).

Accordingly, in the last decade of the twentieth century, the United Kingdom turned a suspicious eye on refugees (Bancroft 2001; Zimmermann 2011). In particular, the United Kingdom deemed the Roma the wrong category of migrant, unworthy and invalid, seeking to abuse socialized government benefits. Officials made public statements declaring the Roma as bogus asylum seekers and warning the Roma that their false intentions preceded them and would result in the rejection of their claims (Bancroft 2001). Warnings were only the beginning as the United Kingdom enacted stricter immigration

procedures, resulting in an inversion of acceptance and rejection rates, taking the country from previously high refugee claim acceptance rates and low rejection rates to high rejection rates and low acceptance rates (Zimmermann 2011). The adoption of the Safe Country of Origins list, an official European-wide sanctioned list of countries with passable human rights records, was one such mandate that contributed to the inversion rate and inhibited 'illegitimate' refugees. Similarly, suspicions against Roma refugees rose across the Atlantic in North America, namely Canada.

Roma immigration from CEE to Canada has been occurring since the late nineteenth century with Roma looking to escape large-scale wars and the Soviet invasion. In particular, Canada, a country that had proven welcoming to Roma refugees and asylum seekers, stiffened refugee policies beginning in the late 1990s continuing into the second decade of the twenty-first century. Since CEE came under a communist regime, anyone fleeing could apply for refugee status with no need to identify their ethnicity. Decades later, when Communism dissolved, and CEE countries transitioned into democratic nations, citizens were no longer afforded automatic refugee status (Kováts 2002; Lee 2000). Subsequently, as victims of the aforementioned violence and institutional discrimination, Roma refugees primarily from the Czech Republic and Hungary were forced to claim their ethnic identity as their reason for seeking asylum. Despite their right to claim refugee status based on ethnic discrimination and persecution, Roma found that many neighbouring European countries were unwilling to receive them. Canada, on the other hand, proved more receptive as long as the number of Roma asylum seekers remained low (Lee 2000).

Following the demise of Communism, the Czech Republic and Hungary were the only two countries whose citizens were not required to apply for a visa to enter Canada. However, once the number of asylum seekers, predominantly Roma applicants, increased significantly, visa requirements for both countries were reinstituted (Arhin 2013; Lee 2000; Tóth 2013; Virág and Vidra 2013). As an additional method to stem Roma asylum-seeking, CEE Roma applicants entering Canada were subjected to extensive criminal background checks and interrogations by immigration officers, a measure never before implemented for a specific group of people. Eventually, these checks and interrogations were declared violations of the Canadian Charter of Rights (Arhin 2013).

Consequently, Roma asylum-seeking fostered many political implications for CEE countries. These burgeoning democracies quickly began to view Roma asylum-seeking as a barrier to European Union (EU) accession as well as nurturing their bilateral relationship with Canada (Tóth 2013; Virág and Vidra 2013). Concordantly, Canada became concerned about the rise in Roma refugee claims and the effect on friendly relations with these new democratic

nations (Lee 2000). In response, legislation to deter ‘bogus’ Roma asylum seekers from applying in Canada was enacted. The legislation changed the process and rights of refugees by eliminating temporary healthcare benefits for claimants waiting for processing and approval and the provision for the Designated Country of Origin (DCO), a list of countries deemed to be safe and unlikely to produce refugees due to their democratic political systems (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2012). The DCO included both Hungary and the Czech Republic, despite the targeted violence, discrimination and persecution the Roma endured in these countries.

FROM INTEGRATION TO IMMIGRATION: THE PERPETUATION OF ROMA AS OUTSIDERS

Throughout Europe, historically ingrained processes of exclusion, segregation, discrimination and state systems have ‘condemned’ Roma to social ostracism (Araújo and Maeso 2012). As our broad overview on CEE countries exhibits, much of the modern mistreatment and disadvantage of the Roma escalated after the fall of Communism in 1989. Although, the circumstances underlying the treatment of Roma in post-Communist Europe are complex, two basic factors have been highly influential: a heightened sense of nationalism and the transition to a market economy in these countries (Foszio and Anastasoae 2001; Imre 2006; Gabel 2009).

The fact that Roma populations in Europe are three times more likely to be unemployed than members of the dominant culture results from enduring socio-historical racial relations, which continue to regard members of Roma communities as foreigners in their own countries. High rates of illiteracy also contribute to their disadvantage, with the majority of Roma having little to no education beyond primary school (Gabel 2009; Lloyd and McCluskey 2008). Their disadvantage goes beyond socioeconomic factors and has followed historical trends to include persecution at the state level. In the past few decades, they have endured ethnic profiling in Italy; segregation, discrimination and bullying in schools throughout Europe; mass evictions from their homes in Spain; the expulsion of Roma refugees from France and Germany and forced sterilizations throughout CEE (Csepeli and Simon 2004; Lloyd and McCluskey 2008; McGarry 2012).

Our broad overview of CEE countries also shows that, whether under socialism or neoliberalism, the proliferation of dehumanizing stereotypes can often be observed in paradigms of inclusion and citizenship that have shaped past and present Roma policies. Much of the history of anti-Roma policy has either tried to physically eradicate the Roma through genocide or ethnocide or to control their movement. Today, ‘the focus is on the cultural

inadequacies of [ethnically marked] populations – who ought to show a willingness to integrate to prevent hostile reactions’ (Araújo 2016: 301). In many respect, these discourses continue to pose the very existence of the Roma and Roma lifestyles as problematic by focusing on their indigence, substandard living conditions and victimization by xenophobes (Erjavec 2001; Imre 2006; Kenney 2009; Richardson 2006). EU and country-specific initiatives to ‘integrate’ Roma populations into mainstream society can be challenging. On one hand, these efforts address long-standing struggles for Roma citizens to have the same rights and obligations guaranteed to other citizens. On the other hand, the language of integration is racialized. ‘Gypsies’ continue to be portrayed as a timeless primitive culture – romanticized for their resistance to the constraints of modernization and criminalized for operating on the margins of the dominant economic, social and political system (Bardi 2006; Mayall 1988). Our focus on recent migration in recent history has further exhibited the extent to which the language of immigration is also racialized and riddled with enduring stereotypes. During the nineteenth century, this occurred throughout western Europe and North America when generations of Roma, who endured slavery, headed westward after their emancipation from the Balkans in 1856. As a result, Roma-phobic practices began appearing in many western European regions (McGarry 2012). After the fall of Communism in CEE countries, anti-Roma sentiments, once hidden under Communism, resurfaced within the new democracies. Now in the open and unfettered, anti-Roma practices left the Roma excluded from the job market, relegated to subpar housing and denied basic human rights. In the United Kingdom, racist overtones emerged and manifested in immigration policies and procedures. Perceived and framed as an ‘unworthy’ and invalid category of migrant, looking to victimize UK citizens, Roma asylum applications were rejected at heightened rates by invalidating their claims as victims of violence and persecution. However, this was not isolated to Europe. In Canada, previously those fleeing Communism could apply for refugee status unquestioned; however, restrictions tightened and suspicions heightened following the spread of democracy in former Communist-bloc countries. Roma refugees, fleeing ongoing violence and institutional discrimination, were obligated to claim their ethnic identity as their reason for seeking asylum. Yet rather than address evident human rights violations, both CEE countries and Canada were more concerned with their bilateral relations. Both the United Kingdom and Canada delegitimized these claims under the racist colonial logic that Roma were ‘bogus asylum seekers’ with false and greedy intentions.

Throughout their movements westward, we find the continued iteration of ‘Gypsy’ stereotypes that have prevailed over centuries, traversing, eventually to North America. That Canada saw relations with CEE countries over human welfare is reminiscent of past representations of the Roma as

inhuman parasites undeserving of humane treatment since they threaten the economic well-being of hardworking citizens. To add a final note on North America, while Roma are less visible in the United States, it is also significant to note that negative stereotypes, such as the foreign and exotic ‘Other’, have historically influenced the treatment of the Roma in the form of past anti-Roma legislation designed to monitor and inhibit their movements as well as problematize and punish their existence. More recently, the enduring criminal stereotype exposes members of the ethnic group to ethnic profiling and harassment at the hands of the police, two actions designed to save moral, hardworking US citizens from the immoral Roma intent of fraud and theft (Hancock 1997, 2002, 2010a).

CONCLUSION

We began this chapter by stating it was through movement that Europe proclaimed itself the centre of a provincial ‘world history’. The situation of the Roma is an outstanding example of how coloniality has shaped the idea of not only ‘what’ Europe is but also ‘who’ belongs there (Suárez-Krabbe 2014). Despite the historicity of their presence, the Roma have always been conceived as foreigners in and out of Europe. Born in Europe, anti-Roma sentiments travelled – not with the Roma – but through colonial logic. Stereotypes and misrepresentations, such as the misnomer ‘Gypsy’, indicate non-Western origins, the exotic nomad in opposition to settled civilized society, and the dangerous, immoral criminal have laid the foundation for and continuation of the exclusion and mistreatment of the Roma.

Most postcolonial perspectives hold that it is incontestable to say that Europe was constructed by its colonial projects and that colonial endeavours laid the foundations of the modern world system. As such, whether we speak of CEE countries or North America, our core analysis reveals the extent to which the Roma are denied belonging in the face of the nation-state. Past and present anti-Roma sentiments exemplify the strong hold the coloniality of power has exerted over the Roma within Europe. Further engaging past and present situation of Roma peoples has much to offer to postcolonial debates. Roma scholars have come to take part of the postcolonial discussion and the coloniality of power coloniality (Garcés et al. 2015). Contributing to their discussions, our analysis of CEE to North America migration exhibit the continued need to draw connections between conquests and genocide and the emergence of Western modernity through an approach that does not focus solely on Roma in European contexts. Finally, these global histories – as well as the global reaches of Roma people – will contribute to decentralize the discussion from and to challenge the idea Europe from within.

NOTES

1. The story of Roma origins has proven problematic for many reasons. Until recently, the Roma lacked a written language and relied only on oral tradition to record their history and culture. Scholars speculate that a peripatetic lifestyle and the desire to evade military conflicts were responsible for the Roma dispersion throughout and migration into Western lands. Another exodus hypothesis centres on an agreement between the rulers of India and Persia, with the former sending 10,000 musicians per the latter's request in the hopes that the entertainers would boost the morale of the Persian people. The musicians are believed to be the respective ancestors of the modern-day Roma (Fraser 1995; Liegeois 1986). Another theory places the Roma as the scions of ancient elite Indian military forces and their camp followers who continued combat efforts westward into Persia, where they were unable to navigate back to their homeland (Hancock 1987, 2010b).

2. As such, we use the term only 'Gypsy' in this chapter to allude to stereotypes and misrepresentation of Roma peoples.

3. Based on Darwin's research, Cesare Lombroso, an Italian scholar, published his influential work in 1876, which claimed the ethnic minority had a genetic propensity for criminality, and was essentially a race of criminals.

Chapter 5

Claiming Greyness: Dutch Coloniality against Polarization

Patricia Schor and Egbert Alejandro Martina

In June 2016, an international expert jury awarded a group of students from Utrecht University in the Netherlands first place in the Facebook Global Digital Challenge, ‘a worldwide contest’ (organised by Facebook and the US Department of State), for their ‘anti-extremism’ social media campaign ‘Dare to Be Grey’ (2016). The campaign, which ‘aims to counter polarisation’ that is dividing our society (Dare to Be Grey 2016), has also been nominated for the University of Utrecht’s Exceptional Extracurricular Achievements 2016 award. The campaign’s message is not in any way unique. Even though it has not yet drawn overwhelming public attention, we take Dare to Be Grey as a small, exemplary, case study that illustrates a violent narrative permeating public discourse and shaping policy in a normalized and naïve fashion. Appeals ‘against polarisation’ are ubiquitous across the political spectrum in the Netherlands and have been on the rise simultaneously with increasingly vocal Islamophobic and anti-Black¹ sentiments.² Such appeals became prominent in public debate since the rise in visibility of the anti-racism movement that shook the Netherlands in 2011.

This chapter will explore the campaign Dare to Be Grey, and contemporary public appeals ‘against polarisation’ and for ‘love, positivity, understanding, and stability’ in the Netherlands. We have chosen to focus on Dare to Be Grey for three reasons: the campaign, which offers the normative frame of ‘togetherness’ as an antidote to polarization, has received a degree of official recognition through the award it has received; it benefits from the authority of a leading academic institution and, last, it makes an explicit – albeit unacknowledged – link between a geographical/territorial/spatial (‘the middle ground’) and a racial imagination structured by the colour line. We think it is fundamental to examine the limits of abstract appeals against polarization and ‘togetherness’ and expose the colonial racial phantasmagoria that

guides them. The chapter problematizes the general assumption that appeals against polarization, which aim to return society to a state of ‘balance’ and ‘stability’, are unquestionably good. We posit that, at closer inspection, such appeals help normalize racial violence through a politics of constraint and a *post-political* understanding of polarization.³ Through an analysis of the campaign’s rhetorical positioning, we demonstrate that rather than serving as a ‘non-aligned’ alternative to ‘black/white thinking’, ‘greyness’ actually reinforces the colonial logics of whiteness and anti-Blackness.

Our chapter is inspired by Gloria Wekker’s (2006) approach in her groundbreaking book, *Politics of Passion: Women’s Sexual Culture in the Afro-Surinamese Diaspora*. Wekker employs a ‘scavenger theory’, as well as a queer or ‘scavenger methodology’ as developed by Judith/Jack Halberstam. A queer/scavenger methodology, Halberstam states, tries ‘to combine methods that are often cast as being at odds with each other, and it refuses the academic compulsion toward disciplinary coherence’ (Halberstam 1998: 13). We traverse the social sciences and humanities explicitly making recourse to scholarship that theorizes anti-Black racism and whiteness to counter the avoidance of race that characterizes analyses of Dutch society in traditional academic scholarship and in postcolonial (and gender) studies.⁴

AGAINST POLARIZATION

Go beyond black and white thinking! Dare to Be Grey! (Dare to Be Grey 2017)

Dare to Be Grey purports to lend ‘a voice to the grey masses in between the small group of black-and-white thinkers who tend to dominate the debate’ (Dare to Be Grey 2016). The campaign posits that the different views of the “‘grey” middle ground’ are ‘being drowned out by the extreme voices of today’ (Dare to Be Grey 2016). Dare to Be Grey, which underwrites the position of a hypothetical ‘grey’ mass of citizens, has received support from notable academics⁵ and transpires a positive energy associated with the high-educated youth. According to the University’s website, the students who created the campaign ‘translated scientific insights with unbridled enthusiasm into this social and political campaign against radicalisation’ (Utrecht University 2016). The campaign presents itself as a ‘platform with room for personal stories’ that offers an alternative to ‘black and white’ opinions (Dare to Be Grey 2016).

The primary aim of the campaign is to de-escalate tensions around politically contested issues in the Netherlands, such as the asylum policy, Islam and Zwarte Piet (the Dutch blackface character), by providing a more

reasonable and *productive* alternative. Whether one is *against* or *for* the aforementioned politically contested issues, both positions are presented as extreme. The underlying message is that Dutch society is much more *nuanced* than the rigid division suggested by ‘polarised opinions’. However, the campaign overlooks the political context giving rise to these ‘rigid’ positions. Moreover, this way of thinking relies on the idea of a parity between ‘against’ and ‘for’ as equally extreme positions, and equally alienating to ‘moderate’ people who, for instance, ‘deem Zwarte Piet a racial stereotype, but consider its abolishment a step too far’ (Rueb and Bos 2016). The idea of moderation, as in the avoidance of excess or extremes, especially in one’s behaviour or political opinions, is at the core of Dare to Be Grey. What lends the campaign its coherence is its incautiously naïve understanding of polarization, and its disregard of white supremacy as a fundamental principle that structures social, economic and political life. At the same time the campaign (re)produces this organizing principle.

This is evident, for instance, in the campaign’s opening Animation video. The animation invites the viewer to ‘imagine that this is our society’.

In the animation, colour symbolism is used to illustrate the different shades of opinion and subject positions: black located at one end represents one extreme and white located at the other end represents the opposite extreme, with various shades of grey in between. The video, however, skirts the implied racial Manicheism at play. In society, black and white serve as racial signifiers that invoke not only the bodies of real people but also, respectively, racialized social problems and the dominant norm. The social and political role of black and white adds a racial significance to the seemingly ‘neutral’ use of black and white in the video. Blackness represents the




Figure 5.1. Screenshots of Dare to be Grey – The Animation. Source: Dare to Be Grey 2016d.

failure of reason: ‘In Europe the Negro has one function: that of symbolizing the lower emotions, the baser inclinations, the dark side of the soul. In the collective unconscious of homo occidentalis, the Negro – or, if one prefers, the colour black – symbolizes evil, sin, wretchedness, death, war, famine’ (Fanon 1967: 147). Thus, the representation of those polarized figures/subjects that ‘want to suppress others’ opinions’ either ‘shouting out loud’ or ‘by means of violence’ is not innocent. Yet the animation narrates subject positioning as ‘the result of thousands of individual “free” choices – not of legalized racism’ (Hondius 2016: 39).⁶ At the same time, it rehearses and naturalizes the association of blackness with violence by way of the black flag⁷ and of the gun.

Dare to Be Grey is marked by a desire to distance itself from blackness and discredited forms of whiteness. The move away from such forms of whiteness is taking place amidst increasing popularity of the extreme right, whose voters or sympathizers are thought to be, in media and political discourse, the white lower classes. Those aligned with the popular Dutch right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV) are positioned as ‘the real racists’ and are made to serve as ‘extreme whites’. In this way racism is presented as a problem of maladjusted (poor and lowly educated) whites, and its structural nature is made unintelligible.

Putatively, ‘grey subjectivities’ emerge in relation to blackness and such discredited forms of whiteness. Greyness serves as a marker against which extremism is measured. By positing ‘greyness’ as reasonableness and informed, Dare to Be Grey aims to create a ‘complete social distance from problematic white bodies’, whose loud-mouthed extremism upsets ‘the social decorums that have supported the hegemonic, unmarked status of whiteness as a normative identity’ (Hartigan Jr. 1997: 317). It is through this dynamic that ‘moderate whites’ reposition themselves as the grey norm, the silent majority and the unproblematic moral ground of normalcy.

The ‘black and white thinking’ that the campaign argues against is most evident in the political organization and management of social space. ‘Black and white thinking’ not only facilitates but also sustains the social and spatial distribution of resources, access, wealth and power. In this animation, however, the logic of the colour line is diagnosed as a performative *act* – it is those at either side of the spectrum who ‘*pretend* that society is black and white’ (emphasis added) – or as a *misreading*, as in the video’s closing motto: ‘Beyond the black & white *fallacy*’ (emphasis added). The appeal to move ‘beyond black and white’, that is also an implicit call to move ‘beyond race’, is far more than a rhetorical issue. It is a strategy and enactment of power, which evades, misrepresents and extenuates the political consequences and realities of the colonial and racial Manicheanism that conceives of the world as polarized between darkness and light, good and evil, black and white, *native* and *alien*.

VIEWS ON POLARIZATION: A MATTER OF FEELINGS

In this section, we will scrutinize the understanding of polarization that resonates in the campaign, Dare to Be Grey, by examining the document *Polariseren Binnen Onze Grenzen* (*Polarization within Our Borders*) a publication issued by the Council of Social Development (RMO) (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling 2009b). The Council is an advisory organ to the Dutch government and parliament and as such its perspective is essential to authoritative Dutch policy literature.⁸ Polarization is defined in the document *Aanpak Polarisatie en Radicalisering* (Zannoni and Naaijken 2007) – another of such studies commissioned by the government – as ‘the sharpening of contradictions between groups in society that results or may result in (an increase in) tensions between these groups and risks to public safety’ (18) or as conflicts that might arise in individual negotiation relationships that lead to situations ‘where positions often harden further, whether it concerns a severance payment, a divorce, or a fence’ (20). This understanding of polarization focuses primarily on interpersonal conflicts rather than on the structure of society as a whole.

In *Polariseren Binnen Onze Grenzen*, the Council offers a ‘broad analysis’ of polarization. It argues that

we all do it too, yet polarisation still causes uneasiness in our polder. It seems as though people like to polarise, but at the same time they have become more sensitive to the strong positions of others. We seem to be in any case more frightened than at other times in our history when strong polarisation also occurred frequently.

The violent incidents and the increasing threats in our country might be possible explanations. After all, that is the end of the spectrum, where polarisation is no longer a matter of harsh words (RMO 2009b: 10).

In the same document, polarization is defined as ‘a communicative act in which contrasts or differences are sharpened, whether verbally or written. However, polarisation is not only an act. It is also a process of estrangement between (groups of) people’ (11). Polarization is nevertheless not exclusively seen as a negative process. It is understood as a constructive part of an open democratic society, which ‘ensures attachment formation within the group’ (11). Thus, polarization is seen as beneficial when it is in service of expediting ‘identification with one’s own group’, which ‘makes participation and a stable society possible’ (12). Polarization is considered harmful, however, when it affects social, political and personal relationships adversely and undermines social participation and puts social stability (order and safety) under pressure (10).⁹

The Council understands polarization mostly in terms of identity formation, rather than the persistence of the colonial matrix of power that generates the ‘black-white Manicheanism’ and produces uneven social geographies in the Netherlands along the colour line (this organization is most visible, for instance, in the categorization of ‘black neighbourhoods’ and ‘white neighbourhoods’). Dare to Be Grey and the report by the Council of Social Development offer a conception of polarization wherein political conflict emerges without context and is relegated to the private sphere. Both understandings reveal a symptomatic lack of critical attention to the racial Manichean logic that governs the dynamics of polarization.

The interviewees in the campaign’s collection of videos demonstrate a similar lack of critical understanding. The interviewees offer diagnoses of social problems in the Netherlands associated with *aliens* that establish a causal relationship between the psychology of raced subjects and those who reject them and their experiences of marginalization. In *Aflevering 1* (Episode 1) (Dare to Be Grey 2016a), the interviewee actor Saman Amini posits that one must understand the psychology of radicalization in order to fight it. Moreover, for Amini, one’s ‘prejudices’ against others (read *aliens*) dissipate to a large extent as one gets to know them. By trying to win over people’s hearts, he hopes to create more space for insight, understanding and ultimately love. In *Aflevering 2* (Dare to Be Grey 2016b), Frans van Heezik, who does social work for a social services organization in Amsterdam, describes a causal chain that inexorably leads a child from a ‘lesser neighbourhood’ who is not fluent in Dutch to a future of unemployment and criminality. Van Heezik argues that if you are confident enough to form an opinion/pass judgement, then you should be confident enough (‘dare’) to consider what might be going on in a youngster’s private sphere. Public intervention offers, according to him, solutions for problems created in the private sphere. In *Aflevering 3* (Dare to Be Grey 2016c), terrorism expert Beatrice de Graaf argues that the actual divide in society is between ‘people of goodwill and terrorists’. The latter, for de Graaf, exaggerate lines of social separation, which is a ‘performative’ act. Instead she proposes greyness as a ‘counternarrative’ for ‘unreasonability’.

Both Dare to Be Grey and the Council of Social Development paint a picture in which the gulf between *Autochtoon* (Dutch native or white), and *Allochtoon* (someone from elsewhere, alien or non-white), seems to have increased, especially concerning Islam, without any political interference. What is more, the particular cluster of definitions hides a more fundamental, or rather essential, antagonism that structures social reality: the structural antagonism between subject and non-subject – the human and the Black. Popular and official understandings of polarization reproduce structural flaws due to a misrecognition of how the black/white binary is, in fact, an outcome

of the logic of whiteness, which ‘solidified white thinking into an extensive and racialized either/or framework’ (Feagin 2006: 15).

This Manichean schema gave rise to, as cultural anthropologist Gloria Wekker argues in her much debated book *White Innocence*, ‘the fundamental impossibility to be both European, constructed to mean being white and Christian, and being black-Muslim-migrant-refugee’ (Wekker 2016: 21). She points out that in the Netherlands ‘in the public sphere, the assimilation model of monoethnicism and monoculturalism is so thorough that all signs of being from elsewhere are erased’ (7). She contends further that ‘those who can phenotypically “pass for” Dutch, that is who are white, are in an advantageous position. It is migrants with dark or olive skin who do not succeed in enforcing their claim on Dutchness or have it accepted as legitimate’ (7).

Although Dutchness is a never-fulfilled promise for racialized people, it is the normative standard by which *all* are judged. However, in spite of this exclusionary norm, Dutch society is narrated as a community of equals (*samenleving*) – rather than a closely managed collective of subjects differentially imbued with power and authority and conferred (degrees of) citizenship. According to cultural anthropologist Guno Jones:

The history of Dutch dynamics of citizenship is inconsistent with self-congratulating discourses that represent the Netherlands as an essentially innocent, morally progressive, non-hierarchical, enlightened, and “just” nation prone to equality (cf. Wekker 2016; Essed & Hoving 2014). The history of Dutch politics of citizenship reveals a deeply hierarchical logic. (Jones 2016: 605)

Jones suggests that ‘these politics may be viewed as an integral part of a longer offensive imperial Dutch history’ (605). He further notes that, ‘these racialized, gendered and classed processes do not only render a category of non-citizens/second class citizens/*conditional* citizens but also a category of privileged, elevated unconditional citizens’. He therefore suggests reading the Dutch politics of citizenship ‘as an economics of citizenship, via which securities, opportunities and wealth are unevenly distributed’.

Wittingly or otherwise, Dare to Be Grey overlooks the ‘racialized, gendered and classed processes’, described by Jones and Wekker, which position subjects in relation to normative conceptions of Dutchness. Although the campaign extends the tradition of a firm belief in *respectful* dialogue, it does so within a socio-epistemic context that disqualifies *a priori* racialized subjects as interlocutors. This *a priori* disqualification manifests itself in the dealings of racialized subjects/citizens with public servants, in the racial profiling exercised by police, in the differential attribution of prison sentences, in housing and in hiring practice,¹⁰ and it is most evident in the heated debate on Zwarte Piet.¹¹ What does it mean, then, to go ‘beyond black and white’

within this context? What ideological function does the synthesis between the two polarities, ‘the grey space in between’, which is presented as the solution to ‘black and white thinking’, perform?

IN EXCESS OF THE POLDER CONSENSUS

What underpins appeals against polarization and the desire to mend, if not *blend*, the social and political fabric of Dutch society is a drive to rehabilitate and rejuvenate the ideology of the *Polder model*, a hallmark of Dutch exceptionalism. As a political metaphor for consensus, the Polder model is understood as a dialogical mechanism of negotiating interests and reaching agreement among stakeholders in a non-conflictual fashion. The model for Dutch political consensus comes from water and land management. Polders are areas of land that have been reclaimed by draining excess water; polders require, by their very nature, collaboration and coordination in order to maintain their delicate integrity. Polders have, thus, given rise not only to a purportedly unique but also to a fragile ‘rational parcellation of land’ (Vlassenrood 2005) and – through its signification in Dutch politics – a space in which conflicting interests are rationally managed. What constitutes successful management of diverging interests is predicated on tolerance, and ‘rationally draining excess’ through dialogue and negotiation until a consensus is reached.

The fantasy of tolerance has been fundamental in cementing the Dutch myth of a society built through solidarity, whereby *everybody* had to give *room* to *others*. As literary scholar Isabel Hoving, following the sociologist Van Ginkel, notes, ‘Dutch national identity did not come into being “through state intervention, by the repression of national differences,”’ but by the ‘networking and “consensual practices” . . . of the political-cultural elites who emphasised and institutionalised differences’ (Hoving 2004: 2). Tolerance served as the principle that guided the management of institutionalized differences in service of social cohesion.

Hoving posits that ‘one could say tolerance is not a consistent Dutch value, but it exists, first and foremost, as an institutionalised structure’ (2). Despite having fallen out of favour in recent decades, there is ‘a curious consensus in the right-wing and left-wing critiques of the concept [of tolerance]’ (3). Right-wing critics consider ‘Dutch tolerance as a national silence about the severe problems of migration and as the cowardly, politically correct evasion of difference, instead of an openness to difference’ (3). Whereas left-wing critics argue that ‘the passive form of tolerance dominant in the Netherlands and known as “gedogen,” which means “to put up with, to tolerate a practice one disagrees with, or which is against the law,” is close to . . . evasion’ (3).

Hoving argues that ‘both strategies, tolerance and evasion, are considered to be based on the radical differentiation between self and other, and they both testify to a strong sense of superiority, from which stems the authority to tolerate or evade others’ (3).

Sociologist Ellie Vasta similarly observes that ‘a politics of consensus has led to a politics of avoidance, not only in terms of academic research [which does not address institutional racism in the Netherlands], but also in the society generally’ (Vasta 2007: 731). Vasta notes that ‘in a project that examines everyday ways of thinking about multiculturalism, [the social scientist] Verkuyten indicates that although people can simultaneously hold liberal and illiberal views, there is a tendency to blame the migrant while appearing mainly ignorant of how the ‘native Dutch’ are implicated, except in a rather positive way’ (731–32).

In this context, the ‘grey middle ground’ serves as staging ground for those who ‘simultaneously hold liberal and illiberal views’. The ‘“grey” middle ground with its wide diversity in views, nuances and identities’ (Dare to Be Grey 2017) offers ‘reasonable’, ‘moderate’ whites a stable space in the midst of harsh and heated debates. Like tolerance, the imaginary ‘grey middle ground’ allows the nation to come to terms with contradiction and conflict; the grey space is positioned as a generative dialogic realm in which contradiction can, at least, be *reasonably* addressed. The territory recovered through Dutch poldering is, however, a virtuous space for ‘moderate’ whites; excess is positioned as extremism, where extremism can take the shape, for example, of a staunch anti-Zwarte Piet or pro-Zwarte Piet protester. If the polder offers a model for reaching a political consensus that is premised on rationality, then what is classed as outside the bounds of functional politics are demands and desires in excess of consensus.

The desire for moderation is driven by a libidinal economy of anti-Blackness, which historically produced ‘the angry black woman’ alongside ‘the radicalised Muslim’, the configuration of the raced and gendered dissident – the abjected exotic ‘object’ of desire – as a threat to its coherence.¹² The demand for moderation disregards the legitimacy (and force) of black anger in a world shaped by white supremacy and anti-Blackness.¹³ In a well-known and often-cited passage, James Baldwin writes that, ‘To be a Negro in this country and to be relatively conscious is to be in a rage almost all the time’ (Baldwin et al. 1961: 205). Baldwin’s assessment resonates with the African diaspora on the European side of the Atlantic. However, calls against polarization do not understand black anger as ‘a powerful source of energy serving progress and change’ (Lorde 2007: 127), but disqualify it as an uncontrolled emotional expression; it is anger that aspires revenge.¹⁴

The figure of the ‘angry black woman’ is made to serve as the quintessential embodiment of such unruly excess (the black-Muslim-migrant-refugee),

and her anger ‘calls for’ disciplining. Audre Lorde has explored the pernicious dynamic at play here:

To turn aside from the anger of Black women with excuses or the pretexts of intimidation is to award no one power – it is merely another way of preserving racial blindness, the power of unaddressed privilege, unbreached, intact. . . . Oppressed peoples are always being asked to stretch a little more, to bridge the gap between blindness and humanity. Black women are expected to use our anger only in the service of other people’s salvation or learning. But that time is over. My anger has meant pain to me but it has also meant survival, and before I give it up I’m going to be sure that there is something at least as powerful to replace it on the road to clarity. (Lorde 2007: 132)

The discrediting of anger is symptom of ‘a pervasive politic of white supremacy which seeks to prevent the formation of radical black subjectivity’ (Hooks 2015: 26). It is, to say the least, doubtful whether ‘grey subjectivities’ possess the radical potential ‘to create a space in opposition to dominant norms, a space where transformational political work can begin’ (Cohen 1997: 438).

METAPHORS OF RACIALIZED COLONIAL SPACE

Both polarization and consensus are structured and understood through spatial metaphors. The production of the relations of direct opposition relies on the irreconcilable and extreme difference between white and black and is inseparable from the racialization of space in the Netherlands, whereby ‘white neighbourhoods’ are positioned over and against ‘black neighbourhoods’. Jack Burgers argues that major cities in the Netherlands ‘are not only polarised in terms of the incidence of high-quality jobs and poorly educated unemployed’, but ‘the socio-economic divide also reflects an ethnic divide’ (Burgers 1996: 101). Black and white as signifiers of socioeconomic divide play an important role in mapping and organizing space in Dutch society. It bears noting that the Dutch conception of society is predicated, however, on similarity. *Samen* in *saamenleving* (society) shares an etymological root with the English word *same*. Both *saamen* and *same* come to us from the Proto-Germanic *sama*, which connotes ‘together, with’, ‘to collect’, ‘as one’, ‘even, level, similar, identical’, ‘likeness’ (Harper 2016). In the following we will read *saamenleving* through the Critical Race lens offered by Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg’s theorization on cultural cloning.

Essed and Goldberg define *cloning* (culture) as ‘the systemic reproduction of likeness’, which is ‘a phenomenon deeply engrained in the organization of contemporary culture, in social life generally, and in the racial, gendered

and class structures of society, in particular' (2012: 98). Cloning, which mobilizes the affective registers of togetherness and commonness, is deemed a requirement for living together in society – *samenleving*. Here, sameness evokes a scene of happiness and comfort that qualifies *gezelligheid* – safety in cosiness (and *gezelligheid* lies at the heart of Dutch common sense notions of comfort and home-making). Happiness can serve, according to Lisa Duggan, as 'the affective reward for conformity, the privatized emotional bonus for the right kind of investments in the family, private property and the state' (Duggan and Muñoz 2009: 276). The right kind of investments precludes conflict and facilitates social adjustments for the maintenance of the status quo: 'Sameness, repetition, predictability renders social circumstance more manageable, more comfortable, more readily negotiable' (Essed and Goldberg 2012: 102).

Essed and Goldberg evidence the violence 'embedded silently in the reproduction of sameness and the privileging of likeness' (2012: 100). They question the desire, or normative preference, for sameness that animates cloning, through the rejection of 'those who are perceived as deviant' (Essed and Goldberg 2012: 100). The authors indicate that in Europe, the reproduction of whiteness (sameness around the traits of a dominant group) is reinforced through the denial of racial preference in the context of (national) official ideologies of racial equality. As object lessons, they put forward 'the unnamed preference for the comfort, safety, familiarity, and privilege associated with whiteness [while] elites remain resiliently homogeneous (masculine, middle to higher social classes, white)' (Essed and Goldberg 2012: 103 and 104). The normativity that guides this regime of preference guarantees 'privilege along lines of race and gender' (Essed and Goldberg 2012: 101).

Essed and Goldberg outline '*kinhood, productivism, consumerism, and aestheticism*' as 'the principal concepts constitutive of cloning culture'. They further note that 'each of these dimensions manifests through gender, racial, ethno-national and socio-economic dynamics' (Essed and Goldberg 2012: 102–3). To put a finer point on it, gender, race and sexuality have been essential to the construction of white authority and sociality. Benedict Anderson reminds us that Dutch colonial authority, to be effective, 'relied on whiteness and the mystique of *zakelijkheid* [business-like efficiency]' (Mortimer 1974: 31). The aura of business-like efficiency ensured and deepened white male power; its glow still warms whiteness and maleness as signs of intellectual authority. Sameness modelled on whiteness and maleness, the norm of middle-to-higher social class, able-bodied, neuro-typical, heterosexual white male, re-establishes 'the underlying hierarchy of humanity, revealing that its definition is always contrasted with the different and excluded, the deviant and excommunicated' (Essed and Goldberg 2012: 106).

GREY, THE NEW WHITE?

While the disciplining space of ‘the grey middle ground’ is not biological, it depends on and mobilizes a particular colonial economy of racial desire and abjection, which gave rise to social and political hierarchies of colour. ‘Grey-ness’ as a remedy to polarization conjures up the theme of *mixing*¹⁵ black and white together. The result of this mixture is, however, not a ‘greyness’ without chromatic nuance – within this ‘mixed’ space of ‘greyness’ there are different shades of grey. By presenting ‘greyness’ as a desirable position, Dare to Be Grey provides a scaffold on which to build a ‘middle ground’ across cleavages. However this scaffold facilitates overlooking whiteness as a structural feature of society. Even though both black and white persons who hold conflictual views are ‘invited’ to inhabit the mixed position of the ordinary ‘grey’ subject/citizen, power remains ascribed to the normative white subject/citizen.

It is worth pausing to reflect on the work done by the verb ‘to dare’, applied in the campaign to convey the idea that *people* – otherwise grey – are being driven into taking up extreme positions in debates: either *for* or *against*. The message of the campaign is that in an environment of extreme positions it takes courage to *choose the middle*. The conception that one’s social positionality is a subject of choice is an important neoliberal trope in the idea of a cohesive society made of allegedly non-racialized individuals.¹⁶

This, however, changes when the campaign is placed within the context where the Dutch establishment has been using material and symbolic resources to control what it terms a ‘dialogue’ or ‘debate’. The ‘dialogue’ with anti-Zwarte Piet activists, who managed to break down the wall of silence on racism in the Netherlands, is a case in point. The desired outcome of this dialogue has been described as ‘a reasonable alternative that would bring together opposing parts, [who are, actually] the objectified subaltern and the white establishment, somewhere in the middle’ (Schor 2013). This ‘mutually agreeable resolution’ of societal conflict needs disentangling:

What hides behind the idea of an *acceptable middle-ground* between *equal parts*? The notion of parity between the hegemonic establishment and the subaltern subject, between the dominant majority and a marginalised minority is myopic and ideological. This misconception hides the fact that it is the hegemonic *part* that defines the terms of the conversation, how, when and who enters it and what is open for negotiation. (Schor 2013)

Moreover, the workings of race operate silently in this story:

The Zwarte Piet discussion is actually not a debate. . . . We are dealing here with a minority that is the *target* of racial policy and practice, and a majority that

benefits from white privilege. The majority has defined what is a *reasonable* outcome of this engagement, and this is basically that the will of the majority should prevail, as morality is presented to be on their side and actually as an unborn property of the white. So much so that the *benevolent* majority is allegedly showing a gesture of *accommodating* the *sensibilities* of the minority in offering a compromise between them and the *opposing* part. (Schor 2013)

This framing is radically post-political, that is to say, it denies the unequal distribution of power between such *parts*. Additionally, it disciplines raced and gendered minorities who refuse to negotiate towards achieving a compromise ‘in the middle’. The act of refusal only further confirms *the other* as excessive, as the author of a violent disruption and threat to the affective bonds of whiteness.

Dare to Be Grey instates ‘the grey in between’ as a dialectical resolution of societal conflicts that arise due to ‘black-and-white thinking’. Even though the campaign presents ‘grey subjectivities’ as liminal subjectivities situated in between black and white, they are still authorized by whiteness: whiteness continues to operate as the unspoken norm. The logic that makes togetherness under the sign of greyness politically desirable and intelligible is premised upon a disavowal of continued restaging of colonial violence. Rather than confronting the white supremacy that structures Dutch society, Dare to Be Grey invites the subject of dissent (through gentle social coercion) to embrace the promise of a harmonious post-conflict *samenleving*. Thus, through a post-political naïvety and colonial desire, the campaign works against the emergence of strategies that challenge white hegemony. Greyness, which operates as a sign of tolerance, might thus be read as a desire for a post-racial society in which we have gone beyond the ‘black and white fallacy’. Like the image of the ‘mixed race’ child,¹⁷ who serves as a symbol of racial reconciliation and a hopeful post-racial future, the ‘grey in between’ promises a happy future resolution to a present of racial conflict.

CONCLUSION

The prominence of calls against polarization is not exclusive to the Netherlands but belongs to a perceived moment in Western history and politics. These calls proliferate with the rise of a vocal right-wing contingent to political rule, for example, Donald Trump in the United States, PVV leader Geert Wilders in the Netherlands. These figures defy the carefully designed fantasy of whiteness as synonymous with reasonableness and civility. Calls against polarization in the Netherlands put the blame on dissidence – that has also gained visibility in the recent years – for having provoked such anger (white excess or the excess to whiteness). It is dissidence that has allegedly

paved the way to unguarded misogyny,¹⁸ racism, ableism and classism into the public sphere and state institutions.

We have shown that the various coercive colonial mechanisms that underwrite appeals against polarization aim to curtail anti-racist, anti-sexist and anti-capitalist critique. Calls against polarization produce anti-racist, anti-sexist and anti-capitalist demands and desires as excessive in relation to the supposed coherence and universality of liberal heteronormative whiteness. The ‘balance’ envisioned by such calls is reached through the affective bordering of dissent. Shedding light on this economy, we have unveiled how radicalism is rhetorically constructed and contained through the colonial management of affective investments.

By analysing polarization at a higher level of scale that accommodates a move from the interpersonal to the structural, we aimed to put on view the grammar that structures racial hierarchies and (re)produces white as *legitimate, good, being in place/belonging* and black as *excessive, dangerous, out of place*. Black and white occupy separate and unequal material and symbolic spaces in Dutch politics and society. For this reason, the move from white to grey and black to grey cannot be read as though they are equivalent. White people who ‘dare to Be grey’ – a greyness authorized by whiteness – risk very little. Black people, however, are gently coerced to move away from blackness to compromise the emergence of a radical black subjectivity. ‘Greyness’, narrated as a middle ground, comes into existence through violent means that establish the parameters of what is considered ‘open public debate’ or ‘respectful dialogue’. The desire and demand for a society founded on the replication of whiteness contradicts the categorization of the Netherlands as postcolonial. Rather, claiming the middle ground of greyness discloses an extant and resilient Dutch coloniality.

NOTES

1. We capitalize the term ‘Black’ when referring to Black identity, and use a lower case when referring to the colour ‘black’ or to the construction ‘black and white thinking’.

2. Here, we present a short list of such appeals over the years: Kim Putters, director of the authoritative Netherlands Institute for Social Research SCP (Sociaal en Cultureel Plan Bureau) (<https://www.scp.nl/english>), writing against polarization (see Putters 2016). The demonstration against polarization Ieder1 had considerable public resonance (see NOS 2016). The chief editor of the Left website Republiek Allochtonië has written extensively on the plethora of research and policy against polarization (see Butter 2011). Finally, the journalist and documentarist Fidan Ekiz, a woman of colour, authored the 2016 pamphlet ‘Hoe lang nog zwijgen. Pleidooi voor het radicale midden’ (‘No More Silence. Plea for the Radical Middle’) (see Ekiz 2016).

3. In 'Planning as War by Other Means', Tesfahuney and Ek (2015) assert that the term 'post-politics' does not 'denote the end of politics, or an era after/beyond politics'. Rather, post-politics refers specifically to 'the conduct of politics by other means', which reassembles political issues 'as economic, managerial (administrative/ technocratic) and moral concerns'. In the framework of post-politics, political struggles and antagonisms are ratcheted down to operational problems that can be resolved through 'consensual "good" techno-managerial governance'. Politics, then, becomes 'institutionalized social management, whereby all problems are dealt with through administrative-organizational technical means and questioning of things as such disappears' (Martina and Schor 2015: 182–83).

4. On the avoidance of race in Dutch discourse, policy and research and/instead the focus on 'migration policy oriented studies', and the silencing of race critical paradigms, see Essed and Nimako (2006). On the avoidance of Dutch voices and paradigms on race in gender studies, see Smiet's (2014) analysis referring to the situation since the 1980s and to (marginalized) analyses previously made by feminists of colour, such as Gloria Wekker, Nancy Jouwe and Maayke Botman.

5. Dare to Be Grey has received support from senior scholars, such as renowned terrorism experts Beatrice de Graaf and Jacco Pekelder, and the dean of Utrecht University College, James Kennedy.

6. 'The Netherlands today are plagued by persistently high levels of ethnic and racial segregation in cities and towns. . . . Four hundred years after the beginning of the slave trade and colonial expansion, this "European apartheid", as Dutch journalist Hofland recently called it, is all the more difficult to counter because it is claimed to be the result of thousands of individual "free" choices – not of legalized racism. . . . Feelings of white, European, Christian supremacy and superiority still have much of their old self-evident power and force. Both with regard to housing, residency, and education – all termed "private choices" in an open society – the "black" and "white" Dutch are quite segregated' (Hondius 2016: 39).

7. The black flag is associated with anti-establishment ideologies, such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and anarchist movements as the Black Blocks.

8. *Polariseren Binnen Onze Grenzen* draws from the collection *Polarisatie. Bedreigend en verrijkend* (Polarisation. Threatening and Enriching) also published by RMO *Polarisatie: Bedreigend En Verrijkend* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SWP, 2009a). This collection is made of a series of articles, most of which authored by well-known scholars, some of whom actively participate in the public debate on multiculturalism and migration. *Polariseren Binnen Onze Grenzen* is therefore a single but exemplary document that shows how authoritative analyses/opinion is translated into advice for public policy. We are not claiming though that the collection dovetails into a coherent strategy (nor is RMO).

9. It is worth noticing that the emphasis placed by the Council on *social participation* happens at the same time when the provisions of the Dutch welfare state have been increasingly shrunk by both labour and neoliberal governments. Social participation entails thus being *active* in civil society and assuming functions hitherto under the responsibility of the Dutch state.

10. See, on 'ethnic difference' in sentencing, Wermink et al. (2015). On ethnic profiling by police, see Open Society Justice Initiative and Amnesty International

(2013). For a general view on racial discrimination and segregation (in education, employment and housing sectors, etc.), see Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2013).

11. Black anti-Zwarte Piet activists gained notoriety through public ridicule by the overwhelming majority of media outlets, government officials and politicians. These activists were delegitimized as ‘reasonable’ partners in the public debate, which gave room to intimidation and death threats. For a view on the climate of intimidation in 2013 (which continued in the following years), see Frank et al. (2013).

12. Here we point to the common genealogy of a category of deviance that is racialized. This category is shaped historically and informs the ubiquitous figures of threat, desire and dissidence in contemporary Europe (see Stam and Shohat 2011 and see Medovoi 2012 arguing that alongside and supplementary to the colour line, religion [the ‘dogma-line’]-shaped processes of race-making in history).

13. Medovoi’s aforementioned colour and dogma-line racisms interact in a particular manner with regard to the position of Black women (see Mugabo 2016).

14. Both fear and desire are inscribed in the construction of Black anger. In Dutch colonial history they emerge, for instance, in the belief that Black women’s bodies are, on one hand, inferior and therefore subservient and, on the other, have magical powers (see Allen 2007).

15. The theme of mixing also surfaces in Dutch urban restructuring programmes, where ‘social mixing’ is considered, as sociologist Justus Uitermark writes, to strengthen ‘the social tissue of a disadvantaged neighbourhood, thus saving its inhabitants from living in an environment that allegedly inhibits social and economic integration’ (2003: 531). Within this framework not mixing, or ‘not mixedness’, is understood as a problem.

16. This conception is also active in what Wendy Brown shows as the ‘governability of tolerance’ – itself operating through a civilizational discourse (2006: 310), inhabited by ‘imperial and colonial impulses’ (2006: 317).

17. Here, we draw on Jared Sexton’s theorization in Amalgamation Schemes of the consequences of race mixture in maintaining racial categories to foreground the fact that greyness can only emerge as a ‘form of value’ by reifying ‘blackness’ as violence and deviance while distancing itself from whiteness as an oppressive structure (see Sexton [2008]).

18. ‘Known for creating the term *Misogynoir*, [Moya] Bailey defines it as the intersection of racism, anti-Blackness, and misogyny that Black women experience. The term is specific to Black womanhood, as *Misogynoir* cannot be experienced by women of any other race, but can be perpetuated by people of any gender or race’ (Bristol 2014).

Chapter 6

How to Draw a Haunted Nation: Colonial Ghosts and Spectres in Conceição Lima's Poems

Inês Nascimento Rodrigues¹

Ghosts are powerful presences in the narratives of countries addressing violent pasts.² The phantoms of slavery,³ the ghostly presences of Indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada,⁴ Aboriginal spirits of Australia,⁵ Cameroon's *wandering subjects*,⁶ the revenants of the Spanish Civil War and the Portuguese Colonial War,⁷ the spectralization of Myanmar,⁸ the phantasms of the great Chinese famine⁹ and the spirits of the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau¹⁰ – are spectral manifestations of violence. Most of these 'spectro-geographies', as Jo Frances Maddern and Peter Adey (2008) named them, are somehow related to a far from overcome colonial past and so they refer not to a dead and finished experience but are instead a product of the ongoing legacies of brutal imperial systems in newly founded nations.¹¹

As 'the idiom of haunting'¹² is present across diverse geographies and substantially different colonial and postcolonial¹³ histories, ghosts (and their interpretations) have to be culturally specified, as Esther Peeren states (2009, 2010). María del Pilar Blanco and Peeren are alert to the Eurocentric and ahistorical biases of Jacques Derrida's conception of the revenant in his *Specters of Marx* (1994), and so argue for a 'careful contextualization and conceptual delimitation' (2013: 15) of spectres. Taking its cue from their observation, this chapter focuses on the ways in which ghosts of the Massacre of 1953, in Conceição Lima's writings, help to unveil histories, voices and a profoundly shattered Santomean society that remains haunted by the consequences of colonialism. My argument is that, in these cases, spectres allow for renewed ways of imagining and telling the nation, in relation to both former colonies and metropolises. These ghost stories reveal as much about these nations' emergence from independence struggles as they do about their former imperial colonizers.

Following the concept of haunting – as originally defined by Avery Gordon in 1997 – articulated with the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences – proposed by Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos – I shall revisit the ghosts of Lima's poems. Phantoms can function as an important narrative element and also as a powerful historical metaphor (Kwon 2008: 2), with the capacity of bringing to life the injustices of a colonial past that persists, rendering some people spectres, in the present. Through this haunting process, homogenizing stories of the postcolonial nation are challenged.

‘THE MASSACRE OF 1953’: A PLACE OF GHOSTS AND SILENCES

The events that began on 3 February 1953 – now known as the Batepá Massacre and commemorated as a public holiday in São Tomé and Príncipe – victimized an undetermined number of *forros*,¹⁴ the Santomean dominant ethno-cultural group. The perpetrators were the colonial Portuguese government of the islands, headed by the Lieutenant Colonel Carlos de Sousa Gorgulho.¹⁵ My interest in this particular episode concerns not only the symbolic value that it allegedly acquired during the independence struggle of the Santomeans, but it also involves the rituals, narratives and performances that have been produced about it since 1953. These reveal the massacre as a haunted space that still shapes private and public memories and identities within the archipelago. The event remains largely unacknowledged in Portugal, which refuses to discuss an occurrence that disturbs the national post-imperial narrative that, mimicking Gilberto Freyre and luso-tropicalism,¹⁶ promotes Portuguese colonialism as benign and pacific. By contrast, the history of 1953 was also exploited in São Tomé and Príncipe by their successive governments, giving rise to a dominant and normative narrative that paves over crucial aspects needed to understand the ‘Batepá’ incidents (Nascimento 2011).

In the islands, the prevailing public memory of the event has reconfigured identities, with victims becoming heroes – this is a discourse which Lima in her poetry chose not to condone. The creation of martyrs from corporeal people, with feelings, dreams and sufferings, is questioned by Lima in the verse ‘Heroes’,¹⁷ ‘Jovani’, ‘Proposal’ and ‘Archipelago’, four texts where the poetic subject deconstructs the myth of the ‘nationalist hero’:

The martyrs – they say – are exceptional beings, rare
To a certain light destined.

It wasn't that, I suppose, his fate.

...

I won't think of miracles, I won't think
 Of the crucifixion in which a man was reborn
 Without really knowing why he was falling.¹⁸
 (Lima 2006: 34)

The enigma is another – here no gods dwell
 Men only and the sea, irremovable heritage.¹⁹ (Lima 2006: 53)

The national narrative projects the massacre as a foundational myth of the nation, placing it at the heart of the Santomean political awakening. However, this process of unifying the nation under the rubric of the national struggle silences the social and cultural distinctions that were present in the islands – an outcome of a settlement and colonization process that forged complex dynamics of inclusion and exclusion (Margarido 1980).

According to Gerhard Seibert (2002a: 60–61), the sentiment of the superiority of the *forros*, for example, in relation to other groups in São Tomé and Príncipe – though they were also discriminated against by the Portuguese colonialists – was legitimated by their past as free men and women.²⁰ It is this that provided them with the status of 'authentic' Santomean and it constitutes the main reason why they want to distance themselves from the contract workers that came mostly from other former Portuguese colonies such as Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde, to work in the *roças* (plantations) (Seibert 2002a: 61).

Later, during the February 1953 events, several of these contract workers joined the *Corpo de Polícia Indígena* (the Indigenous Police Force), composed mainly of Angolan soldiers and Portuguese volunteers, which played a fundamental role in repressing the native Creole elite (Cervelló 1999: 30; Seibert 2002a: 76). The contract workers collaborated with the Portuguese colonial power in the Batepá episodes, partially because they were marginalized in the islands, but their peripheral status was also propelled by colonial propaganda that placed the responsibility for their precarious slave labour on the *forros*, claiming that the latter 'didn't want to get their hands dirty' (Seibert 2002a: 84) toiling in the plantations. However, in the 1960s, the Santomean nationalist movement decided to conceal the participation of these workers in the massacre because such information could 'put at risk the unity against the Portuguese' (Seibert 2002a: 115). This development reveals a deeply fractured society permeated by internal conflicts, where the axis of discrimination is based not exclusively on skin colour as a sign of inferiority and exclusion, but equally importantly on ethnic, national, class and sexual differences.

The nationalist and hegemonic narrative about the massacre emphasizes the suffering and heroism of the Santomean people against the Portuguese

enemy and simultaneously erases the violent acts committed by the contract workers against the *forros* during these events. Furthermore, it occludes the violence committed by some of this Creole elite, heir to the *filhos-da-terra* (sons of the land), against the contract workers and their descendants.²¹ This process of agglutination that seeks total rupture with the colonial past and a consensus to forge a sense of nationhood seems also to constitute a mechanism of state control (see O'Riley 2007: 7).

Lima's poetic voice establishes a radically different approach to conceptualizing Santomean nationhood. She confronts the Santomean society with her imagining of a nation that reveals itself as mutilated. The poet relates a story of violence, only depicting not colonialism's brutality but also her people's. Thus, the archipelago emerges as a dismembered place, where the grammar of the abject and of haunting sustains a dimension of exclusion, as in the poem 'Show Me the Blood of the Moon':

Show me the blood of the moon
Now that the beach has spat
The nausea of the sea
And the loathing of the rocks
Petrifies the screams I haven't heard
Show me the blood
The blood and the veins of the moon
When the amputated tongues
Resuscitate
In Fernão Dias in February.²² (Lima 2004: 29)

Fernão Dias, the Santomean pontoon where most of the *forros* during the Batepá Massacre were imprisoned, tortured and compelled to work, is here a phantasmagorical space where painful memories of colonialism are re-enacted and revived. In the literary representations of the 1953 Massacre, Santomean national and cultural identity is questioned, offering the reader the possibility to re-engage the past (see Colmeiro 2011). The contract workers, absent or marginalized in the nationalist narrative, become major presences in the Batepá texts but are also central figures in other fictions by Santomean writers.²³

In Lima's poetry, the presence of these (invisible) workers takes on an almost obsessive dimension. In the words of Inocência Mata, 'We can almost say that this is one of her [Lima's] demons, the accusation of a community that, having fought for independence, turns out reducing some of their members to refugees' (2006: 239). Lima's poetry creates a space of phantasmal identification, where the poetic voice raises 'the exact questions, the questions that the unburied ghosts of the island for long cried out', as Margarida Calafate Ribeiro (2011: 203) notes. This can be witnessed in two sections of

‘Heroes’ and ‘Plantation’, both works from Lima’s first book, where the dead return asking for answers:

The dead who died without questions
Return slowly with their eyes open
Inquiring for their crucified wings.²⁴ (Lima 2004: 23)

The dead ask:
Why are roots springing from our feet?²⁵ (Lima 2004: 30)

These spectres are also responsible for transforming São Tomé and Príncipe into something reminiscent of graveyard islands, constructed at the expense of the lives and exploitation of contract workers, which as living-dead now have come back to haunt the nation, sharing space with the living:

Look how discreet are the roofs of the Marginal Avenue
Listen how the bricks of the Marginal chalets gasp
Feel the breeze when it grates the palm tree’s hair
In the arteries of the city.

It’s the spirit of those who died planting
The pillars of this town where we laugh and feign
Suffer and lie, betray and fight
Struggle and love.²⁶ (Lima 2006: 28)

In the Santomean case, unlike most of the hegemonic occidental ghostly traditions, the phantoms do not have to be necessarily exorcized, as Freud proposes,²⁷ nor mourned, as Derrida advocates in *Specters of Marx* (1994), because there are no clear-cut boundaries between the world of the living and the dead (or living-dead, in some situations). Peeren reached this conclusion in her exploration of the meaning of hauntings in relation to the work of the Nigerian writers Ben Okri and Amos Tutuola using the reflections of Cameroonian theorist, Achille Mbembe:

Freud’s uncanny and Derrida’s specter become insufficient models with which to think through the ghostliness of the everyday, since they explicitly oppose the ghost to order and routine as an unexpected, surprising figure of disturbance, the return of the repressed, and absolute alterity. (2010: 113)

In Lima’s poetry, ghosts and living share liminal realms and the same Santomean ground. This communication between spirit and material worlds represents a diverse ontology and cosmology towards the dead, as anthropologist Paulo Valverde (1998, 2000) has observed in his studies of Santo-means society.²⁸ There are many different spectres inhabiting Lima’s writings:

the phantoms of the liberation struggle or ‘elementary ghosts’ (Lima 2011: 79–94), such as Alda Espírito Santo, Kwame Nkrumah, Amílcar Cabral and Patrice Lumumba; and the familiar phantasms of ancestors that, among the women, dwell in the spaces of affection, childhood and of the ‘House’, as in ‘The voices’, where the poetic subject recalls her aunt Spirit, the cousins of Good Death and the old Venida and Lochina, that ‘sat there in the yard/ speaking of grandfather and other ghosts’²⁹ (Lima 2006: 62).

The most striking spectres in her work, however, are the ones that are still alive, subjected to ‘*extreme forms of human life, death-worlds, forms of social existence . . . that confer upon them the status of living dead (ghosts)*’ (Mbembe 2003: 1) – referring to the former contract workers and their descendants. These men and women are turned into ghosts not exclusively by the dimension of exclusion in which they live, relegated to the marginal socioeconomic space of the *roças* (plantations), but also as a result of their own historical and social condition – considering they were removed from their homeland and forced to work virtually as slaves in a Santomean society that would not accept them as enfranchised members. In addition, they still occupy a minor place in the foundational narratives of the country, which continue to reproduce colonial categories and social hierarchies of inferiority to the former contract workers. To confront this reality of a haunted community, these liminal beings in Lima assume multilayered meanings: they are symbolic, indeed, but they allude also to something material, in the sense that they embody the contract worker rendered absent by the colonial and postcolonial society that constructs them as spectres.³⁰ In this way, the poet offers these men and women platforms via which to achieve recognition and agency in the narratives of the nation, by listening to their struggles, discussing their marginal existence and allowing for their memories to be duly noted.

According to Gordon and Derrida, recognizing the spectres and providing with them a space of enunciation, while, at the same time, making public past silences, represents an ethical attitude of social justice:

No ethics, no politics . . . seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some *responsibility*, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead. (Derrida 1994: xviii)

It is sometimes about writing ghost stories, stories that not only repair representational mistakes, but also strive to understand the conditions under which a memory was produced in the first place, toward a counter-memory, for the future. (Gordon 2008: 22)

The ghosts, inhabiting the visible and the invisible, the present and the absent, the good and the bad, the living and the dead, can break dominant narratives (see Blanco and Peeren 2013). To paraphrase Gordon (2008: 22–23)

and Joshua Gunn (2006: 92–93) the spectres, transcending fixed spatial and temporal boundaries, have the potential to produce different experiences, memories and narratives with distinct and ambiguous grammars otherwise systematically marginalized and disqualified by hegemonic discourses.

Gordon's influential and compelling argument of haunting has to be used, notwithstanding, with caution. For instance, in his essay, 'Place, Position, and Postcolonial Haunting in Assia Djebar's *La femme sans sépulture*', Michael O'Riley highlights his concern about the use of literary ghosts as a strategy that can detract attention from present issues (2004). O'Riley declares, 'Frequently, haunting as a mode of recovery of colonial history leads to a focus on the aesthetics of the experience of colonial oppression' that 'when taken too far . . . can obsess memory and divert the critical gesture from contemporary issues requiring intervention and immediate attention' (2007: 4). Emilie Cameron articulates similar apprehensions, stating that, 'These stories manage to *write out* the bodies and voices of living, politically active Indigenous peoples', while at the same time they, 'risk perpetuating a kind of endless "dancing around a wound" . . . neglecting to mobilize effectively for change in the present' (2008: 388–89).

While I acknowledge both O'Riley and Cameron's warnings, studying the ghosts of the Santomean literature and, particularly, the ones from the Massacre of 1953 challenges historical narratives, unveiling profound and unequal hierarchies, contradictions and power relations that still demand long overdue debate. The spectres' include the possibility of raising a discussion about knowledge realms that is often neglected or avoided (Blazan 2007: 1). It is, also, in the sense of the commitment to the voices and stories silenced in the past centuries by hegemonic discourses and narratives that the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences, posed by Santos in 2002, surface as an epistemological reflection integral to the deconstruction of the public memory of the past (2010: 87–126; 414–20).

The sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences present the world as full of inexhaustible experiences, part of them being wasted every day. At the same time, these sociologies alert us to the danger of normative narratives, that is, stories that carry silences and exclusions that we have to be vigilant about:

Through the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences, social experience that resists destruction is unconcealed, and the space-time capable of identifying and rendering credible new counter-hegemonic social experiences is opened up. . . . The objective of the sociology of absences is to transform impossible into possible objects, absent into present objects. (Santos 2004: 14–15)

The absences, in Santos's context, are the hauntings Gordon writes of. They refer to 'what's living and breathing in the place hidden from view: people, places, histories, knowledge, memories, ways of life, ideas' (Gordon 2011: 3),

that it is crucial that they be rescued so that a fairer and more ethical relationship with others can be developed.

Lima, notably, uses the ghost trope critically, not only to recover unheard voices and histories of the colonial past but also to stress that there are persistent forms of violence that still pervade the Santomean societal space. The trope in her writing calls for an effective change in politics. This is one of the most inspiring and attractive dimensions in Gordon's haunting proposal for a sociological imagination (2008, 2011). As the sociological imagination is not backward gazing, but also oriented towards the possible futures, it manifests a profound ethical concern for the silenced subjects of history in the present, so that different futures and other narratives can be possible. It is at this point that the sociology of emergences can also act, since it 'aims to identify and enlarge the signs of possible future experiences, under the guise of tendencies and latencies that are actively ignored by hegemonic rationality and knowledge' (Santos 2004: 24).

The social, political and cultural marginalization of the contract workers in São Tomé and Príncipe is depicted in Lima's poetry through the phantasmagorical idiom, by giving power to these ghosts, a power that, in a symbolic order, allows them the chance of becoming speakers with their own voice, something previously absent in the drama of the nation. In 'Imagined manifesto of a servant', contractual workers return from the dead demanding a place in the 'Santomean ground' (Lima 2004: 35–37), asserting themselves before those who, as Inocência Mata claims, are 'directly responsible for their destiny of refugees' (2006: 244), the *forros*, and contending that they are like them, also 'sons of the land'.

In Lima's work, particularly, in '1953', the poet offers a perspective of haunting close to the one proposed by Derrida and Gordon, where the poetic voice recognizes the suffering imposed on the Santomean by colonialism, but at the same time it reflects upon the persistent social differences and complex hierarchies in the islands. The violence experienced by the *forros* during the massacre and their 'unfair mode of loving freedom'³¹ (Lima 2006: 27) works, in this text, as a call for attention to the extreme segregation experienced by the 'despised' contract workers with 'the slave stigma in the hand that executes'³² (Lima 2006: 26). In this way, the rigid dichotomy between innocent and guilty is deconstructed, and the reader becomes aware of the necessity of more complex models of framing the massacre in order to better understand it. It is apparent in Lima's poems that the *forros* are not the only victims of the 1953 events since the massacre is not a singular annihilating and isolated explosion, but the result of a continuous process of colonial violence, and as such part of a wider context that produces many victims.

The haunting is, in Lima's case, also a mode of testing the limits of the massacre's representation, emphasizing its untold and indeterminable dimension. Faced with the difficulty of finding a suitable language for expressing

the immeasurable trauma and suffering, the poet chooses to tell the violence of the 1953 events through the phantasmagoric idiom.³³ In ‘Zálima Gabon’ – *zálima* meaning ghost, spectre or soul – the poetic subject assumes that these dead, the contract workers, are different from others in their demand for recognition and justice.³⁴ Here, the dead return as a sign of something unspeakable and unresolved, and as such a manifestation of the impossibility of portraying extreme violence and marginalization:

They’re tangible with their pupils of corpses without graves
The pathetic shadow, their bones adrift and without shelter
And a long, hundred-year old, tolerant fury.

That’s why I don’t mistake them for other dead.

Because they come and go but do not leave
They come and go but do not die.³⁵ (Lima 2006: 22)

In ‘Zálima Gabon’, the spectres do not mean simply a dead person, they embody exclusions and invisibilities. Because ‘the ghost always carries the message’ (Gordon 2008: 98), in this poem, through the visitation of the hauntings, the idea of a homogenous national identity is contested and the verse reminds readers of the colonial heritage of injustices that persist in the islands. The ghosts stand, in this way, as a powerful reminder of past errors and discriminations that shall not be forgotten and that should not recur. The hauntings speak, also, of the particular forms through which the Santomean experienced colonial practices. This allows for a reckoning of the specific violence mechanisms inherited from colonialism, like the profound hierarchical and social categories of exclusion enacted by the colonizers. It is this everyday experience that Lima, with her poetry and ethics of justice, aspires to change by encouraging debate and action.

The poetry confronts and rescues the ghostly presences of *tongas*, contract workers or servants, within the colonial and postcolonial Santomean society that discriminates against them, forcing the community of *forros* to acknowledge their presence and actual claims for a legitimate place in the archipelago. Lima’s work evokes the concept of ethical accountability before these persons – subjects with concrete desires, sufferings and struggles – that Gayatri Spivak in her classic essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1988) considers fundamental: listening *to* their previously muted voices, instead of speaking *for* them.

CONCLUSION

Studying the colonial phantasmagoria in Lima’s work ‘illustrate[s] the anxieties of a country struggling for a postcolonial identity’ (Giles 2011: 1), in

depictions that lend support to or subvert the dominant narratives that have been and continue to be constructed about the recent colonial past of the archipelago. The rescue of the figure of the contract worker-turned-ghost allows the framing of the complexities of the 1953 Massacre and makes visible the social tensions present in colonial and postcolonial São Tomé and Príncipe. In these texts, the spectres demand their place in the land of São Tomé and Príncipe and in its discourse(s), making claims for justice and recognition in a national space from which they have been excluded.

Through the idiom of ghosts, Lima recovers and questions the discourse(s) that narrate the nation, both in the former metropolis and in the colony, revealing them as the product of fallacies. The supposed originality of a Portuguese colonization without violence is exposed and Salazar's rhetoric of Portugal as a country of exceptional character,³⁶ dispersed over various continents, but harmoniously united, is denounced as a fantasy (Castelo 1999: 14, 97). Furthermore, the idea of a fixed and homogenous identity of the Santomean people is also shattered in the poet's texts, unveiling in these other stories many different possibilities for the future of the islands.

NOTES

1. This chapter is part of a PhD investigation with the reference SFRH/BD/81653/2011, carried out at the Centre for Social Studies/Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra and cofinanced by the European Social Fund, through the Operational Programme Human Potential and by National Funds through Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia. An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the conference 'After the Empires – Reflections of European Colonialism in a Globalized World', Roskilde University, May 2013. I am grateful to those who have discussed my research with me along the way including Professors António Sousa Ribeiro, Margarida Calafate Ribeiro, Maria Paula Meneses and Gerhard Seibert, my colleagues at Centro de Estudos Sociais and Rita Grácio. Special thanks to the organizers of the 'After the Empires' Conference and to Lars Jensen, Conceição Lima, Joana Pratas, Ronnith Morris and the peer-review referees for their insightful comments on the draft.

2. Ghosts also provide a rich strand of renewed scholarship in the humanities and social sciences that can be dated from before the 1990s. For elaboration on the 'spectral turn', see Luckhurst (2002).

3. See Gordon (2008) and Craps (2013: 60–71).

4. Read Cameron (2008) and Boyd and Thrush (2011).

5. See Gelder and Jacobs (1999).

6. See Mbembe (2003).

7. Further reading by Labanyi (2000) and Colmeiro (2011) in the case of the Spanish Civil War and for analysis of the Portuguese Colonial War, see Vecchi (2010).

8. Paper presented by Marijke Denger at Kingston University, 13 September 2013.

9. Mueggler (2001).

10. I recommend the haunted narrative of *The Battle of Tabato*, a movie by João Viana (2013). I am grateful to Papaveronoir for sending me a copy of this film.

11. For other considerations of haunting and postcolonial studies, see Joseph-Vilain and Misrahi-Barak *Postcolonial Ghosts* (2009). For a comprehensive overview of the uses of spectralization in the field of cultural studies, I recommend *The Spectralities Reader* published by Blanco and Peeren (2013).

12. The notion of an 'idiom of haunting' is suggested by Joshua Gunn (2006: 78).

13. I do not use the term 'postcolonial' as meaning a chronological step after the end of the 'colonial', but as a means to regard the present globalized world through colonialism's heritages. For accurate reflections on postcolonial thought and theories, read António Sousa Ribeiro (2010) and the book edited by Brugioni, Passos, Sarabando and Silva (2012).

14. *Forros* refers to freed slaves, men and women with full citizenship rights, natives and their descendants and is a term that also designates the prevalent ethno-cultural group in São Tomé and Príncipe.

15. Concerning the political, cultural and historical contexts of the Batepá Massacre, see Mário Pinto de Andrade under the name of Buanga Fele (1955), Pelissier (1972), Moreira (1974), Seibert (1996, 1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2008), Cervelló (1999), Lima (2002), Santo (2003) and Mata (1998, 2004b, 2010).

16. Luso-tropicalism is a theory of hybridism without violence that shares the assumption of a gentle relationship between colonizer and colonized, presenting the mulatto as the material trophy of the miscegenation (Santos 2010: 227). For critiques of Gilberto Freyre and the ways luso-tropicalism was appropriated by the authoritarian Portuguese regime of *Estado Novo*, see Castelo (1999) and Almeida (2000).

17. See Mata (2004a: 13).

18. 'Os mártires – dizem – são seres excepcionais, raros / A certa luz destinados. / Não era essa, suponho, a sua sina. . . / Não pensarei em milagres, não pensarei / Na crucificação em que um homem renasceu / Sem saber ao certo porque caía'. All the translations are mine, except when otherwise noted.

19. 'O enigma é outro – aqui não moram deuses / Homens apenas e o mar, inamovível herança'.

20. Although there are *forros* with many different socioeconomic statuses, the native Creole elite of the islands was composed mainly by men and women from this group. Most of the members of the local elite occupied intermediate social positions during Portuguese colonialism, holding posts in the public administration of the colony and/or being owners of plantations. For more information about this subject, read Seibert (2002a: 75, 114–15).

21. Although these workers are in the archipelago, sometimes, for more than three decades, they continue to be excluded from full citizenship, as revealed in Leão Lopes's documentary *S. Tomé e Príncipe: os últimos contratados* (2010). In the documentary Alda Espírito Santo states that while included in the country's constitution, the former contract workers and their descendants' right to vote is not assured, even though they are Santomean.

22. 'Mostra-me o sangue da lua / Agora que a praia cuspiu / A náusea do mar / E o nojo das rochas petrifica os gritos que não ouvi / Mostra-me o sangue / O sangue

e as veias da lua / Quando as línguas decepadas / Ressuscitem / Em Fernão Dias no mês de Fevereiro’.

23. Notwithstanding, it is important to keep in mind that the depictions of these workers assume distinctive features according to the contexts in which the texts are written. For example, in the anti-colonial and nationalist poetry by Alda Espírito Santo and Maria Manuela Margarido, the priority was to create a consolidated community to fight against the Portuguese enemy, so the contract workers are referenced, but generically remain mute. More recently, however, in the new critical writings of Conceição Lima, Manuel Teles Neto and Olinda Beja, the performance of the complex voices and lives of these men and women contribute to a reevaluation of their role in the history of the nation. See Mata (2004a, 2006, 2010), Padilha (2004) and Falconi (2011).

24. ‘Os mortos que morreram sem perguntas / Regressam devagar de olhos abertos / Indagando por suas asas crucificadas’.

25. ‘Perguntam os mortos: / Porque brotam raízes dos nossos pés’?

26. ‘Vê como são circunspectos os telhados da Avenida Marginal / Ouve como arquejam os tijolos dos chalés da Marginal / Sente a brisa quando roça os cabelos das palmeiras / Nas artérias da cidade. / É o espírito dos que plantaram morrendo / Os pilares desta urbe onde rimos e fingimos / Sofremos e mentimos, traímos e lutamos / Pelejam e amamos’.

27. See, for example, *Three Case Histories* (1996) and *The Uncanny* (2003).

28. There are several animistic rituals in the islands. Spirit possession is a common phenomenon, namely in healing ceremonies, such as *djambi*. I recommend Inês Gonçalves’s documentary *Na Terra como no Céu* (On Earth as It Is in Heaven) (2010) on this subject.

29. ‘Sentadas lá no quintal / falando do avô e de outros fantasmas’.

30. See Turcotte (2009). For a critical study of how actual people are produced as ghosts in our contemporary globalized world, see *The Spectral Metaphor. Living Ghosts and the Agency of Invisibility* (Peeren 2014).

31. ‘Injusto modo de amar a liberdade’.

32. ‘O escravo estigma na mão que executa’.

33. For theoretical elaboration in the field of memory studies, in the extensive line of enquiry relating memory, violence and trauma, see, for example, Ribeiro (2013), Assmann and Shortt (2012), Vambe (2012) and Antze and Lambek (1996).

34. The term *gabon* from the title is a pejorative word by which the non-natives of São Tomé and Príncipe were known. It is used to designate the servants and contract workers that came from the African continent to the archipelago.

35. ‘São tangíveis com suas pupilas de cadáveres sem cova / A patética sombra, seus ossos sem rumo e sem abrigo / E uma longa, centenária, resignada fúria. / Por isso não os confundo com outros mortos. / Porque eles vêm e vão mas não partem / Eles vêm e vão mas não morrem’.

36. Concerning this alleged exceptional character of the Portuguese colonialism, see Almeida (2000), Vecchi (2010) and Santos (2010).

Chapter 7

Who Speaks the Postcolonial Community? Reflections on Language, Community and Imperial Nostalgia within the European Continent

Elena Brugioni

This chapter¹ examines the ideological ambiguities that inform the ‘Europhone linguistic community’ by addressing its cultural, social and political developments. A number of case studies and different linguistic contexts are considered in exploring the relationship between language and the ‘communitarian paradigm’ as the postcolonial problematic symptom of what Pascal Blanchard defines as ‘the colonial fracture’ (Blanchard, Bancel and Lemarie 2005). Within the field of literary studies – at least within many European academic and cultural contexts – African literature(s) are still defined (and approached) at the margins of the ‘great European literary canon’. The treatment of African literature(s) point to critical, theoretical and political problems, including ambiguities that this chapter examines. From a critical perspective, I propose a redefinition of the concept of community that Europhone ideologies implicitly encompass. This redefinition strives to emancipate linguistic community concepts – such as Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone Studies – from their problematic dimension of ‘new [old] empires of compensatory geo-linguistics’ (Almeida 2006).

After Angela Merkel’s visit to Portugal in November 2012, Miguel Sousa Tavares – a leftist journalist, well-known television commentator, author of the Portuguese bestseller, *Equador* (2003) and son of renowned Portuguese poet, Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen – expressed indignation over Merkel’s translator not being Portuguese but Brazilian, or possibly German with a Brazilian accent. Sousa Tavares said, ‘In our country, we speak our language’. This is but one recent example of a ‘linguistic obsession’ that haunts the Portuguese ‘(post)imperial house’, to paraphrase Gilberto Freyre’s synthesis in his canonical *Casa-grande & senzala* (1933). The affective conceptualization of a ‘Lusophone community’ represents the terrain against which the (post)colonial disquiet and resentment that appear to run through

aspects of Portuguese social, cultural and political life and public space may be tackled and problematized. In this respect, some questions immediately arise:

- Is the linguistic community – that is, *Lusophonia* – the ‘last avatar of a new colonialism’? (*Manifeste* 2007)
- Will the Lusophone community be able to productively create a future instead of simply managing nostalgia – *saudade*? (Couto 1994)
- Does a Lusophone community exist?

To address these questions, I propose to reflect on the ideological ambiguities that inform the theorization of the ‘Lusophone linguistic community’ and its cultural, social and political outcomes, in order to underline a number of specificities that characterize the Portuguese postcolonial situation.

The category ‘Lusophone literature’ commonly indicates literature(s) situated outside the new/old symbolic and thus economic centre – Portugal and, more recently, Brazil – resulting in what Etienne Balibar defines as ‘criteria of internal exclusion’ (2007: 64). In other words, as Calixthe Beyala would say: ‘French is Francophone, but Francophony is not French’ (1996). Concerning these problematizations, an emblematic example of university studies is a case in point: while Portuguese academies often teach Portuguese Literature and Brazilian Literature, Mozambican Literature, Angolan Literature and so on are less often studies as discrete subjects. On that account, literature(s) from a number of different African countries, and literature(s) of distinct regions such as Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé e Príncipe are considered as a *single literary system* – through the generic name *Lusophone African literature(s)* – revealing critical and pragmatic problems and determining several misinterpretations about texts and authors, which are primarily approached as ‘Lusophone’ rather than as African, sub-Saharan, West African, Mozambican, Angolan and so on.² The main issue concerns the operational use of the notion of ‘linguistic community’ as one that somehow responds to an ideological and, thus, problematic imperial nostalgia – *saudade* – suggesting what Miguel Vale de Almeida defines as the ‘new [old] empire of compensatory geo-linguistics’ (Sanches 2006: 364). To paraphrase this approach, the configuration of the logocentric discourse that underlies and sustains the ‘Lusophone community’ may be the most evident and paradigmatic element of a compensation where the language, and in particular its dissemination, are no more than a neo-colonial fetish. This double bind is evident in a wide variety of contexts, apart from literary criticism and its institutional developments. A first paradigmatic example would be the Portuguese reaction to the admittance of a Portuguese-speaking African

country like Mozambique to the Commonwealth in 1995. Mozambican writer Mia Couto remarked:

We all remember how certain Portuguese politicians panicked at the admittance of Mozambique to the Commonwealth. What was going on? Had Mozambicans betrayed their loyalty to the Portuguese language? The reactions of some of the factions were so excessive that they could only be explained by a feeling of loss of the old empire, not unlike the syndrome of the betrayed husband who, failing to recognize autonomy and majority in the ex-wife, continues to wonder: Who is she seeing now? Mozambique would, thus, be seeing the Englishman on the side. Not only was this adultery, it was with an Englishman on top of it. How distasteful, with all the historical ghosts this conjures up. (Couto 2007, author's translation)³

Besides the dimension of *possession*, and therefore *betrayal*, there is also a notion of uniformity and norm disguised as legitimacy and, therefore, a less suspect instrument for the claiming of linguistic domination based on a presumed superiority, which is cultural, and obviously economic, as seen in the debate around the 'orthographic agreement' for the Portuguese language that happened in 2008 and represents, still today, a very problematic debate within the Portuguese-speaking world. The Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos has called this debate the 'Luso-Brazilian burlesque drama' (2008):

The colonizer/colonized relationship between Portugal and Brazil was always either on the brink of collapse or inversion. Until today. That indecision is what makes the Orthographic Agreement so necessary and so difficult. On the Portuguese side, the attitude to the Agreement is always based on an idea of "surrendering to Brazil", whether accepting it, or refusing it. Both cases reveal the ghost of inverted colonialism, instead of the liberating idea of the inversion of colonialism. (Santos 2008: 32)

To sum up, the language, in its institutional dimension, immediately conjures up the colonized/colonizer relationship, at the same time that it points to a set of cultural, political and economic convergences that are central and clearly ambiguous, framing the Portuguese language as the revealing issue of the so-called colonial fracture (Blanchard, Bancel and Lemarie 2005).

In relation to cultural production and representation, the *Lusophonic*, or more particularly the *Lusocentric*, paradigm operates within the domestication of subversions that deconstruct any power relationship within the Portuguese language and that are accepted through the double bind of the *typical* and the *exotic*. Far from being exclusively problematic for the *Lusophone world(s)*, these issues have parallel situations in other contexts, which further preclude

unequivocal answers. For this reason it is essential to refer to what Edward Said has defined as a *counterpoint* (2001), in this case, of a more theoretical origin, with the critical formulations and debates that have arisen around other European languages in their exoglossic or, more accurately, in their ‘polycentric’ dimension. Among these, I single out the critical formulations around the French language, particularly the questioning of the underlying implications of the literature that since the publication of the *Manifeste*⁴ have been reconfigured by the not unproblematic designation of *littérature-monde en français*. Evidently some of the questions raised by the authors of the *Manifeste* are relevant to the Lusophone context.⁵ Notably, the ‘Copernican revolution’ (*Manifeste* 2007) proposed by the notion of *littérature-monde en français* destabilizes the idea of an exclusive relation between language, belonging, nationhood and cultural identity (Butler and Spivak 2007), establishing as the *subject* and *centre* of this cultural production ‘another-France’ (*Manifeste* 2007) that extends to the ‘four corners of the world’ (*Manifeste* 2007).

Copernican Revolution. Copernican, because it reveals that the literary world knew without admitting: the center, the point from which was supposed to radiate a Franco-French literature, is no longer the center. The center so far, even though fewer, had this absorption capacity which forced the authors from elsewhere to strip their luggage before melting in the crucible of language and national history: the center, say the price fall is now everywhere around the world. End of the Francophonie. And birth of a world literature in French. (*Manifeste* 2007, author’s translation)⁶

Besides a strong appeal to the *differential and the transnational*, which also stands out as a theoretically problematic aspect of the *Manifeste*,⁷ the most urgent subject for discussion relates to the cultural aspect to which the geo-linguistic category seems to point, proclaiming ‘francophonie as the light of a dead star’ (2007) and, thus, subverting the critical and political value of the ‘francophone linguistic community’:

Let’s be clear: the emergence of a *littérature-monde* in French consciously assertive, open to the world, transnational, sign the death certificate of the Francophonie. No one speaks francophone, nor writes in francophone. The Francophonie is the light of dead star. How the world could he be concerned with the language of a virtual country? Now it is the world that is invited to the banquet of autumn prize What we understand that times are ready for this revolution. (*Manifeste* 2007, author’s translation)⁸

On this point, writer Jean-Luc Raharimanana, who is also a co-author of the text, states:

This subdivision of the francophone literature into categories is, actually, refused by most writers: many of them think that the concept of the francophone

author is made up by the critics, since there is no creative community among the French-speaking writers. In conclusion, for writers subjected to this cataloguing, francophonia is, at worst, an abuse, and at best, an aborted utopia that, besides that, risks contributing to an ulterior marginalization of this literature (Raharimanana 2007, author's translation).⁹

Raharimanana's concern immediately draws attention to the essence of this supposed *community* which, despite having a common language, seems void of any pragmatic, or even symbolic meaning. Indeed, the result of this categorization is, first, a more *imaginary than imaginable* construction, to paraphrase Eduardo Lourenço (1999), which as a consequence of its significant popularization seems responsible for a *marginalization* or even a *typification* of subjects, which is strongly rejected by the same subjects who find themselves included in these processes.

Considerations of this type are relevant in the context of the Portuguese language. In fact, what makes the *lusophone categories* more ambiguous, and therefore, not so *innocent* is, as Miguel Vale de Almeida argues, an ideological configuration that privileges the Portuguese 'gift of language' without, at the same time, acknowledging the 'counter-gift' that comes from the extra-European linguistic and cultural spheres (Almeida 2006: 365). Besides the ideological and symbolic problems determined by this use of the category of linguistic community, another important aspect arises concerning the very field of African literary studies. Generally, according to the principles of the *assimilation/exclusion dichotomy*, what is observed – in terms of the literary context and thus, in terms of the cultural representations – results in the *construction of a specificity* that automatically refers to the phenomena of *domestication* and/or *exoticism*. Due to these logocentric cartographies, African literatures – at least within many European and Western academic and cultural contexts – are still defined and approached as literary appendices or, more appropriately, at the margins of the great European literary canon, undermining a number of alternative critical mappings through which contemporary African writings and cultural representations can be placed and read. This signals the inability to acknowledge this *difference*, which in relation to language can be viewed as *polyphonic diffraction* from the perspective of a *sine qua non* precondition for any sharing of that language.

It is difference that constitutes the perhaps essential presumption for the existence of a *Lusophonia* that lies beyond the 'aborted utopia' or even the 'abuse' (Raharimanana 2007), and that ultimately does not represent, as the *Manifeste* states, 'the last avatar of a new colonialism' (2007). Furthermore, considering the *phenomenology* of the *Lusophone* community, it is clear that the symbolic and pragmatic dimensions of this ideology are removed from a configuration that conceptualizes the Portuguese language as, to quote Mia Couto, '[the] *mestizo* child of the love affair between the two

shores of the Mediterranean' (2007). Therefore, what appears to be brought out by these reconfigurations of the Lusophone communitarian notion is a challenge of several critical paradigms – language, national and cultural identity, and difference – that promote an essential redefinition of language and of its political and symbolic developments. Therefore, the concept of a *hybrid and mestizo Lusophonia*, as detailed by Mia Couto, represents a crucial historical and critical tool to deconstruct the coincidence between the linguistic communitarian paradigm and its colonial and imperial value.

We say that the Portuguese language is not only of the Portuguese. And we believe that that is the manifestation of a political intention, of an adopted will. But it is not at all intention or will. It is a historical question: for centuries, the Portuguese language has also been African. What would become of the Portuguese idiom had it not benefitted from linguistic contributions from the Arabs who occupied and lived in the Iberian Peninsula? Those Arabs helped to weave this great mat where our souls lay. Those Arabs are Africans, as much as we, who live further south. . . . And even if we want to disregard the influence of the Bantu languages, born after the caravels sailed . . . the truth is that Lusophonia didn't begin today. Our common language was built by ties so ancient, that sometimes we lose their trace. (Couto 2007, author's translation)¹⁰

From a critical perspective, a conceptual and theoretical redefinition of the communitarian paradigm (Agamben 1990; Esposito 2006; Nancy 1990) represents a crucial step in proposing a postcolonial problematization of the Europhone linguistic communities. Within the Lusocentric ideology emphasized earlier, the crucial difficulty involves an essentialist definition of community that can be defined by a suspicious *ambiguity* that is by the ideological projection of imperial nostalgia and neo-colonial fetishism. Transforming 'community's' *essence into a transcendence* is one way of avoiding the ambiguity inherent to our understandings of the term. In other words, as Jean-Luc Nancy points out, *un communauté désœuvrée*, 'an inoperative community' based not on the ideology of identity and uniformity, but a community that shows itself as a 'singular plural being' (Nancy 1990) allows a more viable conceptualization of 'community'.

This kind of interrogative revision of the 'communitarian paradigm' would be crucial to emancipate 'linguistic community concepts' such as Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone from their problematic dimension of 'new [old] empires of compensatory geo-linguistics' (Almeida 2006). To address African literary texts and cultural representations in general as the 'political' place to frame the paradigm of the 'inoperative community':

Community cannot rise from the domain of work. One does not produce it, one experiences or one is constituted by it as the experience of finitude. Community

understood as a work or through its work would presuppose that the common being, as such, be objectifiable and producible (in sites, persons, buildings discourses, institutions, symbols: in short, in subjects). . . . Community necessarily takes place in what Blanchot defines as 'unworking', referring to which, before and beyond the work, withdraws from the work, and which no longer having to do either with production or with completion, encounters interruption, fragmentation, suspension. Community is made of the interruption of singularities, or of the suspension that singular beings are. . . . Community is the unworking of work that is social, economic, technical and institutional. (Nancy 1991: 31)

In addition, this conceptual and theoretical revision represents an essential critical breakthrough for an epistemological approach concerning the specific field of African literary studies. As a result, a set of original critical paradigms arise, undermining the monolingual critical reception of African writing. These paradigms promote a multilingual and transnational framework to address contemporary African texts and literature(s), thus deconstructing what Graham Huggan defines as the 'postcolonial exotic':

Postcolonial exotic is the name that one might give to a dilemma; a name that accompanies the emergence of postcolonial studies as an institutional field. The postcolonial exotic can be either a contradiction in terms (for postcolonialism) or a tautology (for postcoloniality). It is many different things at once: a mechanism of cultural translation for the English-speaking mainstream and a vehicle for the estrangement of metropolitan mainstream views; a semiotic circuit in which the signs of oppositionality are continually recoded, circulating alternately as commodities within a late-capitalistic, neo-imperialist symbolic economy and as markers of anti-imperialist resistance in an age of 'adversarial internationalization' (Said 1990); a reminder generally of the contradictions inscribed in the contemporary alterity industry and a warning-sign, specifically, to those who invoke otherness to disguise their fear of cultural ignorance (Suleri 1992a); a self-obsessed unfurling of fetishistic spectacles, lures and distractions and a self-critical unveiling of the imperialist power-politics that lurks behind aesthetic diversion (Mason 1996; Rousseau and Porter 1990).

[The postcolonial exotic] is a pathology of cultural representations under late capitalism – a result of the spiralling commodification of cultural difference, and of response to it, that is characteristic of the (post)modern, market-driven societies in which many of us currently live. (Huggan 2001: 32–33)

Taking into account that the logocentric communitarian ideology appears to be a *utopian project* – still – upheld by the former European imperial nations in order to compensate them for the loss of their empire, its problematization and deconstruction seem to be crucial aspects of building transnational and intercultural relationships among countries and cultures that share the 'colonial fracture' (Blanchard, Bancel and Lemarie 2005), fostering

political, cultural and critical processes that will be capable of progressing from the imperial nostalgia – *saudade* – to a far more decolonized ‘postcolonial conviviality’ (Gilroy 2004) as ‘the processes of cohabitation and interaction that have made “multiculture” an ordinary feature of social life . . . in postcolonial cities’ (xv).

The most recent developments of the critical debate around Lusophonia, especially in Portugal, are characterized by a dismissal of this category, underlining its strong colonial ideology and, so, the impossibility to rescue this concept from the colonial order that projects and defines it. For instance, in an article published in the newspaper *Público*, António Pinto Ribeiro, former director of several cultural programmes developed by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, proposes ‘to end, once and for all, with Lusophonia’ (*‘Para acabar de vez com a Lusofonia’*), addressing the ‘epistemological violence’ conveyed by this notion and stating that

Lusophonia is the ultimate mark of an empire that no longer exists. And the last impediment to an adult work on the multiple identities of the countries that speak Portuguese. . . . There is no need for a Lusophone diplomacy. What we need is a diplomacy based on rights and equalities. This is the time to be acquainted with and give visibility to the cultural and artistic productions, to literature and scientific works of these countries for what they are worth, and because they are important within the global world, because they contain a strangeness that is perhaps a consequence of the death of this same Lusophonia. (Pinto Ribeiro 2013, author’s translation)¹¹

According to this analytical position, the death of Lusophonia would become the crucial step to face the ‘colonial fracture’ and so tackle the Portuguese postcolonial condition, putting forward a number of significant critical developments suggested by the theoretical articulation between the communitarian paradigm and the concept of death. However, ‘killing’ the notion of Lusophonia fails to address the relations between countries, cultures and subjects that are supposedly tied by their colonial pasts and that have the possibility to build social, political and cultural relationships that are no longer haunted by imperial and neo-colonial ideologies. On the contrary, a far more productive and challenging task would be to *decolonize* the communitarian paradigm, addressing its polyphonic and strangeness dimension as the starting point for rethinking and redefining not its essence but its transcendence (Nancy 1990). In this regard, a close examination of literary texts and cultural representations can provide a crucial framework in order to address the *Portuguese-speaking world(s)*, approaching the language not as an ideology to manage the past, to paraphrase Mia Couto’s famous quotation, but as an opportunity to create the future.

CONCLUSION

If literary writing and cultural productions already contain and represent the death of Lusophonia, that is an alternative configuration of the *Portuguese-speaking postcolonial community*, a situated and critical approach to these representations can be the path to ‘decolonize’ the relations between those countries and cultures that share the colonial past, addressing the language identity outside an ideology of compensation for imperial loss, and as the initiating point to build what Giorgio Agamben defines as ‘the coming community’ (1990). That is a community based on the notion of belonging without identity. That is a community of fragments, and singularities, ‘mediated not by any condition of belonging, nor by the simple absence of conditions, but by belonging itself’ (Agamben 1990: 85).

The question that lends the title to this chapter, inspired by the book *Who Sings the Nation-State?* (Butler and Spivak 2007), possibly needs to be rephrased or indeed, critically revised, undertaking communality *despite* and *beyond* language identity, and thus seeking a ‘community without community’ (Nancy 1990) that appears to have been already *written*, rather than *spoken*.

NOTES

1. This chapter builds on one of the central critical problems that I addressed within my postdoctoral research project at the Centre for Humanistic Studies of the University of Minho – CEHUM and financed by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia. Initial critical reflection concerning the ‘Lusophone’ linguistic cartography and a critical framework was published in an earlier article, ‘Old Empires, New cartographies: Problematizing “Lusophone categorizations”’ (Brugioni 2011). The reflections developed in this chapter provide an updated critical approach.

2. On this subject, see Mata (2013); Falconi (2012) and Brugioni (2011, 2013).

3. Original quote:

Todos nos lembramos como certos sectores da política portuguesa entraram em pânico com a adesão de Moçambique à Commonwealth. O que se passava? Os moçambicanos haviam traído a sua fidelidade ao idioma luso? As reacções de algumas facções foram de tal modo excessivas que só podiam ser explicadas por um sentimento de perda de um antigo império. A exemplo da síndrome do marido traído que, não reconhecendo autonomia e maioria na ex-mulher, sempre se pergunta: com quem é que ela anda agora? Moçambique andaria, assim, com o inglês. Não se apenas tratava de adultério mas ainda por cima que mau gosto, logo um inglês, com todos os fantasmas históricos que isso comportava.

4. The text *Pour une 'littérature-monde en français': le Manifeste* was published, for the first time, in the French daily newspaper *Le Monde* on 16 March 2007 and was signed by Muriel Babery, Tahar Ben Jelloun, Alain Borer, Roland Brival, Maryse Conde, Didier Daeninckx, Ananda Devi, Alain Dugrand, Edouard Glissant, Jacques Godbout, Nancy Huston, Koffi Kwahule, Dany Laferrière, Gilles Lapouge, Jean-Marie Laclavetine, Michel Layaz, Michel Le Bris, JMG Le Clezio, Yvon Le Men, Amin Maalouf, Alain Mabanckou, Anna Moi, Wajdi Mouawad, Nimrod, Wilfried N'Sonde, Esther Orner, Erik Orsenna, Benoit Peeters, Patrick Rambaud, Gisèle Pineau, Jean-Claude Pirotte, Grégoire Polet, Patrick Raynal, Raharimanana, Jean Rouaud, Boualem Sansal, Dai SitJe, Brina Svit, Lyonnel Trouillot, Anne Vallaeys, Jean Vautrin, André Velter, Gary Victor and Abdourahman A. Waberi. It is now published in a collective work: Rouaud, J. and Le Bris, M. (org.) (2007) *Pour une littérature-monde*. Paris: Gallimard.

5. In this respect, see Brugioni and Silva (2013).

6. Original quote:

Révolution copernicienne. Copernicienne, parce qu'elle révèle ce que le milieu littéraire savait déjà sans l'admettre : le centre, ce point depuis lequel était supposée rayonner une littérature franco-française, n'est plus le centre. Le centre jusqu'ici, même si de moins en moins, avait eu cette capacité d'absorption qui contraignait les auteurs venus d'ailleurs à se dépouiller de leurs bagages avant de se fondre dans le creuset de la langue et de son histoire nationale : le centre, nous disent les prix d'automne, est désormais partout, aux quatre coins du monde. Fin de la francophonie. Et naissance d'une littérature-monde en français. (*Manifeste* 2007). The translations of the *Manifeste* presented here are literal and are provided solely to aid the arguments presented.

7. The publication of the *Manifeste* has generated a significant critical debate around the notion of *Littérature-monde*. For an account of this critical discussion and its theoretical developments within the Francophone Studies, see the introductory essay to *Transnational French Studies: Postcolonialism and Literature-monde* by Alec G. Hargreaves, Charles Forsdick and David Murphy (2010) and the issue 'Littérature-monde: New Wave or New Hype?' of the journal *Contemporary French and Francophone Studies* (14: 1 (January 2010)).

8. Original quote:

Soyons clairs: l'émergence d'une littérature-monde en langue française consciemment affirmée, ouverte sur le monde, transnationale, signe l'acte de décès de la francophonie. Personne ne parle le francophone, ni n'écrit en francophone. La francophonie est de la lumière d'étoile morte. Comment le monde pourrait-il se sentir concerné par la langue d'un pays virtuel? Or c'est le monde qui s'est invité aux banquets des prix d'automne. A quoi nous comprenons que les temps sont prêts pour cette révolution. (*Manifeste* 2007)

9. Original quote:

Questa suddivisione in categorie della letteratura francofona è in realtà oggi presa di mira dalla maggior parte degli scrittori: sono in molti infatti a pensare che la

nozione di 'autore francofono' sia una invenzione dei critici, dal momento che non esiste nessuna comunità creativa nell'ambito degli scrittori cosiddetti francofoni. Insomma, per gli scrittori che subiscono questa catalogazione la francofonia in letteratura è al peggio un sopruso, e al meglio una utopia abortita che rischia oltre tutto di portare con sé una ulteriore emarginazione di questa letteratura.

10. Original quote:

Dizemos que a língua portuguesa não é apenas dos portugueses. E acreditamos que isso seja a manifestação de uma intenção política, de uma vontade adoptada. Mas não se trata de intenção ou vontade. Trata-se de uma questão histórica: há séculos que a língua portuguesa é também africana. O que seria do idioma português se não tivesse beneficiado das contribuições linguísticas dos árabes que ocuparam e viveram na Península Ibérica? Esses árabes ajudaram a tecer este grande tapete onde se deitam as nossas almas. Esses árabes são africanos, tanto como nós, os que habitamos mais a Sul. . . . E mesmo se nos quisermos abster à influência das línguas bantus nascidas depois do tempo das caravelas . . . a verdade é a seguinte: a lusofonia não começou hoje. A nossa língua comum foi construída por laços antigos, tão antigos que por vezes lhes perdemos o rasto.

11. Original quote:

A lusofonia é a última marca de um império que já não existe. E o último impedimento a um trabalho adulto sobre as múltiplas identidades dos países que falam português. . . . Não precisamos de uma diplomacia lusófona; do que precisamos é de uma diplomacia de direitos e de igualdades. Este é o momento de conhecer e dar visibilidade às produções culturais e artísticas, às literaturas e aos trabalhos científicos destes países por aquilo que valem, por serem incontornáveis no mundo global, por conterem, até, uma estranheza que é, porventura, consequência da morte dessa mesma lusofonia.

Chapter 8

‘Translation as a Place of Loss’: A Study of the Translations of Fanon’s *Peau noire, masques blancs* (1952) and Their Role in Anglophone Postcolonial Studies

Sarah Scales

The very fact of transporting Fanon into English inevitably means a loss.
(Britton and Philcox 2006: 3).

In 2005, Richard Philcox demonstrated himself to be very well aware of the difficulties ahead of him as the contemporary translator of Fanon’s *Les Damnés de la terre* and *Peau noire, masques blancs*. The task before the translator is one of effective dialogue between the source text and culture and the target language, with a view to reduce the potential for loss, both in terms of content and style. The difficulty in this task lies in how that mediation is achieved, without either over-appropriation of the language and concepts he or she presents into the target language culture or a reduction of the text to that of an exotic novelty. The liminal position of the translator, not entirely assimilated by the source language culture, and yet at one step removed from his or her own, allows him or her to cast a critical eye upon the functionality and purpose of both source and target languages. Marjolijn de Jager, the translator of many Francophone African writers, including Calixthe Beyala, Werewere Liking and V. Y. Mudimbe, expands on this by emphasizing the need for objectivity and precision in the task, noting that, ‘another requirement of the translator, then, is that she be conscious of her “own” words and eliminate them when they are, or are interpreted as, inappropriate to the author’s voice – self-effacement and humility must be practiced, the ear must be sharpened rather than personal memory called upon’ (de Jager 2013: 112–13). The complex relationship between the source text and that of the target language, and the mediation that must be achieved between the two,

can be linked to the social issues related to decolonization, in attempting to broker a compromise between ex-colonizer and colonized. Here, this relationship between France and Martinique, Fanon and the framework of Anglophone postcolonial studies, is further complicated by the fact that Martinique was never properly decolonized, instead becoming a *département* of France in 1946. Nevertheless, the island remains the geographical focus in this study of how the 1967 translation of *Peau noire, masques blancs* by an American translator, Charles Lam Markmann, impacts upon the relationship of Fanon to France in an era of post-decolonization. In this chapter, I shall explore this aforementioned relationship through a close textual analysis of Markmann's translation of *Peau noire, masques blancs* which will seek to highlight a movement away from the source text and the influence this has upon the perceptions the contemporary Anglo-American readership has of both Fanon and post-departmentalized Martinique, and the Caribbean more widely.

FANON AND MARKMANN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LIVES OF THE WRITER AND TRANSLATOR

Fanon's birth into a relatively middle-class family in Fort-de-France, Martinique, in 1925, meant that he experienced life both as a colonized citizen and as a citizen of a French department. Following his education 'the French way' with an emphasis on the history and culture of France and an insistence on the use of French, as the socioculturally 'superior' language to Creole,¹ he left Martinique in 1943 to join the war effort in Europe. He remained there after the war to study medicine and psychiatry in Lyon. It was his rude awakening to the reality of French society's perceptions of their overseas territories – including Martinique – coupled with his studies in psychiatry that developed the thinking that grew into *Peau noire, masques blancs* (published in 1952). The text examines the lived experience of the black man and woman under colonial rule and does so from several different angles: looking at the relationship between the black man and language (the language of the colonizer against that of the colonized), that of the black man and the white woman, the black woman and the white man and the everyday experience of being an object in the gaze of the white colonizer. Fanon's philosophical approach to his work is underpinned by an application of Sartrean existentialism and phenomenology (despite remaining critical of the philosopher himself). An awareness of this and the influence of his psychiatric training and professional background is the key in fully understanding the implications of the issues Fanon tackles in the text, which is why the Markmann translation of 1967 is so intriguing in its methods.

Biographical details of Charles Lam Markmann are limited, although the texts and articles he has translated and written are varied in style and scope. He wrote books on American politics and sports cars, and translated from French and Italian, everything from French science fiction novels (*La Nuit des temps* by René Barjavel) to *Coco Chanel: Her Life, Her Secrets* (Hædrich 1972) and *The Life of Jesus* (Craveri 1989). Little else however fits in with the analytical style and philosophical scope of *Peau noire, masques blancs*. Markmann was translating at the same time as the anti-colonial and black civil rights protest movements occurring in various places across the Anglophone world, and perhaps most crucially, America, during the 1960s. These events appear to have had a clear influence on the style of Markmann's translation, although it is difficult to ascertain if he himself had a vested interest in these causes.

**'THE FACT OF BLACKNESS': AN ANALYSIS
OF MARKMANN'S TRANSLATION OF
*PEAU NOIRE, MASQUES BLANCS***

Fanon's admittance into the Anglophone postcolonial studies canon was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it allowed greater worldwide access to his texts, while, on the other, it gave rise to a serious problem that 'alarmingly few of the theorists involved realize – or admit – that they read him in very poor translations' (Macey 2000: 26). This supports my view that Markmann's 1967 translation distorted and changed, rather than emphasized, Fanon's own voice. Furthermore, it rendered the text devoid of much of the philosophical meaning and therefore gives a misleading account of Fanon's own authorial intentions. How this happened will be examined in the following.

Markmann's translation technique appears to broadly adhere to Lawrence Venuti's theory of domestication, the reframing of notions of the foreign into something more readily understandable in translation. While Venuti can see the usefulness of this style of translation, noting that, 'Fluent translation may enable a foreign text to engage a mass readership, even a text from an excluded foreign culture, and thereby initiate a significant canon reformation' (Venuti 1998: 12), he also criticizes this form of translation as 'assimilationist' and states in *The Scandals of Translation* that '[it presents] to domestic readers a realistic representation inflected with their own codes and ideologies as if it were an immediate encounter with a foreign text and culture' (Venuti 1998: 12). Although this method is now widely discredited in adult literature translation, it did also have its advantages. It meant that the foreign text could connect more easily with the target readership if it were presented

in such a way that it highlighted points of contact between the two. It also meant therefore that the readership of little known texts could be increased. However, the ethics of such a treatment of a source text in translation is indisputably dubious.

Furthermore, Markmann's attempts at domestication in his translation, that is to move the tone of the text towards one perhaps more familiar and accessible to an American audience, can be mapped onto the process of decolonization – by taking what already exists and modifying or moderating it to make it more widely acceptable and, ultimately, more profitable for the publisher. Fanon's own estimation of decolonization as the *substitution totale* put forward in *Les Damnés de la terre* therefore works well in this situation, as it recalls the overwhelming style of Markmann's translation and its substitution of Fanon's syntactic styles and philosophical ideas with his own understanding of them. 'La décolonisation', according to Fanon, 'est très simplement le remplacement d'une 'espèce' d'hommes par une autre 'espèce' d'hommes. Sans transition, il y a substitution totale, complète, absolue' (Fanon 2011: 451).

The effects of this translation are twofold, and I will examine these through a study of a selection of Markmann's translation choices. Firstly, the 1967 translation skims over the emphasis Fanon places on the lived experience of the black man in a particular place and sociopolitical space by removing it from the context of the French Caribbean. Secondly, with the help of the cultural references throughout the translated text, Markmann repositions the work in contemporary America and changes it from being not so much an Anglophone understanding of Fanon's ideology but an Anglophone understanding of how Fanon's work can be applied to the civil rights movement in America. This is emphasized in the translation of chapter 5, 'L'expérience vécue du Noir', which highlights the sociocultural divisions between black and white people, but little of the psychological and philosophical problems that this provokes. For example, his translation of, 'voici les menus morceaux par un autre moi réunis' (Fanon 1952: 88) as 'now the fragments have been put back together again by another self' (Fanon 1967: 109) rather than 'here are the fragments put together by another me' (Fanon 2008: 89), as Philcox translates it, suggests the importance of foregrounding the social and racial sides of the text to buy into an American readership because Markmann's text makes it seem that the act of putting the pieces of himself back together is taken away from him and achieved by somebody else. The emphasis of the removal of personal agency in the translation, and the subjugation of the will to that of a more powerful other, although an idea missing from the source text here, is one which identifies with the position of the Afro-American populace in 1960s America. The issues surrounding the rights of the postcolonial citizen and their identity become those of the black civil rights movement.

Markmann also consistently misses or mistranslates philosophical nuances in the text. As Jean Khalfa notes in his article on Fanon's final prayer in the book, '[Fanon is] constantly shifting from the scientific "nous" (the psychiatrist/philosopher) to the subjective "je" (the self as consciousness), to the descriptive "il" (the self as "nègre")' (Khalfa 2004: 427). Richard Philcox draws our attention to the fact that Markmann disregards entirely the interplay between the use of 'nous' and 'je', translating nearly every instance as simply 'I' (Britton and Philcox 2006: 7). This has the effect of eradicating the philosophical element to the text and limiting the possibility of understanding it as an examination of not only a collective lived experience but also his own. Furthermore, the translation of the title of chapter 5, 'l'expérience vécue du Noir' is entirely misleading, being rendered as, 'The Fact of Blackness' and introduces a whole chapter, which, as Macey rightly states,

obliterates Fanon's philosophical frame of reference, which is supplied by a phenomenological theory of experience, [and] it also perverts his whole argument; for Fanon, there is no 'fact of blackness'. The world is, in his view, experienced in particular ways by 'the black man' [*sic*], but that experience is defined in situational terms, and not by some transhistorical 'fact' (Macey 2000: 26).

The chapter itself underscores Fanon's firm Sartrean framework to his philosophical thought and focuses on the notion of 'objecthood' bestowed upon the black man or woman, the attempt to understand his position in the world and how he can reclaim it for himself, as a Self. The Sartrean overtones in the discussion of the Self and Other and the accusation of 'inauthenticity' that he levels at others he believes would rather be white, or ingratiate themselves with the white settlers, is crucial in his work. Fanon can barely hide his disgust in stating that

Je me détourne de ces scrutateurs de l'avant-déluge et je m'agrippe à mes frères, nègres comme moi. Horreur, ils me rejettent. Eux sont presque blancs. Et puis ils vont épouser une Blanche. Ils auront des enfants légèrement bruns. . . . Qui sait, petit à petit, peut-être. . . . J'avais rêvé. (Fanon 1952: 94)

Again, this tone is simply lost in Markmann's translation, translating the opening phrase in a straight transference of sense, 'I turn away from these inspectors of the Ark before the Flood and I attach myself to my brothers' (Fanon 1967: 116). The Biblical references here are clunky and the sarcastic tone in Fanon's writing is destroyed with the over-literal translation of 'I attach myself', which dulls the damning condemnation of the sentence. In stark contrast, Philcox's translation points to the visceral emotions at play and by replacing 'nègres' missing in the previous translation, he realigns

Fanon with Martinique in the ideological battle against the essentializing of the character of the black man. He writes, 'I turn away from these prophets of doom and cling to my brothers, Negroes like myself' (Fanon 2008: 96). This realignment in turn emphasizes the Sartrean charge of inauthenticity and the condemnation he levels at the other 'Negroes like myself' when he dismisses their behaviour, writing that, 'they'll probably marry a white woman and have slightly brown children' (Fanon 2008: 96).

Moreover, the title, 'The Fact of Blackness' influences the whole tone of the chapter and suggests a feeling of inevitability, embeddedness and immovability in the translation and invokes a feeling of frustration and impotency among the black communities in 1960s America. There is nothing of the possibility of action, change and dynamism of thought so important for Fanon. 'The Lived Experience of the Black Man' as translated by Philcox, however, accurately demonstrates the philosophical thread that runs through Fanon's arguments and reinstates an element so conspicuous in its absence in the Markmann translation. In chapter 5, Markmann's literal translation of 'cette objectivité écrasante' (Fanon 1952: 88) as 'that crushing objecthood' (Fanon 1967: 109) *does* point out the central theme of the black man's constant enforcement of his supposed inferiority under the gaze of the white colonizer. Yet it does not bring out the underlying nuances of the erasure of identity, social importance and, ultimately, personhood. In contrast, Philcox's translation of the phrase as, 'this suffocating reification' (Fanon 2008: 89) firmly underscores the concept of the reduction of the colonized citizens to 'things' to be controlled and managed.

Therefore, the manner in which Markmann approaches the chapter title and content can clearly be said to give a false representation of Fanon's own ideology. Yet at the same time, we must also consider the American context in which, and the readership for whom, Markmann was translating and in so doing it is also possible to suggest that this radically different translation of the title does carry meaning. The description of 'blackness' as 'fact' certainly conveys the reality of the situation of black people in 1960s America and recalls the objectification and stifling restrictions placed on them at this time, allowing a greater identification between the readership and the text. This is an extreme example of the domestication (bringing the text closer to the experience and understanding of the reader) at work in this translation.

Finally, although appropriate for much of the text, Markmann's register in translation also misses the mark at times. In Clarisse Zimra's article examining Fanon's discussion of Mayotte Capécia's work, she notes that in the Markmann translation, '[He] arbitrarily lowers the register [*Black Skin*: 113]. The white mother does not say, as Markmann has it, "Hell, he's getting mad" (113); but rather, "Chut! Il va se fâcher"' (Zimra 1999: 184). Philcox comments on the register Markmann chooses for this translation, describing it as

'[placing] him [Fanon] in the black/white relationship of the U.S South' and notes that 'most of Markmann's references, especially in dialogue, refer to the American South' (Britton and Philcox 2006: 5). Nowhere is the reappropriation of the text for an American market clearer in the translation. Instead, through his treatment of the dialogue, he filters the source language through his own lens of experience, overwhelming the voice of the writer with that of the translator and overshadowing the developing identity of the postcolonial nation of Martinique. As I will later explore, this touches on the notion of the violence committed in translation towards source texts, and this echoes the process of the movement of colonization to decolonization itself.

What is the overall effect, then, of these choices in translation on the Anglophone understanding of Fanon and this key text? There are three main considerations involved with answering this question. First, we must examine the ethical and practical implications of the choices of translation. Second, we must study the effect of these choices on the creation of both postcolonial identity itself and the Anglophone perceptions of it. And third, we need to question how the actions of the translator impact upon the relationship of Fanon to France, post-decolonization.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE TRANSLATION CHOICES ON AN ANGLO-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF FANON AND *PEAU NOIRE, MASQUES BLANCS*

As I have previously shown in the discussion of Markmann's translation choices, he has time and again (whether consciously or unconsciously) employed a domesticating model of translation and privileged his own experience in translation rather than finding the best expression of Fanon's own voice. This is particularly exemplified in his choice of American South style of dialogue, rather than opting to root the text clearly in Martinique, as might be expected. As we have seen in the translation of *Peau noire, masques blancs*, his choice of tone, register and vocabulary in translation can eradicate the essential characteristics of the work, turning it into a text that people *want* to see, rather than the text it is. Perhaps more dangerously in terms of the reader's reception of the work, the overlaying of personal experiences, other than those in the source text, imbues it with significance and meanings beyond that which it originally possessed. Ironically, with Markmann adding racial and political meaning, Fanon's essential philosophical and ideological point is lost. This transfer, or even loss, of meaning in translation brings to mind the desire of the French colonizers to bend the language of the slaves and inhabitants of Martinique to their will – creating an island of French speakers, a language loaded with cultural capital, in contrast to the localized

Creole. By obfuscating the philosophical element of the text, and recalling the dualistic society which existed in both Martinique and France by mapping it onto a North American framework through the style of dialogue chosen, Markmann's translation underscores the sentiment of dualistic stalemate apparent between the colonial Self and the colonized Other in Fanon's work. Furthermore, the style of translation and the positioning of the dialect in the American South also can be said to inscribe an element of American imperialism in the text, albeit one which appropriates the Martinican postcolonial search for a meaningful identity for an Afro-American context and reader.

Although Venuti presents a translation as having an inextricable link with the original text, therefore creating a greater sense of loss when the translation is inadequate to the task, Walter Benjamin in his key work, 'The Task of the Translator' sees the two texts as, at the same time, both meaningless and significant to one another, because 'it is clear that a translation, no matter how good, cannot have any significance for the original. Nevertheless, it has the closest connection to the original by virtue of the latter's translatability. Indeed, this connection is all the more intimate when it no longer has significance for the original itself' (Benjamin 2012: 76). I would argue that, contrary to what we may initially think about Benjamin's statement about a lack of significance (i.e., that it does not matter to the source text how the translation works), it is precisely this lack of significance that creates a responsibility for the translator to work in a way which does credit to the source text. In so doing the practical purpose of the translation becomes clear: it creates a possibility of the source text living on meaningfully, illuminating the source culture and sensibilities in the target language, opening up spaces for further discussion and debate, rather than closing them down.

This concept of a literary afterlife is recalled in Said's travelling theory, which he used to examine the relationship between, 'theory and criticism, on the one hand, and society and culture on the other' in order to 'raise the question of theory and of criticism in ways suitable to the situation in which we find ourselves' (Said 1983: 230). He sees the adaptation of a theory – or, in our case, a text through translation – to a different sociocultural situation in a different time frame as entirely plausible because he found critical consciousness to be a measure of spatial sense through which theory can be located (Said 1983: 241–42). 'This means that theory (or the text) has to be grasped in the place and the time out of which it emerges as a part of that time, working in and for it, responding to it; then, consequently, that first place can be measured against the subsequent places where the theory turns up for use [i.e.: translations and further translations]' (Said 1983: 242). In this way, Markmann's translation can be viewed positively as a way of moving the sociopolitical framework of Fanon's text away from a departmentalized Martinican reality and towards that which would appeal to an American readership, and more

specifically, an Afro-American politically engaged readership. Furthermore, Said notes that it is inevitable, and not necessarily undesirable, that understandings and perceptions of a theory (here, Fanon's text) will shift as they are read by later generations in different social and political situations and insists that all readings are undertaken with a knowledge of the contemporary context in which the texts were written or translated. Here, it is very possible to apply his argument concerning the adaptation of Lukacs's work by Goldmann to that of Markmann's 'adaptation' and translation of Fanon. He writes,

It seems to me perfectly possible to judge misreadings (as they occur) as part of a historical transfer of ideas and theories from one setting to another. Lukacs wrote *for* as well as *in* a situation that produced ideas about consciousness and theory that are very different from the ideas produced by Goldmann in his situation. To call Goldmann's work a misreading of Lukacs' and then to go on immediately to relate that misreading to a general theory of interpretation as misinterpretation, is to pay no critical attention to history and to situation. (Said 1983: 236–37)²

Therefore, the misreadings in Markmann's translation of *Black Skin, White Masks*, which we have examined in this chapter, can be viewed in two ways. First, purely as misreadings of *Peau noire, masques blancs* in terms of his understanding of the philosophical elements of the texts, and, consequently, his application of these misreadings (and simplifications) in the translation. Second, his interpretations of the text can be considered as precisely that, providing one framework of thought through which to approach the text and which was designed to appeal to a particular readership and therefore boost sales of a translated text on the Anglo-American book market (in which it is notoriously difficult for translated texts to find a foothold). Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that since Markmann's translation was the first to be completed of the text, these interpretations form the foundation of Anglo-American appreciation of Fanon's thought and ideologies and allowed their dissemination throughout the world.

Indeed, it is perhaps just as important to question how the source text was linguistically appropriated into an Anglophone discourse and for what purpose. The reach of Fanon's work has latterly spread far beyond the psychiatric and philosophical background in which he was trained and the initial target audience for whom it was intended. It has confirmed his place as part of the Anglophone postcolonial studies canon, and this demonstrates the appropriation of his work into global discussions of decolonization and postcolonialism, which – of course – did not exist as academic concerns during his lifetime.

Henry Louis Gates Jr's examination of the development of Fanonism in critical theory succinctly sums up the many different ways in which

Fanon's theory has come to be used: 'If Said made of Fanon an advocative of post-postmodern counternarratives of liberation; if JanMohamed made of Fanon a Manichean theorist of colonialism as absolute negation; and if Bhabha cloned, from Fanon's *theoria*, another Third World post-structuralist, [Benita] Parry's Fanon . . . turns out to confirm her own rather optimistic vision of literature and social action' (Gates 1991: 465). The adoption of Fanon and Fanonism into work by theorists such as Homi Bhabha and Henry Louis Gates Jr has not been without its critics. Cedric Robinson points out the irony, as he sees it, of Bhabha's readings of Fanon within the context of Cultural Studies. He notes that, 'By employing a language game entirely inaccessible to most of us, he [Bhabha] has blatantly violated Fanon's advice to the national bourgeoisie that it place its academic and technical skills and the people's disposal. Worse yet . . ., Bhabha has erased the violence, the exploitiveness, the reality of colonialism' (Robinson 1993: 85). Reading this, one might wonder how much of Fanon really remains in Bhabha's work that uses Fanonism as part of the critical underpinning. Therefore, when examining translations of Fanon's texts, the questions at the forefront of our minds must concern not only how it is translated but also how this will influence its use in the target language text.

THE LITERARY AFTERLIFE OF MARKMANN'S TRANSLATION OF *PEAU NOIRE, MASQUES BLANCS*

Despite the fact that the growing American imperialism and France's waning colonial power are two different issues, it is possible to see parallels between the rise and fall of the two powers in Markmann's translation. For example, the alignment of Fanon with contemporary American political issues rather than with France underscores the power of the new empire and the fact that, post-decolonization and departmentalization, France was – for the most part – engaged in a project of 'organized forgetting' of the colonial past, which worked as a method of control, in that, 'as people lose awareness of the past, they gradually lose themselves as a nation' (Reinhart 2006: 8). This 'organized forgetting' also worked as a way of attempting to absolve themselves through time of the crimes committed under colonial rule, which were only latterly – and begrudgingly – admitted.

This manner of translation not only holds back Martinicans in their ability to effectively move on from a colonial past but also crystallizes the development of a postcolonial identity in a hinterland between a colonial past and a postcolonial, departmentalized reality. As Niranjana explains in her 1992 text, *Siting Translation*, translation (and especially translation of this kind) often mimics the violence visited upon the colonized by the colonizer and

furthermore, 'in creating coherent and transparent texts and subjects, translation participates – across a range of discourses – in the *fixing* of colonized cultures, making them seem static and unchanging rather than historically constructed' (Niranjana 1992: 3). Bringing to mind for us Markmann's translation, she also discusses the problem of 'over-determination' from without of translations, caused by multiple sources including religious, political and economic discourses. This mirrors the experience of the colonized citizen, just as 'translation is overdetermined, so is the "subject" under colonialism, overdetermined in the sense that it is produced by multiple discourses on multiple sites, and gives rise to a multiplicity of practices' (Niranjana 1992: 32). Here, the loss of the self through an overdetermination of it by external sources echoes the colonial and decolonial practices which sought to replace the sociocultural elements of the society with those approved by the colonizing metropole – such as language and literature.

Philcox's translations of *Les Damnés de la terre* (2005) and *Peau noire, masques blancs* (2008) fit into a period of much anxiety in France about how best to recognize and honour the memory of the slaves and those who experienced life under French colonial rule. The restoration of *Black Skin, White Masks* to a more scholarly style of text, closer to the values and themes (psychiatry and phenomenology) of the source text mean that not only is the book a more traditionally 'faithful' rendering, but it also moves the cultural space the translation inhabits back from a realm of Americanization towards a place of growing self-recognition in an era of French post-decolonization.

The eventual attempts to accept the French colonial past and their current identity in a time of post-decolonization followed years of denial. This was largely due to previous French efforts to forcibly forget the events of colonialism around the world – *un aveuglement volontaire* – by pushing the existence of the slaves back into a 'no-man's-land'. As Pascal Simon notes, 'ces mensonges . . . semblaient constituer le prix à payer pour assurer l'accès à la citoyenneté et la "nativisation" des anciens reclus' (Simon 2005: 241).

However, on 10 May 2006, the first French national commemoration of the abolition of slavery took place. This followed the belated acceptance by President Chirac of a proposal put forward by 'Le Comité pour la mémoire de l'esclavage', which included the recognition of the following points, '[that there must be recognition of the] inadequate official treatment of slavery by the government as a major historical event and as an integral part of the school curriculum' and '[the necessity of] the creation of research and cultural centers which integrate these hitherto marginalized issues into the national memory' (Reinhart 2006: 158). Richard Philcox's timely translation of 2008 highlights the importance of 'integrating these marginalized issues' into an international arena and memory and foregrounds the further consideration of issues such as racism and class inequalities that still permeate society today.

CONCLUSION

Both translations bring the ‘marginalised issue’ of life under colonial rule into the ‘national memory’ but each for very different reasons. The process of decolonization and the ability of a text to travel through time and different spaces are exemplified in these translations. In the Markmann translation we can broadly map the colonial behaviour through the overappropriation of cultural goods (the text) by the Other (in this case the translator) for their own gain, while the Philcox translation returns to the philosophical themes of Fanon’s original text, bringing us back to the French influences on the 1952 text and to an acknowledgement of the role France played in the interplay of colonial and metropolitan lives. While one must note the presence of inadequacies in the translations and the fact that originally Markmann’s translation has been considered ‘poor’, neither translation necessarily represents a complete loss of meaning, but another aspect of understanding a text.

Throughout its linguistic afterlife, *Peau noire, masques blancs* has been able to draw together people common in their understanding of a life lived under scrutiny, and perhaps most importantly, it is beginning to now draw attention back to France and their responsibilities towards their overseas departments post-departmentalization and decolonization. In terms of the implications this may have in the study of Fanon in contemporary postcolonial studies, we may wish to concentrate upon the shift of focus from a predominately Anglophone-based understanding of Fanon to a more Francophone-based examination of his work. While the translation into English of Fanon’s texts has undoubtedly been instrumental in establishing a global readership of his texts (with many translations following that of Markmann) and consequently, the involvement of and theorization of his work in the development of postcolonial studies, as I have previously alluded to, it is necessary now to move beyond an Anglophone monopolization of the discipline towards a reflection of the linguistic plurality contained within postcolonial studies.

In this chapter we have acknowledged and emphasized at once the American ethnocentrism and asymmetry of power relations prevalent in the translation of Fanon and the need to highlight the problems inherent in assuming a translation to be a straightforward rendering of the words, rather than one translator’s interpretation of those words for their intended audience. Broadly, it is hoped that this chapter will encourage scholars of postcolonial studies to reconsider the reliance on English translations of key texts, or at the very least, treat them in a more circumspect and considered manner in order to shift the balance from an acceptance of Anglophone postcolonial studies as being the default mode of study to a more multilingual appreciation for contemporary postcolonial studies. More specifically, it is intended

that this chapter may encourage a reassessment of the reliance on Fanon's texts in translation and a greater emphasis on the examination of the text in French, and the context of the changing contemporary Francophone social and political world, which was so fundamental in shaping Fanon's writing in the first place.

NOTES

1. See Macey (2000: 60–62), for a more detailed discussion of Fanon's sometimes contradictory attitudes to the use of Creole, and the wider issues surrounding the language in Martinique during Fanon's childhood.
2. See Said's (1983) chapter, 'Travelling Theory', in *The World, The Text and The Critic*, for a more detailed discussion of this theory and its application.

Chapter 9

Between Imperial Anxieties and Postcolonial Discourses

Alice Brown

I will examine the postcolonial discourses presented by reporting on the recent French military intervention in Mali and subsequent hostage crisis in Algeria as a case study for the positioning of the French government in the contemporary world. ‘The terrorist attack on a natural gas installation at In-Amenas in eastern Algeria may be an isolated act of revenge for the French intervention in Mali – or an ominous portent of things to come in North Africa, where Islamist militancy is gaining traction fast . . . in part because of the collapse of government authority across the Libyan border, just 50 kilometers (31 miles) from In-Amenas’.¹

Former colonies and the European nations who colonized them must be understood in their dialectical entwinement. The conditions that enabled this shared but uneven history began through the avaricious aims of Europeans setting their sights on the riches of Africa and the ensuing scramble to claim those resources. The enduring political and economic relations between France and North West Africa as well as their shared cultural, social and national orders are on display in the francophone media’s constant barrage of coverage for this international mission in which the support of ‘our American partners’ is constantly emphasized.² Porous borders, religious diversity, ethnic tribes and overlapping ritual practices are all factors that should be examined in order to help us deconstruct the modern nation-state. These factors can be divided into political, social and economic categories across North West Africa, specific histories which contribute to the nuances of geopolitical strategies and alliances for each country.

‘In the aftermath of their conquest of the region, the French embarked on what they described as “pacification” of the Sahel. Beginning with the drawing of new administrative and judicial lines around local populations, the massive reorganizations of political, social and economic life undertaken by

the French had no other aim than to undo the political and social order, which had been in place in the region for centuries, and to substitute systems of their own making'. As recounted by Hampaté Bâ in his autobiography, the French concentrated their efforts on creating new loyalties by dethroning previous rulers and replacing them with selected individuals, who would be beholden to the colonial authorities. An essential plank of this French policy was the systematic devaluation of traditional beliefs and forms of cultural expression, and the active promotion of what can only be called a French ideology, of which an ideal image of France as a benevolent agent of African promotion was the central reference.³

The dependency created by illiteracy or little education severely limits economic opportunity and human rights, especially for women (both institutionalized and in practice). The social and moral consequences of the drastic reordering of life undertaken by the French in the Sahel are at the heart of the conflict seen today. Just as the flow of people, ideas and commodities bound all parts of the former empire into a common historical trajectory, a benevolent postcolonial diatribe of internationalism has served as window dressing for the patronizing, often paternalistic, discourses concerning botched military operations across the African continent. In a region so rich in natural resources, particularly minerals from phosphate, iron and uranium to oil and natural gas, wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few, while most of the populace faces abject poverty in the Sahel.

President François Hollande was greeted with a hero's welcome after declaring victory and 'mission accomplished' in Mali in the spring of 2013. While he received largely favourable reviews for the French military intervention, more importantly it helped bolster his flagging approval ratings at home, and simultaneously illustrated the keen desire of the French to reassert their importance on the international stage.⁴ Reaffirming their position as a major actor in geopolitical affairs, despite the ever-increasing erosion of French influence compared to that of the United States, fostered a sense of misguided goodwill coloured by postcolonial ambitions (see Murray 1953: 47).

Hollande insisted that his foreign policy symbolizes a new dawn in France-Africa relations. Not surprisingly, the Maghreb remains a cornerstone of French foreign policy towards Africa. But Hollande's three state visits to the region, respectively to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, were more of the same old. They were meant to sustain French investment in the region especially after the Arab Spring and bring political backing to governments, notably to Tunisia's, where political assassinations were carried out that year (2013).

What was new in the French approach to the Maghreb, however, was that it seems to consider the region as an ally to address issues of interest to French diplomacy, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Although Hollande's visit to Algeria in December 2012 was presented to the public as a visit to

reaffirm the ‘friendship’ between the two countries, its purpose, as it would later emerge, was mainly to convince Algeria to back a French intervention in Mali. The order of the day was that of attempting to convince partners and to gather support, to avoid being seen as acting unilaterally (see Aggad-Clerx 2013). But was this public show of support genuine or a strategic manoeuvre based upon economic relations, not to mention the large supply of uranium from neighbouring Niger, along with boosting trade agreements in Africa, where in recent years, the French have found themselves undercut time and again by the Chinese. The operations in Mali were self-serving for the French on multiple levels. Taking centre stage in diplomacy and world politics helped shore up national pride. The French could momentarily forget the economic woes plaguing the Hexagon back at home, and the Mali intervention encouraged a flattering notion of self-importance as a ‘protector’ of a former African colony. All of this fuelled a renewed egoism in the discourses of French politicians in the postcolonial era. Working respectfully as a strategic partner to restore order, security and a sense of well-being among their former colonial peoples (who would not, ostensibly without the French intervention, have been able to accomplish such a feat in an autonomous manner), the French were quickly, even prematurely, self-congratulatory of their rapid, ‘clean’ intervention with few casualties, in a region whose stability remains fragile at best. This comes as little surprise, however, as North West Africa is one of the last footholds where the French would perhaps like to consider themselves to exert greater geopolitical influence than the United States.

Nevertheless, as the attack and hostage taking at In-Amenas, Algeria, showed, such influence and military intervention in world affairs can come with a hefty price: grisly reprisal attacks carried out by radicals. Further complicating matters, the French government has long been at odds with the ruling elite in Algiers, who underscore their defiance towards Paris in the postcolonial era with often erratic and unpredictable political manoeuvring. The state-sponsored media in Algeria presented an officially sanctioned discourse, detailing the precise trajectory of military protection, order and stability assured by the government in this time of crisis. Presented as laudable hallmarks of security, these tropes starkly contrast the duplicity and manipulation in the long-standing relationship between Algeria’s intelligence service (DRS) and rebel groups.⁵ The willingness of the government in Algiers to endorse or even co-opt such operations is in no small way fuelling the terrorist activity throughout the region. In the postcolonial era, influences from Europe and North America of immigrant diasporas, political activism in exile, religious fervour and homegrown terrorism fuel the current social and political ferment across North Africa and throughout the rest of the Arab world.

Identifying political or historical elements which trigger the extremist mindset are the key to understanding how Occidental approaches towards the Orient dating back to the Crusades have been turned against the West in the postcolonial rhetoric of modern-day jihadists roaming across the Sahara. While no doubt Christians were overzealous crusaders who committed atrocious and irrational acts of violence, there also exists a compelling narrative to which Muslim extremists have subscribed based upon a twisted anachronistic rebuttal against medieval Christian objectives of religious and ideological dominance.

In northern Mali, the Tuaregs from Movement for the Liberation of Azawad were vying for political control to implement stringent Islamic law, smuggle cocaine to Europe and occasionally take Europeans hostage for ransom, along 'with a constellation of jihadist groups who also operate in the region – the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO); the Islamist Tuareg group Ansar Dine; and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)' (Roussinos 2013). The jihadist forces controlling Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao banned music, imposed a strict code of morality, which included harsh and often barbaric punishments for petty crimes, as part of their vision for establishing an Islamist state. Then they raped, pillaged and desecrated thousands of years of cultural heritage along their way across northern Mali. The rudimentary Malian army proved no match and when it seemed the Islamists were gaining momentum to possibly take over all of Mali, the French decided to make their move and begin a new chapter of *Francafrrique*.

I explore coloniality across the Sahel region, and in particular how these concepts of empire persist: how in the postcolonial era has colonization changed its dynamics? As the discourses on colonialism have evolved, the imbalance of political power between former colonies and metropolises (namely France) is displayed by the competition for resources, the economic disparity across the population, the lack of transparency or absence of democratic systems to check the abuse of powers and the suppression of opposition. When no space is made for different political positions or critique of regimes, atrocious conditions emerge: humanitarian crises, human rights abuses and torture of political opponents and hostage situations in which rebel groups (some affiliated with AQIM) take revenge for the continued presence of Occidental powers in the region.⁶ The so-called new scramble for Africa must also be addressed in conjunction with France's intervention and the increased presence of the Chinese across the African continent over the past two decades. Following this, coloniality in Africa can be defined as a new repositioning between players, not only African and European but also American and Chinese. I will also suggest how interactions between North and sub-Saharan Africa contribute to the new mosaic of dynamics on the continent, no longer limited to the traditional North/South rapport between Europe and Africa.

The enduring tribal conflicts also possess a tremendously complicated history and speak to many of the issues related to postcolonialism throughout the region. This is not to diminish the other conflicts across the Sahel or to suggest they are in any way less significant. The European colonial governors routinely sought to sow instability by playing off ethnic, religious or tribal alliances and drawing borders with the explicit aim of fracturing or weakening various peoples. My goal is to exemplify how many of the recurrent themes from African colonial history are at work today in the postcolonial context, first by posing the following questions: What are the agendas of various groups and governments across North Africa? And what events have defined policies for each of the parties involved? How does France's long history and foothold in the region colour the current situation, altering the dynamics between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan powers? Since the French intervention in early 2013, how much real change has actually occurred in Mali, not only with regard to the territorial situation but also in the day-to-day life of the country at large?

This begs the question of how notions of the colonial or colonization evolved? The exploitation, self-interest, competition for resources between nations – along with issues of sovereignty lead to the consideration how tendencies of former imperial powers have been directly inherited by their former colonies. 'Nation building cannot be detached from, and it is indeed a particular stage of, the modern/colonial world. . . . In other words, decolonization and nation building became a new form of articulation of the coloniality of power in the Americas (in the nineteenth century) and in Asia and Africa (in the second half of the twentieth century)' (Mignolo 2011: 434).⁷ Across North Africa, these conflicts exist, perpetuated by the old colonial order as much as new competing interests, principally economic ones. I seek to show that while there are many different conflicts across the region, some concentrated in specific areas, while others are widespread (corruption, poverty, etc.), each sharing many common elements concerning questions of hegemony, sovereignty, ethnicity, national identity or economic objectives. Here it is fitting to mention Edward Said's definition of colonialism as 'the implanting of settlements on a distant territory', while imperialism in contrast consists of 'the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory' (Said 1993: 9).

There are conflicting notions of identity in the postcolonial modernity, and the peoples affected by European colonization are touched by the Eurocentric notion of 'modernity'. Modernity is also represented by the rejection of these discourses or their failures in the postcolonial reality for North Africans and sub-Saharans alike and their attachment to their non-Western traditions or the 'old way of life' (Wallerstein 1979). They cannot return to what was before, but this in-betweenness compounded by the constant upheaval of social,

political and economic instability, which now plagues the region, has sadly become the new normal. For Walter Mignolo, ‘The fact that globalization is undermining state sovereignty and transnational corporations by passing frontier regulations does not mean, necessarily, that internal colonialism is no longer in force. First of all it is important to understand the differences between nation-states in Europe and in the third world. And second, it should be rethought in terms of the new forms of coloniality in a global and transnational world’ (Mignolo 2011: 439).⁸

HISTORICAL ORIGINS

The terms *colonization*, *colonialism*, *colonial* and *colony* all derive from the Latin word *colonia*, while *imperialism* and *empire* stem from the Latin *imperium*, and *civilization* from the Latin *civilis*. But Roman ‘colonies’ were not the same thing as nineteenth-century French or British colonies (Dietler 2010: 17). In this vein, it is also relevant to note that the late twentieth century is by no means the first experience of a ‘postcolonial’ moment in world history (Dietler 2010: 22).

If any real change is to occur in the way *Francafrique* operates, the region’s problems should be examined in three stages. First, by discussing how history since the beginning of the twentieth century (and in some cases going as far back as the nineteenth century to further elucidate these tensions) can explain the geopolitical situation in which we find ourselves. Next, by looking at recent events that have transpired in the past year. Finally, by analysing the meaning of this reality, and the solutions proposed by various groups (and their positions) in order to determine the viability of each proposal and reach political and economic agreements that might stave off future debacles such as what transpired at In-Amenas. Nevertheless, the unwillingness of the parties involved to negotiate is not altogether surprising nor is the fragility of the government in Mali, as demonstrated by President Touré’s March 2012 ousting in a *coup-d’état*. Vulnerability of African governments makes diplomacy a particularly tricky high-stakes game of poker in the Sahara and Sahel regions where one false move can lead to utter disaster.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY HISTORY

For the United States, when it came to the Iraq war, little credence was given to Algeria’s bloody civil war during the 1990s, until the situation deteriorated irreparably in Iraq, with escalating sectarian violence. Only then did

'counter-insurgency' experts began to address the similarities to tactics long employed in Algeria, many of which dated back to the days of the independence war as potentially viable solutions for policing in Iraq.⁹ If the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan have left the American public increasingly weary, the memory of *les événements d'Algérie* (the events of Algeria) still haunts the collective French psyche today.¹⁰ Both should serve as a cautionary tale against further meddling in postcolonial Africa. False bravado of politicians, as seen during the Mali intervention, can easily catapult a nation into futile conflicts, where there are no winners.

The rhetoric used during the intervention recalls the French defiance in other regional confrontations. Towards the end of the Algerian war, the French tenaciously attempted to hold onto as much territory as possible, moving the borders between their soon-to-be former colonies especially after the discovery of large deposits of oil, iron and manganese. This last ditch effort led to cross-border skirmishes which remain a sticking point for years to come.¹¹ Given how much the French have continued to meddle in North African affairs since decolonization, it comes as no great surprise that the Algerian government would play a pivotal role in the Mali conflict, especially once the crisis at In-Amenas erupted, in a show of military muscle and political power. Whatever its intentions in handling the hostage crisis (which are beyond the scope of this chapter), the Algerian government became once again embroiled with the affairs of France, to which it has been intrinsically linked for decades. Once the jewel of the French empire, Algeria remains forever dogged by the legacy and consequences of *Francafrique*.

The region at large has witnessed a number of territorial disputes and tribal rivalries escalating into nationalist tensions. The geographical isolation of northern Mali bordering the Sahara enabled its position as a nesting ground for rogue militias and AQIM militants seeking to impose control on ill-protected outlying areas. The presence of lucrative natural resources including minerals and natural gas, along with control of routes to the Atlantic coast, has further fuelled regional territorial conflicts in the past: the long-standing support of the Algerian government for the Polisario Front, which along with Libya and Mali were allied to the Soviet Union. Morocco by contrast was the only African country in the region allied to the West.¹²

EVENTS IN 2013

Shortly after the French military operations were under way in Mali, Algerian television announced the death of Abdelhamid Abou Zeïd, a top AQIM commander responsible for a series of kidnappings in the Sahel over the past decade. Initially, the French army neither confirmed nor denied involvement

in his death (Rémy 2013). (It was not until a month later, on 23 March 2013 that France confirmed Abou Zeïd's death based upon DNA testing.) France has continually vowed to fight AQIM, eliciting a statement from Mohammed al-Zawahiri, the brother of al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri: 'France is playing with fire. . . . By attacking Mali, France lit the fuse and will suffer the consequences', Zawahiri told French weekly *Le Point* in April 2013. The capture and killing of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the purported leader behind the In-Amenas crisis, had looked like a coup for French forces, despite being an operation carried out by Chadian forces in Mali. But was it in reality more of a publicity stunt to punish the supposed mastermind hostage-taker than a strategically significant blow? After all when one leader is assassinated, another takes over, and dynamics of rebel groups enable them to survive attacks on their ranks, sometimes even reinvigorating followers and enticing new recruits. The removal of Belmokhtar in no way eliminates the possibility of grisly incidents such as the gas plant attack in Algeria where 800 hostages were being held at one point and dozens lost their lives. Alliances whether along geographical or ethnic lines continue to dictate the power relations on both sides of the Sahara. Looking at Algiers, Bamako and the rebel groups in 2012 and 2013, it was often unclear which of the three were actually in control as these events unfolded.

The tribal structure of African societies and the importance of kinship whether in Christian or Muslim communities should not be underestimated. Religion and communal life still play a central role in the life of Africans today as they struggle to assimilate traditional values with the changing ways of modern society. As political scientist Jonathan Smith has pointed out, 'While there are terms which suggest the sort of kinship implied by the notion of the "genealogical" – for example, "affinity", "homology", and "divergent" – the majority of the terms presume *intellectual operations* on the part of the individual making the comparison, as well as the notion that we are comparing *relations and aspects* not things' (Smith 1990: 51). These structures are especially important given the fragile government structures and the frequent absence of rule of law especially in rural areas, making them especially vulnerable to radical Islamist militants encroaching from across the Sahara. When responding to the question 'Is it analogy or genealogy?' in *Drudgery Divine*, Jonathan Smith argues, 'There is nothing natural about the enterprise of comparison. Similarity and difference are not "given". They are the result of mental operation' (Smith 1990: 51)

It is precisely through this sort of comparative framework, like a Kantian categorical imperative, that France casts itself over and over as a protector of democracy and human rights – all the while consorting with regimes which do not respect either. The French have a long tawdry history and sordid colonial past in Africa, having themselves egregiously strayed from their lofty

Declarations of the Rights of Man and the Citizen outlined during the French Revolution. Throughout the decolonization process, European powers have time and again played regional factions against one another. In the Sahara, encouraging conflict between the governments of Morocco and Algeria has worked to serve both French and Spanish interests.¹³ In recent times, perhaps even more eerily, the French have taken to the imperialistic, self-importance and diplomatic role of the world's policeman/protector which they so scathingly criticized the United States for after its decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The French scoff at the cowboy image of a naïve, brazen 'my way or the highway' imperialist brand of American foreign politics but tend to operate under precisely the same pretext.

Consider the atrocious conditions in refugee camps for those fleeing Mali (Gao, Timbuktu, etc.). Take the media rhetoric about 'victims' in the following conflicts as a point of comparison. The Anglo-American press portrayed northern Mali as another Darfur, taking a cautious tone after highly unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. More recently (December 2013), the conflict in South Sudan eclipsed the situation in Mali and garnered most of the daily coverage on sub-Saharan Africa: scourged by ethnic strife, this new bloody conflict in Juba left the Malians all but forgotten by the international community. After a delicate peace accord was brokered, the former interim leader ousted in a coup and tenuous elections held in the fall of 2013, Mali has remained on the precipice of disaster. It is still highly vulnerable in this weakened fractured state to the outside influence from Islamist radicals.

After their military's arrival in Mali, the French press quickly assumed the liberator's discourse used by the Bush administration following the United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq. The French playing the role of arbiters of freedom, pursuing terrorists without remorse, and being greeted as liberators delivering democracy to Bamako seemed to suit public opinion nicely in the Hexagon. The French army tightly controls the camera footage of its armed conflicts, and has journalists embedded with its soldiers who produce official reports. Independent journalists captured video footage which painted a much more chaotic picture of the battle for Gao in February 2013: utter chaos reigned in the town's old marketplace, bullets flying in every direction while young teenage soldiers did the bidding of Islamic militants from behind the old city walls.

After rolling through the centre of Gao with large artillery, the French retreated to the calm of their headquarters outside the city, letting the Malians do the dirty work, ill-equipped in the dangerous battle with Islamist live fire at close proximity and sometimes hand-to-hand combat. The strategy of the French became increasingly clear as time went on: this was a publicity campaign to clear out certain areas, quickly declare victory over the Islamist militants, before moving on and leaving the Malian army with the arduous

task of re-establishing order and control. To further underscore the enduring feel of colonial relations during these operations, a story emerged in the international press of the gift of a camel presented to President Hollande, a symbolic token of the gratitude from the Malian people. Due to regulations about importing wildlife to France, the decision was made to leave it in the temporary custody of a caretaker in Mali. Subsequently, it emerged that the camel was eaten by those to whom it had been entrusted for care, once they discovered Hollande had no intention of taking the animal back to Paris with him (Samuel 2013).

Similarly, the dialectical imbalance of powers between empires and their former colonial subjects has been illustrated in other contemporary imperial anxieties. The rumblings of disaccord over negotiations in the Sahara and the ensuing friction between Morocco and the United States led to cancellation of joint annual military training exercises in 2013 (A.N. 2013). The Moroccan press claimed this decision was made on their own volition, although the emergence of reports of a delegation stocked with high-level government officials who were sent to Washington D.C. to assuage tensions suggest that other more pressing interests had to be taken into consideration than the position of sovereignty over Western Sahara vis-à-vis the importance of maintaining good relations with the US government.¹⁴ In essence, this diplomatic retreat hinted at a deeper malaise: the deteriorating state of Moroccan diplomacy over the course of the past few years. Domestic concerns appear to have superseded any lingering motivations to stand up against the wishes of the United States or France in exchange for their continued endorsement of the Moroccan government. Like the French intervention in Mali, a neo-colonial dependency of political and military support has become the latest recipe for maintaining civil order in Africa.

CONTEMPORARY REALITIES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

Perhaps more troubling is how the diplomatic agenda of former colonies in the Maghreb have particularly seen a notable shift in the past few years. In public discourse and media outlets alike, military action and government policy intended to quell radical Islamist activity and pursue security has been presented in an aggressive public relations campaign to the world. Missed opportunities of the Moroccan government's recent reforms underscoring *realpolitik* intentions, the role of self-interest and how everything has become about money on both sides of the *Francafrrique* equation. Economic colonization has seemingly eclipsed the earlier discourse of political colonization.¹⁵

Governing elites in Africa have concentrated so much energy on internal strategies, suggesting their increased paranoia and concern over threats of

their governments being overthrown. Wealth concentrated in the hands of few makes the pressures of daily life and economic uncertainty the fertile ground for extremism among those who wallow in poverty and harbour resentment towards the colonial system which left them with little or nothing at all. Tensions in Algiers are palatable, where the populace seemingly feels it has less and less to lose by speaking out against the authorities in the wake of the Arab Spring. Abdelaziz Bouteflika's public appearances are rare and his ill-health is constantly shrouded in a veil of secrecy (Gall 2015). Neighbouring Tunisia struggles to form a parliamentary government and begins the arduous task of restructuring both government and society on many levels. The short-term prognosis region-wide is not particularly rosy especially taking into account tumultuous events in Libya and Egypt in recent years. The Moroccan monarchy has no shortage of its own domestic woes. Diplomatic relations on the international stage have suffered significantly as a result. Policy has been criticized for its sloppy appearance and careless mistakes have been made, especially concerning missed opportunities to capitalize on diplomacy to advocating for its people and advance the good of the country at large.

This does not have to be an either-or decision, but effectively has become so by the choices of those who travel in the inner circles of power, who place their own advancement and safeguarding of position ahead of the interests of a vision to raise the populace. It is not difficult however to see the limitation of this logic, leaving most of the society in check, weighed down by the struggles of poverty and all its disastrous consequences. Ultimately, this strategy is non-tenable in the long term, as all empires rise and fall. Arguably, their demise accelerates when government goes against the will of the people and the eventuality of popular revolt ferments.

In essence the economic control of poverty, a lack of education and therefore the lack of any real political rights for the majority of the population in North and West Africa has become a more powerful tool by which to rule than the civilizing missions of the nineteenth century. This trend has also paved the way for outside rebel groups to move in and take control with or without government consent, though in some cases with evidence of auspiciously working in concert with government authorities through backroom deals. In short, the system sees no reason to change its current set up masquerading legitimacy.

Just like the Roman senatorial elites, the machinations of power, which Machiavelli warned the *grandi* against, could quickly be turned against them by popular revolt.¹⁶ Given the Romans were the original colonizers of some of these same lands in question today, some parallels between late antiquity and the early Christian era are apt comparisons to the tribal conflict of modern-day North Africa, as examples of failures in colonial governance.

Here it is important to remember that after the Romans, the rule of law effectively became intertwined with religion. In the Maghreb, the same model of government has existed whether under Arab or Berber rulers. The dynasties did not change in organization or style of governance (their names simply reflect the founding tribes). Rather, there has always been a dialectical relationship between Islam and the law since the seventh century. Oriental philosophy and Islam have no doubt played an important role in shaping the views on governance and self-determination in North Africa. But other elements, by no means exclusive to any particular belief system, have triggered certain individuals to embrace radicalism and violence which have transformed the experiences of postcolonial realities and multiplied the pressures facing ordinary Malians and many other Africans today.

The spiritual relationship between North and West Africa is also an important element which must not be overlooked. The Tijaniyyah order of Sufism, which originated in Fez, underlines that ties to West Africa run deep on a historical, cultural and religious levels across the Sahara. But can the important role of Morocco's King Mohammed VI, as a revered spiritual leader, be harnessed into real political and economic weight in the contemporary context of relationships on the African continent through the currency of 'cultural capital'? Many of these investments must be viewed over the long term, for they do not actually yield immediate returns, and are in some cases actually being made at a net loss. But while the return on investments for sustainable African development is not particularly spectacular, can we credibly read these interactions as beginning to form a 'new order' in terms of Walter Mignolo's discussions of decoloniality and dewesternization? (Mignolo 2009)

This also begs the question whether there is beyond the religious and spiritual ties a certain degree of allure towards economic neo-coloniality among Africans. With the southern European markets sluggish, Moroccans have begun to look beyond their traditional trading and investment partners. Does the enticement of perceived economic opportunities by looking South mean more than just extending a helping hand of charity and fraternal good will to their neighbours? Especially given the ambiguous history of Western Sahara (to which Morocco has laid claims dating back to the eleventh century), it remains to be seen how the interaction with the sub-Saharan nations will evolve. In contrast to the enduring stability of the Moroccan monarchy, West Africa has been plagued by war, military coups and frequent violence characteristic of the broader 'postcolonial era'. These circumstances make it difficult to form a durable partnership of any great consequence in fragile nations. All the while exploitation continues, with new actors like the Chinese now angling for business as well all over Africa. Despite their precious natural resources, the ancestral Tuareg lands of the Sahara are home to some of the poorest people on Earth. Their very way of life and relationship to

the land is under threat. When violence erupts as seen at the In-Amenas gas plant attack, it rouses an army of rebel fighters rising like a phoenix from the desert sands.

CONCLUSION

The patterns of modern-day governance outlined here in this chapter the troubling indicators of an illegitimate power structure whose only definitive means of staying in power or maintaining the status quo is by suppressing the opposition, and selling a story of progress and legitimacy to the populace and the global media-consuming public. Herein lies the reason it becomes important to study media discourses. To understand how a former empire can maintain its sphere of influence in the postcolonial reality of today's Africa, one must first examine how the discourses of coloniality are carefully arbitrated and vetted by the ruling classes of both former colonizers and the colonized. It remains an open question to what extent (if any) free speech is available under these circumstances.

Further, the chapter asks how a society in which the vast majority of the citizenry remain uneducated can gain freedom from the draconian, manipulative state? The crushing weight of despots, and the vast numbers of people who live in poverty, fear and ignorance, collectively suggests the lack of political rights has become a new form of domestic colonization. Whether in Algeria, Mali or any other country, an uptick in violence drives the ephemeral popularity of political groups who garner votes with hollow promises of stability, security and economic prosperity. Rigged elections (or those in which there is no real choice between the candidates) make a mockery of modern-day African politicians whose claims become an echo of French governors under the protectorate or colonial rule. The economic control of enduring ties to the former colonial power (France), engendered by poverty and lack of education, and therefore lack of rights, has become a more powerful tool by which to rule Africa than the civilizing missions of the nineteenth century. The occasional skirmish with jihadist groups is a small price to pay for the huge dividends of mineral resources and natural gas available across the Sahara.

The practices of 'containment' which I have discussed, namely the territorial disputes and armed conflicts related to the sharing or access to natural resources in North Africa, and the ensuing hostage crises only serve to make the governments involved appear as a fragile shell of regimes. Desperate to avert the inevitable popular discontent, and in attempt to retain their positions in power, government officials feign to entertain the democratic process despite implementing little real change. The imprudence and maladroitness

manoeuvring which the regimes have shown exposes the charade of a democratic process. A surge of precarity and insecurity (Butler 2010b) present the perfect climate for employing nationalistic rhetoric as a bulwark for popular support in both France and Africa alike for the military operations (seen in the battles for towns like Gao and Timbuktu and the In-Amenas hostage crisis). The unfortunate result is an ever-deteriorating socioeconomic plight for the masses, who have seen little change in the past thirty years. Despite repeated promises from their governments and a constant barrage of rhetoric about a march towards modernization, an endemic climate of hopelessness in these regions persists. The underlying avidity and self-interest which dictates the ruling political class leads to the inevitable question, whether the rulers of the former colonies have become new colonizers of their own people?

Colonialism is intrinsically mired in the notion of a nation-state (Mignolo 2011). Neo-colonialism, involving former imperial powers and their ex-colonies, is driven by tacit pacts to serve the political and economic interests of the ruling class of African statesmen and Europeans alike.¹⁷ In short, the points of reference have simply moved vis-à-vis the nineteenth-century model. Is decolonization really over? Not so long as the North African political elites continue to manipulate tribal rivalries, playing their European and American partners, all this to convene their personal interests and fill their pockets. In an effort to maintain its relevance, France's activist foreign policy may have gained momentum, but its long-term consequences may easily backfire.

A defiant tone of imperialist exceptionalism was exhibited by leaders in both France and the United States as the events at In-Amenas unfolded. US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta declared, 'Terrorists should be on notice that they will find no sanctuary, no refuge, not in Algeria, not in North Africa, not anywhere' (Thorne 2013). Beginning with the revived international engagement under the administration of former President Nicholas Sarkozy, the French have in recent time begun to reassert their desire to be present as a major powerbroker on the international stage. This political grandstanding had appeared with the early recognition of Libya's National Transitional Council by the French as the legitimate government representative of the Libyan people and their backing of the NATO military intervention in Libya (Graciet 2013). The trend in activist foreign policy continued with the mission in Mali, and both interventions have received more than tacit support from members of the French media and the voting public. Gone is the embittered isolationist France of De Gaulle. Instead is a nation craving a 'retour' to the good-old days of grandeur on the world stage. As such, France's postcolonial foreign policy may have gained dangerous momentum. With troubles in the

Central African Republic (CAR) and mass graves discovered in South Sudan, whispers of 'another Rwanda' as United Nations inspectors banter back and forth, the Malians have been relegated to the back-burner, all but forgotten by the larger international community. A ceasefire and a handshake between leaders of opposition groups, smiling for the international press in Bamako, or a single election cannot resolve the looming problems which continue to haunt this West African nation. Based on recent historical experience it is hard to escape the thought that security will be chosen over democracy. From Paris, the agenda will stay the same, as long as the economic stakes remain the primary objective. Particularly given the current state of financial affairs in Europe, Africa remains the last frontier.

NOTES

1. From CNN <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/23/business/algeria-energy-exports-struggle/index.html>.

2. A defiant tone of imperial exceptionalism has characterized the Anglo-American press. Former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta declared there was 'no safe haven for terrorists anywhere in the world'. Simultaneously the Benghazi hearings in Congress underscored the United States' vulnerability in North Africa. It remains to be seen, of course, what will be the consequences of the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the next French president for US-French relations.

3. As Abiola Irele points out in the introduction to *The Fortunes of Wangrin*: 'In broader cultural perspectives intimated by the work, Wangrin's experience epitomizes the movement from a heritage of life that, for all its limitations, provided an anchor for the self, to an externally imposed and problematic modernity derived from the Western paradigm' (Irele 1987: iii–xv; see also Bâ 1972, 1973).

4. His accolades even include a UNESCO Peace Prize for his leadership in the Mali intervention.

5. In his 21 January 2013 interview on *Talk to Al Jazeera*, human rights activist and former Algerian envoy to Libya, Mohamed Larbi Zitout acknowledged the long-standing and ongoing relationship between the DRS and extremist groups to serve the regime's interests.

6. (1) The overlay shown in the documentary film *Le Dessus des Cartes* of the AOF in 1914 is almost exactly the same region where the Tuareg conflicts occur today. (2) The map as the Sahara envisioned by the Moroccan proposal and (3) as it exists today with the divided zone, gives an idea of the simple physical delineation of this space and its highly problematic conceptualization.

7. See also Quijano and Wallerstein (1992) where they discuss (based on the experience of Ibero colonialism in the Americas) the emergence and consolidation of capitalism and of colonialism. In the sixteenth century, the universalist project was not so much a bourgeois as it was a Christian one.

8. By internal colonialism, I am referring to a term Mignolo employs, first coined by Pablo González Casanova and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘to describe the colonialism embedded in the nation state but also modified the taken-for-granted idea that the independence of Spanish American countries in the nineteenth century was the end of colonialism’ (Mignolo 2011: 439).

9. Looking to events in 1990s Algeria for counter-insurgency techniques, General David Petraeus’s policing techniques to monitor sectarian violence were also inspired from Chicago’s South Side.

10. It was only in 1999 that the French national assembly passed a law to use the term ‘Algerian War’ instead of other euphemistic phrases taught in school and common in vernacular usage.

11. Tensions escalated during the Sand Wars (1962–1963) when fighting intensified between Morocco and Algeria. Additionally, surveillance planes leaving from Kenitra during 1962–1964 were used to spy on Algeria – one of the many examples of French intervention which exacerbated regional discord.

12. ‘The United Nations Failure in Southern Morocco’, <https://globalsecurity.org>: In November 1975, 350,000 Moroccans converged on the city of Tarfaya in southern Morocco and waited for a signal from King Hassan II of Morocco to cross into the territory of Western Sahara, in what became known as the Green March. As a result of international pressure, Spain acceded to Moroccan demands and entered bilateral negotiations which led to the Madrid Agreement, a treaty that divided the territory between Morocco and Mauritania, in return for phosphate and fishing concessions to Spain. The tripartite agreement was signed between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. Spain and Morocco did not consult the Sahrawi population, and the Polisario violently opposed the treaty. These developments chance in the region until the 1990s were strongly influenced by the power struggle of the cold war.

13. This of course dates back to the days of the protectorate when the French decided to grant Morocco and Tunisia independence in 1956 in hopes that sacrifice would permit them to retain the large swathe of territory which comprised Algeria.

14. <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt627/html/CRPT-108hrpt627.htm>.

In a State Department report titled ‘United States-Morocco Free Trade Implementation Act’, House Report 108–627, 108th session of the US Congress: US Government Publishing Office, 2004, when commenting on the 2004 free trade agreement with Morocco, US Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Zoellick stated in response to questioning, ‘the United States and many other countries do not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and have consistently urged the parties to work with the United Nations to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. The Free Trade Agreement will not include Western Sahara’.

15. According to the United Nations, currently 51 per cent of Moroccans are under the age of twenty-five. Each Moroccan spends sixty times as much for the monarchy as a French person contributes to the presidency. The Elysees budget tops

out at €112.6 million per year. This statistic takes into account population and gross national product (Graciet and Laurent 2012).

16. Niccolo Machiavelli (1996) *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

17. Amar and Turquoi (2012) detail these contemporary relations between France and Morocco.

Chapter 10

Possible Greenland – Impossible Denmark? *Rigsfællesskabet* and the Postcolony

Lars Jensen

‘Possible Greenland’ was the name of the Danish entry for the Thirteenth International Architecture Exhibition at the 2012 Venice Biennale. Not only was this the first time Greenland featured prominently as part of a Danish contribution, ‘Possible Greenland’ was its exclusive feature. In the 2008 Biennale, the Danish Pavilion had focused on the environment with a component addressing the upcoming COP15 conference (held in Copenhagen, December 2009). Yet this contribution had no Greenlandic focus. The dramatic shift from the 2008 theme – which clearly invited emphasis on Greenland but failed to provide one – to the 2012 exclusive focus on Greenland under the Biennale title of ‘Common Ground’ tells a story of Greenland’s dramatically changed position within the Danish national imaginary, from peripheral to central preoccupation. ‘Common Ground’, the title of the 2012 Biennale, showcases Danish architects collaborating with Greenlandic architects and artists, and as such implies a shared Danish-Greenlandic space. Nonetheless, the physical space of the collaboration is exclusively situated in Greenland, which invites questions concerning the structures surrounding the idea of commonality: Could one envisage Greenlandic proposals for the development of national Danish spaces? How does the commonality of contemporary collaborative architecture measure against legacy of the prior massive Danish intervention into Greenland’s architectural space – the 1950s–1960s building boom in Greenland driven by Danish governments? The latter question is particularly pertinent given the critique of the modernization process and its alienating consequences (Petersen 1986; Jensen 2014; Andersen, Hvenegård-Lassen and Jensen 2016).

The space of the Danish Pavilion becomes a manifestation of the construct that is the Danish Commonwealth (*Rigsfællesskabet*)¹. My exploration of the exhibition and the framing around it focuses on the way it projects Greenland

under the auspices of Danish sovereignty, articulated through *Rigsfællesskabet*. This chapter asks what is being represented as a Greenlandic project? When is it a *Rigsfællesskabet*'s undertaking and when is it a Danish enterprise? What are the differences between a Danish, a Greenlandic and a *Rigsfællesskab*'s project? And to what extent does the project break with past assumptions of a Danish inalienable right to impose itself on Greenlandic space?

Contemporary Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are three nations within the umbrella of what is often addressed as partners in a 'conglomerate' state and represent a case of a sovereign state ruling over geographically remote minorities. Denmark upholds sovereignty over Greenland and the Faroe Islands; hence meetings between the three 'partners' are in effect meetings between heads of nations – not states. Executive power rests with the Danish prime minister, as the Danish government's chief minister, regarding matters pertaining to defence policies and foreign affairs. Clearly, there are vast terrains of rule outside these areas which are now under the auspices of local government. Yet while autonomous rule in the extremely central area of economics is administrated locally, both Greenland and the Faroe Islands are dependent on the annual transfer of funds from the Danish state. Hence while both countries are autonomous politically, they continue to be financially dependent on Denmark. Until they become economically autonomous, Danish influence will remain sizeable both directly and indirectly, a familiar pattern in other parts of the former colonial world. Danish politicians, administrators and researchers have been reluctant to recognize the full implications of the presence of a Danish colonial mentality and even more resistant towards comparisons with other (post)colonial situations. For some, the evasion of this question reflects an awareness of the complex and troubled history of Danish interference. For others, though, the absence of an established self-critique merely represents an opportunity to once again relaunch the pursuit of Danish interests in the increasingly globally important Arctic region – from natural science projects where Greenland's ice cap makes it the frontier of climate change science, to the pursuit of the military-extractive resource nexus (Hvenegård-Lassen 2016).

Seen from the Greenlandic side, the inclusion of Greenland in Denmark in 1953 (leading to the formal end of Greenland's status as a colony, but ironically a far more strident Danish presence and assertion over its right to dictate Greenland's future [Dahl 1986]), home rule in 1979 and self-government in 2009 represent important milestones towards greater autonomy and, eventually, independence. There is also the recognition that this has had to be fought for against a recalcitrant Danish bureaucratic-political establishment reluctant to cede Danish control. There is no question that Greenlandic political agency has been dramatically enhanced, yet political independence depends

on financial independence (A.N. 2015). On the one hand, Greenland is faced with Danish governments pursuing its interests in the Arctic, as long as the subsidy exists as a bargaining chip. On the other hand, alternative sources of income are contingent on resources (oil, minerals and tourism) and the opening of the Arctic waterways in the wake of climate change (Sale and Potapov 2010; Huggan 2016). Economic opportunities bring with them problems of a different nature.

Questions of resource allocation and access represent a starting point for a tangible exploration of self-determination and interdependence conducted through the lens of the ‘Possible Greenland’ exhibition. This exhibition, with its optimistic gaze towards future architectural scenarios, is wedded to the idea of the opportunities offered by climate change and the scramble for the Arctic, rather than, for example, to the formidable challenges climate change and a resource scramble bring to a pristine Arctic environment. The envisioning of a bright Greenlandic future is not only abstracted from some raw social realities in contemporary Greenland (Björkstén, Bjerregaard and Kripke 2004) – which will not be alleviated by architectural design – but it is also, in its artefacts and documents, oblivious to the challenges posed by climate change to Inuit ways of life, potentially disastrous environmental consequences of oil spills, uranium extraction waste, ships colliding with icebergs and a new Russian military build-up, to mention other ‘possible’ disturbing developments.

The material considered in this chapter consists of a website, a catalogue and the exhibition itself – not as featured in Venice – but in the bilingual (English-Danish) exhibition at the Danish Architecture Centre in Copenhagen (11 October 2013 to 26 January 2014). Prior to the Copenhagen exhibition it had been staged in Katuaq, the Greenlandic Culture House, in Greenland’s capital, Nuuk. The exhibition bore the assertive title ‘Greenland – Head to the Centre of the World’, invoking, possibly involuntarily, another form of scramble.

THE WEBSITE

The website has an English and a Danish language version. It begins its account of the Danish Pavillon at the Venice Biennale with the following statement:

The current development in the Arctic region positions Greenland as a new geopolitical fulcrum of the world. Greenland is also faced with a paradigm shift, driven by a political development towards independence, internal demographic challenges and dramatic climate change. Possible Greenland is a cultural and

business-oriented knowledge and communication project [that] latches on to a highly topical agenda. It focuses on the challenges and opportunities that Greenland faces as the ice melts, vast mineral resources become accessible, and new industries and urban cultures emerge. Possible Greenland focuses on the solutions that Greenlanders have realised they need to develop, solutions that the global community and business communities can help to bring to fruition; those who take part also help to set the agenda.²

This passage posits three important changes facing contemporary Greenland:

- (a) Global climate change
- (b) Local demographic challenges
- (c) The emerging local availability of globally attractive resources

It is impossible to completely unpack these three reference points, as they refer to complex issues both locally and globally, but it is possible to briefly identify what such an unpacking would entail:

Global Climate Change

The discourse around global climate change is fraught with ironies. When German chancellor, Angela Merkel, flew in to gaze at the retreating glacier near Ilulissat in 2009, she witnessed a naturally occurring phenomenon: icebergs calving from the glacier being pushed out from the ice cap. The disturbing element of climate change in action pertains to the accelerated process – and the accompanying retreat of the glacier further into the Icefjord. Only through a comparison with photographs uncovered from Danish reconnaissance flights in the 1930s (Bjork et al. 2012) does the dramatic retreat of the glacier become apparent – not through the immediate spectacle Merkel witnessed. Another, equally unsettling local aspect of climate change, which is seldom part of politicians' tour of the Arctic, is the danger posed to hunters by thinning ice and the increasing unpredictability of glacial flow affecting anyone moving in the water/ice along the Greenlandic coast. Alterations in ice conditions also threaten the survival of the frequently used climate change icon of the Arctic, the polar bear. Nonetheless, in spite of these local challenges to thinly populated areas, the most acutely threatened people are islanders from low-lying atolls in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as graphically captured in the underwater video footage of the 17 October 2009 scuba diving gear-clad Maldivian governmental meeting staged by the Maldivian president.³ This example illustrates the global reach of climate change brought about by melting ice caps.

Local Demographic Challenges

Local demographic challenges refer to the fundamental restructuring of Greenlandic society – some 56,000 individuals – which began with the large Danish investments in infrastructure in the 1950s and 1960s.⁴ Although the Danish modernization project is now widely accepted in Greenland as at least partly misguided, its policy of depopulating small settlements in favour of population centres continue for fiscal, social and educational purposes. Political autonomy has not done away with the challenges facing 56,000 people living on a 2 million square kilometre island. While the depopulation of smaller settlements and movement towards larger towns and cities is typical of emerging economies, Greenland has unique factors exacerbating this situation; for instance, no roads connect any villages or towns in Greenland.

The tightening of the Greenlandic economy, as the Danish annual subsidy is frozen at its current levels (DKK 3.7 billion), has forced the Greenlandic political establishment to underfund ‘economically unviable’ settlements. This fiscal discourse is at times reduced to the question of expenses connected with bringing supplies to remote communities of less than 100 people, even if the research into this question suggests that the definition of economic viability in the relationship between settlements and larger urban centres is ambivalent at best (Kleist 2010; Hendriksen 2013). A documentary from 2012, *Village at the End of the World*, captures the dilemma as it follows the locals’ fight to attract more inhabitants in response to depopulation, which has brought it close to the fifty inhabitants threshold deemed as the minimal to be considered viable by the Greenlandic self-government. The villagers’ struggle to attract cruise ships and revive the prawn factory and the film’s protagonist, Lars, a young man who leaves the village for an urban centre (in pursuit of education – and a girlfriend) epitomize the locals’ gravitation towards urban centres in search of a better future.

The Resource Boom Predicament

The resource boom is concurrently a national and a local predicament. Resource availability offers money and the possibility of employment. The boom can be understood in its limited form as mineral or oil resources or, more broadly, as cruise ship tourism where the imagery of Greenland and its masses of ice constitutes a less material, but nevertheless attractive, form of asset. The individual village’s opportunity of increased economic self-determination is countered by the gravitational forces of neoliberalism and becomes a microcosm of Greenland’s general predicament. How to navigate inside the opportunities and challenges caused by the neoliberal scramble for

the Arctic? ‘Possible Greenland’ is framed by this vision of local sustainability and an awareness of the global circuit of capital. Yet sustainability and neoliberalism are not merely two aspects of a Greenlandic reality, they clash in fundamental ways. The question is how this clash affects the discourse in the narration of ‘Possible Greenland’.

ESTABLISHING THE PROJECT’S VOICE

The website text establishes a delicate balance between challenge and opportunity, yet it does little to maintain this equilibrium. Without much deliberation it tips decidedly in favour of opportunity, its language reflecting a particular form of business argot:

Possible Greenland focuses on the solutions that Greenlanders have realised they need to develop, solutions that the global community and business communities can help to bring to fruition; those who take part also help to set the agenda.⁵

The passage envisages the local agency and global solutions in terms of a partnership. There is no hint of a conflict of interests between local priorities and global designs. As such it becomes an unqualified embrace of the neoliberal agenda where capitalism reaches to the ends of the world, embraced by savvy but also eager locals. This flies somewhat in the face of the long history of Greenlandic reservations about outsiders’ designs on their environment. The brazen attitude informing the text invites the question as to who is the implied narrator – are they speaking for Greenland, Denmark or *Rigsfællesskabet*? Given the historical Greenlandic opposition to authoritarian Danish administrators lording it over the locals, it is hard to imagine a Danish voice pronouncing on a future Greenland scenario. One answer to the question is supplied by the exhibition itself, where it is difficult to escape the voice of Greenlandic geologist and curator, Minik Rosing, who addresses the audience from a number of television screens activated by viewer presence. However, rather than personifying the presumptuous embrace of a neoliberal future, Rosing represents a genealogy of Greenlanders who have sought to engage ‘the modern’.⁶ This engagement has different facets such as modern education and health systems. Two of the most important aspects given the context here have been, on the one hand, the modernization of a challenged Greenlandic infrastructure and, on the other, the Danish promise of recognition of Greenlanders as equals once Greenland had been ‘modernised’. This was pivotal to Greenlandic political self-determination aspirations. The relationship between Greenland and the outside world, however,

was channelled through Greenland's colonial relationship with Denmark, who had little interest in the Arctic-jewel-in-the-crown becoming independent. Greenland delivered and continues to yield international importance to Denmark that the country would otherwise quite simply not have. So, while Denmark embarked on a massive infrastructure building project in the 1950s and 1960s, including a new ship, *Hans Hedtoft*, that would ensure regular connections between Denmark and Greenland,⁷ the change in the political power imbalance was much slower. As elsewhere in the colonial world, it only occurred when national political parties demanded influence over the future development of their society.

The second part of the website text comes closer to addressing the issue of voice. It describes the development of the ideas presented and the implementation of them, which includes acknowledging this is not a Greenlandic project under a Danish Biennale entry, but rather, as it describes in its preference for the prose of innovation, 'the first collaborative project':

Possible Greenland is the first collaborative project of its kind between Greenland and Denmark. Teams of architects, engineers, urban planners and strategists raise essential strategic questions, while creating positive, concrete scenarios to inspire and qualify the debate on the future sustainable development of Greenland in a global context. Taking into account the unique nature of Greenland's history and culture, the teams – headed by curator Minik Rosing, the internationally renowned Professor in Geology at the University of Copenhagen, and co-curator NORD Architects Copenhagen – have developed innovative and sustainable visions for economic, social and cultural development in Greenland.⁸

Initially, the Greenlandic component appears to have a strong presence with the Greenlandic geologist Rosing as the project's curator. The professor has been portrayed in the Danish media as a central spokesperson on the possibilities (rather than the difficulties) posed by climate change and the scramble for the Arctic. His popularity in the Danish media suggests a preference for spokespersons espousing views conducive to Danish political and investment interests in Greenland.

Rosing has referred to the Arctic Sea as the new Mediterranean, echoing John Barrow, the promoter of the British nineteenth-century search for the North West Passage – which in itself represented an Arctic scramble. Barrow was deeply involved in British colonialism from South Africa to China and, as second secretary to the British Admiralty, oversaw expeditions from John Ross to John Franklin. Barrow believed fervently in the ancient Greek idea of a temperate sea beyond the Arctic Sea (Berton 1988; Williams 2003). Such a body of water would have granted the British access to East Asia without the need to navigate the long way around Cape Horn, with the advantage

that it would have been via British-held territory (Canada). In the exhibition, the Arctic Sea as the Mediterranean, a Eurocentric perception centred on the Mediterranean as the cradle of civilization, has been replaced by the idea of Greenland/the Arctic as the heart of the planet's emerging future. At the Venice Biennale, the entrance to the pavilion was decorated with a map which, because of its implied reference to sea lanes and the extraction of resources in the Arctic, resembles an emerging highway for the neoliberal scramble, with the Arctic as its epicentre.⁹

Rosing's presentation of his desires for the exhibition is unambiguous when he states:

My ambition for this project has been to show Greenland as a modern nation with a long and rich cultural history – a country that has immense value to a globalised world. Greenland is not merely a repository of untapped mineral resources ready for exploitation; it offers a complex reality that may nourish us through ideas, experiences and challenges. And 'Greenlandicness' is in itself a resource that will be much in demand in the Arctic century that lies before us.¹⁰

The anxiety in relation to shifting Greenland's image from an indigenous locus, and by implication, a site beyond the pale of modernity, towards an assertive representation of Greenland's place in the modern world is evident. As is the eagerness to portray Greenland as worthy of the global economy's intervention. However, when Rosing speaks of the Arctic century to come, he invokes a global focus on the Arctic that cannot be driven by (unlike, for example, the idea of the Pacific century) seismic shifts in the global economy away from the long-established centre of the North Atlantic axis.

The thinly populated Arctic necessarily remains at the receiving end of the traffic and consequently Rosing's discourse hinges on an opportunity-driven engagement with neoliberalism (rather than a critique of the environmental destruction that accompanies it as has become clear, from logging in the Amazon to environmentally disastrous damming projects in India and coal pollution in China). What Rosing also glosses over is the fact that the massive projects envisioned are necessarily imposed upon the Arctic rather than emerging from it. He is keen to assert that Greenlandic/Inuit culture offers a localized sustainability narrative to the arriving global forces, which raises the obvious question why such global forces are not in themselves sustainability conscious, given his ready endorsement of their presence in an Arctic pristine environment. Part of the explanation of the contradictions inherent to his discourse may be sought in his preference for metaphorical language: For example, 'complex reality that may nourish us through ideas, experiences and challenges' obscures the contradictory relationship between sustainability and the global economy. The metaphors are inadequate in terms of addressing

obvious challenges that follow a resource grab. These difficulties include the increased use of Arctic waterways as a threat to local sustainability and raise questions such as who possesses the right to dispose of mineral assets in what ways and how to ensure the profits from the resource boom benefit Greenlandic society.

THE PROJECTS

The website links to a series of specific projects:

- Connecting
- Inhabiting
- Migrating
- Cultivating
- Comparative studies

These projects are all collaborative, although the extent of the partnership is doubtful, in particular as the documentary tracing the evolving relationship between Danish architecture companies and their Greenlandic partners contains voices querying the extent of Greenlandic involvement. Furthermore, some of the contributing Danish architectural firms are internationally recognized and hence they partake in the global economic hub that produces Greenland as peripheral but ripe for inscription.

*Connecting*¹¹ is a collaborative project by The Studio Nuuk, Bjarke Ingels Group and two of Greenland's well-known contemporary artists, Julie Edel Hardenberg and Inuk Silis Høegh. Conceptually, the striking (air + port) image of a combined airport and shipping terminal is innovative, if the obtuse architectural wording is disregarded. The runway of the airport crossing the container terminal below signals, as is stated, a 'north-south, east-west' orientation. Seen from above it also resembles a white cross, which links it historically to the arrival of Christianity that inaugurated Danish(-Norwegian) colonialism in Greenland in 1721. The proposal of a major port and airport also makes explicit the absence of a major airport near Greenland's capital city. Currently, Kangerlussuaq operates as the hub for international flights. Smaller planes fly from here to the Greenlandic population centres, including Nuuk. Hence the project strengthens Nuuk's status as the Greenlandic hub and presumably increases pressure on the smaller population centres. The project's inclusion of the container terminal prepares Greenland for the projected increase in Arctic shipping, as the sea lanes open as a result of the nexus of increasing trade and global warming.

*Inhabiting*¹² opens with a provocative statement:

When we build, we occupy land. In Europe we sit on it, matriculate it, fence it in and entrench ourselves behind deeds and property rights.

The defiant tone, however, only succeeds as long as the issue of who constitutes the *we* remains unexamined. Within a European context, the *we* posits an opposition between Europe and Greenland based on the distinction that land cannot be owned privately in Greenland. This is an opposition that revisits the colonial relationship between Denmark and Greenland. As other colonial interactions, this connection was premised on territorial ownership exercised through Danish sovereignty, conveniently displacing the issue of Greenlandic possession of their land through the assertion that (private) ownership was an alien concept. The collective European *we* fails to acknowledge that not every European owns property, indeed far from it. Yet the most curious aspect of the statement is that the European *we* is syntactically interchangeable with the Greenlandic *we*.

The earlier statement is all the more striking since immediately in the next sentence the Greenlandic *we* rests upon a presumption of cultural difference:

In Greenland, thankfully, we live by other rules. The mountain side is common ground, and we must live by other priorities here, move closer together, and find foothold and home in useful, high-ceilinged spaces that greet the view and guard against cold and wind by means other than those previously assumed.

Greenland is currently experiencing growth optimism, but it is necessary to reach a sustainable balance. There is no reason to repeat the mistakes that a blind faith in growth has led to elsewhere. There must be fish, seals and seaweed in the sea for those who come after us, and we must place our feet with the utmost care in the northern landscape.

The first passage begins with a disclaimer against an automatic belief in the advantage of private land ownership, which is, of course, an impossibility in Greenland. The second passage mentions 'growth optimism' cautioning that this must not happen at the cost of sustainability, followed by the warning not to 'repeat the mistakes that a blind faith in growth has led to elsewhere'. The metaphorical language used does not indicate which examples not to follow. It chafes against the general tone of 'growth optimism', however. Even more bizarre is the suggestion to look elsewhere, when the Greenlandic coastline is in places littered with the evidence of 'blind faith in growth'. For example, the waste left after the American activities in Greenland – the modernization period itself has left plenty material behind that makes the need to go elsewhere to look for evidence of 'thoughtlessness' superfluous. There are also ample examples of 'blind faith in growth' in the current and planned programmes of resource extraction (uranium extraction from Kvanefjeld

near Narsaq and oil rigs to be placed in iceberg passages) and the opening of Arctic waterways to shipping lanes. Those are the same planned programmes, which are seen to deliver the very platform for making possible the Greenland of architectural innovation.

One example of a current dilemma might illustrate the predicament. In a report to the Inuit Circumpolar Council of Greenland, 'Project Review: Cairn Energy's 2011 Offshore Drilling in West Greenland', Harvey Consulting notes that out of a 344 tonnes of hazardous waste generated through Cairn Energy's drilling activities, the waste disposal method was reported for only 27 tonnes (Harvey 2013: 6). The details outlining the chemicals and the way they were discarded makes for damning reading. 'Possible Greenland' fails to address that hazardous waste production also enables its large-scale projections. Instead, its limited critique posits more questions than it answers:

We can no longer uncritically import self-absorbed, European, iconic monumentality that ignores topography and scale. We reject multi-story buildings from the catalogue of housing on Greenland. Instead, our response to the landscape and the intrinsic climate conditions is a lightweight, assembly-friendly system which will effortlessly follow the contours of the mountainside.

'Iconic monumentality' is not necessarily European. Is the massive recently constructed casino in Singapore less of an eyesore, because it is Asian? The reference to high-rise buildings makes Asian metropolises far more relevant reference points than smaller and mostly older European cities. Yet the most relevant critique would appear to be its lack of relevance to Greenland's modest population. The reference may be seen as a gesture to the ill-conceived blocks of flats erected during the modernization era in Greenland, which were at the time seen as iconic manifestations of Danish-driven progress, but later became monuments to the perception of Danish misguided development plans for Greenland in the 1960s. Whatever the reference point, there are no European buildings imposing themselves on the Greenlandic landscape – only Danish – leading to the key question: Why is Denmark absent from these implied historical references to misguided building practices?

Inhabiting picks up the thread of sustainability and reveals its understanding of how architecture engages with ecology through the preliminary statement: 'Architecture should not strive to reconcile contradictions between nature and construction. We must, however, stubbornly study and listen to the place we are visiting'. How listening is supposed to be enabled remains unexplained, instead the text distances itself from an implied earlier approach to building in Greenland:

We forbid the use of dynamite and provide a principle for development which reduces landscape intervention to a minimum, embracing the cliff face instead of blowing it up. Our lightweight system will bring areas that were previously

deemed unbuildable within reach. Once the sites are decided, the ground is prepared with the establishment of shared entry decks that become the area's service-friendly supply route, appearing as lifelines in the landscape, following it carefully, lit at night and in the dark months of winter.

The vision described here projects itself as being in tune with the landscape but does not register this as a contradiction to the argument of bringing 'areas that were previously deemed unbuildable within reach'. This ecological vision seems based on the idea that nature must finally surrender to a utilitarian relationship with human enterprise. But if indigenous approaches to nature mean anything within a Greenlandic context, this needs to include the idea that humans exist in or with nature rather than through a one-sided imposition of human culture on the landscape.

The envisioned impact of the building activities on the local communities opens another contradictory space in the presentation:

For decades, changes to local hunting culture have [*sic*] increased the number of idle, unskilled hands. This points to a building practise which reduces the need for both craft and heavy machinery, a light system which can be handled by crews of only 2 to 4 men, allowing work on difficult sites and a high degree of independence as was always the tradition in the north.

This reading of local development suggests that hunting practices have decreased and no alternative jobs have emerged. The buildings are designed on a *simple-to-build* principle that indicates, from the earlier description, little physical labour or local involvement. Ironically then, even as the scale of building suggests a contrast to the major intrusive scale that characterized the modernization plans (imposing buildings with locals as passive bystanders or at best manual labourers), the smaller scale future projects offer at best a limited space for local engagement. It once again segregates housing from livelihood, which given the architectural desire for holistic designs, becomes a pronounced contradiction. Culture in this way – far from Raymond Williams's famous expression of culture as 'a whole way of life' – is compartmentalized into a range of cultural practices, where architectural design becomes the indisputable authority. This introduces a particularly acute dilemma when the architects stress 'the new Arctic building practise must deliver on a number of specific functions that separate it from the traditional, Scandinavian single family house. We relate to an Inuit culture that has developed its own ingenuity, astuteness and identity'. The houses in this way become containers of an Indigenous identity that has no anchoring in the world outside the house, because that way of life has disappeared and not been replaced with an Indigenous modernity,¹³ unless Indigenous modernity means – as in the 1960s – alienation and lack of agency. And it illustrates the continuity between Greenlandic voices in the documentary complaining

about a lack of consultation – and the complaints from Greenlanders about the same during the modernization era.

At this point the presentation acknowledges the need to address the contradictions of a Greenlandic society caught between ‘organic’ Indigenous practices and Western modernity-driven ways of living imposed through Danish rule, subsequently inherited by home rule and self-government: ‘It is outside the scope of architecture to make Greenland a happier society. However, one should expect thoughtful floor plans, a distinctive style, rich experiences, and efficient spaces that all contribute to a better quality of life’.

*Migrating*¹⁴ takes its departure in domestic migration history in Greenland starting with the migration of the whole community of the village Qullissat,¹⁵ after the local mine was closed down, in 1973. The opening section concludes with the observation that migration has always been and will continue to characterize life in Greenland. The presentation then makes no further reference to the Qullissat community. Given the backdrop of the mining boom that is supposed to enable the different architectural visions for Greenland, the reference to what remains a controversial historical event in the Danish-Greenlandic history, without any contextualization is at best negligent. Similar to the *connecting* and *inhabiting* projects, *migrating* also embraces the idea of sustainability and growth. It proposes four specific projects for catalysing this process: a culture centre, harbour, glacial hub and sports plaza. The culture centre is seen both as a space for visiting tourists, whose numbers have risen dramatically through cruise tourism, and as a local centre that will incorporate a retirement home, library and exhibition space. The harbour is likewise imagined to integrate locals and visitors through the establishment of a marketplace. Furthermore, the harbour is seen as an area that may resolve Ilulissat’s chronic housing crisis through the erection of temporary housing mainly for the many visiting students. The Glacial Hub refers to a proposed combined UNESCO office linked to the world famous glacier with a faculty for the study of glacial science. The proposal argues that this is tied to the difficulties in keeping Greenlandic students in Greenland. Yet Greenland’s education problems are not mainly concerned with glacial studies but with maintaining a growing number of students across many disciplines, as Greenland seeks to take over responsibility of its own administrative affairs from the thousands of temporarily stationed Danish civil servants and professionals. The sports plaza likewise is envisioned to create better facilities for the locals, not least the youth, who find the current facilities wanting.

CULTIVATING

The heading *cultivating*¹⁶ refers directly to the economic possibilities potentially offered by the resource boom. It contains a striking graph that details

the death of local villages in Greenland, as people move to the larger towns. This graph sets the tone of the passage outlining Greenland's problems:

Cultivating our resources can help us meet our challenges. We have the world's largest public sector, social problems, poor education, weak business development and is [*sic*] heavily depended [*sic*] on subsidies from Denmark.

As our Welfare Commission stated in 2011: Status quo is not an option! Fundamental societal changes are needed. We need to discuss HOW?

The alarming tenor of this passage will sound familiar not just to Danes but also to most Westerners as there is a pervasive crisis mood throughout Western countries, exacerbated by austerity measures. It is striking though that Greenland is placed in the same category as Western nations, in spite of Greenland's economic dependence on Danish subsidy. It is noteworthy that the economist leading the Welfare Commission had previously headed a similar commission in Denmark, which warned of the same problems there. Pointing this out is to not dismiss the commission's identification of the problems but rather to ask the question whether all solutions must be placed inside the same framework, which then becomes a normative reading of local global economies, which can all be unproblematically compared as a confirmation of Fukuyama's teleological vision in *The End of History and the Last Man*. Thus, the opening of the presentation places Greenland squarely inside the area of what is largely agreed are neoliberal solutions to neoliberal-made problems riding roughshod over Greenland's various unique challenges. Yet paradoxically this statement is followed with the Bhutanese example of saying *no* to too many tourists and its introduction of a Gross National Happiness clearly indicating that another approach to dealing with developing economies exists, but that approach remains segregated from the immediately preceding conventional neoliberal creed about the urge for (and desirability of) growth. Instead, *cultivating* simply reverts to the narrative about the growth delivering prosperity for Greenland and economic independence from Denmark, even as it opens for a whole range of questions relating to the possibilities and challenges stemming from a possible resource boom – including other forms of dependencies.

CONCLUSION

'Possible Greenland' displays a vision of Greenland at the cutting edge of modernity, rather than addressing the inherently contradictory aspects of Indigenous modernity at the receiving end of neoliberalism and its various forms of scrambles. Perhaps it is too much to ask of an exhibition – such

as the Pavilion at the Venice Biennale – invested with nationalist discourse to deconstruct its own premises. Yet, as my analysis shows, it is difficult to determine what idea of ‘nation’ actually governs the curatorial language informing the exhibition. It is at best ambivalent but, as has been shown in the chapter, at times demonstrably contradictory in its articulation of a Greenlandic imagined community. This uncertainty haunting the exhibition’s premise is further exacerbated by the fact that it fails to address the potential dangers of embracing a neoliberal paradigm for conceptualizing Greenland’s future. Finally, at the intermediate level between the national and the global, ‘Possible Greenland’ makes itself a prisoner of a third kind of haunting – the ghost of the Danish modernization process in 1950s and 1960s Greenland. This modernization process has been roundly criticized in Greenland and in a far more circumscribed fashion in Denmark. Yet as more policy areas are taken ‘home’ to Nuuk, the modernization project also becomes increasingly Greenlandic. The question is how a contemporary Greenland will negotiate as to what is a delicate balance between reforms of the society aimed at delivering better welfare (at arm’s length from the legacy of a Danish modernization project), while at the same time grant a more autonomous space to alternative forms of developing Greenland in ways more conducive to a Greenlandically informed modernity. ‘Possible Greenland’ provides inadequate answers to these complex issues. Furthermore, it reflects an agenda that dates directly back to the Danish modernization project, while it fails to question a neoliberal agenda whose environmentally destructive path across the globe is acutely visible to all who have not deliberately shut their eyes.

NOTES

1. The Danish Commonwealth.
2. <http://www.dac.dk/en/dac-life/exhibitions/2012/possible-greenland-1/> (Accessed 18 January 2017).
3. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8311838.stm> (Accessed 18 January 2017).
4. There are earlier examples of relocation of Greenlanders to serve the interests of Danish colonial administrators, such as the coal mine town at Qullissat (1924–1973), and the Thule colony founded by Knud Rasmussen (see Andersen, Hvenegård-Lassen and Jensen 2016; Muntzberg and Simonsen 1996).
5. <http://www.dac.dk/en/dac-life/exhibitions/2012/possible-greenland-1/> (Accessed 18 January 2017).
6. For example, Augo Lynge was a leading politician who became one of the first Greenlandic members of the Danish parliament. His 1931 novel, *Ukiut 300-ngornerat* (300 Years after), the second Greenlandic novel ever published, is a utopian narrative set 300 years after the 1721 arrival of the Danish-Norwegian priest, Hans Egede. The work envisages grand-scale farming and includes a plane and boat

chase in connection with an improbable crime story. Lynge has become not only an important voice in support of 'modernising' Greenland but also as an advocate of Greenlandic agency in that process. Many later Greenlandic politicians have followed a similar trajectory of advocating modernization on Greenlandic terms.

7. The ship sank after striking an iceberg on its maiden voyage from Greenland to Denmark in 1959.

8. <http://www.dac.dk/en/dac-life/exhibitions/2012/possible-greenland-1/> (Accessed 18 January 2017).

9. <http://www.dac.dk/en/dac-life/exhibitions/2012/possible-greenland-1/projects/comparative-studies/> (Accessed 18 January 2017).

10. <http://www.dac.dk/en/service-sider/news/2012/august/greenland-in-the-center-of-attention/> (Accessed 18 January 2017).

11. <http://www.dac.dk/en/dac-life/exhibitions/2012/possible-greenland-1/projects/connecting/> (Accessed 18 January 2017).

12. <http://www.dac.dk/en/dac-life/exhibitions/2012/possible-greenland-1/projects/inhabiting/> (Accessed 18 January 2017).

13. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in detail the concept of 'indigenous modernity'/'indigenous modernities'. For a useful introduction, see Diamond, Katiszgo and Sparling (2012).

14. <http://www.dac.dk/en/dac-life/exhibitions/2012/possible-greenland-1/projects/migrating/>.

15. The DAC website actually states they were all moved to Ilulissat, but they were in fact sent to a number of towns along the coast, spreading community and families over hundreds of kilometres.

16. <http://www.dac.dk/en/dac-life/exhibitions/2012/possible-greenland-1/projects/cultivating/> (Accessed 18 January 2017).

Chapter 11

From Mobutu to Molenbeek: Belgium and Postcolonialism

Sarah Arens

Recent events, such as the shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels (24 May 2014), the *Charlie Hebdo* killings (7 January 2015) and, most significantly, the Paris attacks (13 November 2015) and the Brussels bombings (22 March 2016), have drawn an increased attention of international media to Brussels as a migrant destination and postcolonial metropolis. More specifically, this attention has been focused on one of the Belgian capital's nineteen municipalities, Molenbeek-Saint-Jean/Sint-Jans-Molenbeek, or simply Molenbeek. This particular neighbourhood in the northwest of the city has become infamous as the home of those young men who are allegedly responsible for a number of violent attacks carried out in Europe over the past decade in the name of transnationally operating terrorist organizations, either al-Qaeda or the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Place and space thereby appear as central to these events, while they are circumscribed by intersecting transnational trajectories and multiple histories of violence: the diasporic routes between Morocco and Belgium, established through bilateral labour migration agreements between the two countries in the 1960s and subsequent family reunifications and, more recently, narratives of the refugee and returnee, the victims of war and its perpetrators. According to the Soufan Group report on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, by October 2015, 470 Belgian nationals had joined the war, while specifying that most of these fighters originate from Molenbeek (Barrett et al. 2015: 11). The report further states that, 'The secular nature of western European countries like France and Belgium, which top the poll for the highest number of fighters per capita, coupled with a sense of marginalization among immigrant communities, especially those from North Africa, appear to have played a role in the radicalization process' (Barrett et al. 2015: 12–13). In doing so, the authors ignore that, for example, Belgium was the first western European country to

subsidize Islamic religious education in state schools (*Loi du 19 juillet 1974 portant reconnaissance des administrations chargées de la gestion du temporel du culte islamique* 2016). It is interesting to note in this context that, while, in 2012, the Constitutional Court held that the so-called burqa ban does *not* violate the Belgian Constitution, local police regulations, like the one in place for Molenbeek, had already prohibited covering the face in public places as of 2004 (*Règlement Général de Police: Zone de police Bruxelles-Ouest de 2 avril 2014* 2016). These discourses testify to anxieties surrounding immigration and alterity that are certainly not an exclusively Belgian problem but part of wider political developments in the West since 9/11 and expressed by the rise of the far right across Europe, ‘Brexit’ and the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States.

At the same time, more than fifty years after the formal end of Belgian colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa, in what is today the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi, and seventy years after the first post-war labour migration agreements were signed, Belgium is today home to significant diasporic communities:

In contrast with other European countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium never opted to recruit migrant workers in its former colonies in Africa. . . . The mid-1970s oil crisis led Belgium and other European countries to stop active recruitment of low-skilled workers. However, immigration continued through the right of family reunification which was granted to the migrant workers who opted to settle in Belgium. Turks and Moroccans are the first major Muslim groups to immigrate to Belgium (Gsir, Mandin and Mescoli 2015: 7).

Apart from this heterogeneity of its diasporic communities, what renders Belgium’s postcolonial situation even more complex are the country’s ‘domestic’ ethnic tensions and their connections to the colonial project in sub-Saharan Africa. Belgium was the youngest among the European imperial powers, having gained independence from the Netherlands only in 1830, fifty years prior to the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. The rise of the new nation as a colonial aggressor was thereby inextricably connected to the figure of Leopold II, the second king of an independent Belgium. From 1885 to 1908, the Congo Free State represented the largest privately owned colonial territory in history under his control. The enormous profits gained from the exploitation of natural resources enabled major construction projects in Brussels and other cities like Antwerp, while an estimated number of 10 million Congolese died in consequence of the brutal forced-labour system and diseases (Yervasi 2008: 14). Following extensive international criticism, Leopold’s private property was turned into a colony in 1908 and renamed the ‘Belgian Congo’ until its formal independence in 1960. Following the

defeat of the German Empire in World War I, ‘Ruanda-Urundi’ (today’s Rwanda and Burundi) was turned into a League of Nations mandate under Belgian control from 1919 to 1962 (Fraiture 2008: 7). With regard to the way in which the Belgian colonial project can be considered an attempt of national consolidation, Pierre-Philippe Fraiture argues that, ‘Leopold II had the ambition of using the Congo as a tool to strengthen the somewhat precarious basis of the Belgian nation and dispel the growing tensions between the ruling French-speaking upper middle class and the rising working class’ (Fraiture 2008: 7). To the present day, however, Belgium has not been able to overcome the deep divide between its two major language communities: Flanders, the predominantly Flemish-speaking north of the country, and Wallonia, the French-speaking south. Fraiture further explains how ‘after the collapse of the empire, the gap between French-speaking and Flemish-speaking communities widened . . . and after more than forty years of institutional dismembering of the former centralised state, it is debatable whether or not they still have a common future’ (Fraiture 2008: 10).

In his landmark article ‘Postcolonial Belgium’, Idesbald Goddeeris mentions an inscription on the *Monument aux pionniers belges au Congo* (Monument for the Belgian Pioneers in the Congo) in Brussels’s Parc du Cinquenaire, which praises Belgium’s military ‘heroism’ of ‘annihilating the Arab slave trader’. Goddeeris observes that, ‘It did not seem to occur to people that the message may be offensive for some Belgians, particularly the ones frequenting Brussels’ largest mosque nearby, in spite of the fact that “vandals” had erased the word “Arab” before 2009 (and did again after restoration)’ (Goddeeris 2015: 449). He considers the continuing presence of such monuments celebrating colonialism as symptomatic for Belgium’s difficulties in coming to terms with its imperial past. Meanwhile, the specificities of the Belgian situation elucidate why it is problematic to use postcolonial theory that has been developed in different contexts. My approach in this chapter thus echoes Charles Forsdick’s and David Murphy’s call for an emancipated Francophone postcolonial studies instead of using frameworks that have been constructed in an Anglophone context (Forsdick and Murphy 2009: 7). I posit that coming to a better understanding of Belgium’s postcolonial situation including, for example, the terrorist attacks of recent years, requires the contextualization of these events within both Belgian postcolonial history and globalization.

The urban space of Brussels and its diasporic communities, especially those originating from the DRC, have received ample academic attention from scholars in social sciences. For instance, Ural Manço, Mireille-Tsheusi Robert and Billy Kalonji have analysed the dysfunctional social care in Belgium for youth of Congolese origin, differences to other migrant groups

and the mediatization of racialized neighbourhoods of Brussels and Antwerp (Manço, Robert and Kalonji 2013). Eva Swyngedouw and Erik Swyngedouw have examined transnational identity formation of the Congolese diaspora in Brussels (Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw 2009), while Nicole Grégoire's and Jacinthe Mazzocchi's study focuses on the lived experience of a 'qualified' participation in citizenship outside the imagined community of Belgian majority society (Grégoire and Mazzocchi 2013).

Meanwhile, the cultural production of these diasporic communities in Flemish or French has been examined far less frequently (Bekers 2009; de Mul 2014; Arens 2015, 2016). The focus on the fictional, however, enables us to tease out the intertwined connections between power relations, violence, globalization and their representation by concentrating on the intersections of mobility, language(s) and space in contemporary cultural production. It reveals the ways in which recent cultural representations perpetuate or problematize narratives of racialization within the urban space of the Belgian capital. I am less interested in depictions of terror as such, but rather in the ways in which recent filmic and literary representations of male bodies of colour in Belgium have already emphasized the anxieties surrounding them. I will focus on these bodies as sites of violence as depicted in Adil El Arbi's and Bilal Falah's 2015 film *Black*¹ and in Patrick François's 2011 novel *La dernière larme du lac Kivu* (*The Last Tear of the Kivu Lake*). While neither El Arbi and Falah, who are both Belgian-born and of Moroccan heritage, nor François, who left Haiti for Belgium in the early 1990s, originate from countries with a history of *Belgian* colonialism, their respective works address the intersections of the aftermath of the Belgian colonial project, post-war labour migration and globalized asylum-seeking. As Elleke Boehmer and Sarah de Mul argue:

The postcolonial, let us not forget, emerged out of situations of resistance to colonial inequality, its core concepts born out of an anti-colonial struggle. And though our times may appear superficially post-postcolonial, unequal conditions analogous to those under empire, or stemming from them, continue to pertain in ex-colonizing countries like the Netherlands and Belgium today. (2012: 8)

Moreover, these works draw connections between different experiences of violence that produce a shared sense of marginalization that affects in particular the youngest generations of diasporic communities in a space that has always already racialized them. Both *Black* and *La dernière larme du lac Kivu* can be seen, at least to a certain degree, to be influenced by a certain European cinematic tradition of the 1990s and 2000s that focuses on young men of colour in marginalized urban spaces, such as *La Haine* by Mathieu Kassovitz (1995) or *Kurz und Schmerzlos* (*Short, Sharp, Shock*,

by the German-Turkish director Fatih Akin 2008). In this context, I am, in particular, interested in the mobile nature of Kara Keeling's use of the term 'ghettocentrism', which she builds upon Ed Guerrero's notion of 'ghetto-centric' African American cinema. Keeling refers to an 'innovation [that] is a conception of the world consolidated by and circulating in gangsta rap and its related products and practices. I understand "ghettocentrism" to be a historically specific reaction to and articulation of a cinematic social reality (the postindustrial city's ghetto) produced at the juncture between globalizing capitalism and contemporary U.S. racism' (Keeling 2007: 120).² At the same time, and specifically for the Belgian context, I posit, the 'ghettocentrism' of both film and novel have to be considered within the context of what Bill Ashcroft describes as follows:

Neither imperialism nor globalization can be described simply as a program of homogenization because their operations are characterized by multidirectional and transcultural interactions, operating rhizomically rather than hierarchally or centrifugally. The various transcultural interactions between imperial powers and colonial cultures have a correlation in one of the most interesting features of the present globalized world: the degree to which local modernities have come to characterize the global, in their adaptation of the principles and technologies of modernity to local cultural conditions. (Ashcroft 2009: 86–7)

While both *Black* and *La dernière larme du lac Kivu* use different adaptational approaches as we will see (and, implicitly, target different audiences), these 'principles and technologies of modernity' appear as multilingualism, mobility and use of visual media in these works. I will demonstrate how such a focus allows us to address questions such as how fictional characters experience and negotiate space and what visions of mobility are expressed. This will help in attaining a better understanding of the links between public discourses surrounding young male bodies of colour and the specificity of Belgium's complex postcolonial situation.

BRUSSELS AS BABEL: LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN POSTCOLONIAL BELGIUM

Depictions of young men of colour in recent Belgian film and literature both precede and are arguably informed by discourses surrounding their bodies in western Europe and the United States. Across various national contexts, such rhetoric represents brown and black male bodies as what Peter Cherry calls, referring to the British context, 'prone to a pathological form of masculinity supposedly inculcated by their religio-cultural background' and/or as

drug-dealing and engaging in gang warfare (Cherry 2017: 2). I am thereby particularly interested how film-makers and writers of colour in Belgium present discussions of space and language as central to the representation of these young men. This helps us understand the specificity of the Belgian situation where any domestic politics are inextricably connected to questions of territory and language/ethnicity. Brussels thereby assumes several, sometimes conflicting roles, being the *de facto* capital of the European Union, the national capital of Belgium and the regional capital of Flanders. Although surrounded by the Flemish Brabant province and officially bilingual, this is no longer the case in linguistic-sociological terms, as Rudi Janssens explains, due to the city's migrant communities and important political and cultural status: 'People simply do not live in a monolingual environment in Brussels and both in their personal relations and in their daily public life they are constantly reminded of that multilingual environment' (Janssens 2008: 2). Any questions surrounding group identities certainly differ depending on geographical and socioeconomic context. However, in postcolonial Belgium, navigating space through multilingualism is an everyday experience for the country's diasporic communities, both within the capital city and beyond. In this context, El Arbi's and Falah's film *Black*, based on Dirk Bracke's eponymous 2006 novel, emphasizes the pivotal role that spatiality and language play for young men of colour in postcolonial Brussels. The film tells the story of two teenagers, who are part of two opposing street gangs in the Belgian capital. Marwan's (Aboubakr Bensaihi) friends of Moroccan and white Belgian origin form '1080', which is Molenbeek's postcode, while Marie-Evelyne/Mavela (Martha Canga Antonio) is affiliated with 'Black Bronx' through her cousin. The territory of Black Bronx is set in a part of Brussels that is allegedly Matonge, a neighbourhood within Ixelles. Sarah Demart has demonstrated how Matonge has become a space that illustrates the racialization of social relations in Belgium, especially since the 'riots' of 2001 and 2011–2012, while the neighbourhood had already been subject to disproportional police surveillance since the 1970s (Demart 2013: 6). While Véronique Bragard supposes that Matonge is 'probably the only European neighbourhood to have an African name', it is indeed this very name that forms a transnational connection between the former imperial centre of Brussels and a homonymic neighbourhood of Kinshasa (Bragard 2011: 104), thus connecting multiple histories of violence in the capital of the former Belgian colonizer. The names of both gangs thereby adapt practices of appropriating urban spaces rooted in US-American hip-hop culture, such as using postal codes, as Murray Forman explains:

Whereas blues, rock, and R&B have traditionally cited regions or cities . . . contemporary rap is even more specific, with explicit references to

particular streets, boulevards and neighbourhoods, telephone area codes, postal zip codes, or other sociospatial information. Rap artists draw inspiration from their regional affiliations as well as from a keen sense of what I call the *extreme local*, upon which they base their constructions of spatial imagery. (Forman 2002: xvii)

The identity formation of both gangs in *Black* is thus closely tied to their respective neighbourhood and sphere of action within the urban space of Brussels: Molenbeek and Matonge. The ‘extreme local’ thereby functions as a sort of authentication both within the narrative (as a spatial delimitation of each gang’s respective territory) and towards the film’s audience (by demonstrating the directors’ intimate knowledge of the city and its different neighbourhoods). The name of ‘Black Bronx’, referring to the economically most disadvantaged borough of New York City in particular, evokes discourses of (white) anxiety surrounding neighbourhoods with high percentages of non-white inhabitants, racialized poverty and violence, such as the *banlieues*, certain suburbs of Paris or Brussels’s so-called *croissant pauvre* (the poor croissant), a string of neighbourhoods, including Forest, Anderlecht, Molenbeek and Schaerbeek, that form a half circle around the city centre. The gang’s name testifies to their recourse to a US-American imagery via a perception of the urban space of Brussels that is defined by race relations, ethnicity and language, as is Belgium as a whole. The ‘extreme local’ then becomes part of the global, in that it constitutes a practice that globalization has transported across the Atlantic. In the absence of any available identity frameworks in Belgium – Manço, Robert and Kalonji have highlighted the lack of discourse of what it means to be black in Belgium (Manço, Robert and Kalonji 2013: 29) – the gang’s spatial practices do not translate into empowerment of its marginalized members. Instead, the film’s representation of black male characters and its problematic gender politics tap into long-established and mediatized stereotypes thereof (Demart and Robert 2015: n.p.).

Through its adaption of the ‘Romeo-and-Julia’ narrative, the film features the common tropes of the so-called mob or gangster film genre, such as gang affiliation and group identification along ethnic and linguistic lines, as well as the rivalries between them, such as fighting over territory. Moreover, the Belgian context evokes ethnic conflict, both domestic and in the country’s former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, the worst consequences of which resulted in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the less well-documented and ongoing armed conflicts in the DRC and Burundi.

At the same time, it becomes very clear which gang the audience is meant to sympathize with: 1080 are depicted in a much more amiable way than Black Bronx, which is part of the wider troubling gender and racial politics of the film. This juxtaposition in representation between the gangs is

introduced right from the start. During the opening credits, the late Belgian-Congolese rapper Romano Daking's song 'Problème' is playing while all we can perceive is a mesh-wire fence in the foreground. The moving but blurred contours of people in the background are accompanied by screams and indiscernible exclamations, foreshadowing the two gang rapes that the male members of Black Bronx will perpetrate later in the film and further emphasized through the oppressive atmosphere, created through the menacing beats and sexualized violence that is evoked through movements and sounds in the background. The mesh-wire fence will return in the scenes at a local nightclub in Matonge with Mavela leaning against it, symbolizing her entrapment and inability to leave the gang.

Following the unsettling opening of the film, the camera cuts to Marwan walking through a sunny street in Brussels. We do not see his face until later in this sequence, since the camera focuses on his hand carrying a brick that he will use to break a car window to steal a handbag from the passenger seat, while the woman in the car is screaming. In contrast to the opening sequence and later depictions of Black Bronx, 1080's violence is banalized: as Freddy Sartor observes in his critical review, these robberies, which other reviewers have often rather euphemistically described as petty thefts, are displayed in the film as an amusing pastime, while they might constitute a traumatic experience for the victims (Sartor 2015: 12). Marwan, who successfully escapes a Flemish man chasing him, is dressed in an Adidas tracksuit and Nike AirMax sneakers, recognizable insignia of a fashion connected to the creation of a distinct youth culture surrounding migrant working-class neighbourhoods in western Europe. El Arbi and Falah thus solidify the film's contextualization within a framework of globalized references to US-American popular culture and their adaptation in a European environment.

On the other hand, the members of Black Bronx are one-dimensional caricatures of the black street gangster stereotype. They are involved in organized crime (as opposed to 1080's occasional stealing of handbags), sell and consume hard drugs and are depicted as sexual predators since they use gang rape as a means of subduing female members or to humiliate their rivals. There are volatile attempts of rendering the black male characters more complex, for example, when X (Emmanuel Tahon), the gang leader, is watching a documentary which seems to be about the ongoing paramilitary conflict in the eastern Congo. His emotional reaction when child soldiers appear on the screen suggests that his current violent behaviour in Brussels indeed constitutes a re-enacting of a traumatic past in his country of origin, similar Michaël/'MikeNike' in François's novel, a petty diamond trader from the same unstable border region between the Congo and Rwanda, who has become the leader of a street gang in Brussels (François 2011: 148). In *Black*, however, this narrative strand, which connects the postcolonial history of the

Congo with contemporary violence in the streets of Brussels, is not taken up again and X, like all other black male gang members, remains in his stasis. His representation thus solidifies the film's recourse to a racist discourse of atavistic violence reverberating with the rhetoric of savagery and barbarism (Demart and Robert 2015: n.p.). While the depiction of both Marwan and X heavily relies on stereotypes, it is, after all, also informed by what Sarah Demart and Mireille-Tsheusi Robert have identified as a form of postcolonial racism, which has rarely been addressed critically: that of young men of Maghrebi/Arab origin directed at the black community (cf. Demart and Robert 2015: n.p.; Manço, Robert and Kalonji 2013: 30).

Significantly, Mavela and Marwan are the only characters in the film who are portrayed as being able to speak French, Flemish and Arabic or Lingala, respectively. Their multilingualism plays a central role to their first meeting at a police station where both have been brought after Mavela has stolen alcohol from a supermarket for the other gang members and Marwan and his brother Nassim went on a shopping spree with a stolen credit card: she provocatively responds to an offensive remark made by Marwan with, 'You think I don't understand Flemish?' Flemish, both as language and identity construction, is represented as synonymous with upward social mobility in the film. When Marwan's parents appear at the police station to pick up their son, their representation forms a clear juxtaposition to their son's petty-criminal persona: they are dressed in conservative middle-class attire and his father speaks to Marwan in Flemish. Their brief appearance complicates any stereotypical assumptions about neighbourhoods like Molenbeek and indeed emphasizes the community's heterogeneity. However, 'granting' heterogeneity to the Moroccan diasporic community, but not to the one of Congolese descent, further conforms to the film's asymmetrical representation and racialization of the two groups. While Marwan, at this point, responds to his father 'I'm not Flemish, Dad' in Arabic, his brother Nassim later sceptically assesses his disclosure to leave the gang and their criminal acts behind as wanting to 'become Flemish'. *Black* thus frames Flemish identity as exclusively white and imbued with a social and cultural capital that remains entirely out of reach and 'inauthentic' for someone like Marwan, Nassim or their father. In doing so, the film adds a dimension to what Wouter van Gent and Rivke Jaffe have called the 'normalisation of marginalisation' that is both linguistic and identitarian: 'Urban inequalities are rendered normal by spatial imaginaries that depict "natural" associations between space, race, class and gender, with dysfunctional family life, sexual immorality and danger projected onto "non-White" [*sic*] neighbourhoods' (van Gent and Jaffe 2016: 3). While most characters are represented as confined to their respective urban spaces and thus implicitly to their race, ethnicity and language, Mavela's and Marwan's multilingualism, at least temporarily, seem to enable them to form

a connection across these boundaries. This is visualized through their mobility, linguistically, by being able to switch from one language to another, as well as physically, in scenes of them traversing the urban space of Brussels, not only underground on the train but also overground on foot or by observing the traffic of the city's main arteries from a rooftop.

MOBILITY AS A THREAT: POSTCOLONIALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL VIOLENCE

Marwan's and Mavela's mobility highlights and challenges, but eventually does not transcend racial and spatial boundaries in the city. However, it poses a (temporary) threat to the identity constructions of their respective gangs that they have developed based on difference and antagonism. Patrick François's 2011 novel *La dernière larme du lac Kivu* produces a vision of black (im)mobility in a broader framework of hegemonic power relations between male bodies of colour and the state that offers further insight into Belgium's postcolonial situation. The novel tells the story of nineteen-year-old Calixte Bien-Aimé who flees Haiti and arrives in Belgium in 1992, following the military coup that deposed of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. He meets three young men of Congolese origin – Karl, Anthony and Michaël/MikeNike – and quickly becomes part of their circle of friends, which consists mainly of young black and mixed-race men. On their way to party in what Calixte describes as 'a luxurious house of the Congolese bourgeoisie of Waterloo' (François 2011: 104, author's translation), once Napoleon's battleground and now a suburb of the Belgian capital, the young men are stopped by the police who demands they show their passports. It is here that Calixte, quite literally, meets his Waterloo. Aware of his legal rights, he refuses to hand over his documents:

We're in Waterloo here! one of them shouts at me in a condescending voice and visibly irritated. – That's true, this is not Brussels! repeats another one maliciously and smiles self-righteously. – But is this still Belgium? Reassure me! is what I want to scream for my legitimate rights to be respected in a space that already appears as some sort of lawless 'no man's land'. (François 2011: 106, author's translation)

It is not within Brussels, but in its suburbs that Calixte is suddenly reminded of the police violence and arbitrary exercise of law he thought he had left behind in Haiti. In stating 'We're in Waterloo here!' the policeman clearly establishes a spatial opposition between Brussels and the suburb. The policemen are not only limiting the freedom of movement of Calixte and his friends but also setting a limit to their ability of exercising their civil rights. The condescending voice and the self-righteous smile express the unequal

power relationship between the police and the young men. Indeed, the suburbs outside the capital appear as a veritable ‘no black man’s land’, in which Calixte and his friends are shoved into a police van without even being told the reason why they had been stopped in the first place. Their race and gender seem to be the only decisive factors. Mark Anthony Neal’s assessment of the disproportionate incarceration of black (and brown) male bodies in the United States finds a parallel in Waterloo, as ‘some preemptive attack on the presumed criminality of those bodies’, while ‘the most “legible” black male body is often thought to be a criminal body and/or a body in need of policing and containment’ (Neal 2013: 4). What connects the representations in François’s novel to the American situation that Neal describes, is the prevention of movement and mobility of black male bodies and their removal from the streets into the police van.

Earlier on in the narrative, when Calixte and his friends watch ‘a videotape from the Congo that recounts the exploits of the dictator-president’ (François 2011: 60, author’s translation), they take part in the global circulation of a very limited scope of masculine identities that are available to young men of colour. Similar to the pedestrians filming Marwan’s and Nassim’s spectacular arrest by the police after their ‘shopping trip’ on their smartphones, ready to be posted to and shared via social media, the mediatization of Mobutu and the handbag thieves of Molenbeek heavily relies on staging male bodies of colour as violent masculinities. The transnational circulation of these images thereby connects disparate moments of anxiety surrounding these bodies in Belgian postcolonial history, while highlighting the very limits of what Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw have called ‘forms of transnational identity formation and their local-spatial expression as embodied in and performed through the everyday urban life of local transnational communities’ in Brussels (Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw 2009: 69).

Mobutu’s rule, according to Priscilla Appama, ‘remains one of the world’s most notorious examples of dictatorship and kleptocracy’, while his seizure of power in the Congo was ‘supported . . . by the CIA and the Belgians – who wanted to remove Lumumba from power (considered pro-Soviet and thus, dangerous for them) and saw in Mobutu the figure of . . . an ally in the Cold War’ (Appama 2008: 41). Meanwhile, other male bodies of colour in Belgium that are perceived, in Neal’s words, ‘in need of policing and containment’, are put under state control. Hence, the police officers in François’s novel erase the young men’s presence in the public sphere and put them into an extremely confined space.

While being driven around in Waterloo, Calixte reacts somatically: ‘In the police van, which is literally suffocating me, I’ve discovered a claustrophobia I had not experienced before. Is it a panic attack? In any case, I can barely breathe’ (François 2011: 108, author’s translation). Inevitably reminiscent of

Eric Garner, who died at the hands of New York City police officers on 17 July 2014 while recorded on video gasping ‘I can’t breathe’, the policemen in the novel immediately identify the young men as being from Brussels. They perform van Gent’s and Jaffe’s notion of the ‘normalisation of marginalisation’ mentioned earlier by collectively imagining Calixte and his friends to ‘belong’ to certain urban spaces and not to others, such as an affluent suburbia, which is why they emphasize that this is Waterloo, not Brussels. By establishing a racial geography of Brussels and its suburbs, they delimit the young men’s mobility to the urban space of the capital, which they perceive as ‘other’, and not in the predominantly white suburb. While Teju Cole’s novel *Open City* produces what Madhu Krishnan describes as ‘a vision of space [in Brussels] in which the illusion of freedom of movement serves as a mask for the continuation of violence’, François paints an even bleaker picture by presenting the only mobility of black male bodies that state power allows as them being driven around in a police van (Krishnan 2015: 675). The intersections of masculinity and race are thereby paramount to understand the relationship between the diasporic subject and the Belgian state, as the police officers’ identification of the young men as not belonging to the suburban space demonstrates.

While sitting in the police van, Calixte struggles to understand his friends’ apathy and calmness regarding the current events, which probably testifies to the fact that this is not the first time they have experienced such treatment. He is rebelling against the hegemonic discourses that force him to fit into the only recognizable, hence the only acceptable identity framework that will always posit him as other: that of the male black ‘African’ criminal. Michaël, the gang leader and the only black character in François’s novel who *actually* engages in criminal activities, is significantly absent from this scene. With him, rage is absent and so even Calixte’s panic and anger eventually develop into apathy and obedience.

CONCLUSION

Both François’s novel and El Arbi’s and Falah’s film express visions of violence that connect the very local narratives set in Molenbeek, Matonge and Waterloo to the postcolonial legacies of Belgium in sub-Saharan Africa. X’s and MikeNike’s traumatic experiences of the armed conflict in the border region between the two former Belgian colonies Rwanda and the DRC complicate any easy assumptions about their status as violent gang leaders in the capital city of the former colonizer. *Black*, however, perpetuates mediatized stereotypes of black masculinity, which reverberate with old and new colonial and racist discourses of ‘savagery’. At the same time, the ways in which

Marwan, Nassim and Calixte experience police violence testify to Belgium's complex postcolonial situation: its ambiguous attitude towards Islam and the marginalization of migrant working-class communities, as well as hesitation towards acknowledging and confronting the country's colonial legacy in sub-Saharan Africa and diasporic presence in the former metropolis. Young male bodies of colour are imagined to 'belong' to certain neighbourhoods, like Molenbeek and Matonge, but not to others. These discourses have produced visions of spatiality and mobility in postcolonial cultural production that emphasize mobility between ethnic groups, languages, (urban) spaces and across borders. At the same time, current debates – in the aftermath of terrorist attacks by the so-called Islamic State militants in Paris and Berlin – about reintroducing border controls in the Schengen area rearticulate how young men of colour's mobility is perceived as a threat. In a Belgian context, it is multilingualism in particular, which appears as the key to the ability to traverse imagined boundaries. While it is important to highlight what Ravi calls the persistent problems of transnationalism and translatability of non-Anglophone postcolonial studies, works like *Black* and *La dernière larme du lac Kivu*, as well as media narratives surrounding the figure of the terrorist, require us to move towards a multilingual, postcolonial approach to investigate the intersections of colonial legacies, global migration and the state in the twenty-first century (Ravi 2011: 216).

NOTES

1. All translations from English subtitles.
2. For Ed Guerrero's (1993) original use of the term, see his *Framing Blackness: The African American Image in Film*, 182.

Chapter 12

Comparative Posts Going Political – the Postcolonial Backlash in Poland

Dorota Kołodziejczyk

In this chapter, I am going to trace the development of what I propose to term the ‘postcolonial backlash’ in the populist right-wing discourse in Poland that has managed to accrue a considerable political capital by the hostile takeover of postcolonial terms, among which decolonization, self-colonization, the subaltern and the hegemon are the most reiterated. We need to locate this phenomenon of reinforcing the right-wing politics with postcolonial vocabularies in the context of eastern and central Europe which, after the dismantling of Communism, has been forming its identity anew vis-à-vis Europe and reflecting on its position in the European political, social and cultural space. This chapter outlines ways in which postcolonial studies has been transferred onto the postcommunist contexts and links some of its developments with the political uses of postcolonial categories in right-wing populist discourse to show that the language of postcolonial self-identification of the current ruling camp in Poland works to objectify and legitimate the underlying nationalist and autocratic agenda.

The pertinent category of ‘self-colonization’, developed by Alexander Kiossev (1999: 114) and recurring implicitly or explicitly in most discussions of the region’s (debated and contentious) postcolonial condition, provides a handy tool for populist discourse. An admission of own inferiority in relation to the superior symbolic power and political/economic order, ‘self-colonization’ captures the essence of eastern and central European peripherality in relation to Europe ‘proper’:

The concept of self-colonizing can be used for cultures having succumbed to the cultural power of Europe and the west without having been invaded and turned into colonies in actual fact. . . . [T]hey had to recognize self-evidently foreign cultural supremacy and voluntarily absorb the basic values and categories of

colonial Europe. The result might be named ‘hegemony without domination’. (Kiossev 2011: n.p.)

The European allure is rooted in the sense of lack at the heart of own culture (Kiossev 1999: 115). In the case of eastern and central Europe, self-colonization must be seen as a consequence of orientalization or, rather, balkanization (Todorova 1997) of the region, represented in the European imaginary as both excess (of non-European element) and lack (of European norm).

Self-colonization has some profoundly disturbing implications. It ascribes ownership to political systems, traditions of thought or cultural patterns and, most importantly, it redefines influence as always already a colonizing process. It seems, though, that colonization and hegemony differ as political occurrences quite considerably and the latter does not entail the former. The ‘self-colonizing cultures’ are, as a result, locked in the guilt of inauthenticity and mimicking that they can do nothing about but perpetuate. Drawing on Achille Mbembe, Bogdan Ștefănescu links the intrinsic construction of ‘the colonized as an ontological and historical vacancy’ with self-colonization as one of the ways of ameliorating the trauma of the void that Communism inflicted (2015: 107). In this framework, self-colonization is much less deterministic, and more a self-conscious process of relating to other cultures, including those whose status may be considered hegemonic. Self-colonization may, as Ștefănescu argues, be also a playful and self-reflexive way of self-construction. Relatedly, the nostalgia after Europe that Svetlana Boym ascribes to the essential spirit of anti-communist dissidence (Boym 2002: 221) could also, in Kiossev’s sweeping category, be considered self-colonization. But there is a contradiction in terms here, since this self-colonization was a form of anti-colonial resistance against the Soviet internationalism and the covert pan-Slavism it fostered as part of its imperial cultural programme (Boym 2002: 229). The Europe longed-for in the eastern and central European cosmopolitanism of dissidence mapped by Boym, provided a horizon of hope that included those behind the Iron Curtain.

While the concept of self-colonization has been a genuine contribution from the postcommunist space to postcolonial studies, it has also rendered agency to populist discourse. It has been a crucial tool in constructing the new binary in which one is either a self-colonizing subject (those political and social organizations that are open to the prospect of intensified European Union [EU] integration, and to liberal projects and ideologies) or the true national subject (defining its identity in contrast to all liberal concepts that prioritize civil rights, personal choices, civic society over ethnic/national bounds, etc.). Self-colonization is crucial for understanding the profound rejection of Europe as ethos in current populist discourse in postcommunist

countries, in Poland especially, where this discourse has become the official government line. However, not only is this ethos not the property of the West, but it is also a claimed legacy of all those who may have been balkanized, Othered, separated by the Iron Curtain and otherwise side-tracked, hanging on to their sense of European identity as something they own rather than something that has been given, not to say imposed, on them. If this is self-colonization, then indeed the most authentic and effective decolonizing work that is being done at the moment is by nationalist populism. As we can see, this peculiar side effect of rebranding postcommunism as postcolonial space is that it translates easily into the politics of *ressentiment* and is used to legitimate radical nationalism as a postcolonial reclamation of the self and (denied) authenticity.

'POSTS' IN CONTENTION: POSTCOMMUNISM – POST-SOCIALISM – POSTCOLONIAL – POSTDEPENDENCE?

Naming the object of study that comprises polities and cultures of the former socialist states proved to be an interesting negotiation between a need for objectivity and an urge to signal the hegemonic and coercive aspect of these forms of governance, 'Communism' best denoting the additional context of alien imposition. Thus, 'postcommunist' has been the most widely accepted qualifier. Although none of these countries was officially 'communist', the name captures the negative attitude towards a regime that was always referred to by the dissidents and in common reference, as 'communist', in all socialist countries. Cristina Şandru highlights the global ambitions of communist ideology in her project to study postcommunism comparatively in order to 'situate communist ideological imperialism within the context of other world systems of domination and expropriation' (2012: 281). In turn, 'post-socialism' came up mostly in social sciences, for example anthropology, as a category that pertains to the situation as it had been officially named, thus objective and devoid of ideological connotations. Within the humanities, however, 'post-socialism' did not become a working term, mainly because, as non-ideological, it did not signal the ambiguity produced from markers of dissidence, nostalgia and collaboration that the 'Communism' core contains. *Postcolonialism/Postcommunism: Dictionary of Key Cultural Terms* (2011) highlights, under the entry 'postcommunism', the term's critical agency, locating it in the 'post' suffix that does not only denote the time after but also the work of critique (248). The authors discuss also postcommunism's spectral nature – apart from connoting the obvious process of settling scores with the past regime, it also signals the persistence of the remnants of the past system in a range of forms: 'The ghost may revisit the new postcommunist

societies in the shape of lingering mentalities, or as the conversion of the older communist into new capitalist networks of influence, inside information, and preferential allocation of resources' (248). Further, postcommunism (or: postcommunism studies) challenges the assumptions of transitology as that field of study that premises the post-Soviet/postsocialist/postcommunist on a lack, thus, defined by what these states are missing (251).

Scholars in post-socialism studies, observing the tendency in area studies/transitology to naturalize the passage to capitalism as the only available logic of history and a process that basically develops by filling in the void of what was Socialism/Communism, advocated an epistemological strategy of 'thinking between the posts'. Sharad Chari's and Katherine Verdery's reading of the two 'posts' tracks differences between these prefixes, the most important of which is the abrupt end of socialism as compared to a more processual fading of colonialism.¹ The dialogic potential of both 'posts' lies in their reactive engagement with the past regime (reassessment, rewriting, subversion, deconstruction, rectification/redress) and the reconstructive activation of the present, especially around identity formations and related politically charged junctions of social and cultural discourses. Chari and Verdery highlight the rhetoric of change and alterity that both 'posts' reveal: 'Both "posts" followed and continue to reflect on periods of heightened political breakthrough – the fall of the Berlin Wall and of Communist Party monopolies, or the formal granting of independence on ex-Soviet republics. Both connote efforts to overcome the past² and the ensuing reformulations of collective and individual selves – becoming something other than socialist or other than colonized' (11). A comparative reading of post-socialism with (note: 'with' not 'through' the postcolonial perspective) postcolonialism disturbs, as Chari and Verdery convincingly show, the Three-World division and the concomitant splitting the postsocialist and postcolonial apart as belonging to 'different worlds'. The comparative reading brings in not only the nuanced differences but also digs down to the bedrock of the imperial drive, revealing its homogeneous nature under the 'capitalist' and 'socialist' identity (18). This core affinity of empires is revealed in other studies across the disciplines (Ștefănescu 2013; Șandru 2012; Zarycki 2014; Morozov 2015) that either identify the common root of both as accumulation of wealth (Ștefănescu 2013; Șandru 2012; Zarycki 2014) or classify the Soviet imperialism as a subaltern form of the inherently imperialist thrust of capitalism (Morozov 2015).

Concerns about the term 'post-socialism' point out the 'epistemic enclavisation of the region' in social sciences, which effectively turns eastern and central Europe into the 'internal other of capitalist Europe' (Petrovici 2015: 81). Norbert Petrovici locates here the same mechanisms that prevailed in reference to eastern-central Europe through, among others, pervasive orientalizations and modernization discourses, with the effect of 're-iterating a

geo-epistemic boundary through which the region was re-created as a special island with its own laws' (Petrovici 2015: 81). Maria Todorova's *Imagining the Balkans* (1997), showcasing balkanization as the located form of orientalist discourse, raised debates on the processes and results of such epistemological containment. The 'geo-epistemic boundary' here divides Europe into the self-same Europe proper and eastern/central Europe as its foggy repetition – an imperfect copy. Unlike Orientalism, this is not a discourse conceptualizing and sustaining the opposite but a 'discourse of imputed ambiguity', in Todorova's succinct definition of balkanism (17). Michał Buchowski further shows how 'balkanism' that, for him, pertains not only to the Balkans but also to the orientalizing approach towards eastern and central Europe is a mode of Othering that has escaped the confines of culture and place (or the located culture as the site of orientalized difference). In its new morphed shape, orientalism-balkanism-Othering is a floating discursive device for objectifying, for example new economic inequalities in post-socialist market economies, paving the way for neoliberalism. With the help of the 'balkanizing' device a new determinism develops in which inborn personal characteristics render some people successful and some 'civilizationally incompetent' (Buchowski 2006: 469), unable to catch up and transform.³

Michał Buchowski's study joins the debate on self-colonization, meticulously tracing how Othering becomes internalized and develops as the strategy of placing the guilt for such negative aspects of transition in the 1990s as unemployment solely on the residue of *homo sovieticus* (473) in those disenfranchised. The pervasive neoliberal discourse fostering the new spirit of entrepreneurship by means of representational degrading of those who did not fare well in the transition took on the form of pedagogical mission, developing a normative rhetoric of self-reliance and economic success. Ironically, it spurred new populism which has managed to convince a fair part of the electorate that they will, as the degraded subaltern, be protected now from the onslaught of neoliberalism (somewhat absurdly conflated with all-pervasive 'leftism' of the EU).⁴

Another contribution to the self-colonizing concept is *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe* by Tomasz Zarycki (2014). Departing from an assertion of the colonial status of eastern and central Europe entrapped in the perpetuated Orientalist (and self-orientalizing) discourse (1), the author identifies the region as semi-periphery and investigates how anti-communist discourse, hegemonic especially in the central European part of the Soviet bloc (Poland predominantly), resulted in the naturalization of the region's dependence on the European core (31). The flip side of this is 'ideologies of Eastness' produced in semi-periphery to disavow any potential similarity to the East represented metonymically by Russia/Moscow and declare the natural belonging to the European identity.

Once again, the logic of self-colonization reduces the complexity of identification, with all its contradictions and conflicts, to a binary of progressives (readily self-colonizing) and conservatives (choosing ‘tradition’ as a way of resisting colonization) (Zarycki 2014: 43), making the latter exactly what they have turned into their political shibboleth – the decolonizing force. It is grounded on a normative determinism that denies the inevitability of influence, or borrowing, in processes of forming collective cultural or political identities.

POSTCOLONIAL EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE: BETWEEN MARKETING THE MARGINS AND NATIONAL PEDAGOGY

Qualifying the region as a ‘postcolonial’ space comprises a huge archive of research which also reveals a split into opposing ideological positions. In Poland, the ‘postcolonial’ self-identification started with the translation of Ewa Thompson’s book *Imperial Knowledge* (2000), in which she defines the tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union as colonial empires. A more contentious part of her book contains the claim that the high status of Russian literature in the West is a direct consequence of Russia’s imperial status, while as a matter of fact Russia’s cultural resource is ‘derivative’ and overly supportive of the imperialist thrust of Russian culture. The publication of the book coincided with the rising interest in approaching Polish literature and culture from the postcolonial perspective. Clare Cavanagh traced a manifest postcolonial/anticolonial sensibility in such writers as Czesław Miłosz. She declared that Poland is a similar postcolonial country to Ireland and characterized Poland’s absence from the map of postcolonial theory as a gaping hole (Cavanagh 2003: 61 and 63). Other studies collected comparative research on the subjection to the Soviet sphere of influence (see Kelertas 2006; Korek 2007; Bakula, Dabert and Kledzik 2015). The double position of Poland as colonial subject to the three European empires and as the colonizer in its eastern part called the Borderlands (*kresy*) developed into two separate fields of study (see Bakula 2006: 6; Gosc 2010). The recurring point of difference, accentuated by some critics, was that the European ‘colonies’ of the Soviet Union, and, before that, the Russian empire, never recognized the cultural or civilizational superiority of the ‘metropolis’, making the rhetoric of derision a substantial part of anti-colonial counter-discourse (Gosc 2016). This part of the postcolonizing venture seems to manifest the need to use postcolonial categories primarily as tools in self-definition developing against the backdrop of what Zarycki calls ‘ideologies of Eastness’, which in turn have become an object of scrutiny in postdependence studies (Gosc 2010).

The difference between readings that focus on tracing convergences between postcommunism and postcolonialism (Kołodziejczyk and Şandru 2016: 1–4) and those which define the region directly as ‘postcolonial’ may seem of minor importance. After all, both have to start from space-clearing gestures that locate central and eastern European experiences of modernity in the colonial space. But they stem from different ideological premises and pursue opposite goals. The convergence approach is geared towards a comparative thinking of the ‘posts’. It avoids ontological bounds and treats the ‘postcolonial’ qualifier strategically, as something that can modify thinking about postcommunism in a broader perspective rather than identify it and become its attribute. The second approach, in which the discursive dimension of the applied postcolonial perspective also plays an important role, harnesses the ‘postcolonial’ to identity discourse and is given a task, implicitly (national pedagogy) or explicitly, of reinforcing self-identification of the nation, apparently lacking or ‘voided’ in the aftermath of colonization. Some critics labelled this trend of postcolonizing the postcommunist space ‘conservative’ (Bill 2014: n.p.), avoiding the more risky categorization of ‘nationalist’. Nationalist or just ‘conservative’, such ontological and identitarian implementation of postcolonialism not only armed nationalist populism but also prompted it.

Dariusz Skórczewski argues that framing Polish literature in the postcolonial perspective is the best way to battle its marginalization in the world canons: ‘It’s high time to notice the need for a postcolonial optics and a chance it gives, also in relation to our literature. Until those more powerful speak for us, marginalizing our own voice again’ (Skórczewski 2007: n.p., author’s translation). On the home front, postcolonial discourse, in Skórczewski’s proposition, would be an important agent of national pedagogy (Skórczewski 2013: 98), contrary to the ‘hermeneutics of doubt’ that the author ascribes to postdependence studies (105), a research collective whose priority is to construct a translational conceptual framework for investigating histories of dependence in eastern and central Europe, and postdependence discourses produced in response to these histories, and reflecting imaginaries, visions and contradictions of transition periods.⁵ The postcolonial perspective would contribute to national pedagogy the diagnoses of complexes and afflictions that posed an obstacle to a more authentic national community, by investigating the ‘comprador elites’ under Communism, melancholies and nostalgias gnawing on the postcolonial subject founded on denied source of identity *in lieu* of the changed borders after World War II (2013: 458). It would identify manifestations of inferiority complexes of the Eastern and Central European subjects intimidated by the metropolitan West and, last but not least, trace the ‘surrogate hegemon’ that Skórczewski locates in the West. Thompson’s articulation of such colonized mentality calls for a radical decolonization:

‘The need to have a hegemon is part and parcel of contemporary Polish culture. . . . This explains the popularity of ideologies telling of the supremacy of the West and our inferiority’ (Thompson 2014: n.p., author’s translation).

National pedagogy morphs from subject/nation building mission to straightforward nationalist discourse in right-wing media. There, the national subject is restored to its authentic core, and approximated by what it is not – not politically correct, not yielding to such European fads as rainbow- and gender-ideology,⁶ not coerced into admitting ‘Islamists’ to the country⁷ and substituting ‘pedagogy of shame’ and ‘anti-patriotic revisionism’ with the proper historical politics (see Gebert 2017). The scarecrow categories constitute the core of the language war that is part and parcel of the ruling camp’s discourse in Poland now. It fosters the national subject decolonized of anything that would make it relational and dialogic, fully free to perform its unbound sovereignty.

THE SEMIOSPHERE OF DECOLONIZATION: DIVISION, REWRITING, REVERSING

The elections campaign in Poland in the summer of 2015 and the subsequent rule of the winning Law and Justice Party showed that postcolonialism has provided the right-wing populist discourse with a strong legitimating base. The new ruling camp branded itself the ‘white and red team’ implementing ‘good change’⁸ that makes it possible for the country to ‘rise from its knees’.⁹ It started from telling gestures: removing the EU flags that had accompanied the Polish flags during previous governments’ press conferences, branding such limitations to democracy as the obstruction of the Constitutional Tribunal ‘bringing order’ and ‘restoring freedom’ and retorting to the European Commission pressures to respect the rule of law with parallels to World War II German occupation of Poland (hardcore version) or caricaturing the EU as hijacked by the all-powerful political correctness, ecological craze, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rainbow mentality and mindless multiculturalism. The re-election of Donald Tusk, former Civic Platform government prime minister, for the President of the European Council in March 2017 was not only vehemently opposed by the ruling team in Poland but also represented on national media¹⁰ as the proof of the total German domination, blatant breaking of basic solidarity rules in the EU and, last but not least, the moral victory of Poland (the government here represented itself metonymically as the nation *in toto*) over those accepting their domination. Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński, in an interview for the daily *Rzeczpospolita*, reinforced his party’s key stand on the opposition as an external force: ‘It is all inscribed in the very infamous, lasting at least from the seventeenth

century onwards, tradition of national treason. . . . One can be in the opposition, but it would be good if the opposition was not supported from the outside' (Dąbrowska 2017, author's translation).

The new rhetoric puts a clear border between Europe represented as a project of modernity that has passed into the phase of manic distortion and self-destruction and Poland as soberly traditional, an adjective that apparently needs no further qualifiers. The whole opposition becomes 'leftist', because it is the only way the ruling camp may sustain the old dichotomy between communists and freedom fighters. So, the previous government of right-centre liberal Civic Platform realized the purely Marxist programme of turning Poland into a country run solely on renewable energy, and promoting the bicycle culture and vegetarianism, deeply alien to the Polish tradition, in foreign affairs minister Waszczykowski's *bon mot* (Vehlewald 2016). They have been labelled 'traitors' who 'denounce their country to the centre abroad', 'left the country in ruin' (even though the economic indices said the opposite) and 'defenceless'. Along with the 'elites' reified as 'EU grant recipients', desperately holding on to their alleged massive privileges now at peril with the onset of the new rule, the whole public sphere – opposition parties, private media, non-governmental organizations and even secular charities – have been subsumed, as the 'establishment' of postcommunism,¹¹ under the narrative of a 'setup' (probably international, if not immediately global) against 'good change'.

The politics of division into the healthy core of the nation and its alien, parasitic element, developed into a war over symbols, history and language. The postcolonial branding taken on by the nationalist right has been crucial in activating dichotomies structuring the political discourse along the 'cosmopolitans' versus 'patriots' line. This clear-cut division into the good, healthy core of the nation and the scheming, alien elites on the payroll of the foreign power (read: the EU which is but concealing the true hegemon at work, Germany, in the always lurking alliance with Russia) became the determining signifying tool of the new majority. The right-wing media had been steadily promoting the vision of the EU as a 'colonizer' and the post-1989 governments as 'acting in accordance with their foreign mandataries'¹² for years before, combining it with the deep historical narrative of the struggle for full sovereignty continued since the first partitions of the country in the eighteenth century. The ruling camp continues this narrative of incomplete national freedom as the grounds of its 'historical politics' that locates legitimacy of politics in Poland permanently in the past (Koczanowicz 2008: 132). Koczanowicz finds this 'politics of time' the key feature of postcommunism. However, while in the past the chief division line was between the post-Solidarity camp and postcommunist left, the current narrative digs deeper, to weave its total rejection of the post-1989 Poland into the grand narrative of

intermittent national insurrection. In this framework, the past quarter-century has been a continued colonization perniciously disguised as democracy and free market.

The tightly knit narrative of the nation decolonizing itself coercively sets the rules of this language game in which the postcolonial component functions through an inversed semantics to legitimate nationalism and the dismantling of institutions warranting democracy. The staunch autocratic bedrock of the ruling party determines the less disguised and strongly affective language of consolidation against the EU, betraying symptoms of a postcommunist nostalgia after etatism and cosy provinciality. The agenda of 'decolonization' provides an ideological rationale that is naturalized as historically logical, necessary and urgent.

In order to bring about the total systemic overhaul, the language politics has been designed to secure control and discipline of official statements, on the one hand, and to offer a new set of grand narratives to legitimate the process, on the other. In an uncannily parallel fashion to Orwell's *1984*, the language of power has produced so far a new vocabulary (old words gain new meanings), imposed it as a game totally on its own terms and framed its enunciatory practice within the epochal politics of time – the national struggle for sovereignty is about to complete now. The current state of affairs is, then, that of exception/emergency, and history is about to reach its *telos*. The Nation and the Sovereign (but by no means citizen) have turned into powerful empty signifiers: by relegating difference to pure negativity, the Nation/Sovereign needs to signify a radical exclusion (Laclau 1997: 39) of threatening difference. The list is long: the 'elites'; the 'migrants'; the 'Islamists'; the EU 'hypocritical democracy' and its blatant 'leftism'; unspecified 'foreign powers'; 'gender'; 'hysterical opposition' who are no less but, in Law and Justice leader Kaczyński's oracles, 'genetic traitors'; 'the worse sort'; 'the animalistic element'; 'special needs people' and 'communists' who meet with Angela Merkel during her visit to Poland in February 2017, a clear evidence of the Germans hiring the opposition against the government of good change.¹³ The opposition is not internal, as I signalled earlier, but manipulated from the outside – by the colonizing EU, in one of Kaczyński's most recent oracle-style speeches at the monthly commemorations of the catastrophe in Smoleńsk he said: 'This is an attack on Poland. Under the EU banners, but an attack on Poland. . . . They are playing the "Ode to Joy" to make it impossible for Poles to use their rights and this is symbolic'.¹⁴

The production of yet more negativity breaks in the end the differential flow of signification and makes the Nation/Sovereign the total guarantor of order, but also, concomitantly, an empty signifier founded on lack of the signified that would be other than a chain of equivalences (Laclau 1997: 42). While Laclau tends to think of empty signifiers in terms of the guarantors of

the totality of the system and the convenient discursive situations enabling the constitution of hegemony, often as a result of contingency, a postcolonially inflected Lacanian perspective is here more to the point. It is fairly easy to trace the setting up of hegemonic order in the development of a particular empty signifier, but it is far more productive to trace the many slippages of this seemingly non-differential emptiness into its reversed, subverted and anarchic undoing.

Decolonization rhetoric bolsters language politics on several levels. First, the top level of the master narrative whose chief role is to turn the political (a discursive mode) into myth (an axiomatic mode). Its chief *modus operandi* includes a prompt to rewrite history from scratch so as to secure the *raison d'être* of the systemic change – in brief, the post-1989 history has been a cover-up for the conspiracy of a narrow group of beneficiaries who traded Poland. This task is directly connected with the absolute signifier governing the master narrative: rescuing the sovereign from the state of subalternity. Second, the distribution of the political: some areas are depoliticized, which is seen in the shift from the civic (civil society as the carrier of political awareness and agency) to the social/communal (the nation as a form of non-discursive belonging by birthright), and some areas are politicized. Within this logic, the ruling camp itself does not do politics – it simply instills the historically necessary programme of ‘good change’ in the name of the Sovereign, on a higher ground than the petty (political) antagonism. And indeed, the typical strategy by the majority politicians is to occlude the political, especially where its aim is securing more power to the executive branch at the cost of local governments or the judiciary and rephrase it as commonsense administration. Third, the metonymic reduction – all terms and categories are subordinated to the appeal of the master narrative; their role is to reduce the complexity of a discursive mode of politics to a metonymic performance of several key terms along the binary set of oppositions ordered by the axis of ‘good change’ versus ‘the former setup’. The level of metonymic reduction provides a powerful reinforcement of the axiomatic mode of the master narrative.

DECOLONIZATION: PAVING THE WAY FOR DECISIONISM

The populist rhetoric mobilizing the dichotomies of us and the alien others has successfully settled the new political scene on antagonism, thus, not a space of debate any more but a battlefield between two enemies who do not share any symbolic space (Mouffe 2000: 13). The reordering of the social discursive field into the sharply delineated opposites at war was crowned by the president's dictum in winter 2016: ‘Our state has been abused, we

are treated as second-class people . . . we have the right to decide who's the friend, who's the enemy. We have the right to speak it loud, unconstrained by political correctness which leads [Europe] astray and brings it to civilizational collapse'.¹⁵ The anti-EU rhetoric serves to consolidate the nation which faces the imperative of decolonizing itself.

Decolonization premises the antagonism induced in the us/them dichotomy on the grounds of morality, in line with the Schmittian understanding of democracy: 'Not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally' (quoted in Mouffe 2000: 39). The position of moral superiority over the 'enemy', achieved through the rhetoric of decolonization, aims to cut across the field of antagonism to reach what the Sovereign is waiting for – the right decision. Already, in 2007, Jarosław Kaczyński complained about the 'impossibilism' of the executive power and 2009 Law and Justice elections programme featured a lengthy section diagnosing the state of Poland as petrified by the 'impossibilism' of 'postcommunist establishment' that is most vocally and efficiently sustained by the work of Constitutional Tribunal: 'One of the manifestations [of state impossibilism] is the hyperactivity of the Constitutional Tribunal, which has sometimes rejected, even by a narrow majority, legislation expressing the will of the majority and the effect of hard work of democratically elected state organs' ('Nowoczesna, Solidarna . . .', 13–14). After 2015, the hyperactivity disorder of the organ created to guard the constitution, and issuing its sentences on the basis of constitutionally secured majority vote, was cured effectively by the government. Since all the judicial bodies in the country and abroad saw this abrupt 'healing' as breaking the system of checks and balances, the European Commission launched the rule of law control procedure. Within the narrative framework developed by Law and Justice, the procedure 'against Poland' proves that the hegemon, the EU, must be interested in sustaining the 'impossibilism' of the Polish state to keep control over it. Prime Minister Beata Szydło tried to implement the decisionist politics at the summit in Brussels in March 2017, refusing to sign off the official record of Tusk's re-election and announcing that without her signature the re-election is not legal (Maurice 2017, n.p.). Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki confirmed the 'decisionist' line of the government politics by admitting, in an interview for *Deutsche Welle*, that law is secondary in politics. Asked by the journalist why the Law and Justice government demolishes such key state institutions as the Constitutional Tribunal, he replied: 'Security is more important, life of people is more important [than the law]'; and further, in an attempt to show that law is not always an absolute value, he stated: 'In Nazi Germany the law was very much observed' (Sebastian 2017). Symptomatically, the minister chose to ignore a very inconvenient parallel: that for Nazi Germany to implement its law, it had first to totally destroy the rule of law premised on the independent judiciary.

The empty signifier of the ‘sovereign’, underwritten by the mythic force of the nation, becomes a transcendent axiom moved away from the uncertain mires of discourse. The ruling party takes upon itself the role of plenipotentiary of the ‘Sovereign’ and its task is to retaliate any attempts to curb its freedoms, as in May 2016 when the parliament, in response to the European Commission launching the rule of law control procedure, voted a motion ‘for the defense of the Polish Republic sovereignty’, leaving the opposition rather bemused.

CONCLUSION

It is quite easy to notice the charges against core values that populist discourse represents as Europe’s suicidal drive: political correctness, multiculturalism, civic freedoms (including those connected with gender and sexuality), respect for institutions and their grounding in law that has the legitimacy to limit sovereignty (Mouffe 2000: 4). The charges are expressed mostly in the language of ridicule. Granted, Europe as ethos does not exhaust all possible meanings that this construct connotes, and its colonizing power through discourses of universalism remains an important reference. However, in the situation of the enforcement of autocracy with the help of decolonization rhetoric which I have termed ‘postcolonial backlash’, Europe changes its meaning and position and becomes counter-discourse (again) for those who have found themselves under the rule of less and less liberal, or more and more illiberal, democracy.

Just like ‘sovereignty’ reveals its tautological signification that covers up naked power, in much the same way ‘self-colonization’ is threatened by tautological circularity. In the hands of populists it may work, as I have argued, as an ethical hijack – anything borrowed is a self-inflicted colonization, obliterating, rarefying or plainly erasing the national authentic. It also premises our thinking of culture on strictly capitalist categories of ownership. Finally, it is ahistorical – it extracts interconnectedness from its complexity in economic, cultural and political dimensions and distils it to the paradigm of non-self-identity as the predicament of those societies which do not deserve better. It provides the effective weapon for the language of postcolonial backlash whose main discursive work is to reiterate the ethos of overcoming the past and secures a geo-epistemic rationale for the historical politics of dignified and always insurrectionary victimhood.

George Lakoff noticed that the ‘conservatives’ have a much more effective communication policy than the ‘progressives’ (Lakoff 2014: n.p.). In *The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist’s Guide to Your Brain and Politics* (2008), Lakoff locates, traces and theorizes the fundamental difference

between the ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ mind. He observes that the ‘conservatives’ are more assertive about resorting to the higher grounds of (their) value system than ‘progressives’ who tend to downplay their participation in the ‘progressive’ value system. If we were to resort, experimentally, to the Aristotelian classification of persuasion modes, we could see that indeed there is a possibly universal tendency for the ‘conservatives’ to rely on ‘pathos’ and the ‘progressives’ on ‘ethos’ (however, mixing the two forms of persuasion, but in reverse proportions). ‘Conservatives’ will appeal to collectively shared (or evoked through language politics) emotions, while ‘progressives’ will appeal to individually performed qualities, of which self-distance and empathy are the most characteristic. Zbigniew Janas, anti-communist dissident, sees in the transition to conservatism among young people in Poland a profound error of the politics that downplayed its political dimension and neglected the symbolic sphere: ‘The big part of the young . . . has not seen for years a flame that would move them. We have given up the street without fight. We left symbols behind’ (Smoleński 2016).

Somewhat ironically, in the onslaught of autocratic tendencies, Europe needs to reassert its ethical dimension of a ‘common dream’¹⁶ – the space of belonging and mutuality through the thick and thin of politics. Europe as ethos of commonality that postcommunist communities have always nurtured and identified with is an imaginary category holding a considerable potential, in Arjun Appadurai’s understanding of imagination as social practice (Appadurai 1996: 31 and 33). However, it has been made into a weak and self-effacing category. It can become stronger precisely as counter-discourse – a determined language operating the categories of radical democracy and the ethics of sharing. Only naming these things anew will prevent entrapment in the language game we do not want to be in: ‘Don’t think of an elephant! You’ll think of an elephant. Negating a frame reinforces the frame, makes it stronger’ (Lakoff 2014: n.p.).

NOTES

1. Considering that anti-communist opposition persisted in various forms and grades of intensity – from guerrilla wars to worker’s strikes, intellectuals’ dissidence and struggle for independent trade unions in the case of solidarity, this difference is more of a similarity.

2. See also Koczanowicz (2008: 144–47).

3. So, it is not the typical ‘denial of coevalness’ that Johannes Fabian formulated in his study of the temporal indexing in othering processes (Fabian 2014 [1983]: 32 and 35).

4. While the first right-wing Law and Justice government won the elections in 2005 by promising the departure from what it presented as rampant neoliberalism, its 2015 elections campaign was grounded on representing the EU as rampant leftism.

5. In the case of Poland, these would be the post-partitions interwar period of newly gained independence and postcommunist transition period. For postdependence studies research and publications, see <http://www.cbdp.polon.uw.edu.pl/index.html>.

6. The detrimental effects of multiculturalism, political correctness and 'rainbow ideology' have been serious concern of many Law and Justice government ministers, most notoriously of the minister Mariusz Błaszczak, who commented in a TV interview that the Nice attack was 'the effect of multiculti politics and of political correctness', and that no right conclusions were drawn from the tragedy in Paris earlier, only 'marches were organized, flowers drawn on pavements in rainbow colours, which for me is a clear reference to the LGBT' (Interview by Konrad Piasecki: 'Piaskiem po oczach', TVN24, 15 July 2016).

7. Deputy Minister Patryk Jaki revealing the reason behind the European Commission intervention into the state of rule of law in Poland stated: 'The European Commission and all these European elites in fact have one thing against us – this is at the background of this conflict – that we do not want to receive immigrants. The previous government which agreed to receive any quota of Islamists [*sic*], was pampered by European elites' (Interview on the Polish Radio, 25 May 2016).

8. 'Good change' was the presidential elections campaign slogan.

9. An important part of the 2015 elections campaign was to represent the international politics of the government of Civic Platform as that performed 'on its knees' (i.e. in total submission to the EU, Germany and Russia). In contrast, the new politics by the Law and Justice party would be that of rising from its knees. The first visit to the United States by President Andrzej Duda was represented in right-wing press as 'rising from its knees'. For example, 'Polska wstaje z kolan. Prezydent Duda podbija świat' ['Poland Rises from Its Knees. President Duda Conquers the World'], *wSieci*, <http://www.wsieci.pl/wsieci-polska-wstaje-z-kolan-pnews-2455.html>.

10. 'National media' is the official name of the former public media in Poland.

11. 'Establishment', in connection with the 'elites' is the key term attributed by the ruling team to those who are not 'common Poles'.

12. Most outspokenly, the Catholic broadcaster Radio Maryja.

13. Law and Justice politicians' Twitter reactions to Merkel's meeting with the opposition in Poland.

14. Jarosław Kaczyński's speech, 10 March 2017.

15. President Andrzej Duda speaking in Otwock, January 2016 (author's translation).

16. Europe as 'common dream' was the subject of the First Annual Tartu Conference on Russian and East European Studies, June 2016, Tartu University.

Chapter 13

Between East and West: Queerness in Zhang Yuan's *East Palace,* *West Palace*

Zoran Lee Pecic

In his highly instructive analysis of Stanley Kwan's film *Lan Yu* (2001), a film which traces the passionate and volatile relationship between two Chinese men before and after the Tiananmen Square massacre, David Eng (2010) notes that the film presents a 'space and time dissonant to conventional protocols of Western visual representation and traditional understandings of modernity' (462). The visual logic of *Lan Yu*, in which the two men appear in a series of mirrored reflections which Eng terms 'impossible spaces', offers 'a *discrepant* modernity: an alternate historical awareness, a different historical tempo and beat, a queer space and time' (462, emphasis in original). Combining the film's historical context and its queer theme, Eng argues:

Queerness in Kwan's film comes to function as a critical tool for organizing and evaluating not just the contemporary emergence of nonnormative sexualities and desires in (post)socialist China, but also, and more urgently, historical continuities and ruptures among China's (semi)colonial past, its revolutionary aspirations for a socialist modernity, and its contemporary investments in a neoliberal capitalist world order. (Eng 2010: 462)

Taking cue from Eng's highly instructive analysis of the use of mirrors in Kwan's film, I would like to narrow down this argument by looking at mirror reflections as a queer *Thirdspace*, that is, a space caught in-between two views of non-normative sexuality in China: the 'progressive' global and the 'authentic' local. In other words, I argue that the 'impossible' and paradoxical spaces in the mirror are not impossible after all – these are inhabitable, *lived* spaces in that they are occupied by the simultaneity of presence. In this chapter I look at a film which predates *Lan Yu* by five years, a film which already relies heavily on the use of mirrors and reflections. More importantly, in Zhang Yuan's *East Palace, West Palace* (1996), we find highly intricate

uses of space which inform Kwan's film and add spatiality to our discussions of queer desire in China.¹ Importantly, Zhang's film provides vital clues towards a reconceptualization of the well-established Euro-American notions of the 'developed' West and the 'developing' East. By challenging the Western modernity's ideals of individual freedom and the necessity of its public expression, the film highlights the agency found in the space in-between the supposed Western values of visibility and China's ostensible suppression of human rights, freedom and choice. By reterritorializing the space of 'China', Zhang's film offers a renewed understanding of both China and the ways China is positioned in Western discourses of modernity and progress. This way, queerness and space become tools for problematizing these discussions, offering a more nuanced ways of discussing postcolonial queer both in China and in Europe (Figures 13.1 and 13.2).



Figure 13.1. Reflection as an impossible space, *Lan Yu*.



Figure 13.2. Disconnection between lovers, *Lan Yu*.

Before I begin the discussion of the film, I would like to elaborate what I mean by the 'progressive' global and the 'authentic' local. In his controversial essay on the 'global gay' identity, Dennis Altman argues that there exist two contradictory tendencies in the articulations of homosexuality in Asia:

On the one hand, Asian gay men, by stressing a universal gay identity, underline a similarity with Westerners. Against this, on the other hand, the desire to assert an 'Asian' identity, not unlike the rhetoric of the 'Asian way' adopted by authoritarian regimes such as those of China, Indonesia, and Malaysia, may undermine this assumed solidarity. (Altman 1997: 418–19)

Altman also notes that 'the ubiquity of western rhetoric' in Asia indicates that these men 'use the language of the west to describe a rather different reality' (419). Here Altman presupposes not only an unambiguous dissimilarity between what he describes as 'western style' and 'Asian', but he also posits that Asian gay men employ the rhetoric of the 'West' as a means of viewing themselves as a part of a global gay community that ultimately supersedes any cultural differences between them. This Western rhetoric, then, is used by the 'community' to describe the encounter between the 'global' West and the 'authentic' local East. Importantly, as the earlier quote demonstrates, Altman not only reconstructs the dividing line between the East and the West – by emphasizing the gap between Asians and Westerners, but he also fails to question the meaning and the validity of both terms. Lisa Rofel is sceptical of Altman's claims for a unified global gay identity based on the self-evident notions of the West. Altman's ambivalent desire to 'to assert cultural diversity and the need to respect it while also recuperating identification in a monumentalist history of gay identity', turns not into a promotion of gay rights but in an erasure of 'diversity, articulation, and alliance with radical cultural difference' (90). Rofel argues that Altman's contention does not account for the (im)balance of power in global gay discourses:

Asianness, or a reputed claim to Asianness, can never be more than a distraction, a power move, or a distortion from the originary truths of gayness. Gay men in Asia can be either universal or Asian but not both, even as their Asianness continues to leave them in the place of otherness to global gayness. Altman's Western origin story of gay liberation places Asian gays forever in the place of deferred arrival. (Rofel 2007: 91)

Rofel dismisses the notions of the global gay community based on the self-referential tropes of 'modern', 'traditional' and 'western style', whose historical specificities are never seriously problematized. As a consequence, we can argue that by placing it in a narrative of Western liberal progress, Altman relegates Asian queerness to the 'imaginary waiting room of

history' (Chakrabarty 2007 [2000]: 8). As a response to Altman, Rofel proposes a new way of viewing non-normative sexualities in Asia where both the global *and* the local are imaginary cultural sites that are in a constant state of flux:

The local and the global are both acts of positioning, perspectives rather than merely locales, used as signifiers of difference. The local, rather than a synonym for particularity, is a *spatial* category given meaning through specific signifying practices. Similarly, the global does not exist above and beyond the cultural processes of attaching meaning to *places*. (Rofel 2007: 93, my emphasis)

Taking cue from Rofel's arguments on the global and the local as spatial categories, I would like to explore the space *in-between* these positionings.² In other words, I combine spatiality with Eng's notion of a discrepant modernity to investigate what happens in the queer space *between* the supposed localness of Chinese non-normative sexuality and the 'universality' of the global gay community. This space, I believe, provides potent means for investigating and theorizing the use of space in queer Chinese cinema, where queerness and non-normative desire is not impossible or paradoxical but that which is hybrid and lived. By exploring these spaces, I argue that the fixedness of the 'developed West' and the 'developing non-west' in terms of non-normative sexuality begins to unravel.

In *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (1996), Edward Soja argues that the social production of space is built upon three premises. First, 'spatial practice' (*Firstspace*) is the material forms of social spatiality made up of things like houses, streets and cities. Second are 'representations of space' (*Secondspace*), which is 'the space of science, planners, urbanists, technocrats, artists' (Soja 1996: 66). These two 'practices' make the foundation for the 'real' material world and the ways we interpret this reality. However, between the two realities there exist 'spaces of representation' which are the result of an interaction between Firstspace and Secondspace. This Thirdspace complicates material and mental spaces, which Soja sees as 'simultaneously real and imagined and more (both and also)': 'The exploration of Thirdspace can be described and inscribed in journeys to "real-and-imagined" (or perhaps "realandimagined"?) places' (Soja 1996: 11). Soja's conceptualization of space, I believe, offers valuable insights into the workings of Thirdspace in Zhang's film, where queerness acts not as a figure of impossibility but as a method of understanding different positionings of non-normative sexuality.

East Palace, West Palace is arguably China's first 'gay' film. The title of the film refers to the two public toilets that flank the Forbidden City – the

imperial palace just north of Tiananmen Square. While the toilets are popular gay cruising sites in Beijing, so are the city parks, such as the one in which most of the film takes place. The film centres on a conversation between one of the men in the park, A Lan, who is a writer, and Shi Xiaohua, one of the policemen whose job is to round-up and interrogate the men who cruise the premises late at night.³ During his all-night confession, A Lan reveals not only his troubled past but also his masochistic fantasies. His enchanting narrative, which is evocative of the style of Scheherazade in *One Thousand and One Nights*, mesmerizes Xiaohua, who usually enjoys interrogating suspected gay men when on night duty. As a result, the confession and the cross-examination end in the seduction of the policeman. Thus, A Lan's masochistic fantasy, in which he dreams of being 'captured' by a policeman, turns into reality (Lim 2006: 89).

It is unsurprising that some of the early reviews saw the film as a critique of the oppressive and homophobic Chinese regime.⁴ Indeed, it is hard to argue against the view that *Palace* works as an allegory of the state's relationship not only with its homosexual subjects but also with intellectuals, artists and whoever dares to question or challenge its hegemony (Berry 1998). This argument is particularly apt considering that Zhang Yuan was unable to take part in *Un Certain Regard* at the 1997 Cannes International Film Festival after the Chinese authorities seized his passport and prevented him from leaving the country. Yet Zhang's film *is* clearly a political statement. In an interview with Chris Berry, Zhang Yuan states:

Although there are many stories recorded about gays in Chinese culture, after the Liberation of 1949 and especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), the very word 'homosexual' disappeared from all newspapers, books, and even public discussion (quoted in Berry 1998: 88).

Berry points out that what lies behind 'Zhang Yuan's concern with contemporary Chinese life' is the problem of visibility and the regulation of public discourse in that it 'affects not only gays in China but also many other social groups' (Berry 1998: 87). Moreover, Harry Kuoshu (2011) notes that Zhang's comments on the visibility of homosexuality in China refer to a 'historical discontinuity and a political culture that saw homosexuality as an import from the decadent West' (179). The latter comment refers to the post-Tiananmen period of state censorship that prompted the emergence of the so-called Sixth Generation film-makers whose films place heavy emphasis on the less exposed and oftentimes invisible subjectivities placed at the margins of Chinese society. 'Their filmmaking', notes Kuoshu, 'was outside or on the margins of the state monopoly of production, drawing funds from the emerging venture capitalism in China and seeking the support of overseas funding'

(5). Importantly, Kuoshu draws comparisons between the two decades, arguing that due to the ‘heterogeneity and globalization of cultural production’ of the 1990s, as opposed to that of the previous generation, ‘these film artists were interchangeably described as “self-centered,” “marginal,” “alienated,” “embittered,” “decadent,” “nihilistic,” “carnal,” “vulgar”’ (5). The same can be said of their main object of study. The disappointed and disoriented young urban subcultures, on which the Sixth Generation films centred, were considered ‘decadent’ and culturally lacking. Significant for our discussion of *Palace*, however, is Kuoshu’s argument that, ‘When the channels for public representation of homosexuality were closed, homosexuals were hounded in everyday life as “hooligans” (*liumang*), the same name that has been given to decadent youth’ (179). The aim of pulling that which is hidden into the light is highlighted in Zhang’s statements that one of the main reasons behind the making of *Palace* was his learning of the police harassment and subsequent testing for research on AIDS to which homosexuals in Beijing were subjected:

I believe this dramatic situation and these characters are a true expression of the current circumstances gays in China live under. I interviewed many, many people, including my own friends and also sociologists who have carried out investigations of gay life in China and AIDS researchers. All the stories I heard, including those from the gay community itself, were bound by circumstances of oppression, discrimination and control. In China today, there is no visible gay culture, and no one understands gay people. (quoted in Berry 1998)

Despite Zhang’s discernable efforts to excavate hidden and silenced stories and histories, by viewing *Palace* in terms of visibility/invisibility of homosexuality in the political culture of the 1990s China, situates the film within well-accepted standards of Western modernity. In other words, the ostensible lack of individual freedom, subjectivity and agency, places the Chinese subject in the waiting room of history, whereby the subject himself or herself becomes a symbol of the still-lagging Chinese modernity, not only regarding social equality but also in terms of China’s economic, cultural and political growth. Significantly, I argue that the visibility/invisibility binary ignores the queer space that *allows* non-normative desires to emerge. For instance, the question of the silencing of non-normative voices prompts Shuqin Cui to argue that

a gay identity and homosexual life history, because of the film’s counterangle, emerge into the culture and into visual representation. In addition to the controversy caused by an openly gay subject in China, the core question . . . is how a cinematic construction subverts hegemonic discourse and brings the gay subculture into cinematic representation and public discussion. (Cui 2005: 106)

While Lim is sceptical of Cui's claims about the film's ability to subvert hegemonic discourse vis-à-vis the official ban on the dissemination and public showing of Zhang's film, he does note that 'the making of *Palace* and other underground films on homosexuality nevertheless attests to the existence, however interstitial and precarious, of both public and private spaces for the negotiation of homosexuality' (96–7). I argue that these precarious spaces in-between the public and the private are precisely the queer Third-spaces that allow us to explore queerness and non-normative desire without adhering to the polarizing discourses of modern progression and local authenticity. In other words, I argue that Zhang's film defies these perspectives and offers a renewed assessment of the complex positioning of queer Chinese sexuality. This is done with a highly sophisticated *mise-en-scène* where space is used to divide and bring together not only different characters but also, more importantly, opposing positionings (as the title of the film suggests). In Zhang's film, the policeman and the criminal, the hegemonic and the queer, the masculine and the feminine are brought together in a space where reality and fantasy intersect and where queerness resides (Figure 13.3).

About twenty minutes into *East Palace, West Palace*, after being caught kissing a man in the park, A Lan is brought to the park police station and made to squat in the middle of the police station floor in front of a standing mirror. What is constructed here is an obvious power relation between the hapless homosexual criminal, who is forced to crouch, and the menacing policeman, who circles his prey before he annihilates it. As Xiaohua is getting ready to



Figure 13.3. Bars separating the homosexual and the policeman, *Palace*.

interrogate his suspect, we see A Lan occupying the left side of the screen while his reflection in the mirror takes the right side, the thick mirror frame separating the two images. Much like the impossible spaces in Eng's analysis of *Lan Yu*, in which disconnected lovers are brought together in asymmetrical mirror images on the screen, the scene in *Palace* emphasizes the seemingly incompatible positionings of A Lan and Xiaohua. This is further highlighted in the subsequent scene which presents us with both characters seen from outside of the police station. Here, the bars on the window literally separate the two men, further accentuating their disconnectedness (figure 13.4).

While these visual cues may suggest that the relationship between the powerful and the powerless remains unyielding and resistant to change, I would like to suggest that the use of space in *Palace*, seen in the light of Soja's notion of Thirdspace, allows for a destabilization of this relationship and an upsetting of the notions of Western liberation (modernity) and local and oppressed 'tradition'. Echoing Eng, who argues that the queer space of *Lan Yu* does not 'merely constitute homosexuality as the validation of an emergent sexual identity or the affirmation of a "perverse" sexual practice' (464), I suggest that the convergence of the public and the private in this queer space is exactly the 'mode of speech' that is paramount for our investigations of the complex relationship between the state and the queer (Lim 2006: 97, emphasis in original). In *Raise the Red Lantern* (1991), a film which employs the hallmark of Fifth Generation film-making – the use of allegory and a mythical past – Zhang Yimou employs space in order to convey the main character's (Songlian) sense of estrangement and confinement in the Chen



Figure 13.4. Mirrored image of A Lan, *Palace*.



Figure 13.5. The deadly rooftops of the Chen residence, *Raise the Red Lantern*.

compound. From the wedding chamber to the courtyard to the roof tower, the *mise-en-scène* in Zhang's film highlights the claustrophobia of the residence and the ensuing captivity of the residing concubines (Firstspace). Moreover, the high walls of the residence reinforce the sense that Songlian's movements, actions and, ultimately, mental state are confined and controlled by the feudal patriarch. Tying Songlian to the compound, the spatiality of *Raise the Red Lantern* works to accentuate the oppressiveness of the patriarchal traditions of the 1920s Warlord Era China (Secondspace).

Rey Chow argues that Zhang's personification of the 'backwardness' of the feudal China in the form of the landlord who owns several concubines displays Michel Foucault's idea of the *repressive hypothesis* where sexuality (and in this case the female body) needs to be 'liberated' (1995). Thus, the walls that surround Songlian, in fact all of the compound's architecture, are in effect shackles that chain her to her marriage to Master Chen. In addition, the rooftop scene at the end of the film solidifies Songlian's imprisonment within the male residence as it heralds the death of the third mistress (Meishan) and the ensuing alienation and demise of Songlian's femininity. Zhang Yimou's film, according to Chow, constructs 'a new aboriginality' where women are

the prototype of 'the primitive' in all the ambiguities of that word – they are the bearers of the *barbaric* nature of a patriarchal system that has outlived its time and place; their abuse is a sign of China's *backwardness*; through them we come to understand the *fundamental* horror about a culture. At the same time, women's sufferings reveal a larger human *nature* that has been unjustly chained

and that seeks to be liberated; they are a kind of wronged, maligned, exploited *noble savage* whose innocence must be redeemed. (Chow 1995: 146, emphasis in original)

And although Yimou's film can be said to 'belong' to a different generation of film-makers in Chinese cinema – especially considering Yuan's status as one of the pioneers of the Sixth Generation film-making – a comparison between *Lantern* and *Palace* is nonetheless apt, in that Yuan employs allegory in his critique of state censorship and the restrictions on public discourse. However, instead of continuing in the vein similar to Yimou, only replacing the figure of the subjugated woman with that of the oppressed queer, Zhang Yuan uses spatiality to complicate and nuance the space of the queer subject, reminding us that space need not only be presented as that which is employed by the tyrannical state to subdue and control its citizens. In fact, we could argue that *Palace* makes an explicit reference to *Raise the Red Lantern* in its bird's eye perspective of the police park station. In the very first scenes of the film, as the camera pans across one of the parks, we are presented with a pond surrounded by house walls built in traditional Chinese style, while kunqu music plays in the background (as it does in *Raise the Red Lantern*). After the aptly named shot of 'Men's Room' appears among the barren and lifeless trees, we get a view of what takes place inside this ostensibly 'typical' Chinese, and highly masculine, space – A Lan is seen urinating in one of the toilet stalls after which a policemen promptly inquires as to where A Lan lives and what he does for a living. This kind of supervision and control, which takes



Figure 13.6. The claustrophobic space of the Chen compound, *Raise the Red Lantern*.

place in the most intimate spaces possible, places the marginalization of both the woman and the queer within a long history of master/state domination.⁵ However, as it becomes apparent in the subsequent scenes, the character of A Lan derails this trajectory not only by refusing to flee from the pursuing policemen but by willingly kissing Xiaohua on the cheek (much to the latter's surprise). Here, A Lan exhibits the agency which is missing in the character of Songlian. This, however, is not simply a 'reversal' of the power relation between the state and the queer. In fact, A Lan's pursuit of Xiaohua (he even sends him a diary with the inscription, 'To my Love – A Lan') creates a space in-between the two positions, subverting the repressive hypothesis of *Raise the Red Lantern* and undermining the notion that the queer subject needs to be liberated in order to be seen or heard. For A Lan is certainly not 'liberated'. In fact, in the ensuing scene he is once again being cross-examined about his behaviour in the park toilet, attesting to the 'reality' of the hardships that queer subjects undergo. This time, however, he complies with the instructions and leaves the scene peacefully. Important to note here is the addition of the persistent street noises – car horns, alarms, sirens and passing cars – which have completely replaced the kunqu music of the previous scenes. Thus, we are here witness not to the imaginary reality of A Lan's fantasy or a fetishized image of 'traditional' China but to the workings of Firstspace of Beijing, its streets, parks, traffic and the 'everyday life' that takes place here. It is within this amalgam of reality and fantasy that the confession comes into being. As we will see, this Thirdspace is neither impossible nor paradoxical; both A Lan and Xiaohua occupy positions of the ruler and the ruled, the controlling state and the restrained subject. It is the simultaneity of presence that makes both positions inhabitable. In terms of the overall argument about the representation of non-normative desires in Mainland China, we may argue that this simultaneity works as a heterotopia. That is being a place which is both a site and a counter-site (Foucault 1986: 24) it allows for more nuanced investigations of how space is used to disturb the sharply defined boundaries between visibility and oppression (Figures 13.7 and 13.8).⁶

After the noteworthy kiss-on-the-cheek scene, which leaves Xiaohua with a stupefying look on his face, A Lan begins to break open the seemingly unyielding binary between the dominator and the dominated. In fact, while it appears that the kiss was merely a means with which A Lan manages to escape the ensuing questioning, this presumption proves to be false in that he stays within the premises and begins eyeing his prey, which in this case is the light coming from the park police station.⁷ The result is evident during his second apprehension. The expression on A Lan's face – his sly smile – reveals not only contentment with the success of 'seducing' the policemen but also an awareness of the satisfaction Xiaohua receives from observing A Lan being physically intimate with another man. After being taken in



Figure 13.7. Symbol of the woman confined within the oppressive walls of patriarchy, *Raise the Red Lantern*.



Figure 13.8. The queer subject within the oppressive park walls, *Palace*.

to the police station and placed in the middle of the floor, A Lan becomes visually separated from Xiaohua by a thick window bar. Although this may suggest a disconnection between two, especially after Xiaohua's circling around the corridors of the station invokes images of state surveillance and control (Berry 1998), these will prove to be volatile. As Xiaohua begins his

questioning, a close-up of A Lan's face reveals his uneasiness at being placed in this position (we also hear Xiaohua's intimidating footsteps in the background), while the next frame highlights Xiaohua's calmness as he enjoys his late dinner and soon after begins reading a newspaper. A low-angle shot highlights the policeman's stature as a menacing force that demands answers and an explanation from the 'delinquent'. Moreover, as the policeman begins to record the confession, our bird's-eye view through the police station window intensifies A Lan's status as a lowly criminal. Significantly, a window bar completely erases A Lan from the shot, hereby removing from our view not only his presence but also his subjectivity. Thus, the Firstspace and the Secondspace of the police station appear to be repositioning Xiaohua and A Lan back towards the expected binary of powerful/powerless. However, as Lim has also shown in his analysis of A Lan's 'masochistic sexual imagination', the role of the policeman in an interrogation of a suspect/criminal is not an innocuous one, in that the confessor is complicit and integral to the confessant's revelation (Lim 2006: 92–3). And it is here that we find a 'thirding' of the film's spatial imagination (Soja 1996: 11), for the Thirdspace between the police station as an interrogation room and a confessional is that which enables a coalescence of Firstspace and Secondspace. This is seen in A Lan's kneeling posture during which he reveals his guilty conscience for deceiving his wife. Performing what looks to be the Christian sacrament of penance, A Lan appears to be fulfilling Xiaohua's expectations of a repenting sinner who knows he is in the wrong and whose sins need to be absolved. As A Lan begins to recount the narrative of his life, his story begins to resemble a traditional coming out story, which usually expresses what is 'the most momentous moment in any gay or lesbian life', refers to a 'complex process of moving from a heterosexual (and confused) identity, telling the stories of others given in childhood, to a strong, positive and accepting sense of identity as gay being given to one through awareness of the gay community in later life' (Plummer 1995: 85). The significance of this is twofold: while, on the one hand, it appears that A Lan's narrative contains elements characteristic of the coming out story, the trajectory from (heterosexual) confusion to (homosexual) clarity is disrupted, on the other hand, by the immediate revelation that A Lan is a writer, severely undermining the 'truthfulness' of his account (Figures 13.9 and 13.10).

Indeed, we are never completely certain of A Lan's position, in that his accounts are laden with snippets of childhood recollections, sexual fantasies and daily hardships. Moreover, his narrative is non-linear – A Lan's first story is that of present-day sexual encounters with his friends (The Stud, Dandy, Lily) which take place in an abandoned building. Next comes the 'Public Bus' story of his adolescence, after which he tells the story of his childhood, before recounting the story of the punishment he received from a gang of mine



Figure 13.9. A Lan eyeing his prey, *Palace*.



Figure 13.10. The park police station, *Palace*.

workers at the age of seventeen. In this complex Thirdspace, A Lan narrates, appropriates and nuances his life story, disrupting any straightforward interpretations of his queer identity. Importantly, his fusion of Firstspace realities of an interrogation and the mental Secondspace of a childhood memory creates a Thirdspace that contains elements of both. His story *is* and *is not* a coming

out narrative, for if a coming out story is ‘a tale concerned with establishing a sense of who one *really* is’ (Plummer 1995: 85–6, my emphasis), in *Palace*, we are never offered a picture of A Lan’s ‘true’ identity. This is not to say that A Lan does not claim an identity. While he positions a local cross-dresser as different – ‘He is very different from us. He never makes love with us and we leave him alone. That goes to how. He marches to a different beat’ – A Lan also emphasizes his ability to perform a gendered identity: ‘I can be a goddess or a prostitute; I can be a man or a woman. I can be whoever I want’. Here, A Lan’s becomes a storyteller, a revisionist who reappropriates and adjusts the elements of the plot to fit the story. By the means of appropriating the past and the present, he constructs an identity which is not ontological or fixed but rather adaptable and ever-changing. In fact, he employs the element of Third-space to express pride in who he is, despite Xiaohua’s continuous efforts in treating him as a criminal. Importantly, A Lan’s renewed exclamation of self-worth startles Xiaohua who feels the need to remind A Lan that he is expected to feel shame, not pride: ‘You’re crazy. Where do you think you are?’ Despite the attempt to relocate A Lan to the Firstspace of the police station, Xiaohua nevertheless finds A Lan’s narrative irresistible to such an extent that a sound of a child’s toy dropping on the ground rouses the policeman back to ‘reality’ (Figures 13.11 and 13.12).

It is at this stage of the film that we begin to discern a visible shift in power relations between the two men. The fusion of reality and fantasy within the police station is precisely the heterotopia that allows A Lan to realize his own position as a criminal in the eyes of the state and his own personal vision of



Figure 13.11. Window bar erasing A Lan from the picture, *Palace*.



Figure 13.12. Xiaohua placed on the confessional chair, *Palace*.

himself as a proud ‘gay’ man. After relating the story of how he was used and abused by a mine manager and his employees – interestingly, the manager is played by the same actor who plays Xiaohua – A Lan imagines the *kunqu* scene not as fantastical escape from his plight but as means of coping with the abuse and, most importantly, procuring agency and empowerment vis-à-vis his position as a defenceless criminal.

While his tearful and disillusioned walk on the rooftop may have suggested a concession of defeat and a possible suicide – ‘Suddenly I was aware of how much I had suffered in my life. It would have been better if I had never been born’ – the ensuing statement would prove to be a ruse, in that in the subsequent close-up shot, in which he looks almost directly into the camera with a wry smile, A Lan exclaims: ‘But this kind of experience makes life worth living’. Here, we see his drawing from his experience as a queer marginalised subject as a means of gaining agency and positioning himself vis-à-vis the powerful state that considers him corrupt or degraded: ‘What I write may be trash, but I am not’. Importantly, A Lan’s story physically displaces Xiaohua from the one who ‘oversees’ A Lan to the one being placed on the ‘confessional chair’ in the middle of the floor. In this Thirdspace, where A Lan goes from being monitored by the policeman in the beginning of the film to standing on the veranda looking in at Xiaohua towards the end, we see not only a reversal of positions but also a twofold recognition: A Lan fulfils his fantasy of being ‘taken’ by a policeman, while Xiaohua, by forcing A Lan to put on women’s clothing, realizes that his position as the powerful

policeman parallels not only that of A Lan's previous love affairs but also that of the mine manager who beat him and of the rich man who extinguished a cigarette on his chest.⁸ Here, A Lan's body works as a mirror in which Xiaohua sees his own reflection as a domineering authority. This recognition is not the result of A Lan 'pressuring' Xiaohua into intimacy, although his spellbinding tale of the female prisoner, delivered with delicate touches and seductive smiles, does entangle Xiaohua to the point of complete motionlessness. Rather, A Lan merely precipitates Xiaohua latent desires to engage in intimacy with his 'prisoner', a point already observed by Lim who notes that Xiaohua is 'not totally unaware of his role in Ah Lan's sexual imagination' (92) (Figures 13.13 and 13.14).

The film's ending, which culminates in Xiaohua's 'hose' showering A Lan in a figurative climax scene, offers a nuanced and renewed understanding of not only A Lan's agency but also the space in which such a power relation takes place.⁹ For what do we make of that and the final scene at the break of dawn, where a bewildered Xiaohua trudges on the roof of the park compound while A Lan looks on half-dressed still wearing his earrings? The scene speaks back to the final scene of Zhang Yimou's *Raise the Red Lantern*, in which Songlian wanders aimlessly around the courtyard, seemingly after having gone mad from witnessing the murder of Meishan. In *Palace*, however, it is not the defenceless woman but the supposedly authoritative policeman who appears to be at a loss. While the Chen compound in *Raise the Red Lantern* works as a symbol of the unyielding patriarchal order of the 1920s Warlord Era China, the Thirdspace of the park police station is a fluid and nuanced space that is seemingly occupied by both the oppressed and the oppressor.¹⁰ The open ending of the film embraces a more complicated view of not only the position of the queer other vis-à-vis the state, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, the ideas of the 'progressive' global homosexuality based



Figure 13.13. A Lan's wry smile, *Palace*.



Figure 13.14. A Lan's body as a mirror, *Palace*.

on visibility. Although A Lan does not seek liberation, he still takes pride in his identity, challenging and destabilizing the policeman's notions of what constitutes 'proper' sexuality. If the hegemonic political culture sees homosexuality as foreign and imported from the West (Kuoshu), A Lan subverts this view by both complying with the coming out narrative and subsequently eschewing it. A Lan defies both the global and the local perspectives by bringing in the two opposing positions in one space, exposing their interdependence. On Zhang Yimou's films, Chow writes:

The 'ethnicity' – 'Chineseness' – of Zhang's films is also a sign of a cross-cultural commodity fetishism, a production of value between cultures. Precisely because ethnic practices are theatricalized as arcane and archaic, Zhang is showing a 'China' that is at once subalternized and eroticized by the West. (Chow 1995: 170)

East Palace, West Palace, on the other hand, does not cater to a Western audience who may expect either a 'liberation' of the homosexual subject or further 'evidence' of homophobia of the Chinese regime.¹¹ Rather, Zhang Yuan's film uses space to position A Lan's queerness as local as well as global, progressive *as well as* authentic. The simultaneity of presence in *Palace* points to the instability of these very categories. This Thirdspace, I argue, allows for a reconfiguration and opening up of new methods of viewing non-normative sexuality in China and other locales deemed non-modern or local (Figures 13.15 and 13.16).



Figure 13.15. Disillusioned policeman on the police station roof, *Palace*.



Figure 13.16. Songlian gone mad, *Raise the Red Lantern*.

CONCLUSION

And how does the thirding of the film's spatiality relate to main object of study in this book, namely, postcolonial Europe? If Altman's notions of the global gay community exhibits the (neo)colonial view of culture as that which is timeless and homogenous, it also underpins the idea of the Western teleological development which, according to Cruz-Malavé and Manalansan

(2002), a ‘premodern, pre-political, non-Euro-American queerness must consciously assume the burdens of representing itself to itself and others as “gay” in order to attain political consciousness, subjectivity, and global modernity’ (5–6). *East Palace, West Palace*, on the other hand, invokes Altman’s claims in the form of a ‘Western’ representation of China as a modernity in waiting and subverts them, allowing queerness to reside in the space in-between. Similar to the manner in which the chapters in this volume exhibit the continual redefinition and renegotiation of the terms ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’, *East Palace, West Palace* exposes the tenuous underpinnings of both ‘the West’ and ‘China’. Here, I go back to Eng’s arguments on Stanley Kwan’s discrepant modernity. For if *Lan Yu* offers an impossible queer space and time, *East Palace, West Palace* shows that such spaces are not impossible at all. By highlighting the lived spaces in-between, Zhang’s film offers a renewed means for investigating Chinese queerness without adhering to polarizing discourses of the West and the East.

NOTES

1. I use the term China (rather than the Sinophone) mainly due to its relation to the production of *East Palace, West Palace* as a Mainland film. For more on the theorizations and interpretations of the Sinophone, see Shih (2007), Lu (2007) and Pecic (2016).

2. I do not want to suggest that the local and the global are fixed entities. On the contrary, by investigating what happens in the space between these positionings, we are able to destabilize both referents.

3. Interestingly, the actor playing Xiaohua (Hu Jun) also plays the role of Chen Handong, one of the lovers in *Lan Yu*.

4. Rosen, Steven (1998). ‘*Palace: Too Much Talk, Too Little Insight*’. *Denver Post*; Stuart, Jan (1998). ‘Arresting Behavior’, *The Advocate*.

5. We could argue that this kind of spacing ‘imprisons’ the woman/queer within the normative understandings of space as that of Firstspace and Secondspace. In other words, the ‘voiceless’ subject is quite expectedly denied the power of articulation.

6. On heterotopic places Foucault (1986) writes: ‘Between utopias and these quite other sites, these heterotopias, there might be a sort of mixed, joint experience, which would be the *mirror*. The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. . . . But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy’ (24).

7. The precise meaning of the light is unclear, although in this case it may represent authority and power.

8. This realization is particularly potent with regard to Xiaohua’s insistence that A Lan’s love of the rich man is abnormal and ‘despicable’.

9. The scene is more than just figurative. A Lan’s expression after Xiaohua leaves is clearly that of post-coital contentment.

10. Interestingly, while *Raise the Red Lantern* ends with a death (of the third mistress), *Palace* ends on a more positive note, with the sun rising on the horizon.

11. I should note here that the film was co-produced by Quelqu'un d'Autre Productions, a French production company, while most of its financial support came from France. See Lim (2006: 32). This, however, does not necessarily suggest that Yuan's film exhibits a 'Western' position in terms of visibility of non-normative sexuality.

Postcolonial Europe: Afterword

Gurminder K. Bhabra

The future of the European project has not looked more insecure than in 2017. It faces ongoing crises of nearly a decade of austerity, following the financial collapse in 2008, as well as the perilous situation for refugees caused, in large part, by the civil war in Syria, as well as ongoing violence in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, among other places. These crises have provoked and exacerbated populist and far-right political responses, scapegoating migrants, refugees and minorities, and increasingly calling the very European project of integration into question through the reaffirmation of atavistic nationalisms. Europe now also has to deal with the very real prospect of Britain leaving the European Union (EU), or more simply, Brexit. The challenges posed to the stability and continuance of the post-war European project are immense and likely to be compounded in the near future depending on how the votes go later in 2017 in France and Germany, with the very real prospect, at least, of further disruptive consequences.

The decade-long politics of austerity across Europe has led to the decline of the welfare or social settlement with increasing levels of inequality across the continent. The rise in poverty is a direct consequence of the promotion of neoliberal policies in preference to policies aimed at the reduction of social and economic inequalities. These problems, however, have also been discussed in the context of the perceived rise of multiculturalism, which is seen to undermine the civic solidarity necessary for social welfare policies. Instead of raising concerns against those who have disproportionately profited from the neoliberal agenda, frustrations have been directed against the idea of 'others' coming to take from 'us'. This is particularly so in relation to the crisis for refugees, where politicians and the media have been arguing against helping 'others' when there are such immense problems 'at home'. As Peo Hansen (2016) argues, however, the looming demographic crisis in Europe

means that the acceptance of refugees, on purely economic grounds, would do more to address austerity than is commonly accepted. But, as was demonstrated in the debates in the lead up to the UK referendum on leaving the EU, racist and xenophobic discourses play well in our current times notwithstanding the arguments against them (see Bhambra 2017a; Holmwood 2017).

Our political times are turbulent not just in and around our continent, but across the water with the election of Donald Trump and around the world with the ongoing authoritarianisms of Modi, Erdogan, Putin and Duterte, among others. These political machinations are underpinned by sustained campaigns against expertise and the promotion of ideas of post-truth and alternative facts. In the midst of all this, what does it mean to speak of Europe, the European project and, more specifically, a postcolonial Europe? How might this conceptualization provide a framework for understanding these events and a means of exerting some control over them?

Postcolonial Europe, as I have argued previously, is the Europe that disappears from view in the standard narratives that present either cosmopolitan accounts of Europe or nationalist ones (see Bhambra 2009, 2011, 2016, 2017b). Whatever their other differences, both cosmopolitan and nationalist perspectives on Europe put forward a history of Europe as one constituted by nation-states. In one approach, nation-states have converged on a set of civic and political values that facilitate cooperation; in the other, states embody the aspirations of an *ethnie* that risks dilution. For cosmopolitans, the European project is seen as the bringing together of nation-states into a newly established transnational federation. Yet the majority of European states that constituted the European project in its early iterations were already transnational entities, that is imperial states and not nation-states. Ethno-nationalists frequently claim national rights in a context where their sense of destiny is formed in the knowledge of the domination of others and they are unwilling to accept confederations based on a sovereignty of equal political entities.

What does it mean to erase this colonial history from our understandings of Europe?

One consequence is that multiculturalism in Europe – understood in the most basic sense of people who look different living alongside each other – is often believed to have begun with the movement of darker peoples into European states. Thus, Habermas's association of multiculturalism, for example, with what he calls 'postcolonial immigrant societies' (2009: 65) demonstrates a parochial understanding that limits the 'postcolonial' to those 'others' who migrate to Europe. In the process, he renders invisible the long-standing histories that connect those migrants with Europe. As Adam Elliott-Cooper (2015) asks, in the context of contemporary debates in Britain, and it is a question that can be addressed to cosmopolitans and nationalists alike, 'When did we come to Britain? You must be mistaken, Britain came to us'. Europeans from

other countries may substitute their own country in place of Britain. In light of this, I argue for the need to understand Europe itself as postcolonial, not in the sense of being beyond colonialism but as a need to understand its colonial history as constitutive of its generally regarded cosmopolitan present.

European empires created empirically multicultural societies through their modes of expansion, conquest, dispossession and appropriation but appear to forget this history in the context of political projects reliant on a narrative of a purely national past. In this way, the issues that reference to the 'postcolonial' signifies are seen as beginning with immigration and carried by the non-European 'other'. The effacing of multicultural others from the history of Europe also makes their place within contemporary politics more precarious. This is because they are not seen to belong historically to Europe, either to the nation-states that are seen to constitute it or to the civilizational project that it is presented as being. Acknowledging only diversity *between* states and not accounting for the diversity *within* states precisely demonstrates the Eurocentred particularism at the heart of the cosmopolitan European project as delineated by Beck (2012) and Habermas (2012). In this way, narratives, which elide the historical connections of empire and seek to maintain a distinction between a national state forging new relations of cooperation and equality and imperial colonies that belong to the past, underpin contemporary political discourses on citizenship and belonging.

The question of how boundaries are constructed – both historical and contemporary, and between (legitimate) citizens and (illegitimate) migrants – is precisely what is at issue in effecting a postcolonial historiographical turn in understandings of the EU. While this turn may be relatively recent, the arguments made within it are not, even if they have had insufficient purchase within the academy and more broadly. The self-understanding of Europe has traditionally sought to make colonialism the past property of the individual states – that are mysteriously also understood as nation-states, and not imperial states – that went on to constitute it. There are at least two errors in such an assumption. The first is that the countries that came to constitute the European Economic Community (EEC) and then eventually the EU were not, for the most part, nations, but rather empires with not only colonial histories but also colonial presents at the moment of European integration.

All the original members of the EEC, for example, were imperial formations of one sort or another. The political boundaries of France included Algeria as well as other colonies in Africa. Italy included parts of Somaliland; Belgium included the Congo; and the Netherlands included West Papua, Suriname and a number of Caribbean islands. Luxembourg had been part of the German Zollverein and from 1921 was in a colonial economic union with Belgium. With the subsequent accession of Spain, Britain and Portugal, the idea that it was nation-states that were joining together is demonstrated as a

clear fiction given the imperial histories of these countries and the overseas territories that they also brought with them. The European project, then, was established by the coming together of colonial and imperial states and yet colonialism is rarely mentioned in discussions of it.

The second error is the idea that colonialism was not also a phenomenon that was integral to the European project, as Hansen and Jonsson (2014a, b) have convincingly demonstrated it to be. As they argue, the post-war negotiations, which ultimately led to the establishment of the EEC, were predicated on the idea of ‘bringing Africa as a “dowry to Europe”’, that is Africa’s natural resources – its land, labour and markets – were seen to be available for the European project. Not only were the African colonies of European states unquestioningly put at the service of the incipient European project, but there was a stronger statement ‘that Europe’s unification could succeed only if it also was fashioned as a joint colonization of Africa’ (Hansen and Jonsson 2013: 11; see also Garavini 2012). A version of this understanding was subsequently enshrined in the conventions of Yaoundé and then Lomé that institutionalized Africa’s dependency and have maintained forms of neo-colonial relations with Europe ever since (Martin 1982).

As such, the European project cannot be understood outside of its own colonial ambitions and intent. Taking the colonial constitution of Europe as the starting point, and acknowledging how Europe’s posited others have always been very much a part of Europe’s broader imperial histories enable us to think differently about (postcolonial) Europe in the present. Not taking into account the colonial constitution of European states within dominant discourses of the EU means that however cosmopolitan understandings of the EU may be in their orientation or intention, they nonetheless contribute significantly to the construction of narrow identities and policies mobilized by atavistic nationalisms in the present as demonstrated in the Brexit debates and more generally across Europe.

The standard narrations of European history have consequences for politics in the present; the histories we highlight and those we silence matter in the shaping of politics and the concepts we use in politics. Specifically, the failure properly to account for Europe’s colonial past cements the political division between citizens with rights and migrants and refugees without rights and without even the basis to claim rights. If belonging to the history of the nation is what traditionally confers rights upon individuals (as most forms of citizenship demonstrate), then it is incumbent upon us to recognize the wider histories that would see migrants/refugees as already having claims upon the states they wish to enter. It is this that would enable different ways of addressing the crises that we currently face.

The multiple crises facing the European project cannot be addressed by a simple policy of ‘more Europe’ – a stronger EU – especially as expansive,

neo-colonial Europe itself could be regarded as responsible for their generation (Beck and Grande 2007). What has been termed the 'refugee crisis', but is more appropriately understood as a crisis for refugees, has been produced in no small part through the sale of European-produced armaments and armoury to regimes in the Middle East and further afield. If we do not wish refugees at our borders, then one thing that could be done is to lobby our governments to end their complicity in producing the situations that create refugees. People rarely choose to become refugees, rather, refugees are produced in circumstances usually beyond the simple control of citizens – war, famine and destruction.

It is this vulnerability to such extreme events that led the international community, in the post-war period, to establish norms of how to support those seeking refuge and asylum. These norms were codified in the International Declaration of Human Rights and are also a core constituent part of the European Convention of Human Rights. They further came to symbolize the moral centre of the European project itself, given its emergence out of a history of two world wars and the first recognized genocide on European soil. In the light of the historical numbers of people seeking to exercise their rights to claim refuge in Europe, the media, politicians and even some academics have begun to question whether Europe can maintain its commitments to human rights. This despite the fact that Europe, as the richest continent on the planet, takes in fewer than 5 per cent of the world's refugee population. Indeed, the oft-called 'refugee crisis' is the label given to the arrival of people in Europe who, together, constitute fewer than 0.26 per cent of the total population of Europe. Contrast that, for a moment, with the figures for Lebanon where refugees constitute about 20 per cent – that is one-fifth – of the total population of the country (1.2 million refugees with a national population of 4.5 million).

It is no wonder, then that, in 2016, Pope Francis, on receiving the Charlemagne prize for his work on behalf of European solidarity, was compelled to ask: 'What has happened to you, the Europe of humanism, the champion of human rights, democracy and freedom?' Even if we challenge the associations made by the Pope between Europe's proclaimed values and its practices, it is salutary to note that very few of Europe's mainstream public intellectuals have spoken out about the crisis for refugees. While scholars such as Habermas have expressed concern about the growing economic inequality within and across European states, for example, they have said little about the refugee crisis or the increasing hostility towards migrants and those presented as 'multicultural others' across Europe.

This silence, I suggest, is not an individual lapse but is systematically produced in the failure to think through the connected sociologies of empire and colonialism at the heart of Europe and European conceptions of citizenship. It is embodied in the very silencing of 'Postcolonial Europe' that this volume seeks to uncover.

References

- A.N. 2010a. La rivolta nera di RosarnoVessati dalla 'ndrangheta. *La Stampa*, 8 January. <http://www.lastampa.it/2010/01/08/italia/cronache/la-rivolta-nera-di-rosarno-vessati-dalla-ndrangheta-HMAvvPeo1OC6blkYuW8JFL/pagina.html>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- . 2010b. Ruby: 'Silvio come la Caritas ripudiata perché cattolica'. *La Repubblica*, 29 October. <http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2010/10/29/news/ruby-8560584/>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- . 2010c. Yara, il parroco di Brembate Sopra: rinfaccio al Signore il suo silenzio. *L'Eco di Bergamo*, 8 December. http://www.ecodibergamo.it/stories/Cronaca/172756_don_corinno_scotti/. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- . 2011. Yara Gambirasio omicidio Enrico Tironi confessione nella memory-flash. *Corsera Magazine*, 16 March. <http://www.corsera.it/notizia.php?id=3712>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- . 2013. Morocco Cancels War Games with US over Rights. *USA Today*, 16 April. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/04/16/morocco-cancels-war-games-with-us-over-rights/2089089/>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- . 2015 Independence on Ice. *The Economist*, 21 January. <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21640224-falling-crude-prices-are-forcing-green-land-put-plans-split-denmark-independence-ice>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Agamben, Giorgio. 1990. *La comunità che viene*. Torino: Einaudi.
- Aggad-Clerx, Faten. 2013. France: Out of Africa and back? *Al Jazeera*, 16 December. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/france-out-africa-back-20131214112634946877.html>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Akasoy, Anna. 2010. Convivencia and Its Discontents: Interfaith Life in Al-Andalus. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42 (3): 489–99.
- Akin, Fatih (Director). *Kurz und Schmerzlos*. Hamburg: Wüste Filmproduktion.
- Alasia, Franco and Danilo Montaldi. 2010. *Milano, Corea. Inchiesta sugli immigrati (revised and extended)*. Rome: Donzelli.

- Alcantud, José A. González. 2002. *Lo moro. Las lógicas de la derrota y la formación del estereotipo islámico*. Barcelona: Anthropos.
- Allen, Rose Mary. 2007. Afro-Curaçaoan Life and Culture Prior to Emancipation. In ———. *Di Ki Manera? A Social History of Afro-Curaçaoans, 1863–1917*, 63–100. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SWP.
- Almeida, Miguel Vale de. 2000. *Um Mar da Cor da Terra: Raça, Cultura e Política da Identidade*. Oeiras: Celta.
- . 2004. *An Earth-Colored Sea. 'Race', Culture and the Politics of Identity in the Post-Colonial Portuguese-Speaking World*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- . 2006. Comentário. In *Portugal não é um país pequeno. Contar o império na pós-colonialidade*, ed. Manuela Ribeiro Sanches, 359–67. Lisbon: Cotovia.
- Altman, Dennis. 1997. Global Gaze/Global Gays. *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 3 (4): 417–36.
- Amar, Ali and Jean-Pierre Turquoi. 2012. *Paris-Marrakech: Luxe, pouvoir et réseaux*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
- Andersen, Astrid, Kirsten Hvenegård-Lassen and Lars Jensen. 2016. Qullissat: Historicising and Localising the Danish Scramble for the Arctic. In *Postcolonial Perspectives on the European High North. Unscrambling the Arctic*, eds. Graham Huggan and Lars Jensen, 93–116. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1991 [1983]. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Antze, Paul and Michael Lambek, eds. 1996. *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory*. London: Routledge.
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
- Appama, Priscilla R. 2008. Mobutu. In *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures. Continental Europe and Its Empires*, eds. Prem Poddar, Rajeev S. Patke and Lars Jensen, 41–42. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Araújo, Marta. 2016. A Very 'Prudent Integration': White Flight, School Segregation and the Depoliticization of (Anti-)Racism. *Race Ethnicity and Education* 19 (2): 300–23.
- Araújo, Marta and Silvia Rodríguez Maeso. 2012. History Textbooks, Racism and the Critique of Eurocentrism: Beyond Rectification or Compensation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35 (7): 1266–85.
- Arbi, Adil El and Bilal Falah (Directors). 2015. *Black*. Utrecht and Brussels: Dutch Filmworks B. V. and Kinepolis Film Distribution.
- Arens, Sarah. 2015. Les géographies transculturelles et postcoloniales: Bruxelles dans les écritures de Mina Oualldhadj et de Pie Tshibanda. *Textyles: Revue des lettres belges de langue française* 47: 159–74.
- . 2016. De Mobutu à Matonge: la littérature contemporaine de la diaspora congolaise. In *Créer en postcolonie. Voix et dissidences belgo-congolaises*, eds. Sarah Demart and Gia Abrassart, 225–32. Brussels: Bozar Books.
- Arhin, Antonela. 2013. Roma in Canada: Migratory Trends, Issues and Perceptions. In *Roma Migration to and From Canada: The Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak Case*, ed. V. Zsuzsanna, 53–86. Budapest: Center for Policy Studies, Central European University.
- Asad, Talal. 2007. *On Suicide Bombings*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ashcroft, Bill. 2009. Alternate Modernities: Globalisation and the Postcolonial. *ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature* 40 (1): 81–105.

- Assmann, Aleida and Linda Shortt, eds. 2012. *Memory and Political Change*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Bâ, Amadou Hampaté. 1972. *Aspects de la civilisation africaine*. Paris: Présence Africaine.
- . 1973. *L'Etrange destin de Wangrin*. Paris: Union Général d'Éditions 10/18.
- Bakula, Bogusław. 2006. Kolonialne i postkolonialne aspekty polskiego dyskursu kresoznawczego. *Teksty Drugie* 6: 11–33. Warsaw: Publishing House of the Institute of Literary Research, Polish Academy of Sciences.
- . 2015. *Comparisons and Contexts: Essays on Central-Eastern European Literature and Culture*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo 'Bonami'.
- , eds. 2015. *Dyskurs postkolonialny we współczesnej literaturze i kulturze Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo 'Bonami'.
- Baldwin, James, Emile Capouya, Lorraine Hansberry, Nat Hentoff, Langston Hughes and Alfred Kazin. 1961. The Negro in American Culture. *CrossCurrents* 11 (3): 205–24.
- Balibar, Étienne. 2007. La costruzione del Razzismo. In *Differenza razziale, discriminazione e razzismo nelle società multiculturali. Società multiculturale e questioni razziali*, vol 1, eds Thomas Casadei and Lucia Re, 49–67. Reggio Emilia: Diabasis.
- Bancroft, Angus. 2001. Closed Spaces, Restricted Places: Marginalization of Roma in Europe. *Space and Polity* 5 (2): 145–57.
- Banfield, Edward C. 1958. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Glencoe: The Free Press.
- Banivanua-Mar, Tracey. 2007. *Violence and Colonial Dialogue: The Australian-Pacific Indentured Labour Trade*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Bárány, Zoltan D. 2002. *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.
- Bardi, Abby. 2006. The Gypsy as Trope in Victorian and Modern British Literature. *Romani Studies* 16 (1): 31–42.
- Bargados, Alberto López. 2000. Ces orgueilleux seigneurs du désert saharien: images coloniales et postcoloniales des Sahraouis en Espagne. *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 39: 363–77.
- Barrett, Richard, Jack Berger, Lila Ghosh, Daniel Schoenfeld, Mohamed el-Shawesh, Patrick M. Skinner, Susan Sim and Ali Soufan, 2015. Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq. December. http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf. [Accessed 5 December 2016].
- Bastos, José P. 2007. Que futuro tem Portugal para os portugueses ciganos? *CEMME – Centro de Estudos de Migrações e Minorias Étnicas*. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/37452642/Que-futuro-tem>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Beck, Ulrich. 2012. The European Crisis in the Context of Cosmopolitization. *New Literary History* 43 (4): 641–63.
- and Edgar Grande. 2007. Cosmopolitanism: Europe's Way Out of Crisis. *European Journal of Social Theory* 10 (1): 67–85.
- Bekers, Elisabeth. 2009. Chronicling beyond Abyssinia: African Writing in Flanders, Belgium. In *Transcultural Modernities: Narrating Africa in Europe*, eds. Elisabeth Bekers, Sissy Helff and Daniela Merolla, 57–69. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

- Bello, Walden. 2013. *Capitalism's Last Stand?* London: Zed Books.
- Benjamin, Walter. 2012. The Task of the Translator, trans. Steven Rendall. In *The Translation Studies Reader*, ed. Lawrence Venuti, 15–25. London: Routledge.
- Berriane, Mohamed. 2004. El Rif y la Oriental: segundo foco de la emigración marroquí hacia España. In *Atlas de la inmigración marroquí en España*, eds. Bernabé López García and Mohamed Berriane, 154–58. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.
- Berry, Chris. 1996. Zhang Yuan: Thriving in the Face of Adversity. *Cineyama* 32: 40–3.
- . 1998. *East Palace, West Palace*: Staging Gay Life in China. *Jump Cut* 42: 84–9.
- Berton, Pierre. 1988. *The Arctic Grail the Quest for the North West Passage and the North Pole, 1818–1909*. New York: Viking.
- Bevilacqua, Piero. 1993. *Breve storia dell'Italia meridionale dall'800 a oggi*. Rome: Donzelli.
- Beyala, Calixthe. 1996. *Les Honneurs perdus*. Paris: Éditions Albin Michel.
- Bhambra, Gurinder K. 2009. Postcolonial Europe: Or, Understanding Europe in Times of the Postcolonial. In *Sage Handbook of European Studies*, ed. Chris Rumford, 69–85. London: Sage.
- . 2011. Cosmopolitanism and Postcolonial Critique. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism*, eds. Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka, 313–28. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- . 2016. Whither Europe? Postcolonial versus Neocolonial Cosmopolitanism. *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 18 (2): 187–202.
- . 2017a. Locating Brexit in the Pragmatics of Race, Citizenship and Empire. In *Brexit: Sociological Responses*, ed. William Outhwaite, 91–9. London: Anthem Press.
- . 2017b. 'Our Island Story': The Dangerous Politics of Belonging in Austere Times. In *Austere Histories in European Societies: Social Exclusion and the Contest of Colonial Memories*, eds. Stefan Jonsson and Julia Willen, 21–37. London: Routledge.
- Bhattacharya, Baidik and Neelam Srivastava, eds. 2012. *The Postcolonial Gramsci*. London: Routledge.
- Bill, Stanley. 2014. Seeking the Authentic: Polish Culture and the Nature of Postcolonial Theory. *nonsite.org* 12: n.p.
- Bini, Elisabetta. 2003. *Fonti fotografiche e storia delle donne: la rappresentazione delle donne nere nelle fotografie coloniali italiane*. Lecce: SISSCO Società Italiana per lo Studio della Storia Contemporanea.
- Anders A. Bjørk, Kurt H. Kjær, Niels J. Korsgaard, Shfaqat A. Khan, Kristian K. Kjeldsen, Camilla S. Andresen, Jason E. Box, Nicolaj K. Larsen and Svend Funder, 2012. An Aerial View of 80 Years of Climate-Related Glacier Fluctuations in Southeast Greenland. *Nature Geoscience*: 10.1038/NGEO1481. http://www.nature.com/ngeo/journal/v5/n6/full/ngeo1481.html?WT.ec_id=NGEO-201206. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Björkstén, Karin Sparring, Peter Bjerregaard and Daniel E. Kripke. 2004. Suicides in the Midnight Sun – a Study of Seasonality in Suicides in West Greenland. *Psychiatry Research* 133 (2–3): 205–13.

- Blanchard, Pascal, Nicolas Bancel and Sandrine Lemarie. 2005. *La Fracture coloniale. La société française au prisme de l'héritage colonial*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Blanco, María del Pilar and Esther Peeren, eds. 2013. *The Spectralities Reader: Ghosts and Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Blazan, Sladja. 2007. Welcoming Ghosts. In *Ghosts, Stories, Histories: Ghost Stories and Alternative Histories*, ed. Sladja Blazan, 1–19. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Boehmer, Elleke and Sarah de Mul. 2012a. Introduction: Postcolonialism and the Low Countries. In *The Postcolonial Low Countries. Literature, Colonialism and Multiculturalism*, ed. ———, 1–22. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- . 2012b. *The Postcolonial Low Countries. Literature, Colonialism and Multiculturalism*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Bonavita, Riccardo. 2010. *Spettri dell'altro. Letteratura e razzismo nell'Italia contemporanea*. Bologna: il Mulino.
- Bonfiglioli, Chiara. 2010. Intersezioni di razzismo e sessismo nell'Italia contemporanea. Una cartografia critica dei recenti dibattiti femministi. *DWF – Modelli femminili* 3–4: 87–88.
- Bottez, Monica, Maria-Sabina Draga Alexandru and Bogdan Ștefănescu. 2011. *Postcolonialism/Postcommunism: Intersections and Overlaps*. București: Editura Universității din București.
- Boyd, Colleen E. and Coll Thrush, eds. 2011. *Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence: Native Ghosts in North American Culture and History*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Boym, Svetlana. 2002. *The Future of Nostalgia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bragard, Véronique. 2011. Indépendance! The Belgo-Congolese Dispute in the Tervuren Museum. *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 9 (4): 93–104.
- Brass, Tinto. 1979. *Io, Caligola*, Film Italy/USA.
- Bravo, Luciano Ferrari and Alessandro Serafini. 2007. *Stato e sottosviluppo. Il caso del Mezzogiorno italiano*. Verona: Ombre Corte.
- Bristol, Keir. 2014. On Moya Bailey, Misogynoir and Why Both Are Important. The Visibility Project. <http://www.thevisibilityproject.com/2014/05/27/on-moya-bailey-misogynoir-and-why-both-are-important/>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Britton, Celia and Richard Philcox. 2006. Frantz Fanon: Retrieving a Lost Voice. *The Translation Review* 71: 3–7.
- Brown, Wendy. 2006. Subjects of Tolerance: Why We Are Civilized and They Are the Barbarians. In *Political Theologies. Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*, eds. Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan, 298–317. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Brugioni, Elena. 2011. Old Empires, New Cartographies: Problematizing 'Lusophone Categorizations'. In *Europe in Black and White. Immigration, Race, and Identity in the 'Old Continent'*, eds. Manuela Ribeiro Sanches, Fernando Clara, João Ferreira Duarte and Leonor Pires Matins, 199–208. Bristol, UK/Chicago: Intellect Book.
- . 2013. Contiguidades Ambíguas. Crítica Pós-colonial e Literaturas Africanas. In *Nação e Narrativa Pós-Colonial I – Angola e Moçambique: Ensaios*, eds. Ana Mafalda Leite, Hilary Owen, Rita Chaves and Livia Apa, 379–94. Lisbon: Colibri.

- and Marie-Manuelle Silva. 2013. Cartographies et itinéraires postcoloniaux. Langues, communautés et imaginaires. Repenser la communauté de langue portugaise à partir du débat au sein de la francophonie. *REFLEXOS – Reveu Pluridisciplinaire du Monde Lusophone* 2: n.p.
- Brugioni, Elena, Joana Passos, Andreia Sarabando and Marie-Manuelle Silva, eds. 2012. *Itinerâncias. Percursos e Representações da Pós-colonialidade/ Journeys. Postcolonial Trajectories and Representations*. Vila Nova de Famalicão: Húmus.
- Buchowski, Michał. 2006. The Specter of Orientalism in Europe: From Exotic Other to Stigmatized Brother. *Anthropological Quarterly* 79 (3): 463–82.
- Burgers, Jack. 1996. No Polarisation in Dutch Cities? Inequality in a Corporatist Country. *Urban Studies* 33 (1): 99–105.
- Butler, Judith. 2010a. *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* London: Verso.
- . 2010b. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. London: Verso.
- and Gayatri C. Spivak. 2007. *Who Sings the Nation-State? Language, Politics, Belonging*. London/New York/Calcutta: Seagull Books.
- Butter, Ewoud. 2011. Wat Helpt Tegen Polarisatie En Radicalisering. <https://ewoudbutter.wordpress.com/2011/05/28/wat-helpt-tegen-polarisatie-en-radicalisering/>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Cameron, Emilie. 2008. Indigenous Spectrality and the Politics of Postcolonial Ghost Stories. *Cultural Geographer* 15 (3): 383–93.
- Candel, Francisco. 2008. *Els altres catalans*. Barcelona: Edicions 62.
- Capussotti, Enrica. 2010. Nordisti contro sudisti: Internal Migration and Racism in Turin, Italy: 1950s and 1960s. *Italian Culture* 28 (2): 121–38.
- Cassano, Franco. 2012. *Southern Thought and Other Essays on the Mediterranean*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Castelo, Cláudia. 1999. 'O Modo Português de estar no Mundo'. *O luso-tropicalismo e a ideologia colonial portuguesa (1933–1961)*. Oporto: Afrontamento.
- Castryck, Geert. 2010. Whose History Is History? Singularities and Dualities of the Public Debate on Belgian Colonialism. In *Being a Historian: Opportunities and Responsibilities, Past and Present*, ed. Sven Mörsdorf, 1–18. Pisa: CLIOHRES.net.
- Cavanagh, Clare. 2003. Postkolonialna Polska. Biała plama na mapie współczesnej teorii. *Teksty Drugie* 2–3: 60–71. Warsaw: Publishing House of the Institute of Literary Research, Polish Academy of Sciences.
- . 2004. Postcolonial Poland. *Common Knowledge* 10 (1): 82–92.
- Cervelló, Josep. 1999. A Matança de Batepá. *História* 21 (20): 26–37.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2007 [2000]. *Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chambers, Iain. 2008. *Mediterranean Crossings. The Politics of an Interrupted Modernity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Chari, Shara and Katherine Verdery. 2009. Thinking between the Posts: Postcolonialism, Post-socialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51 (1): 6–34.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 2004. *The Politics of the Governed*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Cherry, Peter. (2017). 'I'd rather My Brother Was a Bomber than a Homo': British Muslim Masculinities and Homonationalism in Sally El Hosaini's *My Brother the Devil*. *Journal of Commonwealth Literature*, (online first): 1–14.
- Chow, Rey. 1995. *Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 2012. Protecting Canada's Immigration System. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/reform.asp>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Clua i Faine, Montserrat. 2011. Catalan, Immigrants and Charnegos: 'Race', 'Cultura' and 'Mixture' in Catalan Nationalist Rhetoric. *Revista Antropologia Social* 20: 55–75.
- Cohen, Cathy J. 1997. Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics? *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 3 (4): 437–65.
- Cohen, Stanley. 1972. *Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*. London: MacGibbon and Kee Ltd.
- Cole, Jennifer and Christian Groes. 2016. *Affective Circuits: African Migrations to Europe and the Pursuit of Social Regeneration*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Colmeiro, José. 2011. A Nation of Ghosts?: Haunting, Historical Memory and Forgetting in Post-Franco Spain. *452°F. Electronic Journal of Theory of Literature and Comparative Literature* 4: 17–34.
- Colpani, Gianmaria. 2015. Omonazionalismo nel Belpaese? In *Il colore della nazione*, ed. Gaia Giuliani, 186–99. Firenze-Milano: Le Monnier/Mondadori Education.
- Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff. 2012. *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving toward Africa*. London: Paradigm.
- Commission against Racism and Intolerance. 2013. *ECRI Fourth Report on the Netherlands 2013*. Strasbourg: ECRI Secretariat Directorate General II – Democracy, Council of Europe.
- Conelli, Carmine. 2018 (Forthcoming). Back to the South. Revisiting Gramsci's *Southern Question* in the Light of Subaltern Studies. In *Past and Present. New Insights into Gramsci's Philosophical, Historical, and Political Thought*, eds. Francesca Antonini, Lorenzo Fusaro, Aaron Bernstein and Robert Jackson. Leiden: Brill.
- Connell, Raewyn. 2007. *Southern Theory. The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Corossacz, Valeria Ribeiro. 2013. L'intersezione tra razzismo e sessismo. Strumenti teorici per un'analisi della violenza maschile contro le donne nel discorso pubblico sulle migrazioni. *Antropologia* 15: 109–29.
- Corrales, Eloy Martín. 2002. *La imagen del magrebí en España. Una perspectiva histórica siglos XVI-XX*. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra.
- Council of Europe (COE). 2012. *Human Rights of Roma and Travelers in Europe*. Commissioner for Human Rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publications.
- Couto, Mia. 1994. Gerar futuro e não gerir saudade. *Jornal de Letras, Artes e Ideias*, 22 (June): xxiv.
- . 2007. Desmontando e reconstruindo a ideia de Lusofonia. *SAVANA* 29 (June 29).

- Craps, Stef. 2013. Mid-Mourning in David Dabydeen's 'Turner' and Fred D'Aguiar's *Feeding the Ghosts*. In *Postcolonial Witnessing: Trauma out of Bounds*, ed. Stef Craps, 60–71. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Craveri, Marcelo. 1989. *The Life of Jesus*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann. Rome: Ecco Pr.
- Croce, Benedetto. 2006. *Un paradiso abitato da diavoli*. Milan: Adelphi.
- Cruz-Malavé, Arnaldo and Martin F. Manalansan. 2002. Introduction: Dissident Sexualities/Alternative Globalisms. In *Queer Globalizations: Citizenship and the Afterlife of Colonialism*, eds. Arnaldo Cruz-Malavé and Martin F. Manalansan, 1–10. New York: New York University Press.
- Csepeli, György and Dávid Simon. 2004. Construction of Roma Identity in Eastern and Central Europe: Perception and Self-identification. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30 (1): 129–50.
- Cui, Shuqin. 2005. Working from the Margins: Urban Cinema and Independent Directors in Contemporary China. In *Chinese-Language Film: Historiography, Poetics, Politics*, eds. Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Y. Yeh, 96–119. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Curcio, Anna. 2014. Sud, razzializzazione e ordine sociale nell'Europa della crisi. In *Briganti o emigranti. Sud e movimenti tra ricerca e studi subalterni*, ed. Orizzonti Meridiani, 60–9. Verona: Ombre Corte.
- and Miguel Mellino, eds. 2010. *Race at Work – the Rise and Challenge of Italian Racism. Darkmatter: In the Ruins of Imperial Culture* 6. URL: <http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2010/10/10/editorial-race-at-work-the-rise-and-challenge-of-italian-racism>
- Dąbrowska, Szuldrzyński. 2017. Jarosław Kaczyński: Unia Europejska została zdominowana przez jedną osobę. *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 March. <http://www.rp.pl/Rzecz-o-polityce/303149852-Jaroslaw-Kaczynski-Unia-Europejska-zostala-zdominowana-przez-jedna-osobe.html#ap-1>. [Accessed 20 March 2017]
- Dahl, Jens. 1986. *Arktisk selvstyre*. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.
- Dainotto, Roberto. 2007. *Europe (In Theory)*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Dal Lago, A. 1997. *Lo straniero e il nemico. Materiali per l'etnografia contemporanea*. Genova: Costa and Nolan.
- Dare to Be Grey. 2016a. 50 Kleuren Grijs – Aflevering 1: Saman Amini. YouTube NL. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wm8odrN6yzk>. [Accessed 3 January 2017].
- . 2016b. 50 Kleuren Grijs – Aflevering 2: Frans Van Heezik. YouTube NL. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Le0JrHEyz1Y>. [Accessed 3 January 2017].
- . 2016c. 50 Kleuren Grijs – Aflevering 3: Beatrice De Graaf. YouTube NL. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6awSXRUT_58. [Accessed 3 January 2017].
- . 2016d. "Dare to be Grey – The Animation." YouTube NL. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbpgHFQSecY>. [Accessed 10 December 2016].
- . 2017. Welkom. Dare to Be Grey. <http://dtbg.nl>. [Accessed 27 February 2017].
- De Jaco, Aldo. 1969. *Il brigantaggio meridionale. Cronaca inedita dell'Unità d'Italia*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- De Jager, Marjolijn. 2013. Translation – a Listening Art. In *Intimate Enemies: Translation in Francophone Contexts*, eds. K. Batchelor and Claire Bisdorff, 109–16. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

- De Mul, Sarah. 2014. Becoming Black in Belgium: The Social Construction of Blackness in Chika Unigwe's Authorial Self-Representation and *On Black Sisters' Street*. *The Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 49 (1): 11–27.
- De Vivo, Barbara. 2010. Postcolonialismo in Francia. Islam, genere, sessualità, razza nel nuovo ordine mondiale. In *Schengenland. Immigrazione: politiche e culture in Europa*, ed. Isabella Peretti, 157–73. Roma: Ediesse.
- and Suzanne Dufour. 2012. Omonazionalismo. Civiltà prodotto tipico italiano? In *Femministe a parole. Grovigli da districare*, eds. S. Marchetti, J. M. Masciat and V. Perilli, 203–9. Roma: Ediesse.
- Dell'Agnese, Elena and Elisabetta Ruspini. 2007. *Mascolinità all'italiana. Costruzioni, narrazioni, mutamenti*. Turin: UTET, xvii–xxiii.
- Demart, Sarah. 2013. Riots in Matonge and . . . the Indifference of Public Authority? trans. by Gail Ann Fagen. *Brussels Studies* 68: 1–9. <http://brussels.revues.org/1168>.
- and Mireille-Tsheusi Robert. 2015. Le film 'Black': un cocktail de racisme postcolonial! *La Libre*, 23 November. <http://www.lalibre.be/debats/opinions/le-film-black-un-cocktail-de-racisme-postcolonial-565343d63570ca6ff91fc480>. [Accessed 27 March 2017].
- Derrida, Jacques. 1994. *Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*. London: Routledge.
- Diamond, Beverley, Kati Szego and Heather Sparling. 2012. Indigenous Modernities: Introduction. *Canadian Journal for Traditional Music* 39 (1): 1–6.
- Dickie, John. 1999. *Darkest Italy. The Nation and the Stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno, 1860–1900*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Dieste, Josep Ll. Mateo. 1997. *El 'moro' entre los primitivos. El caso del Protectorado Español en Marruecos*. Barcelona: Fundación 'la Caixa'.
- Dietler, Michael. 2010. *Archaeologies of Colonialism: Consumption, Entanglement, and Violence in Ancient Mediterranean France*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- D'Ottavio, Angela. 2010. Balotelli e il mito della nazionale di calcio. In *Mitologie dello sport. 40 saggi brevi*, eds. P. Cervelli, L. Romei and F. Sedda, 170–76. Roma: Edizioni Nuova Cultura.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. 1903. *The Souls of Black Folk*. Chicago: A. C. MacClurg & Co.
- Duggan, Lisa and José Esteban Muñoz. 2009. Hope and Hopelessness: A Dialogue. *Women & Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory* 19 (2): 275–83.
- Ealham, Chris. 2005. *Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona*. London: Routledge.
- Ekiz, Fidan. 2016. Fidan Ekiz: 'Waar is De Verbondenheid Die Juist Nu Van Levensbelang is?' *De Volkskrant*, 1 October. <http://www.volkskrant.nl/opinie/fidan-ekiz-waar-is-de-verbondenheid-die-juist-nu-van-levensbelang-is-a4387050/>. [Accessed October 5, 2016].
- El-Hachmi, Najat. 2004. *Jo també sóc catalane*. Barcelona: Columna.
- Elliott-Cooper, Adam. 2015. When Did We Come to Britain? You Must Be mistaken, Britain Came to Us. *Verso Blogs*, 20 October. <http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2294-when-did-we-come-to-britain-you-must-be-mistaken-britain-came-to-us>. [Accessed 14 February 2017].
- Eng, David L. 2010. The Queer Space of China: Expressive Desire in Stanley Kwan's *Lan Yu*. *Positions* 18 (2): 459–87.

- Erickson, B. 2011. Utopian Virtues: Muslim Neighbors, Ritual Sociality, and the Politics of Convivência. *American Ethnologist* 38 (1): 114–31.
- Erjavec, Karmen. 2001. Media Representation of the Discrimination against the Roma in Eastern Europe: The Case of Slovenia. *Discourse and Society* 12 (6): 699–727.
- Esposito, John L. and Ibrahim Kalin. 2009. *Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Esposito, Roberto. 2004. *Bios. Biopolitica e filosofia*. Turin: Einaudi.
- . 2006. *Communitas. Origine e destino della comunità*. Torino: Einaudi.
- . 2012. Cloning, Cultures, and the Social Injustices of Homogeneities. In *Clones, Fakes and Posthumans: Cultures of Replications*, eds. Philomena Essed and Gabriele Schwab, 97–110. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- and Kwame Nimako. 2006. Designs and (Co)Incidents. Cultures of Scholarship and Public Policy on Immigrants/Minorities in the Netherlands. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 47 (3–4): 281–312.
- European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC). 2011. *Czech Republic: A Report by the European Roma Rights Centre*. European Roma Rights Centre Publications.
- Fabian, Johannes. 2014 [1983]. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Falconi, Jessica. 2011. A língua de Conceição Lima: um novo país da palavra. In *Literaturas Insulares. Cabo Verde e S. Tomé e Príncipe*, eds. Margarida Calafate Ribeiro and Sílvio Renato Jorge, 185–96. Oporto: Afrontamento.
- . 2012. Literaturas Africanas, língua portuguesa e pós-colonialismos. In *Itinerâncias. Percursos e representações da Pós-colonialidade | Journeys. Postcolonial Trajectories and Representations*, eds. Elena Brugioni, Joana Passos, Andreia Sarabando and Marie-Manuelle Silva, 203–18. Vila Nova de Famalicão. Húmus Edições-CEHUM.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1952. *Peau noire, masques blancs*. Paris: Éditions de Seuil.
- . 1967. *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Grove Press.
- . 2004. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press.
- . 2008. *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press.
- . 2011. *Les Damnés de la terre*. Paris: Éditions La Découverte.
- Feagin, Joe R. 2006. *Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression*. New York: Routledge.
- Fele, Buanga. 1955. Massacres à São Tomé. *Présence Africaine* 1–2: 146–52.
- Fiut, Aleksander. 2014. In the Shadows of Empires. Post-colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe – Why Not? In *Postcolonial or Postindependence Studies. Teksty Drugie*, English edition, 1, special edition: 34–40, Warsaw: Publishing House of the Institute of Literary Research, Polish Academy of Sciences.
- Fofi, Goffredo. 1976. *L'immigrazione meridionale a Torino*. Milan: Feltrinelli.
- Forman, Murray. 2002. *The Hood Comes First: Race, Space, and Place in Rap and Hip-hop*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Forsdick, Charles and David Murphy, eds. 2003. *Francophone Postcolonial Studies – a Critical Introduction*. London: Arnold.

- . 2009. Introduction: Situating Francophone Postcolonial Thought. In *Postcolonial Thought in the French-Speaking World*, eds. Charles Forsdick and David Murphy, 1–28. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Foszio, L. and M. V. Anastasoae. 2001. Romania: Representations, Public Policies and Political Projects. In *Between Past and Future. The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. W. Guy, 351–69. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 1986. Of Other Spaces. *Diacritics* 16 (1): 22–7.
- Fraiture, Pierre-Philippe. 2008. Belgium and Its Colonies: Introduction. In *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures. Continental Europe and Its Empires*, eds. Prem Poddar, Rajeev S. Patke and Lars Jensen, 7–12. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Franchetti, Leopoldo. 1951. *Mezzogiorno e colonie*. Florence: La Nuova Italia.
- François, Patrick. 2011. *La dernière larme du lac Kivu*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Frank, Chandra, Egbert Alejandro Martina, Zihni Özdil, Patricia Schor and Hodan Warsame. 2013. Public Statement on Zwarte Piet: Institutional Racism in the Netherlands. Public Statment ZP. <https://publicstatementzp.wordpress.com/>. [Accessed 20 March 2017]
- Frankenberg, Ruth. 2001. The Mirage of an Unmarked Whiteness. In *The Making and Un-Making of Whiteness*, eds. Birgit Brander Rasmussen, Irene J. Nexica, Matt Wray and Eric Klinenberg, 72–96. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Fraser, Angus. 1995. *The Gypsies*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- Freud, Sigmund. 1996. *Three Case Histories*. New York: Touchstone.
- . 2003. *The Uncanny*. London and New York: Penguin Classics.
- Freyre, Gilberto. 1933. *Casa-grande & senzala: formação da família brasileira sob o regime de economia patriarcal*. Rio de Janeiro: Maia & Schmidt.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Gabel, Shirley Gatenio. 2009. The Growing Divide: The Marginalization of Young Roma Children in Bulgaria. *International Journal of Social Welfare* 18: 65–75.
- Gall, Carlotta. 2015. Suspicions Mount that Ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika Is No Longer Running Algeria. *The New York Times*, 23 December.
- Garavini, Giuliano. 2012. *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957–1986*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- García, Bernabé López. 2004. La evolución de la inmigración marroquí en España (1991–2003). In *Atlas de la inmigración marroquí en España*, eds. Bernabé López García and Mohamed Berriane, 213–21. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.
- Garcés, Helios Fernández, Nicolás Jiménez González and Isaac Motos Pérez. 2015. *Guía de recursos contra el antigitanismo*. Alicante: Federación Autonómica de Asociaciones Gitanas de la Comunidad Valenciana (FAGA).
- Gates Jr., Henry Louis. 1991. Critical Fanonism. *Critical Inquiry* 17 (3): 457–70.
- Gavron, Sarah and David Katznelson (Directors). 2012. *Village at the End of the World*. Producers: David Katznelson, Al Morrow, Stewart Le Marachal, Jonny Persey and Jerry Rothwell.
- Gebert, Konstanty. 2017. The Polish Republic of Untruth. *Moment Magazine*, January. <http://www.momentmag.com/polish-republic-untruth/>. [Accessed 23 May 2017]

- Gelder, Ken and Jane Jacobs. 1999. The Postcolonial Ghost Story. In *Ghosts. Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History*, eds. Peter Buse and Andrew Stott, 179–99. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Gibson, Mary. 1998. Biology or Environment? Race and Southern ‘Deviancy’ in the Writing of Italian Crimonologists, 1880–1920. In *Italy’s Southern Question: Orientalism in One Country*, ed. Jane Schneider, 99–115. Oxford: Berg.
- Giles, Michelle. 2011. Postcolonial Gothic and *The God of Small Things*: The Haunting of India’s Past. *Postcolonial Text* 6 (1): 1–15.
- Gilroy, Paul. 1993. *Black Atlantic, Modernity and Double Consciousness*. London: Verso.
- . 2004. *After Empire. Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* London: Routledge.
- Giomi, Elisa. 2012. Da ‘Drive in’ alla ‘Makeover Television’. Modelli femminili e di rapporto fra i sessi nella TV berlusconiana (e non). *Studi culturali* 1: 3–28.
- Giuliani, Gaia. 2013a. Non ci sono italiani negri. Il colore legittimo nell’Italia contemporanea. *Studi Culturali* 2: 254–67.
- . 2013b. Per un’analisi intersezionale dell’orientalismo nella televisione italiana contemporanea. In *Orientalismi italiani*, vol. 3, ed. Gabriele Proglgio, 190–208. Castagnito: Antares.
- . 2015. Bella e abbronzata. Visualizzare la razza nella televisione italiana 1978–1989. In *Il colore della nazione*, ed. Gaia Giuliani, 46–60. Milan: Mondadori.
- and Cristina Lombardi-Diop. 2013. *Bianco e nero. Storia dell’identità razziale degli italiani*. Florence: Le Monnier.
- Gladstone, William E. 1851. *Two Letters to the Earl of Aberdeen on the State Prosecutions of the Neapolitan Government*. London: John Murray.
- Glick, Thomas F. and Oriol Pi-Sunyer. 1992. Convivencia: An Introductory Note. In *Convivencia: Jews, Muslims, and Christians in Medieval Spain*, eds. Vivian B. Mann, Thomas F. Glick and Jerrilynn Denise Dodds. 192: 1–9. New York: George Braziller.
- Goddeeris, Idesbald. 2015. Postcolonial Belgium. *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 17 (3): 434–51.
- Gonçalves, Inês (Director). 2010. *Na Terra como no Céu*. Portugal: Noland Films.
- Gordon, Avery. 2008. *Ghostly Matters. Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- . 2011. Some Thoughts on Haunting and Futurity. *Borderlands* 10 (2): 1–21.
- Gosk, Hanna. 2010. *Opowieści skolonizowanego/kolonizatora. W kręgu studiów postzależnościowych nad literaturą polską XX i XXI wieku*. Kraków: Universitas.
- . 2016. Counter-Discourse and the Postcolonial Perspective: The Polish Complex by Tadeusz Konwicki. In *Postcolonial Perspectives on Postcommunism in Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Dorota Kołodziejczyk and Cristina Șandru, 88–105. London: Routledge.
- Graciet, Catherine. 2013. *Sarkozy/Gadhafi*. Paris: Seuil.
- and Eric Laurent. 2012. *Le Roi predateur*. Paris: Seuil.
- Grappi, Giorgio and Devi Sacchetto. 2013. La gestione e la produzione delle differenze: razza e razzismo nei processi lavorativi italiani. *Studi Culturali* 2: 63–70.
- Gramsci, Antonio 1975. *Quaderni del carcere*. Turin: Einaudi.

- Grégoire, Nicole and Jacinthe Mazzocchetti. 2013. Altérité 'africaine' et luttes collectives pour la reconnaissance en Belgique. *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* 29 (2): 95–114.
- Grellman, Heinrich, M. G. 1787. *Dissertation on the Gipsies: Being an Historical Enquiry Concerning the Manner of Life, Economy, Customs and Conditions of These People in Europe and Their Origin*, trans. M. Raper. London: G. Briggs. (Original work published in 1763).
- Gribaldo Alessandra and Giovanna Zapperi. 2012. *Lo schermo del potere. Femminismo e Regime della visibilità*. Verona: Ombre corte.
- Griaudi, Gabriella. 1996. Images of the South. In *Italian Cultural Studies*, eds. David Forgacs and Robert Lumley, 72–87. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Grosfoguel, Ramón. 2003. *Colonial Subjects. Puerto Ricans in a Global Perspective*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2004. Race and Ethnicity or Racialized Ethnicities? Identities within Global Coloniality. *Ethnicities* 4 (3): 315–36.
- . 2006. The Long-Durée Entanglement between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System. *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-knowledge* 5 (1): 1–12.
- . 2013. Racismo/sexismoepistémico, universidades occidentalizadas y los cuatro genocidios/epistemicidios del largo siglo XVI. *Tabula Rasa* 19: 31–58.
- Gsir, Sonia, Jérémy Mandin and Elsa Mescoli. 2015. *Corridor Report on Belgium – the Case of Moroccan and Turkish Immigrants INTERACT RR 2015/03*. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.
- Guaraldo, Olivia. 2011. (In)significante padrone. Media, sesso e potere. In *Filosofia di Berlusconi. L'essere e il nulla nell'Italia del Cavaliere*, ed. C. Chiurco, 97–128. Verona: Ombre corte.
- Guerrero, Ed. 1993. *Framing Blackness: The African American Image in Film*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Guha, Ranajit. 1983. *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Colonial Insurgency in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Guillaumin, Colette. 1972. Caractères spécifiques de l'ideologie raciste. *Cahiers Internationaux de sociologie* 53: 247–74.
- Gunn, Joshua. 2006. Review Essay: Mourning Humanism, or, the Idiom of Haunting. *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 92 (1): 77–102.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2009. *Europe: The Faltering Project*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- . 2012. *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Haedrich, Marcel. 1972. *Coco Chanel: Her Life, Her Secrets*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Halberstam, Judith. 1998. *Female Masculinity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Hancock, Ian. 1987. *The Pariah Syndrome: An Account of Gypsy Persecution and Slavery*. Ann Arbor, MI: Karoma.
- . 1992. *Anti-Gypsyism in the New Europe*. Occasional Paper of the International Romani Union.

- . 1997. The Roots of Antigypsyism: To the Holocaust and after. In *Confronting the Holocaust: A Mandate of the 21st Century*, eds. G. J. Colijin and M. Sachs Little, 19–49. Lanham: University Press of America.
- . 2002. “*We are the Romani People*.” Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press.
- . 2004. Romanies and the Holocaust: A Reevaluation and an Overview. In *The Historiography of the Holocaust*, ed. Dan Stone, 383–96. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- . 2010a. Gypsy Mafia, Romani Saints: The Racial Profiling of Romani Americans. In *Danger! Educated Gypsy: Selected Essays by Ian Hancock*, ed. Dileep Karanth, 195–211. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press.
- . 2010b. The ‘Gypsy’ Stereotype and the Sexualization of Romani Women. In *Danger! Educated Gypsy: Selected Essays by Ian Hancock*, ed. Dileep Karanth, 212–22. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press.
- . 2011. The Neglected Memory of the Romanies in the Holocaust/Porraimos. In *The Routledge History of the Holocaust*, ed. Jonathan C. Friedman, 375–84. London: Routledge.
- Hansen, Peo 2016. Focus: How the Refugees Smuggled Keynes Back from His Exile. *Discover Society*, May. <http://discoversociety.org/2016/05/03/focus-how-the-refugees-smuggled-keynes-back-from-his-exile-2/>. [Accessed 15 February 2017].
- Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. 2013. A Statue to Nasser? Eurafrica, the Colonial Roots of European Integration, and the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. *Mediterranean Quarterly* 24 (4): 5–18.
- . 2014a. Another Colonialism: Africa in the History of European Integration. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 27 (3): 442–61.
- . 2014b. *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Hargreaves, Alec G., Charles Forsdick and David Murphy, eds. 2010. *Transnational French Studies: Postcolonialism and Literature-Monde*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Harper, Douglas. 2016. Same. *Online Etymology Dictionary*. http://etymonline.com/index.php?term=same&allowed_in_frame=0. [Accessed 21 December 2016].
- Hartigan Jr., John. 1997. Unpopular Culture: The Case of ‘White Trash’. *Cultural Studies* 11 (2): 316–43.
- Harvey, Sarah. 2013. *Project Review: Cairn Energy’s 2011 Drilling in West Greenland*. Eagle River, Alaska: Harvey Consulting. http://inuit.org/fileadmin/user_upload/File/2013/Presse/2-18-13_HCLLC_Cairn_Energy_Offshore_Greenland_Report_FINAL.pdf. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Hendriksen, Kåre. 2013. *Grønlands bygder – Økonomi og udviklingsdynamik*. PhD Thesis, Aalborg University/DTU. http://vbn.aau.dk/files/75326539/Elektronisk_version_final_1_.pdf.
- Henriques, Joana Gorjão. 2016. *Racismo em Português. O lado esquecido do colonialism*. Lisbon: Tinta da China.
- Herakova, Liliana Lubomirova. 2009. Identity, Communication, Inclusion: The Roma and (New) Europe. *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication* 2 (4): 279–97.

- Holmes, Douglas. 2000. *Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Holmwood, John. 2017. Entry from the Point of View of Exit. In *Brexit: Sociological Responses*, ed. William Outhwaite, 31–40. London: Anthem Press.
- Hondius, Dienke. 2016. Race and the Dutch: On the Uneasiness Surrounding Racial Issues in the Netherlands. In *Paradoxes of Cultural Recognition: Perspectives from Northern Europe*, eds. Sharam Alghasi, Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Halleh Ghorashi, 39–58. London: Routledge.
- Hooks, Bell. 2015. *Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Hoving, Isabel. 2004. Circumventing Openness: Creating New Senses of Dutchness. *Transit* 1 (1): 1–11.
- Huggan, Graham. 2001. *The Postcolonial Exotic. Marketing the Margins*. London: Routledge.
- . 2016. Introduction: Unscrambling the Arctic. In *Postcolonial Perspectives on the European High North. Unscrambling the Arctic*, eds. Graham Huggan and Lars Jensen, 1–29. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hvenegård-Lassen, Kirsten. 2016. Journey to the Centre of the Ice. Narrating Ice-core Drillings in Northern Greenland. *Studies in Travel Writing* 20 (3): 237–48.
- Imre, Amiko. 2005. Whiteness in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe: The Time of the Gypsies, the End of Race. In *Postcolonial Whiteness: A Critical Reader on Race and Empire*, ed. Alfred J. Lopez, 79–102. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- . 2006. Play in the Ghetto: Global Entertainment and the European ‘Roma Problem’. *Third Text* 20 (6): 659–70.
- Irele, Abiola F. 1987. Wangrin: A Study in Ambiguity. Introduction to Bâ, Amadou Hampaté. In *The Fortunes of Wangrin*, iii–xv. Ibadan: New Horn Press.
- Janssens, Rudi. 2008. Language Use in Brussels and the Position of Dutch. Some Recent Findings. *Brussels Studies* 13: 1–14. http://www.brusselsstudies.be/medias/publications/EN_51_BruS13EN.pdf. [Accessed 17 December 2016].
- Jáuregui, Carlos A. 2008. *Canibalia. Canibalismo, calibanismo, antropofagia cultural y consumo en América Latina*. Madrid: Iberoamericana.
- . 2014. Crisis as Opportunity – Opportunity as Crisis: Greenlandic Independence and Sustainability. In *Crisis in the Nordic Countries and beyond: At the Intersection of Environment, Finance and Multiculturalism*, eds. Kristín Loftsdóttir and Lars Jensen, 143–60. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Jimenez, Aitor. 2017. *La colonialidad del poder constituyente*. Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños.
- Jones, Alex. 1998. Migration, Ethnicity and Conflict: Oxfam’s Experience of Working with Roma Communities in Tuzia, Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Gender and Development* 6 (1): 57–62.
- Jones, Guno. 2016. What Is New about Dutch Populism? Dutch Colonialism, Hierarchical Citizenship and Contemporary Populist Debates and Policies in the Netherlands. *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 37 (6): 605–20.
- Jonsson, Stefan and Julia Willén, eds. 2017. *Austere Histories in European Societies. Social Exclusion and the Contest of Colonial Memories*. London: Routledge.

- Joseph-Vilain, Mélanie and Judith Misrahi-Barak, eds. 2009. *Postcolonial Ghosts*. Montpellier: Presses Universitaires de la Méditerranée.
- Karuri, Ken. 2016. Luanda, Kinshasa Ranked among World's Most Expensive Cities for Expats. *Africa News*, 22 June. <http://www.africanews.com/2016/06/22/luanda-kinshasa-ranked-among-world-s-most-expensive-cities/>.
- Kassovitz, Mathieu (Director). 1995. *La Haine*. Paris: Les Productions Lazennec.
- Keeling, Kara. 2007. *The Witch's Flight: The Cinematic, the Black Femme, and the Image of Common Sense*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kelertas, Violetta. 2006. *Baltic Postcolonialism*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Kenney, Richard. 2009. They Are Romanies: Social Construction of an Oppressed Minority for an Elite Audience. *James E. Murphy Top Faculty Paper Award*. Boston: AEJMC Annual Conference, Cultural and Critical Studies Division.
- Khalfa, Jean. 2004. 'Corps Perdu': A Note on Fanon's *Cogito*. *Forum of Modern Language Studies* 40 (4): 426–37.
- Kiossev, Alexander. 1999. Notes on Self-Colonizing Cultures. In *Art and Culture in Post-Communist Europe*, eds. B. Pejić and D. Elliott, 114–18. Stockholm: Moderna Museet.
- . 2011. Self-Colonizing Metaphor. *Atlas of Transformation*. Tranzit. <http://monumenttotransformation.org/atlas-of-transformation/html/s/self-colonization/the-self-colonizing-metaphor-alexander-kiossev.html>.
- Kleist, Janus Chemnitz. 2010. *De grønlandske bygder – hvad kan vi stille op med dem?* Unpublished Bachelor dissertation, Nuuk: Ilisimatusarfik. <http://www.ilisimatusarfik.gl/Portals/0/Ekstern/Uddannelse/SpecialeBA/Janus%20Kleist%20feb10.pdf>.
- Koczanowicz, Leczek. 2008. *Politics of Time: Dynamics of Identity in Post-Communist Poland*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Kołodziejczyk, Dorota. 2014. Post-Colonial Transfer to Central-and-Eastern-Europe. In *Postcolonial or Postindependence Studies, Teksty Drugie*, English edition, 1, special edition: 124–42. Warsaw: Publishing House of the Institute of Literary Research, Polish Academy of Sciences.
- and Cristina Șandru, eds. 2016. *Postcolonial Perspectives on Postcommunism in Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Korek, Janusz, ed. 2007. *From Sovietology to Postcoloniality: Poland and Ukraine from the Postcolonial Perspective*. Stockholm: Södertörns Högskola.
- Kováts, Andras. 2002. Migration among the Roma Population in Hungary. In *Roma Migration*, ed. Andras Kováts, 9–33. Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Minority Research.
- Krishnan, Madhu. 2015. Postcoloniality, Spatiality and Cosmopolitanism in the *Open City*. *Textual Practice* 29: 675–96.
- Kuoshu, Harry H. 2011. *Metro Movies: Cinematic Urbanism in Post-Mao China*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Kwon, Heonik. 2008. *Ghosts of War in Vietnam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Labanyi, Jo. 2000. History and Hauntology; Or, What Does One Do with the Ghosts of the Past? Reflections on Spanish Film and Fiction of the Post-Franco Period. In *Disremembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to Democracy*, ed. Joan Ramon Resina, 65–82. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Laclau, Ernesto. 1997. *Emancipation(s)*. London and New York: Verso.

- . 2008. *The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist's Guide to Your Brain and Politics*. London: Penguin Books.
- . 2014. In Politics, Progressives Need to Frame Their Values. November. <https://georgelakoff.com/2014/11/29/george-lakoff-in-politics-progressives-need-to-frame-their-values/>. [Accessed 20 March 2017]
- Lampedusa, Giuseppe Tomasi di. 1982. *The Leopard*. London: Random House.
- Lee, Ronald. 2000. Post-Communism Romani Migration to Canada. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13 (2): 51–70.
- Levi, Carlo. 1982. *Christ Stopped at Eboli*. London: Penguin.
- Liegeois, Jean-Pierre. 1986. *Gypsies*. London: Al Saqi Books.
- Lim, Song Hwee. 2006. *Celluloid Comrades: Representations of Male Homosexuality in Contemporary Chinese Cinemas*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Lima, Conceição. 2004. *O Útero da Casa*. Lisbon: Caminho.
- . 2006. *A Dolorosa Raiz do Micondó*. Lisbon: Caminho.
- . 2011. *O País de Akendegué*. Lisbon: Caminho.
- Lima, José Deus. 2002. *História do Massacre de 1953 em S. Tomé e Príncipe: Em busca da nossa verdadeira História*. São Tomé: Author's Edition.
- Lloyd, Gwynedd and Gillean McCluskey. 2008. Education and Gypsies/Travelers: Contradictions and Significant Silences. *International Journal of Inclusive Education* 12 (4): 331–45.
- Loescher, Gil. 1993. *Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis: A Twentieth Century Fund Book*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Loftsdóttir, Kristín and Lars Jensen. 2012. *Whiteness and Postcolonialism in the Nordic Region: Exceptionalism, Migrant Others and National Identities*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Loi du 19 juillet 1974 portant reconnaissance des administrations chargées de la gestion du temporel du culte islamique. <http://www.legirel.cnrs.fr/spip.php?article130&lang=fr>. [Accessed 23 December 2016].
- Lombardi-Diop, Cristina and Caterina Romeo, eds. 2012. *Postcolonial Italy. Challenging National Homogeneity*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lopes, Leão (Director). 2010. *S. Tomé: os últimos contratados*. Cape Vert: Independent Production.
- López, Fernando Bravo. 2011. Towards a Definition of Islamophobia: Approximations of the Early Twentieth Century. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34 (4): 556–73.
- Lorde, Audre. 2007. The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism. In *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches*, ed. Lorde 2007, 124–33. Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press.
- Lourenço, Eduardo. 1999. *A nau de Ícaro, seguido de Imagem e Miragem da Lusofonia*. Lisbon: Gradiva.
- Lu, Sheldon H. 2007. *Chinese Modernity and Global Biopolitics: Studies in Literature and Visual Culture*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Luckhurst, Roger. 2002. The Contemporary London Gothic and the Limits of the 'Spectral Turn'. *Textual Practice* 16 (3): 527–46.
- Lugones, María. 2003. *Peregrinajes/Pilgrimages: Theorizing Coalition against Multiple Oppressions*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Lundsteen, Martin. 2015a. *Conflicts and Convivencia. An Ethnography of the Social Effects of 'The Crisis' in a Small Catalan Town*. PhD Thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Barcelona, Spain.

- . 2015b. *Espai, capital i cultura a Premià de Mar. El cas de la mesquita*. Barcelona: Pol-len Edicions.
- Lynge, Augo. 1931 [Danish tr. 1989]. *Ukiut 300-ngornerat/[300 år efter]*. Nuuk: Atuakkiorfik.
- Macey, David. 2000. *Frantz Fanon: A Life*. London: Granta Books.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1996. *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Maddern, Jo Frances and Peter Adey. 2008. Editorial: Spectro-Geographies. *Cultural Geographies* 15 (3): 291–95.
- Majumdar, Margaret A. 2007. *Postcoloniality: The French Dimension*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Manço, Ural, Mireille-Tsheusi Robert and Billy Kalonji. 2013. Postcolonialisme et prise en charge institutionnelle des jeunes belgo-congolais en situation de rupture sociale (Anvers, Bruxelles). *African Diaspora* 6: 21–45.
- Manifeste. 2007. Pour une ‘littérature-monde en français’ le Manifeste. *Le Monde*, 16 March.
- Marchetti, Sabrina. 2011. *Le ragazze di Asmara*. Roma: Ediesse.
- Margarido, Alfredo. 1980. *Estudos sobre Literaturas das Nações Africanas de Língua Portuguesa*. Lisbon: A Regra do Jogo.
- Margiotta, Costanza. 2007. Quando la razza conta? Fra pratiche discriminatorie e trattamenti eguaglianti. In *Società multiculturale e questioni razziali*, eds. Thomas Casadei and Lucia Re, 132–42. Reggio Emilia: Diabasis.
- . 2012. Giustificare l’eccezione: la discriminazione razziale nell’applicazione della legge italiana. In *La razza al lavoro*, eds. Anna Curcio and Miguel Mellino, 63–76. Roma: Manifestolibri.
- Marsh, Adrian. 2007. Research and the Many Representations of Romani Identity. *Roma Rights Quarterly* 3: 17–30. <http://www.errc.org/article/research-and-the-many-representations-of-romani-identity/2900>. [Accessed 17 November 2016].
- Martin, Guy 1982. Africa and the Ideology of Eurafrica: Neo-Colonialism or Pan-Africanism? *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 20 (2): 221–38.
- Martin-Márquez, Susan. 2008. *Disorientations. Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Martina, Egbert Alejandro and Patricia Schor. 2015. White Order: Racialization of Public Space in the Netherlands. *Dedalus – Revista Portuguesa De Literatura Comparada* 19 (*Cultures of (In)Security – Culturas de (In)Segurança*): 161–88.
- Mason, Peter. 1996. On Producing the (American) Exotic. *Anthropos* 91: 139–51.
- Mata, Inocência. 1998. *Diálogo com as ilhas: sobre cultura e literatura de São Tomé e Príncipe*. Lisbon: Colibri.
- . 2004a. Apresentação. In *O Útero da Casa*, ed. Conceição Lima, 11–15. Lisbon: Caminho.
- . 2004b. *A Suave Pátria – Reflexões Polício-culturais sobre a Sociedade São-tomense*. Lisbon: Colibri.
- . 2006. A poesia de Conceição Lima: o sentido da história das ruminações afectivas. *Veredas – Revista da Associação Internacional de Lusitanistas* 7: 235–51.
- . 2010. *Polifonias Insulares. Cultura e Literatura de São Tomé e Príncipe*. Lisbon: Colibri.

- . 2013. *A literatura Africana e a Crítica Pós-colonial. Reconversões*. Manaus: UEA Edições.
- Maurice, Eric. 2017. How Poland's Szydło fought Europe and lost. *EUObserver*, 10.03.2017, <https://euobserver.com/institutional/137204> 2).
- Mayall, David. 1988. *Gypsy-Travelers in Nineteenth Century Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mbembe, Achille. 2001. *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2003. Life, Sovereignty, and Terror in the Fiction of Amos Tutuola. *Research in African Literatures* 34 (4): 1–26.
- McClintock, Anne. 1995. *Imperial Leather. Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest*. London: Routledge.
- McGarry, Aidan. 2012. The Dilemma of the European Union's Roma Policy. *Critical Social Policy* 32 (1): 126–36.
- Medovoi, Leerom. 2012. Dogma-Line Racism: Islamophobia and the Second Axis of Race. *Social Text* III 30 (2): 43–74.
- Mellino, Miguel. 2012a. *Cittadinanze postcoloniali. Appartenenze, razze e razzismo in Italia e in Europa*. Rome: Carocci.
- . 2012b. De-Provincializing Italy. Notes on Race, Racialization, and Italy's Coloniality. In *Postcolonial Italy. Challenging National Homogeneity*, eds. Cristina Lombardi-Diop and Caterina Romeo, 83–99. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Meridiana*. Rivista di storia e scienze sociali. *Who We Are*. <http://www.rivistameridiana.it/who-we-are.html>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Meridiani, Orizzonti, eds. 2014. *Briganti o emigranti. Sud e movimenti tra conricerca e studi subalterni*. Verona: Ombre Corte.
- Mignolo, Walter. 2009. Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom. *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 (7–8): 1–23.
- . 2011a. Coloniality of Power and Subalternity. In *The Latin American Subaltern Studies Reader*, ed. Ilena Rodríguez, 425–43. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- . 2011b. *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Moe, Nelson. 2002. *The View from Vesuvius. Italian Culture and the Southern Question*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 2003. *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Molfese, Franco. 1964. *Storia del brigantaggio dopo l'unità*. Milan: Feltrinelli.
- Morandini, Laura, Luisa Morandini and Morando Morandini. 2005. *Dizionario dei Film*. Bologna: Zanichelli.
- Moreira, Joaquim. 1974. Ressuscitados os Acontecimentos de Batepá. *Notícia* 765: 22–7.
- Moreras, Jordi. 2004. Marroquíes en Cataluña. In *Atlas de la inmigración marroquí en España*, eds. Bernabé López García and Mohamed Berriane, 305–12. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.
- Morozov, Viatcheslav. 2015. *Russia's Postcolonial Identity. A Subaltern Empire in a Eurocentric World*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Mortimer, Rex. 1974. *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959–1965*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso.
- Mueggler, Erik. 2001. *The Age of Wild Ghosts. Memory, Violence, and Place in Southwest China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mugabo, Délice. 2016. On Rocks and Hard Places: A Reflection on Antiblackness in Organizing Against Islamophobia. *Critical Ethnic Studies* 2 (2): 159–83.
- Muntzberg, Gert and Peter Simonsen. 1996. Knud Rasmussen og handelsstationen Thule 1910–1937. *Historiske/Jyske Samlinger* 2: 209–42. http://img.kb.dk/tidsskrift/kb/pdf/ho/ho_1996-PDF/ho_1996_73504.pdf. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Murray, George. 1953. *Hellenism and the Modern World*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Nancy, Jean-Luc. 1990. *La communauté désœuvrée*. Paris: Christian Bourgois Editeur.
- . 1991. *The Inoperative Community*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Nani, Michele. 2006. *Ai confini della nazione. Stampa e razzismo nell'Italia di fine Ottocento*. Rome: Carocci.
- Nascimento, Augusto. 2011. A construção de São Tomé e Príncipe: achegas sobre a (eventual) valia do conhecimento histórico. http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/11_Nascimento.pdf. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Navarro García, Laura. 2008. *Contra el Islam. La visión deformada del mundo árabe en Occidente*. Córdoba: Editorial Almuzara.
- Neal, Mark Anthony. 2013. *Looking for Leroy: Illegible Black Masculinities*. New York: New York University Press.
- Niranjana, Tejaswini. 1992. *Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism and the Colonial Context*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Njegosh, Tatiana Petrovich and Anna Scacchi, eds. 2012. *Parlare di razza. La lingua del colore tra Italia e Stati Uniti*. Verona: Ombre corte.
- NOS. 2016. Duizenden Mensen Bij Manifestatie Tegen Polarisation in Amsterdam. NOS. <http://nos.nl/artikel/2134330-duizenden-mensen-bij-manifestatie-tegen-polarisation-in-amsterdam.html>. [Accessed 16 February 2017].
- Oliveri, Federico. 2008. La critica dei pregiudizi sui migranti come strategia contro le discriminazioni razziali. In *Lessico delle discriminazioni tra società, diritto e istituzioni*, ed. Thomas Casadei, 73–94. Reggio Emilia: Diabasis.
- Open Society Justice Initiative and Amnesty International. 2013. *Equality under Pressure: The Impact of Ethnic Profiling*. Amsterdam: Open Society Justice Initiative and Amnesty International.
- Oprea, Alexandra. 2007. Psychic Charlatans, Roving Shoplifters, and Traveling Con Artists: Notes on a Fraudulent Identity. *Berkeley Journal of Gender Law and Justice* 22 (1): 31–41.
- O'Riley, Michael. 2004. Place, Position, and Postcolonial Haunting in Assia Djebar's *La femme sans sépulture*. *Research in African Literatures* 35(1): 66–86.
- . 2007. Postcolonial Haunting: Anxiety, Affect and the Situated Encounter. *Postcolonial Text* 3 (4): 2–15.
- Owczarzak, Jill. 2009. Introduction: Postcolonial Studies and Post-socialism in Eastern Europe. *Focaal* 53: 3–19.

- Oy  w  m  , Oy  r  nk  . 2010. *Gender Epistemologies in Africa: Gendering Traditions, Spaces, Social Institutions, and Identities*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Padilha, Laura Cavalcante. 2004. Dois Olhares Uma Guerra. *Revista Cr  tica de Ci  ncias Sociais* 68: 117–28.
- Pagden, Anthony. 1982. *The Fall of Natural Man. The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pecic, Zoran Lee. 2016. *New Queer Sinophone Cinema: Local Histories, Transnational Connections*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Peeren, Esther. 2009. The Postcolonial and/as the Spirit World: Theorizing the Ghost in Jacques Derrida, Achille Mbembe and Ben Okri’s *The Famished Road*. In *Postcolonial Ghosts*, eds. M  lanie Joseph-Vilain and Judith Misrahi-Barak, 327–44. Montpellier: Presses Universitaires de la M  diterran  e.
- . 2010. Everyday Ghosts and the Ghostly Everyday in Amos Tutuola, Ben Okri, and Achille Mbembe. In *Popular Ghosts. The Haunted Spaces of Everyday Culture*, eds. Mar  a del Pilar Blanco and Esther Peeren, 106–17. New York: Continuum.
- . 2014. *The Spectral Metaphor. Living Ghosts and the Agency of Invisibility*. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pelissier, Ren  . 1972. La ‘guerre’ de Batep   (S  o Tom   – f  vrier 1953). *Revue fran  aise d’  tudes politiques africaines* 73: 74–88.
- Pende, Nicola. 1933. *Bonifica umana razionale*. Bologna: Cappelli.
- Peralta, Elsa. 2011. Fictions of a Creole Nation: (Re) presenting Portugal’s Imperial Past. In *Negotiating Identities: Constructed Selves and Others*, ed. Helen Vella Bonavita, 193–217. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Perceval, Jos   M  . 2012. Narrativas historiogr  ficas: las estrategias del discurso a la hora de construir un sujeto ‘morisco’ expulsable. In *La islamofobia a debate. La genealog  a del miedo al islam y la construcci  n de los discursos antiisl  micos*, eds. R. Ram  n Grosfoguel and G. Mart  n Mu  oz, 123–40. Madrid: Biblioteca de la Casa   rabe.
- Perez, Isaac. 2009. Lo que no se olvida. *Anales de Historia Contempor  nea* 25: 57–74.
- Perraudin, Michael and J  rgen Zimmerer, eds. 2010. *German Colonialism and National Identity*. London: Routledge.
- Petersen, Marie-Louise Deth. 1986. The Impact of Public Planning on Ethnic Culture: Aspects of Danish Resettlement Policies in Greenland after World War II. *Arctic Anthropology* 23 (1/2): 271–80.
- Petraccone, Claudia. 2005. *Le ‘due Italie’. La questione meridionale tra realt   e rappresentazione*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
- Petrillo, Antonello, ed. 2009. *Biopolitica di un rifiuto. Le rivolte anti-discarda a Napoli e in Campania*. Verona: Ombre Corte.
- Petrovici, Norbert. 2015. Framing Criticism and Knowledge Production in Semi-peripheries – Post-Socialism Unpacked. *Intersections, EEJSP* 1 (2): 80–102.
- Petrusewicz, Marta. 1998. *Come il Meridione divenne una questione. Rappresentazioni del Sud prima e dopo il Quarantotto*. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino.
- Piot, Charles. 2010. *Nostalgia for the Future: West Africa after the Cold War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Piqueras, Jos   A. 2012. *La Esclavitud en las Espa  as: un lazo transatl  ntico*. Madrid: Catarata.

- Plummer, Ken. 1995. *Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social Worlds*. London: Routledge.
- Poddar, Prem, Rajeev S. Patke and Lars Jensen, eds. 2008. *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures. Continental Europe and Its Empires*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Prado, Abdennur. 2008. *El retorn de l'islam a Catalunya*. Barcelona: Llibres de l'Índex.
- Pugliese, Joseph. 2010. *Biometrics. Bodies, Technologies, Biopolitics*. New York: Routledge.
- Putters, Kim. 2016. Tijd Voor Een Nieuw Sociaal Contract. *NRC Handelsblad*, 9 July.
- Puwar, Nirmal. 2004. *Space Invaders. Race, Gender and Bodies Out of Place*. Berg: Oxford.
- Quijano, Anibal. 2000. Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America. *Nepantla: Views from South* 1 (3): 533–80.
- . 2008. Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Social Classification. In *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*, eds. Mabel Morana, Enrique D. Dussel and Carlos A. Jauregui, 181–224. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- . and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1992. Americanity as a Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World System. *ISSA* 134: 549–57.
- Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling (RMO). 2009a. *Polarisatie: Bedreigend En Verrijkend*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SWP.
- . 2009b. *Polariseren Binnen Onze Grenzen*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SWP.
- Raharimanana, Jean-Luc. 2007. Scrittura multiple dentro un'unica lingua. *Il Manifesto*, 27 July.
- Rajaram, Prem Kumar. 2013. Historicising 'Asylum' and Responsibility. *Citizenship Studies* 17 (6–7): 681–96.
- Ravi, Srilata. 2011. Engaging the Postcolonial: Terrorism, Tourism, and Literary Cosmopolitanism in the Twenty-First Century. *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 44: 215–27.
- Règlement Général de Police: Zone de police Bruxelles-Ouest de 2 avril 2014, Art. 120. 2016. <http://www.lokalepolitie.be/5340/fr/home/algemeen-politiereglement-gas-boetes/le-nouveau-reglement-general-de-police.html>. [Accessed 23 December 2016].
- Reinhart, Catherine A. 2006. *Claims to Memory: Beyond Slavery and Emancipation in the French Caribbean*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Rémy, Jean-Philippe. 2013. L'Élysée et L'armée française ne confirme pas la mort d'Abou Zeïd. *Le Monde*, 28 February. http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/02/28/un-chef-d-aqmi-a-ete-tue-par-l-armee-francaise-au-mali_1840892_3212.html. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Ribeiro, António Pinto. 2013. Para acabar de vez com a Lusophonia. *Bulala – Cultura Africana Contemporanea*, 18 January. <http://www.bulala.org/pt/a-ler/para-acabar-de-vez-com-a-lusofonia>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Ribeiro, António Sousa. 2010. Pensamento Pós-colonial. *JANUS 2010. Anuário de Relações Exteriores* 3: 114–15.
- . 2013. *Representações da Violência*. Coimbra: Almedina.

- Ribeiro, Margarida Calafate. 2011. Património da palavra: o nome, a casa, a ilha. In *Literaturas Insulares. Cabo Verde e S. Tomé e Príncipe*, eds. Margarida Calafate Ribeiro and Silvio Renato Jorge, 197–206. Oporto: Afrontamento.
- Richardson, Joanna. 2006. Talking about Gypsies: The Notion of Discourse as Control. *Housing Studies* 21 (1): 77–96.
- Richmond, Anthony H. 2001. Refugees and Racism in Canada. *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 19 (6): 12–20.
- Rivera, Annamaria. 2009. *Regole e roghi. Metamorfosi del razzismo*. Bari: Dedalo.
- Robinson, Cedric. 1993. The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon. *Race & Class* 35 (1): 79–91.
- Rofel, Lisa. 2007. *Desiring China: Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Rosen, Steven. 1998. *Palace*: Too Much Talk, Too Little Insight [Review of the film *East Palace, West Palace*]. *Denver Post*, 20 November.
- Rouaud, Jean and Michele Le Bris, eds. 2007. *Pour une littérature-monde*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Rousseau, George S. and Roy Porter, eds. 1990. *Exoticism in the Enlightenment*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Roussinos, Aris. 2013. Al-Qaeda Wants Africa: Are the French in over Their Heads in Mali? In conjunction with *Ground Zero: Mali* documentary film for *VICE TV*.
- Rueb, Thomas and Kim Bos. 2016. Een Schreeuw Om Nuance. *NRC Handelsblad*, 28 May. <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/05/28/een-schreeuw-om-nuance-1622351-a1290450>. [Accessed May 30, 2016.]
- Sabelli, Sonia. 2010. L'eredità del colonialismo nelle rappresentazioni contemporanee del corpo femminile nero. *Zapruder* 23: 106–15.
- Said, Edward. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon.
- . 1983. *The World, the Text and the Critic*. London: Vintage.
- . 1990. Third World Intellectuals and Metropolitan Culture. *Raritan* 9 (3): 27–50.
- . 1993. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Chatto & Windus.
- . 2001. *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2003. Always on Top. Review Article on Catherine Hall (2002) *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–67*. *London Review of Books* 25 (6): 3–6.
- Sale, Richard and Eugene Potapov. 2010. *The Scramble for the Arctic: Ownership, Exploitation and Conflict in the Far North*. London: Frances Lincoln.
- Samuel, Henry. 2013. Francois Hollande's Camel Eaten in Mali. *The Telegraph*, 8 April.
- Sanches, Ribeiro M., ed. 2006. *Portugal não é um país pequeno. Contar o império na pós-colonialidade*. Lisboa: Edições Cotovia.
- Şandru, Cristina. 2012. *Worlds Apart? A Postcolonial Reading of Post-1945 East-Central European Culture*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.
- Santo, Carlos Espírito. 2003. *A Guerra da Trindade*. São Tomé: Instituto Camões.
- Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2004. *The World Social Forum: A User's Manual*. http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm_eng.pdf. [Accessed 1 December 2016].
- . 2008. Libertem a Língua. *VISÃO*, 17 April.

- . 2010. *A gramática do tempo: para uma nova cultura política*. Oporto: Afrontamento.
- Sarrionandia, Joseba. 2012. *Som com moros dins la boira?* Barcelona: Pol·len Edicions.
- Sartor, Freddy. 2015. Black Foute Boel. *Filmmagie* 659: 12.
- Schilling, Britta. 2014. *Postcolonial Germany. Memories of Empire in a Decolonized Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schneider, Jane, ed. 1998. *Italy's Southern Question: Orientalism in One Country*. Oxford and New York: Berg.
- Schor, Patricia. 2013. A Reasonable Alternative to Zwarte Piet. *Processed Life*. <https://processedlives.wordpress.com/2013/10/14/a-reasonable-alternative-to-zwarte-piet/>. [Accessed 20 December 2016].
- Sebastian, Tim. 2017. Conflict Zone. *Deutsche Welle*, 15 February. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXzPiSkiJcA>.
- Segretariato generale della Camera dei Deputati. 1961. Discussione delle interpellanze Massari e Paternostro sull'amministrazione delle province meridionali. In *Il Parlamento dell'unità d'Italia: atti e documenti della Camera dei deputati*, vol. 2. Rome: Segretariato generale della Camera dei deputati.
- Seibert, Gerhard. 1996. São Tomé: o massacre de Fevereiro de 1953. *História* 19: 14–27.
- . 1997. Le massacre de février 1953 a São Tomé. *Raison d'être du nationalisme santoméen. Lusotopie* vol. IV: 173–94.
- . 2002a. *Camaradas, clientes e compadres. Colonialismo, Socialismo e Democratização em São Tomé e Príncipe*. Lisbon: Vega.
- . 2002b. The February 1953 Massacre in São Tomé: Crack in the Salazarist Image of Multiracial Harmony and Impetus for Nationalist Demands for Independence. *Portuguese Studies Review* 2: 52–77.
- . 2008. O Massacre de Batepá. Em Fevereiro de 1953, o governador de São Tomé, Carlos Gorgulho, pôs a ilha a ferro e fogo. In *Os Anos de Salazar*, ed. António S. Paço, vol. 10 (1952–1953), 64–73. Lisbon: Planeta Agostini.
- Sexton, Jared. 2008. *Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiculturalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Shih, Shu-mei. 2007. *Visuality and Identity: Sinophone Articulations across the Pacific*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Simon, Patrick. 2005. La République face à la diversité: comment décoloniser les imaginaires? In *La fracture coloniale: la société française au prisme de l'héritage colonial*, eds. Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel and Sandrine Lemaire, 237–46. Paris: Editions la Découverte.
- Skórczewski, Dariusz. 2007. Dlaczego Polska powinna upomnieć się o swoją postkolonialność? *Znak*, September, 628. <http://www miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/>
- . 2013. *Teoria-literatura-dyskurs. Pejzaż postkolonialny*. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL.
- Smiet, Katrine. 2014. 'Transatlantic Cross-Pollination': 30 Years of Dutch Feminist Theorizing on Race and Racism. *Frame* 27 (2): 29–47.
- Smith, Jonathan Z. 1990. *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Smoleński, Paweł. 2016. 'Nu, diemokraty! Nu, pagadi!' Interview with Zbigniew Janas. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2 July.
- Sociaal en Cultureel Plan Bureau. About SCP. SCP. <https://www.scp.nl/english>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Soifer, Maya. 2009. Beyond Convivencia: Critical Reflections on the Historiography of Interfaith Relations in Christian Spain. *Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies* 1 (1): 19–35.
- Soja, Edward W. 1996. *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Spadaro, Barbara. 2013. *Una colonia italiana. Incontri, memorie e rappresentazioni tra Italia e Libia*. Florence and Milan: Le Monnier/Mondadori.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1999. *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 1988. Can the Subaltern Speak? In *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 271–316. Basingtoke: Macmillan Educational.
- Stallaert, Christiane. 1998. *Etnogénesis y etnicidad*. Barcelona: Proyecto A Ediciones.
- Stam, Robert and Ella Shohat. 2011. The Culture Wars in Translation. In *Europe in Black and White: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Immigration, Race and Identity in the 'Old Continent'*, eds. Manuela Ribeiro Sanches, Fernando Clara, João Ferreira Duarte and Leonor Pires Martins, 17–35. Chicago, IL: Intellect.
- Ștefanescu, Bogdan. 2013. *Postcommunism/Postcolonialism: Siblings of Subalternity*. București: Editura Universității din București.
- . 2015. Filling in the Historical Blanks: A Topology of the Void in Postcommunist and Postcolonial Reconstructions of Identity. In *Postcolonial Europe?: essays on post-communist literatures and cultures*, eds. Dobrota Pucherová, Róbert Gáfrik, Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
- Stuart, Jan. 1998. Arresting Behavior [Review of the film *East Palace, West Palace*]. *The Advocate*, 7 July, 55–6.
- Suárez-Krabbe, Julia. 2014. Pluriversalizing Europe: Challenging Belonging, Revisiting History, Disrupting Homogeneity. *Postcolonial Studies* 17 (2): 155–72.
- . 2016. *Race, Rights and Rebels: Alternatives to Human Rights and Development from the Global South*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
- Suleri, Sara. 1992. *The Rhetoric of English India*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Swyngedouw, Eva and Erik Swyngedouw. 2009. The Congolese Diaspora in Brussels and Hybrid Identity Formation: Multi-Scalar Identity and Cosmopolitan Citizenship. *Urban Research and Practice* 2 (1): 68–90.
- Szpiech, Ryan. 2013. The Convivencia Wars: Decoding Historiography's Polemic with Philology. In *In a Sea of Languages: Rethinking the Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History*, eds. Susan Akbari and Karla Mallette, 135–61. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Tavares, Miguel Sousa. 2003. *Equador*. Lisbon: Clube do Autor.
- Tesfahuney, Mekonnen and Richard Ek. 2015. Planning as War by Other Means. In *Planning against the Political: Democratic Deficits in European Territorial*

- Governance*, eds. Jonathan Metzger, Philip Allmendinger and Stijn Oosterlynck, 171–77. New York: Routledge.
- Teti, Vito. 2011. *La razza maledetta (revised edition)*. Rome: Ilmanifesto libri.
- Thompson, Ewa. 2000. *Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- . 2014. Polsce brakuje przywódców. *Idziemy* 31 (463), 3 August. <http://www.idziemy.pl/polityka/polsce-brakuje-przywodcow/2/>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Thorne, John. 2013. No Terrorist Safe Haven in North Africa? That Is a Tall Order. *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 January. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2013/0122/No-terrorist-safe-haven-in-North-Africa-That-s-a-tall-order>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Todorov, Tzvetan. 2010. *La conquista de América. El problema del otro*. Madrid: Siglo XXI Ediciones.
- Todorova, Maria Nikolaeva. 1997. *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tóth, Judit. 2013. Roma Migration from a Legal Perspective. In *Roma Migration to and from Canada: The Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak Case*, ed. Vidra Zsuzsanna, 23–52. Budapest: Center for Policy Studies, Central European University.
- Turcotte, Gerry. 2009. First Nation Phantoms & Aboriginal Spectres: The Function of Ghosts in Settler-Invasion Cultures. In *Postcolonial Ghosts*, eds. Mélanie Joseph-Vilain and Judith Misrahi-Barak, 87–111. Montpellier: Presses Universitaires de la Méditerranée.
- Uitermark, Justus. 2003. ‘Social Mixing’ and the Management of Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods: The Dutch Policy of Urban Restructuring Revisited. *Urban Studies* 40 (3): 531–49.
- Ullman, Joan C. 1968. *The Tragic Week. A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875–1912*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Utrecht University. 2016. Dare to Be Grey is Nominated for the Award Exceptional Achievements. Utrecht University. <http://www.uu.nl/en/education/dare-to-be-grey>. [Accessed 10 December 2016].
- Valverde, Paulo. 1998. Carlos Magno e as artes da morte: estudo sobre o *tchiloli* da ilha de São Tomé. *Etnográfica* 2(2): 221–50.
- . 2000. *Máscara, mato e morte: textos para uma etnografia de São Tomé*. Oeiras: Celta.
- Vambe, Maurice. 2012. French Genocide in Algeria: The Role of Memory in Artistic Representation of Colonial Violence in the Novel, *The Seine was Red* (1999). *African Identities* 10 (3): 221–41.
- Van Gent, Wouter and Rivke Jaffe. 2016. Normalizing Urban Inequality: Cinematic Imaginaries of Difference in Postcolonial Amsterdam. *Social & Cultural Geography* 18: 1–20. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2016.1197303>. [Accessed 23 December 2016].
- Van Vossle, Jonas. 2016. Framing PIGS: Patterns of Racism and Neocolonialism in the Euro Crisis. *Patterns of Prejudice* 50 (1): 1–20.
- Vasta, Ellie. 2007. From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: Multiculturalism and the Shift to Assimilationism in the Netherlands. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (5): 713–40.

- Vecchi, Roberto. 2010. *Excepção Atlântica. Pensar a Literatura da Guerra Colonial*. Oporto: Afrontamento.
- Vehlewald, Hans-Jörg. 2016. Haben die Polen einen Vogel? Interview with Witold Waszczykowski. *Bild*, 3 January. <http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/polen/hat-die-regierung-einen-vogel-44003034.bild.html>.
- Veiga, Ubaldo Martínez. 2001. *El Ejido. Discriminación, exclusión social y racism*. Madrid: Catarata.
- Venuti, Lawrence. 1998. *The Scandals of Translation – towards an ethics of difference*. London: Routledge.
- Verdicchio, Pasquale. 1997. The Preclusion of Postcolonial Discourse in Southern Italy. In *Revisioning Italy: National Identity and Global Culture*, eds. Beverley Allen and Mary Russo, 191–212. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Vi racconto la rivolta degli immigrati a Rosarno*. 2010. *Quotidiano Net*, 8 January. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JB6rYZiBnTg>. [Accessed 20 March 2017].
- Viana, João (Director). 2013. *A Batalha de Tabatô*. Guinea-Bissau/Portugal: Papaveronoir.
- Villa, Renzo. 1985. *Il deviante e i suoi segni. Lombroso e la nascita dell'antropologia criminale*. Rome: Franco Angeli.
- Virág, Tunde and Zsuzsanna Vidra. 2013. Some Hypotheses and Questions on the New Wave of Hungarian Roma Migration to and from Canada. In *Roma Migration to and from Canada: The Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak Case*, eds. Alena Chudzikova, Antonela Arhin, Elena Gallova Kriglerova, Jan Grill, Judit Durst, Judit Toth, Tünde Virág, Zsuzsanna Vidra, 129–62. Budapest: Center for Policy Studies, Central European University.
- Visconti, Luchino (Director). 1960. *Rocco e i suoi fratelli*. Producer: Goffredo Lombardo.
- Vlassenrood, Linda. 2005. 'Aesthetics'. Exhibition 'Polders: The Scene of Land and Water'. http://static.nai.nl/polders/e/esthetiek_e.html. [Accessed 22 November 2016].
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (4): 387–415.
- . 1979. Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World-Economy. In *The Capitalist World-Economy*, essays by Immanuel Wallerstein, 66–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wekker, Gloria. 2006. *Politics of Passion: Women's Sexual Culture in the Afro-Surinamese Diaspora*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 2016. *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Wells, Audrey (Director). 2003. *Under the Tuscan Sun*. Producers: Tom Sternberg and Audrey Wells.
- Wermink, Hilde, Sigrid van Wingerden, Johan van Wilsem and Paul Nieuwbeerta. 2015. *Etnisch Gerelateerde Verschillen in De Straftoemeting – Raad Voor De Rechtspraak*. The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers.
- Williams, Glyndwr. 2003. *Voyages of Delusion the Quest for the Northwest Passage*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Wong, Aliza. 2006. *Race and the Nation in Liberal Italy, 1861–1911. Meridionalism, Empire and Diaspora*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

- Yervasi, Carina. 2008. Anti-Colonial Resistance. In *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures. Continental Europe and Its Empires*, eds. Prem Poddar, Rajeev S. Patke and Lars Jensen, 14-19. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Zannoni, M. and B. Naaijken. 2007. *Aanpak Polarisatie en Radicalisering: Op Weg naar een Succesvolle Start*. Utrecht: Centrum voor Criminaliteitspreventie en Veiligheid.
- Zarycki, Tomasz. 2014. *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Zetter, Roger. 2007. More Label, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20 (2): 172-92.
- Zhang, Yimou (Director). 1991. *Raise the Red Lantern (Da hong denglong gaogao gua)*. Hong Kong: ERA International Ltd.
- Zhang, Yuan (Director). 1996. *East Palace, West Palace (Donggong xigong)*. Hong Kong: Joy Sales.
- Zimmermann, Susan E. 2011. Reconsidering the Problem of 'Bogus' Refugees with 'Socio-Economic Motivations' for Seeking Asylum. *Mobilities* 6 (3): 335-52.
- Zimra, Clarisse. 1999. Daughters of Mayotte, Sons of Frantz. The Unrequited Self in Caribbean Literature. In *An Introduction to Caribbean Francophone Writing: Guadeloupe and Martinique*, ed. Sam Haigh, 177-94. New York: Berg.
- Zitara, Nicola. 2011. *L'invenzione del Mezzogiorno. Una storia finanziaria*. Milan: Jacabook.

Websites

- antefatto.it: www.youtube.com/watch?v=RpQ3tV7Ki4w.
- <http://blog.futbologia.org/2012/06/balotelli-lebron-e-gli-stereotipi-razzisti-della-gazzetta/>
- http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/multimedia/sport/2012/06/14/APNUeyiC-banane_contro_balotelli.shtml#1.
- http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stamp/interview/interventi/210s0_500_ministro/0984_2010_01_12_informativa_senato_Rosarno.html.
- <http://www.wsieci.pl/wsieci-polska-wstaje-z-kolan-pnews-2455.html>.
- www.youtube.com/watch?v=JB6rYZiBnTg.
- www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGWKP8DjHaQ.

Index

- Abdelkrim, 49
- Afghanistan, 135, 137, 213
- Africa, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 17, 23, 24, 33, 34, 35, 37, 43, 47, 48, 51, 58, 64, 129–45, 164, 215, 216
- African, 16, 18, 21, 23, 26, 35, 38, 43, 57, 83, 108, 109, 129–45, 174
- African colony/-ies, 13, 131, 216
- African diaspora, 83
- African literature, 103, 104, 107, 108
- Africanness, 58
- Afro-American, 118, 167, 122–23
- Agamben, Giorgio, 108, 111
- Agency, 23, 24, 96, 118, 148, 152, 158, 162, 178, 179, 187, 194, 199, 203, 209, 210
- Akin, Fatih, *Kurz und Schmerzlos* (film), 166–67
- Al-Andalus, 9, 44
- Alasia, Franco, 37
- Algeria, 11, 47, 129–31, 134–37, 141, 142, 144, 215
- Allochtoon*, 80
- Almeida, Miguel Vale de, 104, 107, 108
- Almería, 53
- al Qaeda, 132, 136, 163
- Altman, Dennis, 195–96, 211
- Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 136
- Al-Zawahiri, Mohammed, 136
- American, 21, 25, 48, 62, 64, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 129, 132, 135, 137, 142, 156, 168, 169, 170, 173
- Amini, Saman, 80
- Anderson, Benedict, 31, 85
- Anglophone, 6, 10, 11, 30, 103, 108, 115, 116, 117, 118, 121, 123, 126, 165, 175
- Angola, 93, 104
- anti-black, 75, 76; anti-blackness, 10, 76, 83, 90
- anti-migration, 2, 8
- anti-racism/-t, 75, 88
- anti-Roma, 9, 64, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72
- anti-Semitic, 9, 46, 53, 59
- Antwerp, 164, 166
- Appadurai, Arjun, 190
- Appama, Priscilla, 173
- Arab/s, 21, 22, 23, 26, 48, 53, 55, 108, 140, 165, 171
- Arab Spring, 130, 139
- Arab world, 131
- Arbi, Adil El, 12, 166, 168, 170, 174
- Arctic, 12, 147–59
- Arens, Sarah, 12, 163–75
- Armani, Giorgio, 23, 25
- Arrhash (Poison)*, documentary, 49
- Aryan/-ist, 21, 35

- Ashcroft, Bill, 167
 Asia, 133, 153, 195, 196
 Asian, 26, 55, 157, 195, 196
 assimilate, 17, 25, 26, 46, 47, 115, 136;
 assimilation, 46, 47, 57, 61, 64, 66,
 81, 107
 asylum, 7, 9, 65, 67–71, 76, 166, 217
 Atlantic, 62, 69, 83, 135, 169
 austerity, 4, 29, 160, 213, 214
 Australia, 7, 16, 91
Autochtoon, 80
 Aznar, José Maria, 59
- Bachoud, Andrée, 48–49
 Bailey, Moya, 90
 Baldwin, James, 83
 Balibar, Etienne, 104
 balkanization, 178–79, 181
 Balotelli, Mario, 15, 17, 24–26
 Bamako, 136, 137, 143
 Banfield, Edward, 36
banlieu, 169
 Barrow, John, 153
 Basque, 46, 49, 57, 59
 Batepá Massacre, 92, 93, 94, 101
 Battle of Annual, 49
 Beck, Ulrich, 215, 217
 Belgian, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169,
 170, 172, 173, 174, 175
 Belgian colonialism/colonial project, 12,
 164, 165, 166
 Belgian Congo, 164
 Belgian Constitution, 164
 Belgium, 163–75
 Belmokhtar, Mokhtar, 136
 Benjamin, Walter, 122
 Berlin Conference, 164. *See also*
 Scramble for Africa
 Berlin Wall, 180
 Berlusconi, Silvio, 15–28
 Beyala, Calixthe, 104, 115
 Bhabha, Homi, 124
 Bhattacharya, Baidik, 40
Black (film), 166, 167–75
- black man, 116, 118, 119, 120, 173
 blackness, 2, 8, 10, 15, 16, 20, 25, 26,
 27, 36, 77, 78, 88, 90, 117, 119, 120
 Blanchard, Pascal, 103, 105, 109
 Błaszczak, Mariusz, 191
 Boabdil, 46
 Boehmer, Elleke, 166
 Bonavita, Riccardo, 21
 border, 4, 5, 7, 12, 18, 25, 26, 27, 31,
 36, 47, 55, 57, 62, 68, 79, 129, 133,
 135, 170, 174, 175, 183, 185, 217
 Borderlands, 182
 Bourbon (monarchy), 32, 33, 40
 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 139
 Boym, Svetlana, 178
 Bracke, Dirk, 168
 Bragard, Véronique, 168
 Bravo, Luciano Ferrari, 37
 Brazil, 64, 104, 105
 Brexit, 164, 213, 216
 Britain, 1, 67, 68, 213, 214, 215. *See*
 also United Kingdom
 Brown, Alice, 11, 129–45
 Brown, Wendy, 90
 Brugioni, Elena, 10, 103–13
 Brussels, 163–75
 Buchowski, Michał, 181
 Burgers, Jack, 84
 burqa ban, 164
 Burundi, 164, 165, 169
- Cairn Energy, 157
Caligula, 23
 Cameron, Emilie, 97
 Cameroon, 91
 Canada, 9, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71,
 91, 154
 Canadian Charter of Rights, 69
 Cape Verde, 93, 104
 capitalism, 3, 6, 31, 109, 144, 152, 167,
 180, 197
 Capusotti, Enrica, 37, 38
 CAR (Central African Republic), 143
 Caribbean, 48, 116, 118, 215

- Casas, Bartolomé de las, 48
 Cassano, Franco, 38
 Castile, 45; Castilian, 46, 51
 Castro, Américo, 44
 Catalonia, 9, 11, 43–59. *See also* Spain
 Catholic, 6, 16, 45, 46, 57
 Cavanagh, Clare, 182
 Cavour, Count of, 32, 33
 CEE (Central and East European)
 countries, 61, 62, 65, 67, 69, 70,
 71, 72
 Chadian forces, 136
 Chakrabarty, 3, 5, 30, 63, 65, 196
 Chambers, Iain, 38–39
 Chari, Sharad, 180
 Chatterjee, Partha, 39
 Cherry, Peter, 167–68
 child soldier, 170
 China, 8, 13, 153, 154, 193–212;
 Chinese, 8, 13, 91, 131, 132, 141,
 193–212
 Chirac, Jacques, 125
 Chow, Rey, 202, 211
 Christian, 7, 44–46, 47, 48, 57, 59, 81,
 89, 132, 136, 140, 144, 206
 citizen, 19–20, 24, 28, 43, 58, 67,
 69, 71, 72, 76, 81, 86, 101, 116,
 118, 120, 125, 137, 186, 203, 215,
 216, 217
 citizenship, 17, 25, 26, 27, 28, 33, 46,
 63, 65, 70, 81, 101, 166, 215, 217
 civilizing mission, 21, 40, 49, 139, 141
 civil rights, 117, 118, 172, 178
 climate change, 4, 148, 149–50, 153.
 See also global warming
 cloning culture, 84–85
 Cole, Teju, *Open City* (novel), 174
 colonial archive, 8, 9, 13, 29, 31, 33, 38
 colonial history, 4, 8, 90, 97, 133,
 214, 215
 colonialism, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16,
 23, 24, 31, 43, 44, 47, 48, 61, 63, 64,
 65, 91, 92, 94, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104,
 105, 107, 124, 125, 132, 133, 134,
 142, 143, 144, 153, 155, 164, 165,
 166, 180, 215, 216, 217
 coloniality, 3, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 43, 61,
 63, 64, 72, 75, 88, 132, 134, 141
 coloniality of power, 2, 7, 9, 31, 48, 52,
 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 72, 133
 colonial laws, 21
 colonial subjects, 9, 10, 43, 53, 58, 138
 colonies, 1, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 21, 28, 36,
 38, 48, 51, 64, 65, 91, 93, 129, 132,
 133, 134, 135, 138, 142, 164, 169,
 174, 177, 182, 215, 216
 colour line, 16, 20, 35, 75, 78, 80, 90
 Communism, 9, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 177,
 178, 180, 183
 Communist era, 12, 66
 Communist Party, 180
 Conelli, Carmine, 9, 29–41
 Congo, the, 165, 170, 171, 173, 215
 Congo Free State, 164
 Congolese, 164, 165, 166, 170, 172
 Connell, Raewyn, 39
 conquest of the Americas, 64
 contract worker, 10, 93–94, 95, 96, 98,
 99, 100, 101, 102
convivencia, Spain, 44
 COP15, 147
 Council of Social Development, 79, 80
 Couto, Mia, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110
 Creole, 116, 122, 127
 Creole elite, 93, 94, 101
 critical race studies, 5
croissant pauvre, 169
 Crusades, the, 57, 132
 Cruz-Malavé, Arnaldo, 211
 Cui, Shuqin, 199
 Cultural Revolution (China), 197
 Czech Communist regime, 66
 Czech Republic, 67, 69, 70
 Dainotto, Roberto, 29
 Daking, Romano, 170
 Danish Architecture Centre, 149
 Danish architecture companies, 155

- Danish-Greenlandic, 147, 159
 Danish modernization (Greenland), 151, 161
 Dare to be Grey, 9, 75–90
 Darwin, Charles, 64, 73
 decolonial studies, 5, 6, 16
 decolonization, 10, 12, 116, 118, 121, 123, 126, 133, 135, 137, 177, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189
 Demart, Sarah, 168, 169, 171
 democracy, 7, 33, 71, 136, 137, 143, 184, 186, 188, 189, 190, 217
 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 164
 Denmark, 1, 11, 50, 147–62
dernière larme du lac Kivu, La (novel), 12, 166, 167, 172, 175
 Derrida, Jacques, 91, 95, 96, 98
 Designated Country of Origin, 70
 diaspora, 76, 83, 131, 166
 Dieste, Mateo, 48, 49, 52
 Dolce & Gabbana, 23, 25
 D'Ottavio, Angela, 25, 28
 Du Bois, W. E. B., 21
 Duda, Andrzej, 191
 Duggan, Lisa, 85
 Dutch coloniality, 9, 75, 88
 Dutchness, 81
 Dutch society, 76, 77, 81, 82, 84, 87

 East, the, 32, 181, 195, 212
East Palace, West Palace, 12, 193, 196, 200, 211, 212
 Egypt, 62, 139
 Ek, Richard, 89
 Ekiz, Fidan, 88–89
 Elliott-Cooper, Adam, 214
 Eng, David, 193, 196, 200, 201, 212
 Enlightenment, 7, 33, 65
 enslaved, 28, 65, 66
 Eritrea, 35
 Esposito, Roberto, 16
 Essed, Philomena, 85–86
 ethnic group, 64, 66, 67, 68, 72, 175;
 ethnic identity, 62, 69, 71; ethnic
 minority, 4, 61, 62, 64, 73

 Ethnocentrism, 126
 Eurocentric, 8, 39, 91, 133, 154;
 Eurocentrism, 32, 63
 Europe, 1–13, 29, 32, 38, 40, 48, 49, 53, 57, 58, 59, 61–73, 78, 85, 90, 116, 131, 132, 134, 143, 156, 163, 164, 167, 170, 177–91, 195, 211–12, 213–17
 European colonialism, 4, 5, 6, 15, 100
 European empires, 4, 11, 61, 182, 215
 European South, 7
 European Union, 3, 4, 18, 29, 52, 69, 168, 178, 213
 Eurozone, 27, 29
 exceptionalism, 3, 10, 82, 142, 143

 Facebook, 75
 Falah, Bilal, 12, 166, 168, 170, 174
 Fanon, Frantz, 2, 10, 21, 24, 34, 78, 115–27
 Fanonism, 123–24
 Farini, Luigi Carlo, 33
 Faroe Islands, 148
 Fascism, 8, 16, 20, 35, 36
 Fascist empire, 21
 Ferdinand II, King, 45, 46
 Fez, 140
 Fifth Generation film-making, 201
 Flanders, 165, 168
 Flemish, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171
 Forman, Murray, 168–69
 Forsdick, Charles, 165
 Fortress Europe, 5
 Foucault, Michel, 202, 204, 212
 Fraiture, Pierre-Philippe, 165
 France, 1, 11, 51, 70, 116, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 129–45, 163, 212, 213, 215
 Franchetti, Leopoldo, 35
 Franco, Francisco, 46, 51
 François, Patrick, 12, 166, 170, 172, 173, 174
 Francophone, 6, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 112, 115, 126, 127, 129, 165
 Frankenberg, Ruth, 15
 French Caribbean, 118

- French empire, 135
 French Revolution, 137
 Freyre, Gilberto, 92, 101, 103
 Fukuyama, Francis, 160

 Gambirasio, Yara, 15, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27
 Gao, 132, 137, 142
 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 33, 34
 Garner, Eric, 174
 Gates Jr., Henry Louis, 123–24
 gender studies, 5, 76, 89
 genocide, 46, 61, 64, 70, 72, 169, 217
 Gent, Wouter van, 171, 174
 geography of reason, 8
 German, 6, 66, 103, 150, 165, 167, 184, 186; Germany, 1, 16, 25, 36, 70, 185, 188, 191, 213, 215
 German Empire, 165
 ghetto, 37, 67, 167
 Gibson, Mary, 34–35
 Gilroy, Paul, 110
 Girona, 43, 54, 55
 Giuliani, Gaia, 8, 15–28, 35
 Glacial Hub, the, 159
 glacial science, 159
 Gladstone, William, 40
 Global Financial Crisis, 3, 4
 Globalization, 7, 134, 165, 166, 167, 169, 198
 Global North, 7, 57
 Global South, 5, 7
 global warming, 155. *See also* climate change
 Goddeeris, Idesbald, 165
 Goldberg, David Theo, 84–85
 Goldmann, Lucien, 123
 Gordon, Avery, 92, 96, 97, 98, 99
 Graaf, Beatrice de, 80, 89
 Gramsci, Antonio, 31, 35, 39, 40
 Granada, 46
 Greenland, 7, 11, 12, 147–62
 Greenlandic/Inuit culture, 154, 158
 Grégoire, Nicole, 166
 Groes, Christian, 1–13
 Grosfoguel, Ramon, 9, 46, 59

Gross National Happiness, 160
 Guerrero, Ed, 167
 Guha, Ranajit, 39
 Guillaumin, Colette, 15
 Guinea-Bissau, 91, 104
 ‘Gypsy’, 9, 62, 66, 71, 72, 73. *See also* Roma/Romani

 Habermas, Jürgen, 214, 215, 217
 Haiti, 166, 172
 Halberstam Judith/Jack, 76
 Hamitic, 20, 26
 Hampaté Bâ, 130
 Hansen, Peo, 213, 216
 Hassan II, King, 144
 Heezik, Frans van, 80
 Henriques, Joana Gorjão, 13
 Hispanic, 6
 histories from below, 39
 historiography, 3, 6, 32, 39, 47, 215
 Hollande, François, 130, 138
 Holocaust, 66
 home rule, 148, 159
 homosexuality, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 211
 Horn of Africa, 27
 Hoving, Isabel, 81, 82–83
 Huggan, Graham, 109
 human rights, 7, 67, 68, 69, 71, 130, 132, 136, 143, 194, 217
 Hungary, 2, 69, 70

 Iberian Peninsula, 44, 45, 46, 47, 108
 illegal migrants, 24
 Ilulissat, 150, 159, 162
 imagined community, 20, 25, 28, 31, 161, 166
 imperial states, 1, 214, 215, 216
 In-Amenas (Algeria), 129, 131, 134, 135, 136, 141, 142
 India, 39, 40, 62, 73, 154
 Indigenous modernity, 158, 160, 162
 Indigenous peoples, 47–48, 64, 91, 97
 Inuit Circumpolar Council of Greenland, 157
 Iraq, 134, 135, 137, 163, 213

- Irele, Abiola, 143
 Iron Curtain, 178, 179
 Isabella I, 45, 46
 Islam, 44, 55, 56, 58, 76, 80, 140, 175
 Islamic, 21, 45, 47, 53, 54, 132, 137, 163, 164, 175
 Islamic fundamentalism, 54
 Islamist, 129, 132, 136, 137, 138, 184, 186, 191
 Islamophobia, 10, 46, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 75
 Italophone, 6
 Italy, 1, 6, 8, 9, 15–28, 29–41, 57, 70, 215

 Jaco, Aldo Di, 40
 Jaffe, Rivke, 171, 174
 Jager, Marjolijn de, 115
 Jaki, Patryk, 191
 Janas, Zbigniew, 190
 Janmohamad, Abdul R., 124
 Jensen, Lars, 1–13, 147–61
 Jews, 9, 44, 45, 46, 47, 66; Jewish, 43, 46, 47, 57, 163
 Jones, Guno, 81
 Jonsson, Stefan, 4, 216
 Judaism, 44
 Juventus, 25

 Kaczyński, Jarosław, 184, 186, 188
 Kalonji, Billy, 165–66, 169, 171
 Kangerlussuaq, 155
 Kassovitz, Mathieu, *La Haine* (film), 166
 Katuaq (the Greenlandic Culture House), 149
 Keeling, Kara, 167
 Khalfa, Jean, 119
 Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 31, 33, 40
 Kinshasa, 7, 168
 Kiossev, Alexander, 177, 178
 Koczanowicz, 185
 Kołodziejczyk, Dorota, 12, 177–91
 Krishnan, Madhu, 174
 Kuoshu, Harry, 197–98, 211

 Kvanefjeld, 156
 Kwan, Stanley, 193, 194, 212

 Lacanian, 187
 Laclau, Ernesto, 186
 Lakoff, George, 189, 190
 Lampedusa, Giuseppe Tomasi di, 40
 Lan Yu, 193–94, 200, 201, 212
 Latin America, 11, 16, 17, 49. *See also* South America
 Law and Justice Party (Poland), 184, 186, 188, 190, 191
 League of Nations, 165
 Lega Nord (the Northern League), 2, 19, 20, 30
 Leopold II, King, 164, 165
 Levi, Carlo, 36
 Liberal Age, Italy, 20
 Libya, 47, 129, 135, 139, 142, 213
 Libyan war, 21, 142
 Lim, Song Hwee, 197, 199, 201, 206, 210, 212
 Lima, Conceição, 10, 91–102
 Lombroso, Cesare, 20, 21, 26, 34, 35, 64, 73
 Lomé (Convention), 216
 Lorde, Audre, 83–84
 Lukacs, Georg, 123
 Lundsteen, Martin, 9, 43–59
 Lusocentric, 105, 108
 Lusophone, 6, 10, 11, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111
 Luso-tropicalism, 92, 101
 Luxembourg, 215
 Lynge, Augo, 161–62
 Lyon, 116

 Macey, David, 117, 119, 127
 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 139
 Maghreb, 21, 130, 132, 133, 138, 140, 171
 Mahroug, Karima el (‘Ruby’), 17, 22, 23, 24
 Maldivian governmental meeting, 150
 Mali, 11, 129–45

- Manalansan, 211
 Manço, Ural, 165–66, 169, 171
 Manichean, 30, 77, 78, 80, 81, 124
Manifeste, 104, 106, 107, 112
 Margarido, Maria Manuela, 102
 Markmann, Charles Lam, 116–26
 Marks, Sabrina, 9, 61–73
 Maroni, Roberto, 19, 20
 Martina, Egbert Alejandro, 9, 75–90
 Martinique, 116, 120, 121, 122, 127
 masculinity, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 167, 173, 174
 Mata, Inocência, 94, 98
 Matonge, 168, 169, 170, 174, 175
 Mauritania, 144
 Mazzocchetti, Jacinthe, 166
 Mbembe, Achille, 95, 96, 178
 Mediterranean, 2, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 35, 108, 153, 154
 Mellino, Miguel, 31, 38, 41
Meridiana, 30
 Mestizo, 107, 108
 Mezzogiorno, Italy, 9, 29–41
 Middle East, 58, 217
 Mignolo, Walter, 133, 134, 140, 142, 144
 migrants, 4, 5, 7, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 37, 38, 50–58, 66, 68, 71, 81, 83, 163, 164, 165, 168, 170, 175, 186, 213–17
 migration, 3, 5, 12, 37, 38, 44, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 61, 62, 68, 71, 72, 73, 82, 89, 159, 163, 164, 166, 175
 minority discourse, 4
 misogynoir, 88, 90
 Mobutu, 163, 173
 modernization, Greenland, 147, 151, 152, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162
 Moe, Nelson, 30, 32, 33, 40
 Mohammed VI, King, 140
 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, 24
 Molenbeek, 12, 163–75
 Molfese, Franco, 40
 monoculturalism, 81
 monoethnicism, 81
 Montaldi, Danilo, 37
 Monti, Mario, 30
 Moor, 9, 59
 moral panic, 54, 58
 Morawiecki, Mateusz, 188
moro, *el*, 9, 43–59
 Moroccan, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 43, 48, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 164, 166, 168, 171
 Morocco, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 130, 135, 137, 138, 140, 144, 145, 163
 Moscow, 181
 Mouffe, Chantal, 187, 188, 189
 Mozambique, 93, 104, 105
 Mul, Sarah de, 166
 multicultural, 4, 15, 16, 23, 26, 215, 217
 multiculturalism, 4, 83, 89, 184, 189, 191, 213, 214
 Murphy, David, 112, 165
 Muslim, 7, 9, 21, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 81, 83, 132, 136, 164
 Mussolini, Benito, 36
 Myanmar, 91
 Nancy, Jean-Luc, 108–9, 110, 111
 Nani, Michele, 32, 35
 Naples, Neapolitan, 33, 39, 40
 Narsaq, 157
 nation building, 30, 133, 184
 nation narration, 3
 nation-state, 4, 63, 65, 72, 129, 142, 214, 215
 Nazi, 16, 66, 188
 Neal, Mark Anthony, 173
 neo-colonial, 52, 104, 108, 110, 140, 142, 217
 neo-Fascism, 8
 neoliberal, 4, 6, 29, 30, 58, 70, 86, 89, 151, 152, 154, 160, 161, 181, 193, 213
 Netherlands, the, 1, 2, 9, 13, 75–90, 164, 166, 215
 Niceforo, Alfredo, 20, 35

- Niger, 131
 Niranjana, Tejaswini, 124–25
 nomadism, 64, 66
 non-citizen, 27, 81
 non-Western, 61, 65, 72, 133
 Nordic countries, 5
 North Africa, 26, 47, 48, 57, 58, 129, 131, 133, 135, 140, 141, 142, 143, 163
 North America, 9, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 71, 72, 122, 131
 North West Africa, 129, 131
 North West Passage, 153
 Norway, 1
 nostalgia, imperial, 10, 103, 104, 108, 110
 Nuuk, 149, 155, 161

 Orientalism, 30, 32, 49, 181
 O’Riley, Michael, 94, 97
 Ottoman, 47

 Panetta, Leon, 142, 143
 Paris, 6, 131, 138, 143, 163, 169, 175, 191
 Parry, Benita, 124
 Partido Popular, Spain, 53, 59
 Party for Freedom (PVV), 78
 peasants, 33–37, 39
 Pecic, Zoran Lee, 1–13, 193–212
 Peeren, Esther, 91, 95
 Pende, Nicola, 16, 28
 Persia, 73
 Petrovici, Norbert, 180–81
 Petrusiewicz, Marta, 32
 Philcox, Richard, 115–27
 Pidal, Ramón Menéndez, 44
 Piedmont, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40
 PIGS countries, 6, 9, 29, 57
 Pippi Longstocking, 2
 Piqueras, José, 46, 48
 Poland, 2, 12, 177–91
 Polder (Dutch), 79, 82, 83
 Polisario Front, 135, 144
 Pope Francis, 217

 Portugal, 1, 6, 8, 29, 40, 57, 64, 92, 100, 103, 104, 105, 110, 215
 Portuguese colonialism, 92
 Portuguese colonial rule, 10
 Portuguese Colonial War, 91, 100
 ‘Possible Greenland’, 11, 12, 147–62
 postcolonial backlash, 12, 177, 189
 Postcolonial Europe, 1–5, 7, 12, 13, 15, 211, 213–17
 postcolonial studies, 5, 10, 11, 40, 101, 109, 115, 116, 117, 123, 126, 165, 175, 177, 178
 postcolonial theory, 165, 182
 post-Communist, 67, 70
 post-socialism, 13, 65, 179, 180, 181
 Premià de Mar, 53
 Protestant northern Europe, 6
 Pugliese, Joseph, 27
pureza de sangre, 45
 Putters, Kim, 88
 Puwar, Nirmal, 25

 Queerness, 12, 13, 193, 194, 196, 200, 211, 212
 queer Thirdspace, 193, 200
 Quijano, Anibal, 2, 31, 48, 62, 63, 143
 Qullissat, 159, 161

 race, 6, 17, 18, 26, 28, 31, 34, 35, 48, 49, 53, 64, 65, 73, 76, 78, 80, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 169, 171–74
 racial, 3, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 34, 38, 45, 48, 53, 57, 66, 70, 75–91, 118, 121, 169, 172, 174
 racialization, 8, 9, 26, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 64, 65, 84, 166, 168, 171
 racialized, 1, 2, 4, 5, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 33, 38, 53, 71, 77, 81, 84, 166, 169
 racism, 1–2, 4, 10, 13, 15, 17, 31, 38, 56, 64, 76, 78, 83, 86, 88, 89, 90, 125, 167, 171
 Raharimanana, Jean-Luc, 106–7
Raise the Red Lantern, 201–4, 210, 212
reconquista, la, Spain, 45, 47, 57

- refugees, 4, 7, 9, 68–70, 71, 94, 98,
 213, 214, 216, 217
Regulares, 49
 Renzi, Matteo, 30
 resource boom, 151, 155, 159, 160
 Ribeiro, António Pinto, 110
 Ribeiro, Margarida Calafate, 94
 Rif people (Morocco), 47
 right-wing parties, 53, 78
Rigsfællesskabet (Danish
 Commonwealth), 11, 147, 148, 152
 Risorgimento, 31–32
 Rivera, Annamaria, 27
 Robert, Mireille-Tsheusi, 165, 171
 Robinson, Cedric, 124
 Rodrigues, Inês Nascimento, 10,
 91–102
 Rofel, Lisa, 195–96
 Roman, 61–73
 Roman Empire, 16
 Romania, 65; Romanian, 20, 22, 27
 Roma/Romani, 7, 9, 27
 Rosarno, Calabria, 17–20, 22, 24
 Rosing, Minik, 152–54
 Russia, 149, 181, 182, 185
 Rwanda, 17, 143, 164–65, 169,
 170, 174

 Sahel, 11, 12, 129–35
 Sahrawi, 144
 Said, Edward, 5, 11, 30, 32, 49, 106,
 109, 122–23, 124, 133
 Salazar, António de Oliveira, 100
 Salt, Girona, 43–59
 Sami, 64
 Şandru, Cristina, 179, 180
 Sand Wars, 144
 Santo, Alda Espírito, 96, 101
 Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, 92, 97,
 98, 105
 São Tomé and Príncipe, 10,
 91–102, 104
 Sarkozy, Nicholas, 142
 Sartrean existentialism, 116
 Scales, Sarah, 10–11, 115–27

 Scandinavian, 6, 158
 Schengen, 175
 Schor, Patricia, 9, 75–90
 Scotland, 1
 Scramble for Africa, 132
 scramble for the Arctic, 149,
 151–52, 153
 Securitization, 12
 Seibert, Gerhard, 93
 self-government, 148, 151, 159
 Semitic, 20, 26
 Sepúlveda, Juan Ginés de, 48
 Serafini, Alessandro, 37
 Sergi, Giuseppe, 16, 28
 Sexton, Jared, 90
 Sexuality, 8, 17, 22, 24, 85, 189, 193,
 196, 200, 202, 211, 212
 Simon, Pascal, 125
 Sixth Generation film-makers, 197,
 198, 203
 Skórczewski, Dariusz, 183
 slavery, 65, 66, 71, 91, 125
 Smith, Jonathan, 136
 Smoleńsk, 186
 sociology of absences, 92, 97
 sociology of emergences, 92, 97, 98
 Soja, Edward, 196, 201, 206
 Somaliland, 215
 South America, 51. *See also* Latin
 America
 southern question (Italy), 30–32, 35,
 36, 40
 South Sudan, 137, 143
 sovereignty, 133–34, 138, 144, 148,
 156, 184, 185, 186, 189, 214
 Soviet Union, 13, 135, 182
 Spadaro, Barbara, 21
 Spain, 1, 6, 8, 9, 29, 43–59, 64, 70, 144,
 215. *See also* Catalonia
 Spanish-American War, 48
 Spanish Civil War, 49, 91, 100
 Spanish Crown, 48
 Spanish Empire, 47
 Spanish Inquisition, 45
 Spivak, Gayatri, 99, 106, 111

- Srivastava, Neelam, 40
 Ștefănescu, Bogdan, 178, 180
 Suárez-Krabbe, Julia, 1–13, 65, 72
 subaltern, 12, 32, 39, 40, 86, 99, 177, 180, 181, 211
 sub-Saharan, 12, 17, 18, 55, 104, 130, 132, 133, 137, 140, 164, 169, 174, 175
 Suriname, 215
 sustainability, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159
 Swyngedouw, Erik and Eva, 166, 173
 Syria, war in, 3, 213
 Szydło, Beata, 188

 Tarfaya, Morocco, 144
 Tavares, Miguel Sousa, 103
 Terrassa, 53
 terrorist, 54, 80, 129, 131, 137, 142, 163, 165, 175
 Tesfahuney, Mekonnen, 89
 Thompson, Ewa, 182, 183, 184
 Tiananmen Square, 193, 197
 Tijaniyyah order of Sufism, 140
 Timbuktu, 132, 137, 142
 Tintin, 2
 Todorova, Maria, 178, 181
 Tom, Miye Nadya, 9, 61–73
 Touré, Amadou Toumani, 134
 transnational corporations, 134
 transnationalism, 12, 175
 travelling theory, 11, 122. *See also* Said, Edward
 Trinchera, Francesco, 33
 Tuareg, 132, 141, 143
 Tunisia, 130, 139, 144
 Turin, 25, 37
 Turks, 164
Under the Tuscan Sun, 23
 Tusk, Donald, 184, 188

 United Kingdom, 65, 68, 71, 164.
 See also Britain
 United States, 72, 87, 91, 130, 131, 134, 137, 138, 142, 143, 144, 164, 167, 173

uomo nuovo (new man), 16
 uranium, 130, 131, 149, 156

 Valverde, Paulo, 95
 Vasta, Ellie, 83
 Venuti, Lawrence, 117, 122
 Verdery, Katherine, 180
 Verdicchio, Pasquale, 31, 35
 Verkuyten, 83
 Victor Emmanuel II, King, 33
Village at the End of the World, 151
 Visconti, Luchino, 37

 Wallonia, 165
 Wangrin, 143
 Waszczykowski, Witold, 185
 Waterloo, 12, 172–74
 Wekker, Gloria, 13, 76, 81
 West, the, 7, 8, 61, 62, 63, 132, 138, 164, 177, 179, 182, 183, 184, 194, 195, 211, 212
 Western knowledge, 63
 Western modernity, 13, 72, 159, 194, 199
 western Sahara, 48, 138, 140, 144
 West Papua, 215
 whiteness, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15–27, 76, 78, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90
 whiteness studies, 5, 21
 white order, 2
 white privilege, 87
 Willén, Julia, 4
 Williams, Raymond, 158
 World Cup (football), 25

 Yaoundé (Convention), 216
 Yimou, Zhang, 201, 202, 203, 210, 211
 Yuan, Zhang, 12, 193, 197, 202, 203, 211, 212

 Zarycki, Tomasz, 181, 182
 Zeïd, Abdelhamid Abou, 135–36
 Zimra, Clarisse, 120
 Zitara, Nicola, 40
 Zitout, Mohamed Larbi, 143
 Zoellick, Robert, 144
 Zwarte Piet, 2, 76, 77, 81, 83, 86, 90

About the Authors

Sarah Arens recently defended her PhD at the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom. Her PhD examines representations of Brussels in diasporic literature. She has studied at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, the University of York and Saarland University in Germany and has worked as a research assistant for several higher-education institutions, including Yale University and Edinburgh's Centre for Cultural Relations. Her research interests include literary writing of migration, exile and displacement in French and German; memory studies; Jewish and postcolonial studies; nationalism; terrorism; the environment and (failed) states.

Gurminder K. Bhambra is a professor of Sociology at the University of Warwick and guest professor of Sociology and History at the Centre for Concurrences in Colonial and Postcolonial Studies at Linnaeus University, Sweden. She is author of *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination* (2007), *Connected Sociologies* (2014) and, most recently, co-editor of *European Cosmopolitanisms* (2016).

Alice Brown is currently a doctoral fellow at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and holds degrees from the University of Chicago and the Université Paris VII Diderot. Her research examines the influence of politics and religion in French civilization, with particular interest in postcolonial North Africa.

Elena Brugioni is a professor of African Literatures and Postcolonial Studies at the Department of Literary Theory of the University of Campinas, Unicamp (Brazil). She is the author of the monograph *Mia Couto. Representação, História(s) e Pós-colonialidade* (2012) and co-editor of the collections *Áfricas Contemporâneas | Contemporary Africas* (2010), *Itinerâncias. Percursos e Representações da Pós-colonialidade | Journeys: Postcolonial*

Trajectories and Representations (2012) and *Prémios Literários. O Poder das Narrativas/As Narrativas do Poder* (2016).

Carminé Conelli is a PhD candidate in International Studies at the University of Naples 'L'Orientale', formerly visiting research fellow at the Centre for Postcolonial Studies of Goldsmiths – University of London. His research interests cover postcolonial and cultural studies, subaltern studies, decolonial theory and critical race studies. He has published two essays concerning the thought of Antonio Gramsci and a postcolonial interpretation of the Italian Southern Question, which are also the main theme of his doctoral research. He is the co-editor of the book *Genealogie della modernità. Teoria radicale e critica postcoloniale* (2017).

Gaia Giuliani (PhD in University of Torino, Italy, 2005) is Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) postdoctoral researcher at the Centro de Estudos Sociais, University of Coimbra (Portuguese) (2015–2021) and founding member of Interdisciplinary Research Group on Race and Racisms (University of Padova, Italy). Among her publications are the single-authored *Beyond Curiosity. James Mill e la nascita del governo coloniale britannico in India* (2008), the co-authored *Bianco e nero. Storia dell'identità razziale degli italiani* with Dr Cristina Lombardi-Diop (2013). Currently, she is preparing the monographic book *Race, Gender and Nation in Modern Italy* (forthcoming, 2018).

Christian Groes is an associate professor at Cultural Encounters, Roskilde University, Denmark. He is trained as anthropologist and has conducted research in Brazil, Mozambique, Denmark and Portugal. His primary research interests are migration from Africa to Europe, intimate economies, postcolonial feminism, marginalized groups and studies of the intersections of gender, class and culture. He has recently published a volume called *Affective Circuits: African Migration to Europe and the Pursuit of Social Regeneration* (2016).

Lars Jensen is an associate professor at Cultural Encounters, DCA, Roskilde University, Denmark. He has published widely in postcolonial studies and has worked particularly in the area of Postcolonial Europe for more than a decade. He has co-edited two volumes on the 'Postcolonial Nordic' and has written a monograph on postcolonial and cultural studies theory (*Beyond Britain*, 2014). His monograph on postcolonial Denmark is currently under publication.

Dorota Kołodziejczyk is an assistant professor at Institute of English Studies, Wrocław University, Poland. She is co-founder of the International Research Center for Postcolonial and Posttotalitarian Studies, Wrocław University, and board member of Postdependence Studies Center, Warsaw University.

Her recent research focuses on new cosmopolitanisms, methodologies in literary and cultural comparison, intellectual disability and citizenship/human rights. Recent publications: (with Şandru) *Postcolonial Perspectives on Post-communism in Central and Eastern Europe* (2016). She is the translator and translation editor of postcolonial theory.

Martin Lundsteen is an independent researcher in Social Anthropology and an assistant professor at the Open University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain. In 2015, he obtained his PhD with the thesis titled ‘Social Conflicts and Convivencia. An Ethnography of the Social Effects of “The Crisis” in a Small Catalan Town’. As a postdoctoral researcher he took part in several research projects on Islamophobia in Catalonia and, specifically, in Barcelona. He is a member of the Grup d’Estudis sobre Reciprocitat since 2009, the Observatori d’Antropologia del conflicte Urbà since 2013 and Stop Als Fenòmens Islamòfobs since 2014.

Sabrina Marks is an American Roma scholar who focuses on the examination of the inequalities faced by the Roma. Primarily focusing on the Roma populations in the United States, her studies analyse media images of the Roma and the effects of those images on American Roma populations. Sabrina’s other research interests include examining recent immigration issues and policies that have restricted the immigration of Roma globally.

Egbert Alejandro Martina is a Rotterdam-based agitator for change. He is currently working on a project that analyses the imaginative work that the term ‘livability’ performs in the design of the spatial environment.

Zoran Lee Pecic is a part-time lecturer at the Department of Communication and Arts at Roskilde University, Denmark. He is the author of *Queer Narratives of the Caribbean Diaspora* (2013) and *New Queer Sinophone Cinema* (2016).

Inês Nascimento Rodrigues recently completed her PhD in Postcolonialisms and Global Citizenship at the University of Coimbra, Portugal. Her research interests include memory studies, the representation of war and violence and postcolonial theories. She is currently a postdoctoral researcher in the project ‘CROME – Crossed Memories, Politics of Silence: The Colonial-Liberation Wars in Postcolonial Times’ (funded by the European Research Council), at the Centre for Social Studies of the University of Coimbra.

Sarah Scales has recently completed her PhD in Francophone Postcolonial Translation at the University of Warwick, United Kingdom. Her thesis focused on the work of Frantz Fanon, Patrick Chamoiseau and Mayotte Capécia, and her research interests lie in translation theory, in examining the translation of identity and how translations affect readers’ perception of the Other.

Patricia Schor is an affiliate researcher to the Institute for Cultural Inquiry at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, where she explores postcolonial literature and theory in Portugal in its disencounters with *Africa*. Recently she has been researching the Portuguese and Dutch biopolitical colonial regimes, (anti-black) racism and colonial heritages across the Atlantic. Patricia is an anti-racism and intersectional feminist activist.

Julia Suárez-Krabbe is an associate professor at Cultural Encounters, Roskilde University, Denmark. She is the author of *Race, Rights and Rebels: Alternatives to Human Rights and Development from the Global South* (2016) and has worked in the field of decolonial studies for a number of years.

Miye Nadya Tom is a scholar of Native American (Walker River Paiute) and Russian descent. Her work on post/colonialism and race examines from a comparative and international perspective, transforming institutions of learning and knowledge production to meet the educational needs of youth from under-represented communities, including Native Americans (United States), communities of African origin (Portugal) and Roma (Spain).